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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RANDY BECK,	)	
	)	
Appellant-Defendant,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 48A02-0610-CR-850
	)	
STATE OF INDIANA,	)	
	)	
Appellee-Plaintiff.	)	

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Dennis Carroll, Judge
Cause No. 48D01-0501-FC-297

August 31, 2007

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Randy Beck appeals his conviction for Corrupt Business Influence, a Class C felony; four convictions for Auto Theft, all as Class D felonies; seventeen convictions for Aiding, Inducing, or Causing Perjury, all Class D felonies; and conviction for Receiving Stolen Auto Parts, a Class D felony, following a jury trial. He raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions.

2. Whether his crimes constituted an episode of criminal conduct.

3. Whether his aggregate twelve-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Beck and his girlfriend, Tami Briscoe, who also used the name Tami Beck, lived in Anderson. Beck was a self-employed mechanic, and he rented a garage to work on cars. Part of his business involved acquiring and selling cars. He sold cars through an auction at an auto auction house in Anderson known as Strawtown and, on at least one occasion, directly to an individual.

The Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") provides an administrative process for people to obtain titles for cars. That process can apply to the owner of a car who has lost his or her title and is the owner of record. That process can also apply to a person who claims that he or she has purchased a car from the owner of record who does not have the title. In other words, a person who is not the owner of record can receive an official

BMV-certified title to a vehicle by following a specific administrative procedure contained in the Indiana Administrative Code.

According to the testimony at trial, the first step of the procedure requires that a police officer actually see the vehicle, obtain the vehicle identification number ("VIN"), and check the State Police database to determine if the vehicle has been reported as stolen. If the vehicle has not been reported as stolen, the officer fills out a BMV form and affidavit, indicating that he or she has conducted the required database check and determined that the vehicle has not been reported as stolen.

The second step requires the person seeking the title to the vehicle to fill out a Petition for Issuance of Title to be presented to a court. This Petition requires that the petitioner "state under oath and under the penalties for perjury (a class D felony) that I have read the foregoing petition to establish vehicle ownership and the petition is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and ability." State's Exh. 1 (emphasis in original). The police officer's affidavit must be attached to the Petition. The third step requires a judge to review the Petition and, if the judge approves the Petition, issue an Order for Issuance of Title.

The fourth step requires the person seeking title to present all this information and paperwork to the BMV. That person must also provide identification with a picture. If the BMV is satisfied with the condition of the paperwork, it will issue a title to the person. The BMV also provides an expedited version of this process, called "Speed Title," for an additional $25 fee.

Beck and Tami utilized this process. In Madison County, there were two civil courts that accepted title petitions. The judge in the Court I always personally reviewed the petitions. But in Court II, the judge authorized staff members to stamp his official signature on the Order when the staff member found the petition satisfactory.[1] Tami always filed her petitions in Court II, and in approximately one and one-half years, between January 2005 and September 2005, Tami petitioned Court II for titles over thirty times.

In July 2004, Douglas Dye's 1998 Chevrolet broke down, and he was forced to leave it on the side of the road. When he returned the next day to leave a key under the mat so the car could be towed, the car was gone. Tami sought and received a title for Dye's vehicle on February 23, 2005.

In January 2005, David Trueblood, who had worked with Beck as a mechanic and tow truck driver, contacted the Anderson Police Department because he was concerned about how Beck conducted business. Beck bragged to Trueblood that he could get a title for any vehicle within twenty-four hours. After Trueblood contacted Detective Waters of the Anderson Police Force, Detective Waters provided a VIN for a car so that Trueblood could obtain a title from Beck. Trueblood asked Beck to get a title for a car and provided only the VIN from Detective Waters. Beck and Tami procured a title for that VIN without ever seeing the car.

In April 2005, Sandra Gee was moving from one house to another in Anderson and because her 1999 Chevrolet Blazer was not running, she left it parked on the street.

[1] State's witnesses testified that Court II has changed its procedure due to the investigation of Beck's crimes.

Shortly after she became aware that a tow sticker had been placed on it, the car disappeared. Gee reported her car as stolen. When the police executed a search warrant at Beck's garage in October 2005, they found Gee's Blazer on his lot.

