FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CLIFFORD W. SHEPARD    THOMAS J. GRAU
Consumer Protection Law Offices     CAROL A. NEMETH
Indianapolis, Indiana    White & Raub
            Indianapolis, Indiana

GREG A. SPEARS,         )

                             )
Appellant-Plaintiff,         )
                             )
vs.                          )    No. 49A02-0003-CV-169
                             )
TIMOTHY L. BRENNAN,          )
                             )
Appellee-Defendant.          )

2.    Whether Brennan’s debt collection notice to Spears complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).

3.    Whether Brennan violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) when he scheduled two hearing dates on the debt collection claim and obtained a default judgment against Spears within the thirty-day debt validation period.

4.    Whether Brennan violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) when he obtained a default judgment against Spears after Spears had notified Brennan in writing that he was disputing the debt and before Brennan had mailed verification of the debt to Spears.

    We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

Record at 17 (emphasis added). When Spears stopped making the loan payments, American General retained Brennan to collect the unpaid contract balance.
    On October 24, 1996, Brennan sent a debt collection notice See footnote to Spears that read:See footnote
RE:    Creditor: American General Finance, Inc.
    Balance: $2,918.47 less applicable rebates

Dear Mr. Spears:

    This communication is from a debt collector and is an attempt to recover a debt owed to the above named Creditor[;] any information obtained will be used for that purpose. Verification of the debt or the name and address of the original Creditor, if different than the above, will be provided upon written request to this office within thirty (30) days[;] otherwise the debt will be assumed valid.

Record at 33. On October 30, 1996, Brennan filed a notice of claim against Spears on behalf of American General in small claims court, seeking recovery of the $2,918.47 unpaid contract balance and $972.82 in attorney’s fees, for a total judgment of $3,891.29. Brennan’s notice of claim further stated:
THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO RECOVER YOUR DEBT OWED TO [AMERICAN GENERAL][;] ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. VERIFICATION OF THE DEBT, OR, THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, IF DIFFERENT THAN THE ABOVE, WILL BE PROVIDED UPON WRITTEN REQUEST TO THIS OFFICE WITHIN 30 DAYS[;] OTHERWISE THE DEBT WILL BE ASSUMED VALID. A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION WILL NOT RESULT IN A DELAY OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.

Record at 16. The small claims court set the debt collection claim for hearing on November 13, 1996, and in the notice of claim ordered Spears to appear on that date.
    Spears retained attorney Clifford Shepard to represent him in the debt collection claim on November 12, 1996, on which date counsel moved to continue the hearing. The small claims court granted the motion for continuance, and Shepard subsequently agreed with Brennan by telephone to reschedule the hearing for November 27, 1996. Also on November 12, Shepard sent Brennan a letter informing him that Spears “disputes your debt collection-related allegations, denies the same, and demands strict proof and verification thereof. This dispute, denial, and demand are made in accordance with federal law.” Record at 21.
    On November 26, 1996, Shepard again moved to continue the hearing on grounds that Brennan, on behalf of American General, “has failed or refused to provide the requested validation and verification” of the debt despite Spears’ demand of the same. Record at 22. The small claims court denied the motion for continuance as untimely and proceeded with the hearing on November 27, 1996. Neither Spears nor Shepard attended the hearing, and the trial court entered a default judgment against Spears in the amount of $3,891.29.
    After learning that a default judgment had been entered against Spears on the debt collection claim, Shepard contacted Brennan, who agreed not to object to a motion to set aside the default judgment. No such motion was ever filed with the small claims court. Instead, Spears filed for bankruptcy and brought an action against Brennan seeking civil liability under the FDCPA. Brennan and Spears filed cross motions for summary judgment on the FDCPA action. The trial court denied Spears’ motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of Brennan, concluding that “[a] careful consideration of the record in this cause discloses that . . . Brennan, without any issues of material fact[], has not violated the provisions of the [FDCPA.]” Record at 164. This appeal ensued.

