DARCY J. ROBINSON,
    Appellant (Defendant below),

    v.

ROBERT J. WROBLEWSKI and ANN WROBLEWSKI,
    Appellee (Plaintiffs below).

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)    Supreme Court No.
)    02S03-9809-CV-482
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)    Court of Appeals No.
)    02A03-9609-CV-341
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    Robert and Ann Wroblewski's son was killed in an automobile accident. They seek damages for the loss of his love and companionship measured using the time period from his

death until the death of his last surviving parent. Darcy Robinson, the defendant, argues for a shorter measuring period. We hold that Indiana's Child Wrongful Death ActSee footnote 1 authorizes the measuring period advocated by the Wroblewskis.
    

    Robinson moved to strike from the complaint the Wroblewskis' request for damages measured using the time period from the date of Brian's death until the death of Brian's last surviving parent. Instead, Robinson argued that the Wroblewskis should only be entitled to recover damages measured using the time period from the date of Brian's death until the date Brian would have reached the age of 23. This latter measuring period is the same as

that assigned by the statute for damages for the loss of a child's services.See footnote 2 The trial court concluded that the legislature intended “two specific and independent limitations” on damages and found that the recovery for the loss of a child's love and companionship began upon the death of the child and extended until the death of the last surviving parent.

    This case was brought before the Court of Appeals on interlocutory appeal on the sole issue of whether “Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Act permits the recovery of damages for the loss of a child's love and companionship until the death of the last surviving parent.” That court answered in the affirmative. Robinson v. Wroblewski, 679 N.E.2d 1348, 1349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Robinson petitioned this Court for transfer, which we granted.

their seventeen year old son. We held then that “the pecuniary loss rule is the law in Indiana” and serves “as an element of damages for a parent suing for the injury or death of a minor child.” Id. at 8. As such, damages for the loss of a minor child were limited to those losses on which a pecuniary value could be placed. Such a value could be determined from the assistance that the child would have provided through money, services or other material benefits. Id. at 10 (citing Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328, 2 N.E. 793 (1885); Louisville, New Albany, and Chicago R.R. v. Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111, 21 N.E. 472 (Ind. 1889); Louisville, New Albany, and Chicago Ry. v. Rush, 127 Ind. 545, 26 N.E. 1010 (1890)). See also Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). In essence, a parent could only recover for the economic loss of a minor child. A parent could not recover for the loss of a child's love and affection. Miller, 506 N.E.2d at 11.
    
    In addition, under the pecuniary loss rule in Indiana, recoverable damages in an action for the wrongful death of a minor child for loss of services were measured using the time period from the date of the child's death to the date the child would have reached the age of majority. Thompson v. Town of Fort Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 157, 178 N.E. 440, 444 (1931) (citations omitted); Boland v. Greer, 409 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Wallace v. Woods, 149 Ind. App. 257, 262-68, 271 N.E.2d 487, 490-93 (1971)); Hahn v. Moore, 127 Ind. App. 149, 158, 133 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1956).

    In summary, Miller reiterated that there were two characteristics of the pecuniary loss rule as it applied to an action for the wrongful death of a minor child: (1) the amount of damages recoverable was limited to the economic loss sustained by the parents; and (2) the time period over which the economic loss was calculated terminated at the age of majority. We declined the invitation to change either of these characteristics of the pecuniary loss rule. Miller, 506 N.E.2d at 11.
    The Legislature has not changed its position on the pecuniary loss rule, even though it had full knowledge of this Court's interpretations of its enactments and in spite of the fact that efforts have been made to provide for a change in the measure of damages awarded to parents for the loss of a minor child.

Id. at 9. Instead, we noted the power of the legislature to change the rule if it “disagree[d] with the Court's constructions of its legislative enactments or fe[lt] that there [was] a need to change [the pecuniary loss rule] based on the needs or requirements of society.” Id. at 11.

(g)    Damages may be awarded under subsection (e)(2) only with respect to the period of time from the death of the child until the date of the child's last surviving parent's death.

Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1 (1998)(emphasis added).

Indiana “continues to contain the temporal limitations previously engrafted upon it by case law.” Id. at 1156. Consequently, damages for the loss of a child's love and companionship were held to be measured using the same period as that for damages for the loss of a child's services. Id.

    Two years later, in the case before us today, the Indiana Court of Appeals declined to follow Herriman. Instead, the court held that a parent was entitled to recover damages for the loss of a child's love and companionship until the death of the last surviving parent. Robinson, 679 N.E.2d at 1354. The Court of Appeals determined that the legislature intended to create two distinct recoveries for the wrongful death of a child: (1) damages recoverable for the loss of a child's services (pecuniary losses), and (2) damages recoverable for the lost love and companionship of a deceased minor child (non-pecuniary losses). Id. After considering the legislative history, the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature only intended to limit the recovery for “pecuniary losses to the period equivalent to the child's minority” whereas the recovery for the loss of a child's love and companionship (a non-pecuniary loss) was intended to be awarded “solely to a period of time from the death of a child until the date of the child's last surviving parent's death.” Id. Accord Carper v. Tuning, No. EV 96-19-C-D/H, 1997 WL 580693 at *1 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 1997).

