EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS OF INDIANAPOLIS, W. LARRY CORBETT, M.D., METHODIST HEALTH CARE CENTER d/b/a METHODIST OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH CENTERS, INC., JOHN W. TIMOTHY, JR., M.D., AND MICHAEL A. KENNEDY, M.D.,
    Appellants (Defendants below),

    v.

JAMES PETTIT,
    Appellee (Plaintiff below).

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)    Supreme Court No.
)    49S02-9911-CV-637
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)    Court of Appeals No.
)    49A02-9805-CV-416
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    On May 9, 1996, Pettit sued Methodist Health Care Center d/b/a Methodist Occupational Health Centers, Inc., John W. Timothy, Jr., M.D., and Michael A. Kennedy, M.D. (collectively “Providers”), along with Emergency Physicians of Indianapolis and W. Larry Corbett, M.D. (collectively “Emergency Physicians”), for medical malpractice. All were health care providers qualified under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, Ind. Code § 27- 12-1-1 et seq. (“Act”).See footnote 1

    Pettit alleged that Providers and Emergency Physicians were negligent in failing to refer him to a vascular specialist after he exhibited signs and symptoms of an arterial clot in his right leg and that this caused him to lose his right leg to amputation.

    A jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Pettit and against Providers in the amount of $750,000.00. Pettit received an adverse jury verdict on his claim against Emergency Physicians, which he does not challenge in this appeal. In a post-trial motion, Pettit sought pre-judgment interest. Alleging that Dr. Timothy pursued defenses at trial that were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, Pettit also filed a motion seeking attorneys' fees and costs against Dr. Timothy pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-1-32-1. (repealed by P.L. 1-1998) (current version at Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1).

    The trial court granted both motions, awarding Pettit $134,383.92 in pre-judgment interestSee footnote 2 and $13,305.00 in costs including attorneys' fees. Providers appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination as to pre-judgment interest, holding that Providers were not responsible for the payment of pre-judgment interest in that the award

resulted in Pettit recovering more than the maximum amount recoverable under the Act.

The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court's determination as to attorneys' fees, determining that Pettit was not entitled to this award. Emergency Physicians of Indianapolis v. Pettit, 714 N.E.2d 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

such as [interest, costs and other expenses]. These collateral litigation expenses arise separately by operation of law and are regulated under distinct statutes, which guide parties' decisions in nearly every stage of either pursuing or defending medical malpractice claims under the Act. To conclude that the statute establishes “solid liability caps” is to create a separate set of rules for the allocation of these expenses in litigating what remain essentially tort suits notwithstanding the passage of the Act.

Poehlman, 1999 WL 801075, at *3. We also specifically considered the issue of pre- judgment interest and noted that “[i]n any particular case, the health care provider or the Insurance Commissioner may develop an entirely different litigation strategy from the other, including a different strategy as to such matters as pre-judgment settlement and post- judgment debt payment.” Id. at *4 (emphasis added). We ultimately held that
the limitations set forth in the recovery limitation section of the Act are limitations on damage amounts, not collateral litigation expenses; [and] each judgment debtor is individually responsible for its own collateral litigation expenses associated with its settlement or judgment figure, irrespective of whether the total figure exceeds the Act's statutory damage limits . . . .

Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).

    We consider our decision in Poehlman to be stare decisis that a qualified health care provider is responsible for the payment of the collateral litigation expense of pre-judgment interest notwithstanding that the entire amount of the judgment equals the maximum amount recoverable under the Act or that the imposition of pre-judgment interest may cause the provider's total judgment debt to exceed $100,000.
    

    We also note, as we did in a different context in Poehlman, that the legislature chose to exempt the Patient's Compensation Fund, but not health care providers, from the provisions of the Prejudgment Interest Statute. Ind. Code § 34-4-37-4 (1993) (“This chapter does not apply to a claim against the patient's compensation fund . . . .”) (current version at Ind. Code § 34-51-4-2 (1998)).See footnote 4 We find this to be persuasive indicia that the legislature considered and rejected exempting qualified health care providers from application of the Prejudgment Interest Statute.

    We (1) grant transfer; (2) adopt and incorporate by reference Part II of the Court of Appeals's opinion addressing the issue of attorneys' fees; (3) vacate the remainder of the

opinion of the Court of Appeals; and (4) remand to the trial court for re-computation of that amount of pre-judgment interest (and court costs) attributable to the $100,000 damage award that Providers are responsible for paying.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON and BOEHM, JJ., concur                         

Ind. Code § 27-12-14-3(a)-(c) (1993) (repealed by P.L. 1-1998) (current version at Ind. Code § 34- 18-14-3 (1998)). See footnote Effective July 1, 1999, the legislature expanded the upper liability limit on damages to “[o]ne million two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($1,250,000) for an act of malpractice that occurs after June 30, 1999.” Id. § 34-18-14-3 (1998).

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