(b)    Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.

(c)    Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(B). 15 U.S.C. § 1692f further provides:
A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1)    The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
    In his consumer credit contract with American General, Spears agreed to pay “reasonable attorney’s fees” incurred by the company for the collection of any unpaid contract balance. Record at 17. In the notice of claim subsequently filed on behalf of American General, Brennan sought $972.82 in attorney’s fees, equal to one-third of the principal amount of Spears’ $2,918.47 debt. The attorney’s fees requested were added to the judgment against Spears for a total money judgment of $3,891.29. Brennan conceded in response to a request for admissions that he regularly seeks a one-third contingent fee for his debt collection services, and he admitted that he did not spend more than two hours preparing the notice of claim against Spears. Consequently, Spears asserts that Brennan violated the foregoing provisions of the FDCPA “by misrepresenting the amount of attorney’s fees to which he was entitled.” Brief of Appellant at 14. Spears argues that “[a]lthough . . . Brennan believes multiplying the principal [unpaid contract] balance by one-third . . . is a reasonable fee, . . . this method [is] inappropriate.” Brief of Appellant at 15.
    Brennan responds that, regardless of whether a one-third contingent fee was in fact reasonable in the debt collection case, he did not “mispresent” the amount of attorney’s fees to which he was entitled simply “by requesting attorney’s fees in the amount of approximately one-third . . . of the principal loan balance.” Brief of Appellee at 6 (emphasis in original). Brennan points out that Spears “did not avail himself of the opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the amount of [attorney’s] fees by . . . appealing the [small claims] court’s judgment” on the debt collection claim and argues that Spears “cannot now challenge the award of attorney[’s] fees by asserting a claim under the FDCPA.” Brief of Appellee at 6. We agree with Brennan.
    This court held in Valparaiso Technical Inst., Inc. v. Porter County Treasurer, 676 N.E.2d 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), that a contingent fee agreement in a collection case that is the product of a bargain between the attorney and client is presumed to be reasonable as between them. Id. at 420 (citing Waxman Indus., Inc. v. Trustco Dev. Co., 455 N.E.2d 376, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)). We explained that where such a fee is subtracted from the amount recovered, the third-party debtor is unaffected by the fee agreement. Id. We noted, however, that it is an entirely different matter when the fee is added to the judgment against the debtor, as was the case here. Under such circumstances, the debtor has a direct pecuniary interest in how the fee is determined. Id. Thus, a one-third contingent fee that is reasonable when deducted from a client’s recovery may be unreasonable when added to a debtor’s judgment. Id. As this court observed in Waxman:
A contingent fee, even between an attorney and his client, is not enforceable unless it is founded upon a prior agreement. It then follows inexorably that a contingent fee contract of the obligee on an instrument with his attorney cannot be enforced against the party obligor who has merely agreed in the instrument to pay a “reasonable attorney fee” for the fundamental reason that the obligor has never agreed or has never even been consulted concerning the arrangement.

