FOR PUBLICATION


ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

HILTON A. TURNER, JR., Pro Se    THOMAS J. TRAURING
Kokomo, Indiana    McGarvey Trauring& Wilson
    Kokomo, Indiana

     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

HILTON A. TURNER, JR.,          )
                                     )
Appellant-Defendant,                 )
                                     )
vs.                                  )    No. 34A02-0004-CV-236
                                     )
BOARD OF AVIATION COMMISSIONERS,     )
and CITY OF KOKOMO, INDIANA,         )
                                     )
Appellees-Plaintiffs.                )

                                 

    APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable John C. Wood, Judge
    Cause No. 34D03-9612-CP-181

    February 14, 2001

    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

SHARPNACK, Chief Judge

whether the trial court abused its discretion in the course of ruling upon Turner’s motion to compel joinder of third party plaintiffs;

whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow two of Turner’s witnesses to testify at trial;

whether the trial court’s denial of Turner’s motion to dismiss is clearly erroneous; and

whether the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees to the Board.

    In addition, the Board raises one issue, which we construe as a cross-appeal and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Turner’s motion to accept a belated filing of materials designated in support of Turner’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
    The relevant facts follow. The Kokomo Board of Aviation Commissioners owns and operates the Kokomo Municipal Airport. In 1993, the Board leased hangar space at the airport to Turner. On April 10, 1995, the Board adopted rewritten Airport Rules and Regulations (“rules”) and rewritten Minimum Standards and Requirements for the Aeronautical Use of the Kokomo Municipal Airport (“standards”) (collectively, “rules and standards”) to govern the airport.See footnote
    Sometime prior to June 1995, Ronald Gilbert, the airport manager, sent all hangar tenants a letter that designated an area of the airport for renters to “self-fuel” their aircraft.See footnote The letter stated that as of June 1, 1995, self-fuelers could only use the designated area and would be fined for self-fueling their aircrafts elsewhere at the airport.
    On May 11, 1996, Turner self-fueled his airplane outside of the designated self-fueling area. On May 13, 1996, Gilbert sent a letter to Turner warning him that he had violated airport regulations by self-fueling his aircraft outside of the designated area and informing him that this would be his only warning. In response, Turner sent a letter to the president of the Board in which he asserted that he believed he had acted in compliance with the rules and standards.
    On June 1, 1996, Gilbert again saw Turner self-fuel his airplane outside of the designated area. Consequently, Gilbert issued a citation to Turner and fined him $100.00. On July 22, 1996, Frank Cade, a supervisor at the airport, saw Turner self-fuel his airplane outside of the designated area. Cade issued a citation to Turner and fined him $200.00.
    After Turner did not pay the fines, the Board filed suit against Turner in small claims court on October 17, 1996, seeking payment of the $300.00 in fines. On December 19, 1996, the case was transferred to the plenary civil docket at Turner’s request. On August 3, 1998, Turner filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court denied Turner’s motion. Subsequently, pursuant to a motion by Turner, the trial court certified its summary judgment ruling for interlocutory appeal. Turner filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with this court, but this court denied the petition.
    On February 11, 2000, the Board filed a motion for sanctions against Turner, alleging that Turner had unnecessarily prolonged the litigation by engaging in obdurate behavior and litigating in bad faith. While that motion was pending, a bench trial was held on February 15, 2000. After the Board ended its presentation of evidence, Turner moved to dismiss the suit, but the trial court denied the motion. After the trial, on March 28, 2000, the trial court entered a final judgment in which it found that the Board was entitled to judgment on both of the fines and ordered Turner to pay the Board $300.00.
    On April 26, 2000, the trial court held a hearing upon the Board’s motion for sanctions. Subsequently, the trial court granted the Board’s motion and ordered Turner to pay $3,422.20 in attorney’s fees to the Board.

Ind. Code § 36-4-9-12.
    In this case, it is undisputed that the Board hired an outside attorney to rewrite the rules and standards without the permission of the city attorney. However, Ind. Code § 8-22-2-5 delineates the powers of local boards of aviation commissioners, and it specifically provides that a board of aviation commissioners may “employ . . . attorneys
. . . .” Ind. Code § 8-22-2-5. When two statutes conflict, a statute dealing with a subject in a specific manner controls over a statute dealing with the same subject in general terms. Isham v. Chaffee, 572 N.E.2d 539, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Because Ind. Code § 8-22-2-5 gives the Board specific independent authority to hire outside counsel, we conclude that it controls over the more general Ind. Code § 36-4-9-12, and the Board was not required to obtain the approval of the city attorney prior to hiring outside counsel. See Vaughn v. King, 167 F.3d 347, 351 & n.3 (7th Cir. 1999) (determining that a municipal sanitation board was not required to obtain the signature of the city attorney before hiring outside attorneys because the board had independent statutory authority to employ such attorneys). Consequently, Turner was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err when it denied his motion for summary judgment on this point.

a reasonable person would not be misled by the error or omission; and

the notice is in substantial compliance with the time and publication requirements applicable under this chapter or any other Indiana statute under which the notice is published.

