ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER:    ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
STEPHEN H. PAUL    THOMAS F. BEDSOLE
BRENT A. AUBERRY    JEFFREY S. DIBLE
BAKER & DANIELS     LOCKE REYNOLDS LLP
Indianapolis, IN    Indianapolis, IN
    
______________________________________________________________________
     IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT

AMERICAN UNITED LIFE                                                   )
INSURANCE COMPANY,                                                          )
                                                                            )
    Petitioner,                                                             )
                                                                            )
    v.                                                                      )   Cause No. 49T10-0210-TA-117
                                                                            )
JAMES P. MALEY, JR., ASSESSOR                                               )
OF CENTER TOWNSHIP,                                                         )
MARION COUNTY,                                                              )
                                                                            )
    Respondent.                                                             )    

Whether AUL’s land should have been valued at $75 per square foot under the Marion County Land Order (land order); and,

Whether AUL’s land should have received a negative influence factor.

contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations;

without observance of procedure required by law; or
unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence.
Ind. Code § 33-3-5-14.8(e)(1)-(5) (West Supp. 2003). The party seeking to overturn the Indiana Board’s final determination bears the burden of proving its invalidity. See Osolo Township Assessor v. Elkhart Maple Lane Assocs., L.P., 789 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).

improperly given an “A-1” grade or improperly denied an “A-2” grade. See footnote See Sollers Pointe Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 790 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003) (footnote added). In so doing, AUL was required to submit “specific evidence tied to the descriptions of the various grade classifications.” See id. (internal quotations, citation omitted).
At the administrative hearing, AUL presented the testimony of its property tax consultant, Ms. Marta Haza (Haza), and its construction engineer consultant, Mr. Thomas Scheele (Scheele). In addition, AUL presented numerous reports prepared by Haza and Scheele. First among these documents was an “Interior Finish Report” (Report). The Report included photographs and descriptions of each of the floors in AUL’s building. Based on these descriptions, a grade factor was assigned to each floor. See footnote Next, AUL averaged the recommended grades of all 38 floors to arrive at an interior grade factor of 124.741% (“B+1”) for the entire building. ( See Cert. Admin. R. at 166.) On the theory that the exterior of its building should be graded an “A,” AUL then calculated the overall composite grade of “A-2” for the entire building (both interior and exterior). See footnote ( See Cert. Admin. R. at 48 (footnote added).)
AUL also submitted a “Common Area Interior Finish Comparison Spreadsheet” (Spreadsheet) to show how its building was similar to several allegedly comparable office buildings in downtown Indianapolis, Indiana. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 324-25.) Specifically, the Spreadsheet compared the interior finish of AUL’s building with the interior finishes of these comparable buildings: Market Tower – a 31-story office building; First Indiana Plaza – a 28-story office building; and, One Indiana Square – a 36-story office building. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 324-25.) These comparable buildings each received an “A-2” grade. (See also Cert. Admin. R. at 273, 292, 300.)
For instance, the Spreadsheet made a side-by-side comparison of all the buildings’ main lobby floor finishes: “Polished Amerillo Gold granite” (AUL); “Honed & Polished Brown Carnelean granite” (Market Tower); “Polished granite” (First Indiana Plaza); and, “Combination Carrara marble and granite” (One Indiana Square). (Cert. Admin. R. at 324-25.) Haza and Scheele concluded that these finishes were all “fairly comparable” to one another in cost, quality, workmanship, and design. (Cert. Admin. R. at 553-55.) The Spreadsheet also indicated when particular features present in the “A-2” graded buildings were inferior or superior to those of AUL’s building. For example, the Spreadsheet stated that the “custom fabricated gypsum board boxed ceiling” in the Market Tower building was a more expensive finish than the “painted gypsum board” ceiling in the main lobbies of the AUL, First Indiana Plaza, and One Indiana Square buildings. See footnote (Cert. Admin. R. at 324-25 (footnote added).)
    AUL’s evidence provided a floor-by-floor analysis of the quality of the interior features of its building. Additionally, it compared the interior finishes of its building with those of Market Tower, First Indiana Plaza, and One Indiana Square. Having demonstrated that its building’s interior finishes were indicative of “A-2” grade, as well as showing how its building was similar to other buildings with an “A-2” grade, AUL established its prima facie case that its building should have been graded an “A-2.”
Having made its prima facie case, the burden then shifted to the Assessor to rebut AUL’s evidence. See Clark v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998) (stating that once a taxpayer presents a prima facie case, it must be rebutted with substantial evidence). At the administrative hearing, the Assessor first questioned Scheele and Haza. In none of these exchanges, however, did the Assessor offer evidence rebutting their conclusions as contained in the Report and Spreadsheet. Rather, he asked seemingly irrelevant questions such as “[y]ou never worked for [the builders] when they built the [AUL] building, right?” and “did you take into consideration the rental rates of the AUL building?” (Cert. Admin. R. at 561, 564.)
    The Assessor also introduced a witness, Mr. Ernest Clark (Clark) of the Center Township Assessor’s Office, who testified that the AUL building was “probably an ‘A’ grade building” because
[the building is] not a square building[.] And anytime you start adding angles to a building, you increase the cost . . . of the building itself[.] [P]lus[,] the design is inherently more expensive because if you don’t have square corners, you use more materials.