Waxman, 455 N.E.2d at 381. Accordingly, without “other objective evidence of reasonableness[,]” a contingent fee cannot be added to a judgment against a third party. Valparaiso Technical Inst., 676 N.E.2d at 420-21; see also Venture Enters. v. Ardsley Distr., 669 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that contingency fee agreements are not controlling as to third parties).
    Here, Brennan sought a one-third contingent fee of $972.82 for the collection of Spears’ debt to American General, an amount “presumed to be reasonable” as between Brennan and American General. See footnote See Valparaiso Technical Inst., 676 N.E.2d at 420. Contrary to Spears’ apparent position, Brennan was not prohibited as a matter of law from seeking a contingent fee, but he was required to present “other objective evidence of reasonableness” in order for the attorney’s fees to be added to the judgment against Spears. See id. (observing that award of attorney’s fees as percentage of money judgment against third party for collection of delinquent real property taxes is not per se unreasonable).
    Moreover, as Brennan suggests, “the determination of the reasonableness of the amount of attorney[’]s fees requested in the notice of claim was a decision for the small claims court.” Brief of Appellee at 7. The small claims court awarded the full amount of attorney’s fees requested by Brennan, and Spears’ subsequent claim of misrepresentation under the FDCPA is tantamount to a collateral attack on that award. See Zsamba ex rel. Zsamba v. Community Bank, Abilene, Kansas, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (D. Kan. 1999) (concluding that debtors could have informed state court of ownership dispute of collateral prior to entry of default judgment in debt collection action; observing that plaintiffs were using FDCPA claim as collateral attack on state court order giving bank possession of and right to sell collateral to satisfy debt). If Spears had wanted to challenge the propriety of the small claims court’s award of attorney’s fees, he should have moved to set aside the default judgment on the debt collection claim or appealed from that determination. An action under the FDCPA is not the proper remedy.
    We hold, therefore, that Brennan did not violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e or f(1) when he merely requested $972.82 in attorney’s fees in his debt collection claim against Spears. The trial court’s entry of summary judgment on this issue is affirmed.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5); Walker v. National Recovery, Inc., 200 F.3d 500, 501 (7th Cir. 1999). Debt collection notices sent to consumers must not confuse them about the verification rights established by the FDCPA. Walker, 200 F.3d at 501; Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that key consideration is that unsophisticated consumer is to be protected against confusion, whatever form it takes). Indeed, the Act “leaves no room for deviation in the language of the . . . notice.” Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assoc., 122 F.3d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1997).
    Here, Brennan’s debt collection notice stated that “[v]erification of the debt . . . will be provided upon written request to this office within thirty (30) days[;] otherwise the debt will be assumed valid.” Record at 33. Spears alleges that this notice violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) in three respects: (1) it failed to inform Spears that he could dispute a portion of the debt; (2) it failed to inform Spears adequately that he had thirty days from the date of receipt to dispute the debt; and (3) it imposed an invalid requirement that Spears dispute the debt in writing. We address each alleged violation in turn.
    Spears initially contends that Brennan’s debt collection notice violated 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(3) because it failed to inform Spears that he could dispute any portion of the debt. He cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982), where the court held that, based on the clear language of the statute, “Congress clearly required the notice to inform the debtor that he could dispute any portion of the debt.” The Baker court concluded that absent a specific directive that a debtor may dispute not just the entire debt but any portion thereof, “[a] debtor who does owe a valid obligation to the creditor but could dispute finance charges, interest, or have some valid defense, might not be put on notice that he could dispute these additional charges.” Id. Brennan, in turn, relies on the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc. 953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that it is “implicit” within the meaning of a notice advising a debt may be disputed “that the claim can be wholly, or partially challenged.” Id. at 1028-29.
    While recognizing these competing authorities, we need not decide whether a debt collection notice must explicitly inform the consumer he can dispute any portion of a debt within thirty days of receiving the notice because we conclude, as a matter of law, that Brennan’s notice did not adequately advise Spears he could dispute the debt to American General at all. In so doing, we observe that Brennan’s debt collection notice is virtually identical to the notice in Baker. The Baker court declared that the notice “barely informs the debtor that he may even dispute the entire debt[,]” much less any portion thereof. Baker, 677 F.2d at 778. In particular, while both notices contain a statement that verification of the debt will be provided if requested in writing, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4), the only statement that refers remotely to a dispute regarding the validity of the debt, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3), is the sentence “otherwise the debt will be assumed valid.” Record at 33; see Baker, 677 F.2d at 778. Further, before concluding that it was “implicit” in a debt collection notice that a claim can be wholly or partially challenged, the court in Smith specifically noted that the notice at issue there “adequately informs the reader that the debt must be disputed, if at all, within thirty days[.]” Smith, 953 F.2d at 1029. Unlike the notices in this case and in Baker, the notice in Smith unequivocally informed the debtor that “All portions of this claim shall be assumed valid unless disputed within thirty days of receiving this notice[.]” Id. In evaluating the tendency of language to confuse or mislead, we look not to the most sophisticated consumers but to the unsophisticated consumer. Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, 211 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000). See footnote The language of Brennan’s debt collection notice was insufficient on its face to put Spears on notice that he could dispute the validity of the debt, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).
    We also conclude that Brennan’s debt collection notice did not adequately inform Spears that he had thirty days from his receipt thereof to dispute the validity of the debt and, thus, failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). The debt collection notice advised Spears only that he must seek verification of the debt “within thirty days[;] otherwise the debt will be assumed valid.” Record at 33 (emphasis added). It is unclear from the face of the notice whether Spears had thirty days from the date the notice was sent, October 24, 1996, or the date it was received, See footnote to seek verification of the debt. See Cavallaro v. Law Office of Shapiro & Kreisman, 933 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that notice advising debtor should dispute debt within thirty days from date of “this notice” rather than within thirty days of receipt of notice violated FDCPA). This facial confusion is compounded by the fact that Brennan’s notice of claim, filed in small claims court on October 30, 1996, contains an identical advisement that “VERIFICATION OF THE DEBT . . . WILL BE PROVIDED UPON WRITTEN REQUEST TO THIS OFFICE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS[;] OTHERWISE THE DEBT WILL BE ASSUMED VALID.” Record at 16 (emphasis added).
    Finally, Spears maintains that Brennan’s notice advising him that “verification of the debt . . . will be provided upon written request” imposed an invalid requirement that he dispute the validity of the debt to American General in writing. Record at 33. Without deciding whether the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from requiring a debtor to dispute the validity of a debt in writing, See footnote we determine only that Brennan did not violate the FDCPA by advising Spears that verification of the debt would be provided if requested in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) clearly requires that a debt collector’s notice contain a statement that verification of the debt will be provided if requested in writing within thirty days of receipt of the debt collection notice. Brennan properly advised Spears of this verification right under the FDCPA.    
    We thus hold that Brennan’s debt collection notice failed, as a matter of law, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) and, specifically, with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). It did not adequately advise Spears of his right to dispute the validity of the debt or of his right to do so within thirty days from receipt of the debt collection notice. We therefore reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Brennan on this issue.