Frank Morgan owned a 1988 Pontiac Bonneville that needed mechanical work. He hired a friend to do the work, and his friend stored Morgan's car at the friend's mother's house starting in the summer of 2004. In April 2005, Morgan's friend's mother had Morgan's car towed. Tami sought and obtained a title for the Pontiac on March 22, 2005. Morgan later saw Darryl Fuller, who at the time lived with Beck's sister, driving Morgan's car. Morgan called the police. Fuller told the officer that he had bought it from Beck and Tami.

As part of the investigation based on Trueblood's information, Detective Waters left a 1989 Volkswagen Jetta parked on the street in March 2005. He placed a tow ticket on the windshield. Ronald McQuery of Anderson Wrecker Service towed the Jetta to his lot, and Beck told McQuery that the owner had authorized Beck to pick up the car. McQuery released the Jetta to Beck for $60, and Tami sought and received a title for the Jetta on April 5, 2005. An undercover police officer bought the Jetta from Beck and Tami through the Strawton auction.

Christina Reis drove a 1997 Dodge Eagle Vision that she bought from CalCars, a business in Anderson. In May 2005, Reis' brother drove that car and hit a curb, causing both body and mechanical damage to the car. Reis got permission to park her car in the lot of an empty building until she could arrange to have it towed and repaired. Early in July, Reis made arrangements to have her car towed, but the tow company Reis hired

could not find the car. Reis attempted to report the car as stolen, but because the title was held by CalCars, the police initially refused to accept her report. Eventually, the police took the report. Tami sought and obtained a title for the Dodge on July 26, 2005. Reis later saw a man, Sean Cowart, driving her car, and she called the police. Cowart bought Reis' Dodge from Beck at the Strawtown auction.

On September 2, 2005, Beck went to the police station and gave a voluntary statement. He told Detectives Sandefour and Waters that he directed Tami to fill out the paperwork for the BMV-certified titles because he could not read or write. He also said that he wanted the titles to be in Tami's name because, on a previous occasion, he had lost the title to a car because he owed child support. He told the officers that he was the actual owner of the cars, that Tami did not know anything about the business, and that he directed Tami to use his last name, so that "if anything come down it come back to me [sic]." Transcript at 1056.

On October 19, the State charged Beck with: Count I, corrupt business influence, a Class C felony; Counts II-V, auto theft, all as Class D felonies; Counts VI-XXII, aiding, inducing, or causing perjury, all Class D felonies. The State also charged Tami as a co-defendant. On March 13, 2006, the State amended the charges to add Count XXIII, receiving stolen auto parts, a Class D felony, and Count XXIV, aiding, inducing, or causing perjury, a Class D felony. The court conducted a trial on in August, and the jury convicted Beck of all charges.

On September 12, the court conducted Beck's sentencing hearing. After evidence, the State argued for an aggregate sentence of forty years, and Beck argued for the

imposition of concurrent terms and acknowledged that he would have to serve at least two years due to his prior convictions. The court found no mitigators and two aggravators: 1) Beck's criminal history; and 2) multiple victims and multiple offenses over a period of time.

The court imposed the following sentences: seven years for his conviction for corrupt business influence, a Class C felony; thirty months for each of his four convictions for auto theft, all as Class D felonies, to be served concurrent with one another but consecutive to his sentence for corrupt business influence; thirty months for each of his seventeen convictions for aiding, inducing, or causing perjury, all Class D felonies, to be served concurrent with one another but consecutive to his sentence for auto theft;[2] and thirty months for his conviction for receiving stolen auto parts, a Class D felony to be served concurrent with the sentence for aiding, inducing, or causing perjury, for an aggregate twelve-year sentence. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Beck contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support each of his convictions. The well-established standard of review to a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction requires us to "neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses." Prickett v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Ind. 2006). We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[2] The Court vacated Beck's conviction for aiding, inducing, or causing perjury under Count XVII because it duplicated another charge.

