FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
SEBASTIAN ARAIZA:
TIMOTHY J. MAHER
BARRY D. SHERMAN
Edward M. Kalamaros & Associates
KRISTEN D. HILL South Bend, Indiana
Barry D. Sherman & Associates
Hammond, Indiana
ROGELIO DOMINGUEZ
Hammond, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
STATE FARM INSURANCE CO.:
JOHN H. LLOYD, IV
Galvin, Galvin & Leeney
SEBASTIAN ARAIZA and STATE FARM )
MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Appellants, )
)
vs. ) No. 45A03-9803-CV-138
)
CHRYSLER INSURANCE COMPANY, )
)
Appellee. )
KIRSCH, Judge
In a published decision issued September 24, 1998, we held that a default judgment
issued against an insured in a policy coverage dispute was not binding on the injured third
party. Araiza v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 699 N.E.2d 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). In so holding, we
stated that the injured third party, Araiza, had an interest in the policy proceeds which
vested at the time of the accident. Id. at 1163 (citing Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla,
Couch on Insurance § 104:33 (3d ed. 1997)).
Chrysler Insurance Company seeks rehearing on various grounds. We grant rehearing
only to address Chrysler's contention that the proposition from the cited treatise applies only
to states that permit third-party direct actions against an insurer which Indiana does not.
While it is true that the cited treatise discusses the stated proposition in the context of direct
actions, such actions are not limited to those in which a third-party proceeds directly against
an insurer prior to obtaining a judgment against the insured. The treatise recognizes that
[a]lthough direct action may be prohibited, execution of a judgment issued against an
insured, which execution is served on the insurer, may be enforced in many jurisdictions[.]
Couch on Insurance § 104:5. Indiana is one of those jurisdictions. See Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Morrison, 146 Ind. App. 497, 256 N.E.2d 918 (1970). The principles in the cited section
apply not only to direct actions brought by the third party against the insurer prior to
obtaining a judgment against the insured, actions which are not allowed in Indiana, but also
to direct actions brought by the third party against the insurer to enforce a judgment obtained
against the insured, actions which are allowed in Indiana. Nothing in our original opinion
should be read as an attempt to change the law in Indiana prohibiting direct actions by third
parties against insurers prior to obtaining a judgment against the insured.
We grant rehearing solely to make the clarification stated herein and deny rehearing
on all other grounds.
STATON, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
Converted from WP6.1 by the Access Indiana Information Network