ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Karen Freeman-Wilson
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
APPEAL FROM THE OHIO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John D. Mitchell, Judge
Cause No. 58D01-9907-CF-065
June 27, 2001
The defendant, Lloyd Flint, was convicted of criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon
as a class D felony,
See footnote attempted battery with a deadly weapon as a
class C felony,See footnote and found to be a habitual offender.See footnote In a
memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals found that it was error to convict
the defendant for both offenses based on the same evidence, but rejected the
defendant's other appellate claims. Seeking further review, the defendant petitions for transfer,
asserting that the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that his habitual offender finding
was based on sufficient evidence. We now grant transfer.
To establish that the defendant is a habitual offender, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been previously convicted of two separate and unrelated felonies. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8. To be "unrelated," the commission of the second felony must be subsequent to the sentencing for the first, and the sentencing for the second felony must have preceded the commission of the current felony for which the enhanced sentence is being sought. Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. 1999). Failure to prove the proper sequencing requires that the habitual offender determination be vacated. Henderson v. State, 534 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Ind. 1989). In addressing the issue of sufficiency of evidence, we will affirm the conviction if, considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was convicted of two previous separate and unrelated felonies beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Here, the evidence did not establish the commission date of the second felony. The State presented evidence that on December 20, 1972, the defendant was convicted and sentenced for an August 31, 1972, forgery, and that on February 16, 1977, he was convicted in Ohio for a murder for which he was arrested in June, 1974. See footnote The evidence does not provide any fact or reasonable inference to establish that the murder was committed after the defendant was sentenced for his forgery conviction.
Transfer is granted, and we hold that the evidence was insufficient to support the habitual offender finding. As to all other issues, the Court of Appeals is summarily affirmed. Ind.Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). See footnote This cause is therefore remanded to the trial court to vacate Flint's conviction and sentence for criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, to vacate the habitual offender enhancement, and to resentence the defendant on his conviction for attempted battery with a deadly weapon.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.