A. Aiding, Inducing, or Causing Perjury

Beck contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aiding, inducing, or causing perjury. "A person who . . . makes a false, material statement under oath or affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true . . . commits perjury, a Class D felony." Ind. Code § 35-44-2-1 (2005). Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-4 reads:

> A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense, even if the other person:
>
> (1) has not been prosecuted for the offense;
> (2) has not been convicted of the offense; or
> (3) has been acquitted of the offense.

I.C. § 35-41-2-4. Thus, to convict Beck as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Beck aided, induced, or caused Tami to make a false statement under oath when Tami knew the statement was false.

In determining whether a person aided another to commit a crime, we consider: 1) presence at the scene of the crime; 2) companionship with another engaged in criminal activity; 3) failure to oppose the crime; and 4) a defendant's conduct before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime. Herron v. State, 808 N.E.2d 172, 175-76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Under an accomplice liability theory, "the evidence need not show that the accomplice personally participated in the commission of each element of a particular offense." Kendall v. State, 790 N.E.2d 122, 131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

First, Beck argues that "[t]here is no specific evidence linking Randy Beck to any of the particular counts." Appellant's Brief at 19. In other words, Beck does not dispute that the State proved Tami's perjury but he argues that the State did not prove that he

aided, induced, caused Tami to commit perjury. We cannot agree because Beck admitted his involvement with Tami's perjury during his statement to the police.

Specifically, Beck told the officers that: he directed Tami to put the titles in her name; "[Tami] don't know nothing about nothing" (transcript at 1049); Tami does the BMV paperwork because he cannot read or write; he told Tami to use his name, Beck, instead of her name, Briscoe, because "if anything come down it come back to me [sic]" (id. at 1056); Tami would not be able to explain where the cars came from because she did not work at the shop; and that he—and not Tami—sold the cars and Tami drove him to the auctions only because he did not have a valid driver's license. Beck also told Trueblood that he could get a title for any car for a price.

While it is true that mere presence at the crime scene is not a sufficient basis on which to support a conviction, presence at the scene in connection with other circumstances tending to show participation in the crime may raise a reasonable inference of guilt. Brink v. State, 837 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Circumstances can include the course of conduct of the defendant before, during, and after the offense. Id. Here, Beck was not merely present. Beck admitted to Trueblood that he could get a title for a car under any circumstances. And he obtained a title for Trueblood for a car that Beck never even saw. Most importantly, Beck admitted to the police officers that he directed Tami, that Tami did not know anything about what he was doing, and that he—not Tami—was selling the cars. These admissions are sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that Beck aided, induced, or caused Tami to commit perjury.

Next, Beck contends the State's evidence is insufficient on Counts VIII and IX of aiding, inducing, or causing perjury charges "[b]ecause there is no evidence that Tami Beck's signature appears on the exhibits that are the basis" for those counts. Appellant's Brief at 34. Even if no witness testified that State's Exhibits 4 and 31 actually contained Tami's signature, the State was not required to prove that each signature on every document was actually Tami's because the jury is allowed to make their own comparison. Indiana Code Section 34-37-3-1 reads:

> In a proceeding before a court or judicial officer of Indiana in which the genuineness of the handwriting of any person is involved, any admitted or proved handwriting of the person is competent evidence as a basis for comparison by:
>
> (1) witnesses; or
> (2) the jury, court, or officer conducting the proceedings;
>
> to prove or disprove the genuineness of the handwriting.

I.C. § 34-37-3-1. Prior to admitting the comparison evidence, the genuineness of the handwriting serving as the standard of comparison must be established. Gardner v. McClusky, 647 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Here, Jill Golden, the bailiff in Court II, testified that she knew Tami because Tami brought petitions into Court II on a regular basis. Golden testified that she personally observed Tami fill out at least thirty forms and that Golden recognized Tami's signature and handwriting. Golden testified that State's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 18 were all filled out by Tami. Indiana Rule of Evidence 901 allows for the authentication of handwriting exemplars by lay witnesses, and Golden's opinion that Tami filled out the documents was proper. See Lockhart v. State, 671 N.E.2d 893,

902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Thus, the State properly established the genuiness of the standard, and the jury was able to make its own comparison to the other documents.

