FOR PUBLICATION         
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
            
JOHN R. OBENCHAIN                    CHARLES P. RICE
J. THOMAS VETNE                    Boveri Murphy Rice Ryan
Jones Obenchain, LLP                    & LaDue, LLP
South Bend, Indiana                        South Bend, Indiana
                

GARY W. OSTERLOO,                          )
                                                )
Appellant-Defendant,                            )                                                    )
        vs.                                     )     No. 20A04-0103-CV-117
                                                )
CHARLES A. WALLAR, a minor                      )
by and through TINA M. WALLAR, his              )
mother and natural guardian,                    )                                                    )
Appellee-Plaintiff.                             )

                                            

Appellant’s App. at 21 (emphasis in original). Osterloo now appeals this ruling along with the denial of his motion for summary judgment. See footnote

(1) When approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing.
(2) When approaching and going around a curve.
(3) When approaching a hill crest.
(4) When traveling upon a narrow or winding roadway.
(5) When special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.

I.C. § 9-21-5-4 (emphasis supplied). Proof of the violation of a safety regulation creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Witham v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 561 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ind. 1990). More specifically, the violation of a motor vehicle statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence that may be overcome by evidence that the driver, even though violating the statute, acted as a reasonable prudent person would act under the circumstances. Stepanek v. Durbin, 640 N.E.2d 429, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
    Here, the designated evidence shows that the weather was hazardous on the morning of the collision. Osterloo was familiar with Neff Street and estimated that he was going approximately 26 to 27 miles per hour. Appellant’s App. at 156. Osterloo admitted, however, that his actual speed may have been different than what he had estimated. Appellant’s App. at 157. Osterloo also acknowledged that he was unable to control his vehicle when the accident occurred, and he began to skid. After the impact, Osterloo’s vehicle left lengthy skid marks on the road. This evidence gives rise to conflicting inferences of negligence that should be reserved to the finder of fact. Put another way, the issue of whether Osterloo’s speed was appropriate given the weather and road conditions is a genuine issue of material fact. Thus, the trial court properly denied Osterloo’s motion for summary judgment.

Ind. Code § 34-4-33-10(c) (1993) (recodified at Ind. Code § 34-51-2-14).
After the accident but before Charles had filed his complaint, the Comparative Fault Act’s definition of “nonparty” had been amended. Therefore, the amended version of the Comparative Fault Act applies to the pleadings in this case. Estate of Robinson v. C&I Leasing, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the Comparative Fault Act amendment was procedural and therefore application was prospective where the amendment had gone into effect after the injury but before the filing of the complaint), trans. denied. The Comparative Fault Act defines a “nonparty” as “a person who caused or contributed to cause the alleged injury, death, or damage to property but who has not been joined in the action as a defendant.” Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-33-2(2) (West Supp. 1995) (recodified at Ind. Code § 34-6-2-88). Osterloo argues that out of fairness he should be allowed to amend his answer to add Mr. Wallar as a nonparty, even though Mr. Wallar had been joined as a defendant. Charles counters that, because Mr. Wallar had been joined in the action as a defendant, Mr. Wallar does not fall within the definition of a nonparty.
    Our supreme court recently addressed this issue in Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905 (Ind. 2001). In that products liability case, the plaintiff had filed a complaint against thirty-three manufacturers or distributors of asbestos, including Owens Corning. Subsequently, some of those defendants settled with the plaintiff or were otherwise dismissed from the action. As a result, Owens Corning sought to add the former defendants as nonparties. Id. at 907. In response, the plaintiff argued in a summary judgment motion that the trial court should disallow the addition of the nonparties because 1) Owens Corning had not sought to add the parties in a timely manner, and 2) Owens Corning lacked sufficient evidence that the nonparties contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s summary judgment.
    Our supreme court initially observed that there were two obvious consequences of the fact that those parties were former defendants. First, since they were named defendants they could not be added as nonparties in the original answer. Second, they were known to the plaintiff. Id. at 914. Relying on the intent of the Comparative Fault Act, our supreme court reasoned:
[I]t is clear to us that the notice provisions with respect to nonparty affirmative defenses are designed, first and foremost, to advise plaintiffs of potential named defendants from which they may be able to obtain recovery and, secondarily, to put plaintiffs on notice generally of the contours of the defendant’s case at trial. No violence is done to either of those objectives by permitting a defendant to assert a nonparty affirmative defense reasonably promptly after receiving notice that a named party defendant has been dismissed from the lawsuit.

Id. at 915. The Supreme Court then held that the trial court had committed reversible error in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff on Owens Corning’s nonparty affirmative defense with respect to at least one nonparty. Id.
    The same code provision, the same reasoning, and facts even more favorable to the defendant are present in the instant case. To begin with, Osterloo had originally named Mr. Wallar as a nonparty in one of his affirmative defenses. Charles then added Mr. Wallar as a defendant, forcing Osterloo to amend his answer because, by definition, Mr. Wallar could not be considered a nonparty. So Charles was apprised of a potential defendant from whom he could seek recovery. Moreover, Charles learned of the general contours of Osterloo’s case—namely, the spreading of blame to Charles’s father, among others. Thus, the underlying purpose of the Comparative Fault Act was satisfied. See id.
    In light of Cobb, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Osterloo the opportunity to add Mr. Wallar as a nonparty. Shortly after Mr. Wallar filed his motion for summary judgment—just fifteen days afterwards—Osterloo filed a motion to add Mr. Wallar as a nonparty in the event of Mr. Wallar’s dismissal. In doing so, Osterloo acted with the reasonable promptness needed to satisfy I.C. § 34-4-33-10(c). Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion See footnote and reverse the trial court’s order denying Osterloo’s motion to amend his complaint to add Mr. Wallar as a nonparty.
    Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BROOK, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

T.R. 15(A).