Ind. Code § 5-3-1-2.3. Thus, we must determine whether the publication was proper despite the omission of the fine schedule. This is a question of first impression.
    A review of our rules of statutory construction is necessary. Our objective when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent expressed in the statute. Chavis v. Patton, 683 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Where, as here, a statute has not previously been construed, the express language of the statute and the rules of statutory construction control the interpretation. Id. We are required to determine and apply the legislative intent underlying the statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience. Id. In so doing, we consider the objects and purposes of the statute, as well as the effects and consequences of such interpretation. Id.
    The first prong of the test set forth in Ind. Code § 5-3-1-2.3 is whether a reasonable person would be misled by the error or omission. See I.C. § 5-3-1-2.3. The statute does not define a “reasonable person.” Undefined words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning. Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1(c). Courts may consult English language dictionaries to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory term. State Bd. of Accounts v. Indiana Univ. Found., 647 N.E.2d 342, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Omitting tautological definitions, “reasonable” is defined, in relevant part, as “amenable to reason; just . . . using or showing reason or sound judgment; sensible . . . not extreme, immoderate, or excessive.” Webster’s New World Dictionary 1118 (3d college ed. 1988). Furthermore, “mislead” is defined, in relevant part, as “to lead into error (of judgment); deceive or delude.” Id. at 867.
    In this case, the rewritten rules and standards imposed a fine not to exceed $100.00 for first-time offenders, imposed a fine not to exceed $200.00 for second-time offenders, and imposed a fine not to exceed $300.00 for third-time offenders. The published rules and standards omitted this fine schedule, however, and instead provided, in relevant part:
The Board has adopted a schedule of Airport Rules and Regulations violations, penalties, and fines imposed. The Schedule of Violations and Penalties shall provide ascending penalties for [a] first offense, [a] second offense and [a] third time offense by an individual violator. A violator with three (3) successive offenses is declared to be a habitual offender of the Airport Rules and Regulations, and the Board may deny such person or persons use of the Airport, enforceable by appropriate civil actions in the local Courts.

Record, p. 475. We conclude that the omission of the exact fine amounts would not deceive a person of sound judgment as to the nature of the fine schedule. Although the precise amounts of the fines are omitted, the published rules and standards inform the reader that fines will be imposed in an ascending schedule and that three violations could cause the offender to be denied the use of the airport. We fail to see how the omission of the mere dollar amounts is misleading. Under these circumstances, we hold that the publication would not mislead a reasonable person. See, e.g., Rush v. Elkhart County Plan Comm’n, 698 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (determining that a publication of a proposed zoning ordinance was not inadequate for omitting the use to which the rezoned land would be put because the publication gave individuals sufficient notice that land in which they had an interest may be affected by the proposed zoning ordinance), trans. denied, 706 N.E.2d 181.
The second prong of the statutory test is whether the publication substantially complies with the applicable time and publication requirements. See I.C. § 5-3-1-2.3. Here, Turner is not challenging the duration of the publication of the rules and standards or the forum in which they were published, and in the absence of a challenge on his part, we conclude that this prong of the statute has also been met. Therefore, despite the absence of the exact fine amounts, the publication complied with the requirements of Ind. Code § 5-3-1-2.3, and the rules and standards are not invalid for imperfect publication. See, e.g., Rush, 698 N.E.2d at 1216. Consequently, Turner was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this point.