The State's evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Tami deliberately filled out all the documents with false statements under oath. Further, Beck's own admissions proved that he directed Tami to do so. Therefore, the evidence sufficiently supports all of Beck's convictions for Beck aiding, inducing or causing Tami to commit perjury.

B. Receiving Stolen Auto Parts

Beck concedes that the stolen auto parts—Douglas Dye's 1998 Chevrolet Tahoe—were found on his property. He argues that the State provided no other evidence to support this charge. Again, we cannot agree.

Indiana Code Section 35-43-4-2 defines the offense of receiving stolen auto parts as when a person "knowingly or intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of a motor vehicle or any part of a motor vehicle of another person that has been the subject of theft." I.C. § 35-43-4-2.5. In order to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the State must prove that the defendant knew the property was stolen. Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The factfinder may infer the defendant's knowledge that property is stolen from the circumstances surrounding the possession, including attempts to conceal evidence. Id.

Here, State's Exhibit 10 proves that Tami sought and received a title for Dye's vehicle on February 23, 2005. In her petition, Tami stated that she purchased the car from Tim Sues in Noblesville on July 29, 2004. Detective Waters testified that he

attempted to contact every individual listed among all of Tami's petitioners, and he never found an individual that could testify that he or she sold Tami the vehicle. Douglas Dye also testified that he left his car on the side of the road in July 2004, and when he returned the next day, his vehicle was gone.

"Possession of recently stolen property when joined with attempts at concealment, evasive or false statements, or an unusual manner of acquisition has been held sufficient to support a conviction for Receiving Stolen Property." Shultz, 742 N.E.2d at 966 (quoting Gibson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. 1994)). The State's evidence about the circumstances under which Beck possessed Dye's 1998 Chevrolet Tahoe are sufficient for the jury to infer that Beck knew the vehicle was stolen. That evidence sufficiently supports his conviction for receiving stolen auto parts.

C. Auto Theft

Beck contends that his convictions for the theft of four different cars are not sufficiently supported by the State's evidence for two reasons: 1) all the vehicles at issue were abandoned because they were towed and, consequently, could not be stolen; and 2) relating to Count V, Beck only constructively possessed the 1999 Chevrolet Blazer owned by Sandra Gee.

The State, however, presented testimony from each vehicle owner that the vehicle was not abandoned. Detective Waters of the Anderson Police Department testified that the 1989 Volkswagen Jetta (Count II) was deliberately placed on the street with a tow sticker, but he never testified that the police department deserted that car. Christina Reis testified that she parked her 1997 Dodge Eagle Vision (Count III) in a parking lot, with

the parking lot owner's permission, and that she reported her car stolen as soon as she was able to do so. Frank Morgan also testified that he never intended to relinquish ownership of his 1988 Pontiac Bonneville (Count IV), and that he contacted the police when he saw Darryl Fuller driving the Pontiac. Finally, Sandra Gee testified that her 1999 Chevrolet Blazer (Count IV) was left parked on the street because it had mechanical problems. She also testified that the car disappeared shortly after she became aware that a tow sticker had been placed on it, and she reported the vehicle as stolen.

Thus, although each vehicle was towed, that evidence does not prove that any owner abandoned his or her car. Indeed, each owner expressed his or her clear intent to maintain ownership of his or her vehicle despite the fact that it was towed. Further, the jury heard evidence about the process the BMV provides to car owners before an car can be considered abandoned. The State's evidence sufficiently proved that Beck exerted unauthorized control over each of the cars with the intent to deprive each owner of the vehicle's value or use.

Relative to Count V involving Sandra Gee's 1999 Chevrolet Blazer, "the unexplained possession of recently stolen property provides support for an inference of guilt of theft of that property." Allen v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1222, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Gee's car disappeared in April 2005, and the police found it on Beck's lot six months later. Although Beck argues that the State did not prove his exclusive possession of Gee's car, his statements to the police show otherwise. He told the officers that he controlled his business, which was not open to the public, that Tami

was not his partner and did not know where the vehicles came from "[bec]ause [Tami] don't stay down to the shop [sic]." Transcript at 1056.

