Attorney for Appellant
Attorneys for Appellee
Leanna Weissmann Steve Carter
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christopher C.T. Stephen
Deputy Attorney General
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
The State asked the original trial court to revoke Defendants probation on grounds
of the burglary and theft convictions. The trial court ordered Defendant to
serve the entire four years of the original sentence that had previously been
Defendant appealed the trial courts decision revoking his probation, arguing that the trial
court should have ordered him to serve a sentence less than the entire
four years of the sentence originally suspended because of his youth and alleged
lack of extensive criminal history. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion.
While Sandlin is young, he has amassed a number of criminal convictions
in a relatively short span of time, including robbery, reckless driving, and multiple
counts of theft and burglary, in spite of the fact that he has
been incarcerated for a significant part of his adult life. Sandlin v.
State, 812 N.E.2d 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (mem.).
In arguing that the trial court should have ordered him to serve less
than the entire four years of his suspended sentence, Defendant took issue with
the holdings of the Court of Appeals in two cases that had held
that where a trial court revokes a defendants probation, it has no jurisdiction
to order the defendant to serve anything less than the entire amount of
the sentence originally suspended. Stephens v. State, 801 N.E.2d 1288 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), revd, 818 N.E.2d 936; Pugh v. State, 804 N.E.2d 202 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), revd, 819 N.E.2d 375. Subsequent to the Court of
Appeals decision in this case, we held to the contrary. We concluded
that a trial court has the authority to order executed time following revocation
of probation that is less than the length of the sentence originally imposed.
Stephens, 818 N.E.2d at 942.
Although Defendant never explicitly says so, we infer from his argument that he
contends that the trial court in this case believed that it was required
to impose the entire amount of the sentence originally suspended. If that
had been the case, it might well be appropriate to remand this case
to the trial court for reconsideration in light of our holding in Stephens.
We have reviewed the transcript of the probation revocation hearing and find nothing
in it indicating that the trial court believed it was required to impose
the entire amount of the sentence originally suspended. Absent a fairly explicit
statement to the contrary, we presume a trial court is aware of its
authority to order executed time following revocation of probation that is less than
the length of the sentence originally imposed.
We grant transfer and summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.