Record, p, 536. However, despite this initial reference to commercial activity, Section III also contains extensive provisions regulating flying clubs, which are defined, in relevant part, as “any association or group of persons . . . joining together in the ownership, lease or use of one or more aircraft, for their own individual use or pleasure . . . .” Record, p. 534. In addition, subsection K of section III provides, in part, that it applies “to all airport users desiring to Self-Fuel their individually owned Aircraft . . . .” Record, p. 555. When we read the provisions of section III as a whole, as we are required to do, it appears that the drafter intended for portions of section III, including subsection K, to apply to personal aircraft as well as commercial operations. See Exide Corp., 727 N.E.2d at 479 (noting that “[w]ords, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, and sections of a contract cannot be read alone”). Consequently, subsection K applies to Turner.
    We first turn to subsection 5, which provides that “[a]ircraft fuel handling . . . shall be conducted at least 25 feet from any hangar or other building.” Record, p. 511. This subsection is a general safety provision. It does not provide that a person may self-fuel his aircraft anywhere in the airport so long as it is done more than twenty-five feet from any building, as Turner argues, and it does not preclude the Board from issuing stricter refueling standards. Thus, subsection 5 does not conflict with Subsection K, which provides that “[a]irport users not operating under a lease contract with the airport to conduct refueling operations, shall refuel only in areas designated by the Board for that purpose.” Record, p. 556. There could be a conflict if the Board designated a refueling area that was closer than twenty-five feet from a building, but that issue is not presented here. Therefore, subsection 5 does not control over subsection K and it does not provide Turner with independent authorization to self-fuel his aircraft outside of the designated self-fueling area. Cf. Discovery House, Inc. v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 701 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (determining that the plain language of a zoning ordinance authorized a party’s proposed use of its property), reh’g denied, 701 N.E.2d 577, trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 168.
    Turning to subsection 14 of the rules, it states that public aircraft parking and storage areas may be used “for the purpose of parking and storing aircraft, for the purpose of servicing aircraft with fuel and lubricants and other supplies for use thereon, and for the purpose of making minor or emergency repairs to aircraft.” Record, p. 516. According to its plain language, subsection 14 appears to authorize the refueling of aircraft in any public parking or storage area. Consequently, it conflicts with subsection K, which authorizes the Board to designate a specific area for aircraft refueling. When two provisions conflict, the more specific statute controls over the more general statute. See, e.g., Salcedo, 696 N.E.2d at 436. Here, subsection 14 is a general provision describing the different areas of the airport and the varied uses to which they may be put, which include the fueling of aircraft. In contrast, Subsection K specifically addresses only aircraft refueling and designates a specific refueling area. Therefore, we hold that the more specific provision regarding aircraft self-fueling, subsection K, should control here. See, e.g., Salcedo, 696 N.E.2d at 436. Furthermore, if we read subsection 14 as authorizing the self-fueling of aircraft in any aircraft parking or storage area, as Turner urges, then subsection 14 would invalidate subsection K. Because we are compelled to interpret statutes in a harmonious manner if possible, subsection K must control over subsection 14. See Salcedo, 696 N.E.2d at 436. Consequently, subsection 14 does not provide Turner with permission to self-fuel his aircraft outside the designated area. In the absence of written permission to disregard the self-fueling area, Turner has failed to show that the Board and the City had no right to relief based upon the weight of the evidence and the law. Thus, the trial court’s denial of Turner’s motion to dismiss was not clearly erroneous on this point. See Brane, 590 N.E.2d at 590.

In any civil action, the court may award attorney’s fees as part of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either party:

brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;

continued to litigate the action or defense after the party’s claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or

litigated the action in bad faith.

Pursuant to this statute, a court may award attorney’s fees upon a finding of any one of these elements. Kintzele, 670 N.E.2d at 102.
    Because Ind. Code § 34-1-32-1 is identical to Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1, we conclude that the standard of review applicable to the former statute is also applicable to the latter. This standard involves several steps. “First, we review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and second, we review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusions. Finally, we review the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof under an abuse of discretion standard.” St. Mary Med. Ctr. v. Baker, 611 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), reh’g denied, trans. denied. In examining the findings of fact we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we view only that evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the trial court’s findings and decision. Kahn v. Cundiff, 533 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff’d, 543 N.E.2d 627. In reviewing legal conclusions under the clearly erroneous standard we will not reverse unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
    In this case, the trial court ordered Turner to pay the Board $3,422.20 in attorney’s fees without issuing findings of facts and conclusions thereon. In the absence of findings and conclusions, we will restrict our review to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Baker, 611 N.E.2d at 137.
    Turning first to Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b)(1) & (b)(2), we must determine whether Turner’s defenses to the Board’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or whether he continued to litigate those defenses after they clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. As we have previously said of these factors:
A claim is frivolous within the meaning of this section if (a) it is taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person, (b) if the lawyer is unable to make a good faith and rational argument on the merits of the action, or (c) unable to support the action taken by a good faith and rational argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A claim or defense is unreasonable if based on the totality of the circumstances, including the law and facts known at the time of filing, no reasonable attorney would consider the claim or defense worthy of litigation or justified. A claim or defense is groundless within the meaning of this section if no facts exist which support the legal claim relied on and presented by the losing party.