(Cert. Admin. R. 576-79 (footnote added).)
The Assessor also produced another witness from the Center Township Assessor’s office, Mr. Frank Corsaro (Corsaro). Corsaro inquired (generally) why AUL chose the comparable buildings it did, as opposed to others. ( See Cert. Admin. R. at 585-87.) Corsaro also explained that at the time the AUL building was built in 1982, he toured the building and thought it was a “beautiful building” that “kind of made downtown.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 593.)
The Assessor’s evidence simply fails to impeach or rebut AUL’s evidence. First, the Assessor did not demonstrate the relevancy of questions such as “[y]ou never worked for [the builders] when they built the [AUL] building, right?” and “did you take into consideration the rental rates of the AUL building?” Consequently, the irrelevant questions do not rebut AUL’s composite grade calculation. See Standard Plastic Corp. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 773 N.E.2d 379, 384 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2002) (stating that relevant evidence is such evidence “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion”). Second, Clark’s testimony that the exterior architectural features of the AUL building support an “A” grade does not rebut Haza and Scheele’s testimony: they admitted the grade for the exterior of the building should be an “A” grade. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 544.) Furthermore, Cosaro’s statements that the AUL building was “beautiful” and “made downtown” are merely conclusions and do not qualify as probative evidence. See Lacy Diversified Indus., Ltd. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 799 N.E.2d 1215, 1221(Ind. Tax Ct. 2003) (finding that statements such as a building is a “grand old building” are nothing more than conclusions and therefore, not probative evidence).
The Assessor failed to rebut AUL’s prima facie case. The Court finds that AUL is entitled to an “A-2” grade factor and therefore REVERSES the Indiana Board’s final determination. See footnote

$10-$20 per square foot for the northern portion of the property bounded by New York Street from Illinois Street to Capital Avenue; and,

$70-$100 per square foot for a northwest to southeast diagonal portion of the property, which at one time was bisected by Indiana Avenue from Ohio Street to New York Street (Indiana Avenue was vacated in 1979).

(See Cert. Admin. R. at 402-04.)
Under the plain meaning of the land order, AUL’s land was to be valued at $70-$100 per square foot, except for the triangular portion of Square 34 bounded by New York Street to the north and Illinois Street to the east, its hypotenuse being Indiana Avenue. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 400.) Land in that triangle is to be valued at $10-$20 per square foot. See The Precedent v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 659 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995) (stating that “[i]n construing a land order, the first and foremost rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the land commission’s intent, and the most reliable guide to that intent is the language of the land order itself”).
Nevertheless, the Assessor interpreted the land order as authorizing the use of one base rate only: the $70-$100 per square foot rate. Indeed, the Assessor asserts that “there is nothing in [the land order] that indicates that [Assessors are] supposed to apply the ten to twenty dollar range to this triangle and the seventy to a hundred [dollar range] to this triangle.” (Oral Argument Tr. at 105.) Additionally, the Assessor contends that because the land order provides for a $70 - $100 per square foot base rate along what was formerly Indiana Avenue, the $70 - $100 per square foot is the appropriate value “anywhere from the geometric center of Square 34 to the southeast corner or the northwest corner of the city block.” (Resp’t Br. at 24.) Finally, the Assessor asserts that the $70 - $100 per square foot base rate along Ohio Street applies to “land anywhere along Ohio Street between Illinois Street and Capitol Avenue.” (Resp’t Br. at 24.)
The Assessor’s interpretation of the land order effectively ignores the $10-$20 base rate range assigned to the triangle of land at the northeastern corner of Square 34. In reading a land order, however, “all language used . . . is presumed to have meaning.” The Precedent, 659 N.E.2d at 705 (citations omitted). Furthermore, this Court will “read the [land order] as a whole, and not sections or parts of it piecemeal.” Roehl Transp., Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 653 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1995) (citation omitted). See footnote Consequently, under the plain meaning of the entire land order, the Assessor must apply both the $70-$100 per square foot base rate range and the $10-$20 per square foot base range, as defined, in assessing AUL’s land. Therefore, the Court REVERSES the Indiana Board’s final determination valuing AUL’s land at $75 per square foot. See footnote