    _    The first, subsection (d) (changed to (e) in the final version of the bill), provided that the plaintiff in a child wrongful death action could recover damages:

            (1) for the loss of the child's services;
            (2) for the loss of the child's love and companionship;
            (3) to pay certain expenses specified in the bill.

    While important changes were made to the details of these and other provisions of the bill as it progressed through the General Assembly, the structure of these three subsections remained the same until the final version of the bill emerged. As noted, the subsections were re-lettered. And, as mentioned supra, the second subsection was changed to provide that the period for measuring damages under “this section” would run from the time of the child's death until the child would have reached a specified age. However, the third subsection remained unchanged. As such, the change in the language of the second subsection provided a different measuring period for calculating damages for loss of love and companionship than the language of the third subsection.

    Our inquiry, then, is whether the change in the final version of the bill inserting the “this section” language was an expression of legislative intent that the measuring period for calculating damages for loss of love and companionship runs from the time of the child's death until the child would have reached a specified age rather than from the time of the

child's death until the death of the child's last surviving parent. To pursue this inquiry, we turn to a more detailed examination of the bill's legislative history.

    At various stages during the legislative process, provisions concerning the following aspects of the child wrongful death statute were included in, deleted from, or amended to the legislation.See footnote 3

    1. The maximum age of a child whose death would trigger the recovery provisions of the statute.See footnote 4 The bill as introduced provided that damages were recoverable for the wrongful death of a child under age 18. The Senate Judiciary Committee amended the bill to increase the maximum age of covered children from 18 to 21; the full Senate reduced the maximum age back to 18; the House Judiciary Committee set the maximum age at 18 or, for children in college or vocational school, 23; and the full House set the maximum age at 20 or, for children in college or vocational school, 23. The bill as passed adopted the full House's approach, i.e., setting the maximum age of covered children at 20 or, for children in college or vocational school, 23.

measuring period for calculating damages for only loss of love and companionship would run from the date of the child's death until the death of the child's last surviving parent.

    4. An offset for the damages recoverable for loss of a child's services for the parents' reasonable expenses that would have been incurred in rearing the child.See footnote 9 The bill as introduced provided that damages recoverable for loss of a child's services would be reduced by the parents' reasonable expenses that would have been incurred in rearing the child. The Senate Judiciary Committee deleted this offset for child rearing expenses; the full Senate restored this offset; the House Judiciary Committee made the offset for child-rearing expenses permissive rather than mandatory; and the bill passed the full House in this fashion. The bill as passed contained no offset for child-rearing expenses.

    5. A dollar limitation on the damages recoverable for loss of a child's love and companionship.See footnote 10 The bill as introduced provided that damages recoverable for loss of a child's love and companionship could not exceed $35,000. The Senate Judiciary Committee deleted altogether any limitation on damages recoverable for loss of a child's love and companionship. The full Senate amended the bill to provide that damages recoverable for

loss of a child's love and companionship could not exceed $100,000.See footnote 11 The House Judiciary Committee deleted altogether any limitation on damages. The full House amended the bill to provide that, for the period May 7, 1987, to May 1, 1990, damages recoverable for loss of a child's love and companionship could not exceed $100,000, with no limitation thereafter.See footnote 12 The bill as passed provided that through October 31, 1990, damages recoverable for loss of a child's love and companionship could not exceed $100,000, with no limitation thereafter.

    From the foregoing history, we believe that it is clear that the bill, as introduced, set forth a different measuring period for calculating damages for loss of a child's services than that for loss of the child's love and companionship. This helps us focus our inquiry on whether, as the bill proceeded through the legislative process, there is evidence that the General Assembly meant to change the measuring period provisions of the bill as introduced. We conclude that there is not.

    We conclude that it was an inadvertent drafting error; that the legislature did not intend to change this aspect of the bill, as introduced. We reach this conclusion for several reasons.

    First, as a general matter, although the bill was amended substantively in Senate Committee, on the Senate floor, in House Committee, and on the House floor, none of the amendments (with the exception of the one in Senate Committee discussed supra) changed the provisions providing separate measuring periods for damages for loss of services and for loss of love and companionship. Because there were no such changes, the language does not seem to have been a likely candidate for compromise in conference committee.

    We note a possible explanation for the error. The bill as introduced provided recovery for damages for the child's health care and hospitalization prior to death and for funeral and burial expenses. No measuring period was required to calculate these damages.

