FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

JAMES C. SPENCER     PETER A. SCHROEDER
Indianapolis, Indiana     ELLEN WHITE QUIGLEY
    Indianapolis, Indiana

STEVEN D. FRICKE and           )
CHERYL FRICKE,                      )
                                    )
    Appellant-Petitioner,           )
                                    )
        vs.                         )    No. 49A02-9705-CV-281
                                    )
LYNNETTE GRAY,                      )
                                    )
    Appellee-Respondent.            )

RATLIFF, Senior Judge

    VI. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence of fraud.

    VII. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying Gray's motion for judgment on the evidence.

(“Cincinnati”). On March 6, 1992, the Frickes filed a proof of loss under that policy with Cincinnati claiming $335,679.00 as the replacement value of the property they lost in the fire.
    In June of 1992, Steven Fricke received a notice from Cincinnati that Cincinnati was going to deny the Frickes' claim. The Frickes contacted Gray to represent them against Cincinnati and paid a retainer fee totaling $1,500.00 in April of 1992. Gray filed a lawsuit in Johnson County on the Frickes' behalf on February 3, 1993. The case was moved to federal court and was dismissed because it was not filed within the limitation set by the policy. The homeowners policy stated that no suit could be commenced against Cincinnati after the one year anniversary of the loss.
    The Frickes' filed a complaint against Gray, and her law partners, Tom G. Jones, and Russell A. Johnson, on December 6, 1994, alleging negligence and requesting damages for the failure to file the lawsuit on behalf of the Frickes within the one year limitation contained in the insurance policy. Tom G. Jones was dismissed from the lawsuit on December 30, 1996, and Russell A. Johnson was dismissed from the case by oral motion during the trial.
    The trial began January 14th and ended January 17th, 1997, with the jury returning a verdict in favor of Gray. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided below.

(R. 495). No other objection was made.
    On appeal the Frickes make several arguments in support of their contention that reversible error occurred. They argue that 1.) Gray's counsel failed to lay a proper foundation for introduction of that evidence at trial, 2.) the trial court erred in denying the motion in limine as to the prior convictions, and 3.) Gray's counsel failed to comply with Ind. Evidence Rule 609's requirement of written notice of intent to use the evidence. Gray contends that those issues were not properly preserved for appeal because a different reason for the objection was argued at trial. We agree with Gray.
    Our supreme court has held that an objection must be specific in order for the issue to be preserved for appellate review. Willis v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (Ind. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1015. Moreover, where, as here, the party states one reason for an objection at trial, he cannot rely upon another argument for the objection on appeal. See, Palmer v. State, 640 N.E.2d 415, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

N.E.2d at 427. Appellant's objection at trial was that the motion in limine order had been violated. Our review of the record shows that the request to exclude income tax returns as evidence was denied. Therefore, the order was not violated. Moreover, no further objection was made to preserve the issue for appeal when the evidence was offered.
    Appellant also objected on the ground that the income tax return evidence was irrelevant. We have held that such a general objection fails to preserve any error for appellate review. See, Mills v. State, 648 N.E.2d 1212, 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The trial court did not commit reversible error.

    Tendered Instruction No. 10 read as follows:

    Contracts must be given such reasonable construction as will give effect, if possible, according to the parties' intention. Accordingly, a construction of a

contract that is inequitable and gives an unfair or unreasonable advantage to one of the parties will be avoided. Thus, ambiguous contracts will be construed to avoid an unreasonable result.

(R. 207).

     When reviewing a trial court's refusal to give an instruction, we consider whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law, whether there is evidence to support giving the instruction, and whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions given by the court. Snow v. State, 560 N.E.2d 69, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The manner of instructing a jury lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be reversed unless the instruction error is such, taken as a whole, that the charge to the jury misstates the law or otherwise misleads the jury. Reaves v. State, 586 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind. 1992).
    In the present case, the Frickes requested that the trial court find the insurance contract to be ambiguous because of alleged inconsistent facts regarding the information provided in applying for the policy. Cincinnati indicated that it was denying coverage in part because of misrepresentations made on the application. On appeal, however, the Frickes argue that certain provisions of the policy are inconsistent, thereby rendering the policy ambiguous.
    The question of whether an insurance contract is ambiguous is one of law to be determined by the trial court. Millspaugh v. Ross, 645 N.E.2d 14, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Here, the trial court determined that there was no ambiguity in the policy itself. Therefore, there would be no evidence to support giving the instructions at issue. Further, the Frickes are attempting to make a different argument on appeal than that which was made before the

trial court. The trial court did not err in failing to give the tendered instructions on the issue of ambiguity.

lawsuit which needed to be pleaded pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 8(C). The trial court ruled that since Gray had not pleaded those affirmative defenses, Gray was barred from introducing evidence supporting those defenses.
    Gray asserts that it was error to rule that she needed to plead arson and fraud as affirmative defenses. Gray claims that those defenses were available to Cincinnati against the Frickes in the lawsuit over insurance coverage, but that the Frickes had the burden at trial in the malpractice action of proving their success against Cincinnati including overcoming those defenses.
    We find the reasoning contained in the annotation by Susan L. Thomas, J.D., located in 10 A.L.R. 5th to be analogous and helpful here. The annotation reads as follows:
    In many legal matters, the outcome depends to some degree on the team work and cooperation by the client and attorney, especially when the client is called upon to better the case by some affirmative act. Consequently, both the conduct of the client and of the attorney may affect the outcome, and, if the client suffers harm, the allocation of fault in an action for professional negligence. The same defenses may be raised in the legal malpractice context as in any other negligence action. The attorney may claim that a client's conduct is the sole cause of his or her harm, or raise the defense of contributory or comparative negligence. The contributory negligence of a client, as in other negligence cases, is a viable defense to a legal malpractice action, and may preclude recovery where comparative negligence is not recognized or serve to reduce recovery in jurisdictions which do apply principles of comparative negligence. . . .

Susan J. Thomas, Annotation, Legal Malpractice: Negligence or Fault of Client as Defense, 10 A.L.R. 5th 828, 842-843, § 2[a] (1993).     
    In legal malpractice actions, the attorney is in the position of arguing against the success of a claim the attorney had previously determined was worth pursuing. Here, Gray

had to argue that the Frickes would have been unsuccessful in their lawsuit against Cincinnati. Therefore, in the legal malpractice action, Gray was standing in the shoes of Cincinnati. The defenses which were available to Cincinnati, fraud and arson, in the claim involving coverage under the insurance policy, then became Gray's defenses in the legal malpractice action involving her representation of the Frickes.
    The trial court correctly determined that Gray had the burden of proving the affirmative defenses of fraud and arson. Therefore, Gray needed to comply with T. R. 8(C). The trial court did not err in excluding the evidence of fraud and arson because of Gray's non-compliance with T. R. 8(C). Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in excluding the evidence, the error would have been harmless in light of Gray's success at trial.

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