Nevertheless, even if that evidence shows only constructive possession, it is sufficient if the State proves that the defendant had both the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over the contraband. Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind. 2006). Again, Beck's statements to the officers about how he ran his business is sufficient for the jury to infer that he knew that Gee's vehicle was on his property and he intended to maintain control over the Blazer. Indeed, it is not clear from Beck's argument on appeal how his possession was constructive as he points to no evidence about other individuals' access to Beck's property where the police ultimately located Gee's car. His argument that the evidence insufficiently supports his conviction for that particular charge of auto theft also must fail.

D. Corrupt Business Influence

Beck also contends that the evidence insufficiently supports his conviction for corrupt business influence. Indiana Code Section 35-45-6-2 states, "A person . . . [w]ho is employed by or associated with an enterprise, and who knowingly or intentionally conducts or otherwise participates in the activities of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity commits corrupt business influence." I.C. § 35-45-6-2. An "enterprise" is defined as "(1) a sole proprietorship, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, business trust, or governmental entity; or (2) a union, an association, or a group, whether a legal entity or merely associated in fact." I.C. § 35-45-6-1. "'Pattern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two (2) incidents of

racketeering activity that have the same or similar intent, result, accomplice, victim, or method of commission, or that are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics that are not isolated incidents." Id.

Beck first argues that neither auto theft nor receiving stolen auto parts can serve as a predicate offense, but he acknowledges that perjury is specifically listed among the crimes constituting "racketeering activity." See I.C. § 35-45-6-1(e)(21). Thus, in order to convict Beck as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Beck knowingly or intentionally acquired or maintained an interest in or control of motor vehicles and U.S. currency by engaging in at least two incidents of perjury, which were interrelated and not isolated incidents.

We determine that the evidence sufficiently supports Beck's conviction for corrupt business influence. His argument on this point is that the State's evidence does not sufficiently support his convictions for perjury, and, consequently, the evidence does not support his conviction for corrupt business influence. But, as held above, the evidence does prove that he aided, induced, or caused Tami to commit perjury on at least two occasions. Thus, Beck's argument on this point also fails.

Issue Three: Episode of Criminal Conduct

Beck contends that his sentence exceeds the permissible maximum term allowed by statute because all twenty-three convictions "constitute one episode of criminal conduct under 35-50-1-2(b)." Appellant's Brief at 40.[3] In support, Beck points to the court's ruling denying his motion to sever the charges for trial. He argues that if his

[3] The State did not address this claim.

crimes were interrelated enough to be tried together, they constitute a single episode of criminal conduct and, consequently, his sentence should be capped at ten years, the advisory sentence for the next highest level felony.

Our Supreme Court addressed and rejected a very similar argument in O'Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. 2001). O'Connell was convicted for one count of murder and five counts of attempted murder, which he committed with a co-defendant, Kahlenbeck. Id. at 946-47. Kahlenbeck was tried separately for the same charges, but prior to his trial, Kahlenbeck moved for severance of the charges, which the trial court denied. Kahlenbeck v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Ind. 1999). Kahlenbeck appealed that denial, and the court affirmed the ruling because Kahlenbeck's crimes were based on a series of acts constituting part of a single scheme or plan. Id. In O'Connell's appeal, he argued that that holding required the conclusion that his crimes arose in an episode of criminal conduct. O'Connell, 742 N.E.2d at 950. The court held otherwise, "In simple terms, the holding that Kahlenbeck was not entitled to severance was based on statutory criteria that are inapplicable to the consecutive sentencing statute." Id. at 951.

The State objected to Beck's request for severance based on Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-9, which reads:

> Two (2) or more offenses may be joined in the same indictment or information, with each offense stated in a separate count, when the offenses . . . are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.

I.C. 35-34-1-9(a). The court sustained the objection and tried Beck on all his charges in a single proceeding. The standard for joinder, however, is not the same standard employed in the consecutive sentencing statute. O'Connell, 742 N.E.2d at 951.