But later versions of the bill added additional expense elements, at least one of which _ reasonable family psychiatric and psychological counseling expenses attributable to the child's death _ could logically require a measuring period for calculation. It may have been that the change in the measuring period language in the final version of the bill was meant to cover the damages recoverable for expenses as well as for loss of services. Under this theory, it could have been that the drafters either did not realize that they were also including damages recoverable for loss of love and companionship or thought that the more specific language of the following subsection would be sufficient.

     Where statutory provisions are in conflict, no part of a statute should be rendered meaningless but should be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Garvin v. Chadwick Realty Corp., 212 Ind. 499, 512-13, 9 N.E.2d 268, 273-74 (Ind. 1937); Chamness v. Carter, 575 N.E.2d 317, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
    In construing a statutory provision, we must consider the statute as an entirety, with each part being viewed not as an isolated fragment but with reference to all the other companion provisions. To effect the legislature's intent, this Court will construe an ambiguous statute in a manner consistent with other sections of the enactment.

    Magistrate Judge Cosbey in Herriman recognized this problem when he asked, “[W]hat is one to make of the language of subsection (g) of the Act?” Herriman, 887 F. Supp. at 1157. He offered two possible explanations. In the first possibility, “subsection (g) underscores the Legislature's view that damages pursuant to subsection (e)(2) [loss of a child's love and companionship] must cease with the death of the parents no matter who asserts the loss.” Id. In this view, subsection (g) serves to express legislative intent that

there is no special measuring period for calculating damages in cases where the child was in the custody of a non-parent guardian.See footnote 15

    However, the same conclusion is reached applying subsection (f) alone. The legislature outlined two mutually exclusive measurable periods in subsection (f): (1) the date the child would have reached age 20 or 23; or (2) the date of the child's last surviving parent's death; whichever first occurs. There is no way that subsection (f) can be read to provide a special measuring period in non-parental guardianship situations. Subsection (g) adds nothing in this regard.

     Second, the court suggested that the language in subsection (g) could emphasize merely that damages for the loss of a child's love and companionship were limited “only” to child death cases _ not child injury cases. Id. However, the introductory sentence to subsection (e) clearly indicates that the identified recoverable damages are for child death cases only. See Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1(e)(“In an action to recover for the death of a child, . . .”)(emphasis added). The notion that recoverable damages apply only to child death

cases is made clear in subsection (e); again, employing this rationale would render subsection (g) superfluous.

    In construing a statute, this Court will presume that the legislature did not enact a useless provision. Hinshaw, 611 N.E.2d at 638 (citing State ex rel. Hatcher v. Lake Superior Court, 500 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind. 1986)). The illustrations offered by the court in Herriman would contradict this canon of statutory construction.

    The other established rule of statutory construction that supports our conclusion holds that where provisions of a statute conflict, the specific provision takes priority over the general provision. Houtchens v. Lane, 246 Ind. 540, 545-46, 206 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ind. 1965) (citations omitted); Ezzell v. State, 246 Ind. 268, 271, 205 N.E.2d 145, 146 (Ind. 1965). The provisions in Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1(f) and (g) can be categorized as general and specific.

    The measuring period for calculating damages in subsection (f) is more general (cross-referencing “this section”) than subsection (g), which cross-references subsection (e)(2). As the latter is the more specific provision, that provision controls.

    In Wiersma, the Indiana Court of Appeals determined that the pecuniary loss rule included the recovery for the loss of love, care and affection under the Indiana Wrongful Death Act by a dependent next of kin. Wiersma, 643 N.E.2d at 913. See also Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1 (“Death from wrongful act or omission”). “Pecuniary loss is the foundation of a wrongful death action, and the damages are limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by those for whose benefit the action may be maintained.” Wiersma, 643 N.E.2d at 911 (citations omitted). Consequently, Wiersma stands for the proposition that the pecuniary loss rule has

been expanded in Indiana to include the recovery for loss of love and companionship in wrongful death actions involving deceased adults. Id. at 913; Herriman, 887 F. Supp. at 1155; Necessary v. Inter-State Towing, 697 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Luider v. Skaggs, 693 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied; Chamberlain v. Parks, 692 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

    The court in Herriman, however, relies on Wiersma to conclude that in an action under the Child Wrongful Death Act, “the proper measure of damages [is] the value of the child's services from the time of injury until the child would have attained majority.” Wiersma, 643 N.E.2d at 912 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This reliance is misplaced. The court in Wiersma was not presented with any question under the Child Wrongful Death Act. The court's sole issue in Wiersma was whether a dependent next of kin could recover damages for loss of love, care and affection in a wrongful death action involving a deceased adult. Wiersma, and our affirmation and adoption of it, does not stand as any sort of precedent on the question of the measuring period for calculating damages in child wrongful death cases.

Wrongful Death Act, specifically Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1 (f) and (g), permits the recovery of damages for the loss of a child's love and companionship with respect to the time from the death of the child until the death of the child's last surviving parent.

    The trial court and Court of Appeals are affirmed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, and SELBY, J.J., concur. BOEHM, J. dissents with opinion.