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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

K.S.,	)	
	)	
Appellant-Petitioner,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 93A02-1011-EX-1349
	)	
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT and STAFF SOURCE, LLC,	)	
	)	
Appellees-Respondents.	)	

APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Review Board
Cause No. 10-R-04797

May 31, 2011

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge

K.S. appeals the Review Board's decision to deny him unemployment benefits. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In early March 2010, K.S. was employed with Staff Source, which assigned him to temporary employment with Dietrich Industries. On or about March 2, K.S.'s supervisors at Dietrich Industries sent him home at noon because they did not have any work, but told him he might be needed in a few weeks. K.S. did not contact Staff Source with this information until seventeen days after that date.

When K.S. contacted Staff Source, a representative indicated another employee had been given K.S.'s placement on March 5 because K.S. had not reported to work. K.S. filed for unemployment compensation and, after a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), his application was denied. The Review Board affirmed the ALJ's decision.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Our standard of review regarding the Review Board's decision to grant or deny unemployment benefits is well-settled:

> When reviewing a decision by the Review Board, our task is to determine whether the decision is reasonable in light of its findings. Our review of the Review Board's findings is subject to a "substantial evidence" standard of review. In this analysis, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board's findings. Further, we will reverse the decision only if there is no substantial evidence to support the Review Board's findings.

Quakenbush v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 891 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).

When an individual voluntarily leaves his employment "without good cause in connection with the work," he may not receive unemployment compensation benefits. Ind. Code § 22–4–15–1(a). Whether an employee leaves his employment without good cause in connection with the work is a question of fact to be determined by the Review Board. *Indianapolis Osteopathic Hosp. Inc. v. Jones*, 669 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). The claimant has the burden to show that he voluntarily left employment for good cause in connection with the work. *Id*. He must show that the reasons for leaving the employment were "objectively related to the employment" and would "impel a reasonably prudent person" to behave likewise. *Id*. "Good cause" does not include "purely personal and subjective reasons which are unique to the employee." *Geckler v. Review Bd.*, 244 Ind. 473, 477–78, 193 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1963).

The ALJ found K.S. voluntarily left his employment because he "did not attempt to contact Staff Source until seventeen days" after employees of Dietrich Industries "told him there was not any work available for him and sent him home during the shift of work." (App. at 39.) K.S. testified he did not contact Staff Source until a "couple weeks had passed," (Tr. at 8), thus confirming Staff Source's assertion that he stopped reporting for work.

K.S. claims he thought he would be contacted by Dietrich Industries once work was again available. However, the Staff Source representative indicated, "You read and signed policies and procedures, so if you did, you would understand that we [Staff Source] will be contacting you, we will be finding you additional work if you need it . . ." (*Id*. at 13.) K.S.'s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. *See*

Quakenbush, 891 N.E.2d at 1054. Accordingly, we affirm.[1]

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.

[1] K.S. also argues the Review Board abused its discretion because it did not allow him to present additional evidence at his hearing. However, K.S.'s admission he did not contact Staff Source for two weeks is dispositive of the question whether he quit his job.