"Episode of criminal conduct" is defined as "offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance." I.C § 35-50-1-2(b). In determining whether crimes arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct, we consider whether the alleged conduct was so closely related in time, place, and circumstances that a complete account of one charge cannot be related without referring to details of the other charge. Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

Here, Beck was convicted of twenty-three different crimes that took place between January 1, 2004, and September 1, 2005. The descriptions of his offenses for auto theft, receiving stolen auto parts and aiding, inducing, or causing perjury can be related without reference to details of the others. For example, Count III describes Beck's theft of Christina Reis' 1997 Dodge Vision, which was accomplished when Jerry Cook towed that vehicle to Beck's garage at Beck's request between May 15 and July 26, 2005. The State charged Count IV for Beck's theft of Frank Morgan's 1988 Pontiac, which Beck acquired through Ronald McQuery of Anderson Wrecking between January 1 and April 20, 2005. All of the perjury convictions, Counts VI-XVI, Counts XVIII-XXII, and Count XXIV, involve Tami's conduct in falsifying petitions to obtain titles for cars at Beck's direction, including a title for a car that Beck never even saw. Thus, the circumstances for those offenses can be related without reference to each other.

His conviction for corrupt business influence, however, cannot be described without relating the facts of at least two of his perjury offenses. As stated above, to support a conviction for corrupt business influence, the State's evidence must show that

Beck knowingly or intentionally engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in property. I.C. § 35-45-6-2. And the pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two predicate acts. I.C. § 35-45-6-1. Neither the charging information nor the jury instructions specifically define which two acts of perjury serve as the predicate offenses. Nevertheless, a complete account of the corrupt business influence charge cannot be related without referring to details of at least two of the other perjury charges. Therefore, Beck's conviction for corrupt business influence and his multiple convictions for perjury arise from one episode of criminal conduct.

The consecutive sentencing statute limits the aggregate sentence for convictions "arising out of an episode of criminal conduct" to "the advisory sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted." Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c). Thus, the total aggregate sentence for Beck's convictions for corrupt business influence, a Class C felony, and perjury, all Class D felonies, may not exceed the advisory sentence for a Class B felony, which is ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. And it does not. The court sentenced Beck to seven years for his conviction for corrupt business influence, a Class C felony and to a sentence of thirty months for his convictions for perjury, which were all ordered to run concurrent to one another and consecutive to the other charges, for an aggregate sentence of nine and one-half years for that episode.

The fact that Beck's total sentence is twelve years, due to his additional two and one-half year sentence for his auto theft convictions, does not impact our resolution of this issue because those convictions occurred during different episodes. As noted above,

the circumstances of his auto theft offenses can be related without referring to the details of his perjury or corrupt business influence offenses. Thus, the court did not violate its statutory authority when it sentenced Beck to an aggregate twelve-year sentence.

Issue Three: Whether Beck's Sentence is Inappropriate

Beck argues that his sentence is inappropriate, but he does not challenge the court's sentencing statement or contend that the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.[4] Beck "must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review." Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)). In this review, we recognize the special expertise of the trial court in making sentencing decisions and do not merely substitute our opinion for that of the trial court. Davis v. State, 851 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. But even where a trial court has meticulously followed the proper procedure and legally imposed sentence, appellate courts may exercise their authority to revise a sentence deemed "inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1080.

Beck first argues that the evidence presented to the trial court from friends, relatives and other supporters proves that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character. But the court heard and reviewed this evidence and found that it was not mitigating in light of the fact that Beck did not take responsibility for his crimes. The

[4] Beck was convicted for twenty-three separate offenses. He committed fifteen of those offenses before the legislature amended the sentencing statutes on April 25, 2005, he committed six of his offenses after that amendment took effect, and his remaining two convictions are based on his conduct that spans a period of time both before and after the amendment. He does not, however, raise an issue that involves those amendments.

court did find Beck's juvenile and adult criminal history, which included ten driving offenses, to be an aggravating factor.

The trial court also considered that the nature of Beck's offenses, including "several different persons who have been injured as a result of his crimes and a lot of offenses over some period of time." Transcript at 1334. The court found those circumstances to be aggravators. "[E]nhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one person." Perry v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003)). Thus, we cannot say that Beck's aggregate twelve-year sentence for twenty-three crimes against multiple victims is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and what they reveal about his character.

Affirmed.

MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.