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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

TERRANCE COLLINS,	)	
	)	
Appellant-Defendant,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 15A01-0901-CR-4
	)	
STATE OF INDIANA,	)	
	)	
Appellee-Plaintiff.	)	

APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable James Humphrey, Judge
Cause No. 15C01-0612-FC-62

July 22, 2009

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge

Case Summary

Terrance Collins appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation. We affirm.

Issue

Collins raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the entire seven years of his suspended sentence.

Facts

On June 20, 2007, Collins pled guilty to Class C felony possession of a lookalike substance with intent to distribute. Collins's plea agreement provided for an eight-year sentence, with seven years suspended to probation. According to the rules and conditions of probation, Collins was not to commit another criminal offense.

On March 18, 2008, and March 25, 2008, Collins was charged with obstructing official business and theft, respectively. On August 9, 2008, Collins was charged with theft and criminal trespass. As a result, Collins's probation officer filed a notice of probation violation. During the initial hearing on December 10, 2008, Collins admitted to violating his probation, and the court found him in violation. On December 11, 2008, the court revoked Collins's probation and ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended seven-year sentence. Collins now appeals.

Analysis

Collins contends the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve the entire seven years of his suspended sentence. We review "a trial court's sentencing decision in a probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion." Sanders v. State, 825

N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. "An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances." Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). "If the trial court finds the person violated a condition of probation, it may order execution of any part of the sentence that was suspended. . . ." Rosa v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3). "The violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation." Id.

Collins argues that the seven-year sentence is unnecessary to bring about his reform, and asserts that his admission should be seen as an acknowledgment of a problem and a desire to change. Though we commend Collins for assuming responsibility, this does not alter the facts. Collins has an extensive criminal history, including nine juvenile adjudications, twelve adult convictions, and four probation violations. Probation is a rehabilitative tool that "gives the defendant an opportunity to show he is able to rehabilitate himself and become a useful member of society. . . ." Hart v. State, 889 N.E.2d 1266, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). After considering Collins's criminal and juvenile history, the trial court found that probation was no longer the appropriate sanction. It was within the trial court's discretion to order execution of the entire suspended sentence. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(g)(3). Given Collins's criminal history and past disregard for probation, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Collins to serve the entire seven years of his suspended sentence.

Conclusion

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Collins to serve the entire seven years of his suspended sentence. We affirm.

Affirmed.

BAKER, C.J., and MAY, J., concur.