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (emphasis added). On November 12, 1996, nineteen days after the date of Brennan’s debt collection letter, Spears’ counsel Shepard sent Brennan a letter declaring that Spears “disputes your debt collection-related allegations, denies the same, and demands strict proof and verification thereof.” Record at 21. As such, Brennan should have ceased his debt collection efforts immediately upon receiving that letter. Instead, Brennan proceeded to obtain a default judgment against Spears on the debt collection claim before he had mailed Spears the necessary verification and, thus, violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
    Brennan maintains, however, that there was no violation of the FDCPA because he “sent adequate verification of the debt [to Spears] in the October 30, 1996 notice of claim.” Brief of Appellee at 13. Specifically, Brennan claims that a copy of the consumer credit contract between Spears and American General attached to the notice of claim provided sufficient verification of the debt within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). We cannot agree.
    The contract in no way provides sufficient verification of the debt. A review of the document reveals that it identifies only the terms of Spears’ loan, including a 17.99% annual interest rate and the original loan amount of $2,561.59. The loan agreement contains no accounting of any payments made by Spears, the dates on which those payments were made, the interest which had accrued, or any late fees which had been assessed once Spears stopped making the required payments. Indeed, the existing unpaid contract balance at the time Brennan sent the debt collection notice was at least $350.00 more than the original loan amount. Therefore, Brennan violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) when he failed to cease collection of the debt by obtaining a default judgment against Spears after Spears had notified Brennan in writing that he was disputing the debt but before Brennan had mailed verification of the debt to Spears. See footnote We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Brennan on this issue.