Ira, 577 N.E.2d at 597.
    Here, throughout this case Turner, either by counsel or pro se, has challenged the legitimacy of the Board’s rewritten rules and standards, as well as the legitimacy of Gilbert’s designation of a self-fueling area. At each stage, he has for the most part offered reasonable arguments and cited authority to support his contentions. Indeed, the trial court initially found in Turner’s favor on the Board’s $100.00 claim. See footnote Although the trial court ultimately found all of Turner’s claims to be without merit, and we have also rejected all of his claims other than those we have remanded for further proceedings, we cannot say that his defenses are unreasonable or so lacking in factual or authoritative support that they are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. See Bagnall v. Town of Beverly Shores, 726 N.E.2d 782, 787 (Ind. 2000). Consequently, Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b)(1) & (b)(2) do not support the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the Board. See id.
    Turning to Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b)(3), we must determine whether Turner litigated in bad faith. We have previously defined bad faith as follows:
[T]he absence of good faith is bad faith, but bad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Rather, it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. It is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

Watson v. Thibodeau, 559 N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Oxendine v. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 612, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
    The Board cites the length of the litigation, Turner’s numerous filings to the trial court, and Turner’s simultaneous lawsuits before the trial court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) as proof of Turner’s bad faith. We will address all three points.
First, while this lawsuit is over four years old, our review of the chronological case summary reveals that the Board as well as Turner moved several times to reset the trial or to reset pretrial conferences. Thus, Turner is not solely at fault for the case’s age. More importantly, the Board points to no evidence that Turner’s requests for continuances were motivated by ill will. Second, Turner filed many motions with the trial court, but the Board points to no evidence that Turner’s numerous filings were intended to harass. Indeed, several of Turner’s motions, if successful, were dispositive and could have greatly shortened the litigation. Third, although Turner did maintain actions before the FAA and United States Court of Appeals while this case was before the trial court, the Board again fails to point to any evidence of malicious intent on Turner’s part. Turner has vigorously defended himself, perhaps more vigorously than the value of the Board’s claims would seem to require, but there is simply no evidence of ill will on his part. See footnote Consequently, Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b)(3) also does not support the imposition of attorney’s fees, and the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees to the Board.See footnote See Red Arrow Ventures, Ltd., v. Miller, 692 N.E.2d 939, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (overruled in part on other grounds by Scott v. Randle, 697 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh’g denied), trans. denied Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Turner’s motion for summary judgment, but we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings on the remaining claims. Those claims are: 1) whether the Board violated Indiana’s open meeting law in the course of adopting the rewritten rules and standards; 2) whether Gilbert had the authority to designate a self-fueling area; and 3) whether Gilbert was required to seek the approval of the state fire prevention and building safety commission before designating a self-fueling area and failed to do so. We also reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Board. In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Vaidik, J. concurs.
Baker, J. concurs and dissents with separate opinion.

BAKER, Judge, concurring and dissenting.
I fully concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the award of attorney fees entered in the Board’s favor. I cannot agree, however, with the vacation of the $300 judgment and the decision to remand this cause to the trial court for “further proceedings on [Turner’s] remaining claims.” Slip op. at 32.
Citing Trisler v. Indiana Ins. Co., 575 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the majority concludes that the denial of Turner’s motion for summary judgment was proper because he failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to his claims that: 1) the Board acted improperly in holding an alleged “closed-door” meeting when approving the fine schedule; 2) Gilbert lacked authority as the Board’s agent to designate a self-fueling area; and 3) Gilbert and the Board did not seek the approval of the building safety commission regarding a self-fueling area. Slip op. at 9, 10, 14-16.
At the time of trial, the judge informed the parties that he did not “intend to rehash everything that we have already done on the Summary Judgment.” Record at 146. The judge further commented that “the issue of whether or not the Board approved the fueling or anything that was raised in the Summary Judgment no, you can’t raise it again. Now, when the case is over with, if you think I’ve made an error in my ruling, you are more than welcome to appeal it.” R. at 147.
I can agree with the majority’s view that Turner should have been afforded an opportunity at trial to proffer additional evidence regarding the merits of his claim, and that he was effectively precluded from doing so. However, Turner did nothing to establish that the trial court’s exclusion of such purported evidence was improper. He did nothing to alert the trial court that he had any additional evidence to offer, which was separate and apart from that designated at the summary judgment proceedings. In other words, Turner has not demonstrated the substance, purpose, relevancy and materiality of excluded evidence that would enable us to determine on appeal whether the exclusion was proper. See Donaldson v. Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp., 632 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). As a result, I vote to affirm the $300 judgment entered in the Board’s favor.