ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael Gene Worden Jeffrey A. Modisett
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
DARRELL TONEY, ) ) Appellant (Defendant Below ), ) ) v. ) Cause No. 49S00-9804-CR-202 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee (Plaintiff Below ). )Cause No. 49G02-9710-CF-150820
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Ruth Reichard, Judge
August 20, 1999
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
A jury found appellant Darrel Toney guilty of dealing in cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park See footnote 1 and of possession of
cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park.
The jury also found
Toney to be a habitual offender.
The court merged the possession
conviction into the dealing conviction and sentenced him to a total
of sixty years--thirty years for dealing enhanced by thirty years
for his habitual offender status. In this direct appeal, Toney
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the
convictions and the habitual offender finding. We disagree.
the exchange, McGavock drove off and radioed the police a
description of the salesman. Shortly thereafter, the police
apprehended Toney. McGavock then drove by the site of apprehension
and signaled to the police that the man in custody was indeed the
person who sold him the cocaine. McGavock gave the rock-like
substance to a detective, who had it tested to confirm that it was
At a second phase of the trial, the State presented evidence
of two prior convictions: burglary and carrying a handgun without
a license. As with the two drug charges, the jury found that the
State had proven Toney was a habitual offender.
The standard of review in sufficiency of evidence claims is firmly established. "On appeal, this Court does not reweigh the
evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, but instead
looks to the evidence most favorable to the verdict and to all the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." Brooks v. State, 560
N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 1990). In other words, we will affirm the
conviction if the admitted evidence contains adequate probative
value from which the jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. Moreover, the uncorroborated testimony of one witness
may be sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on appeal.
Lawhorn v. State, 452 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. 1983).
The evidence here was clearly sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. The informant, McGavock, identified Toney at the scene and again at trial. McGavock's uncorroborated testimony alone is sufficient to sustain Toney's conviction. Lawhorn, 452 N.E.2d at 919. In addition, Toney had the twenty dollars of "buy money" in his possession at the time of his arrest. There is no suggestion of how he otherwise acquired it.
Toney argues that the circumstances surrounding the purchase of cocaine suggest that the "buy" was faked. His contention is unavailing. Our Court will not reassess the credibility of a witness nor reweigh testimony. Brooks, 560 N.E.2d at 53. McGavock's testimony indicates that the sale was authentic. The jury's assessment of him and the evidence he offered should stand. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, McGavock's testimony coupled with Toney's possession of the "buy money" was
more than sufficient for the jury to convict Toney.
Again, because this is a sufficiency question, we do not
reweigh the evidence but instead look at the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict. Harmer v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1139
(Ind. 1983). A habitual offender determination must be vacated,
however, if the appellate court deems the evidence insufficient to
support the finding. Webster, 628 N.E.2d at 1215.
At trial, an Indianapolis Police Department employee, Theresa Bockbrader, testified that cause numbers in Marion County courts are abbreviated. She further testified that the number challenged by Toney, 91060281, is the shortened form of cause number 49G02- 9105-CF-060281 which appears on State's Exhibit 11, an information charging Darrell L. Toney, a black male, birth date 8/22/63, with burglary. Viewing Bockbrader's testimony in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury could rightly
infer Toney's conviction in the prior burglary.
Toney's contention that the document is insufficient because it does not have his name on it is equally unconvincing. The same abbreviated number is also on a Marion County arrest report detailing Toney's arrest for burglary and possession of stolen property. See footnote 8 Moreover, Bockbrader testified that a thumbprint she took of Toney before the habitual offender phase of the trial was identical to the thumbprint on the arrest report. (R. at 388, 400- 01.) A reasonable jury could certainly find that the thumbprints and the same numerical sequence were sufficient to prove that the individual discussed in the documents was the present appellant, Darrell Toney. The evidence was sufficient to support Toney's habitual offender enhancement.
Dickson, Sullivan, Selby, and Boehm, JJ., concur.
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