



2025 Special Election Post-Election Audit Summary Report

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Introduction

The Voting System Technical Oversight Program (VSTOP) was authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State (SOS) to conduct post-election audits (PEA) on the 2025 Special Election. Upon the voluntary participation of County Election Officials and recommendation of VSTOP, two counties were granted designation as post-election audit counties by the SOS. Clark and Lake counties successfully completed post-election audits of their 2025 Special Elections. This report will summarize all Special Election audit activities and the official results for each audit completed.

Two different, audit types were used throughout these post-election audits. Lake County completed a Ballot Comparison Audit and Clark County completed a Ballot Polling Audit. These two types of post- election audits, use risk-limiting audit procedures, as applicable, using the Stark Audit Tool developed by Dr. Philip Stark.

A Ballot Comparison Post-Election Audit is an audit procedure for counties using DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting systems. MicroVote, Indiana's largest voting system vendor utilizes DREs with CVRs (Cast Vote Records) and VVPATs (Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail). This audit procedure checks machine accuracy and functionality to confidently infer correctly reported election outcomes. While this audit procedure cannot check election outcomes directly, it can provide evidence the election systems used functioned properly. If the election systems functioned properly, there can be confidence in reported election outcomes. Using a random sample of ballots, the CVR (digital voting record) is inspected alongside the VVPAT (paper voting record) to ensure every vote cast digitally matches the paper record of that vote. The audit is considered successfully completed when all sample ballots have been inspected and a 100 percent match rate is confirmed. Ballot chain of custody procedures and ballot secrecy are maintained throughout this process.

A Ballot Polling Post-Election Audit is an audit procedure for counties using OpScan (Optical Scan) voting systems. ES&S, Hart InterCivic, and Unisyn are Indiana's voting system vendors utilizing OpScan voting systems with paper ballots. This audit procedure samples ballot selections for specific contests until there is statistical evidence the outcome of the audit would validate the reported election outcome for those contests. Using a random sample of ballots, vote choices are recorded for three contests. Ballot sampling continues until the result of the audit reaches the intended statistical confidence level in the reported election outcome. Once that level is reached, the audit is considered successfully completed. Ballot chain of custody procedures and ballot secrecy are maintained throughout this process.

Nationally, the definition, methods, processes, and procedures of post-election audits vary from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Indiana's audit procedures use risk-limiting audit methods that have been adapted to best fit the election systems used and processes established by state and local election officials. Additional resources detailing the terminology, process, use, and benefits of risk-limiting audits can be found in *Appendix A*.

Clark County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** May 21, 2025
- **Location:** County Government Complex – 501 E Court Ave Jeffersonville, IN 47130
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** ES&S / Ballot Polling
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 3,998
- **Audit Seed Number:** 67551266111033846247
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Silver Creek School Corporation Referendum
- **Results:**
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for an initial sample of 35 ballots. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each yes/no selection into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range for all three contests. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence that the 2025 Special Election was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**

More information detailing the Clark County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix B*.

Lake County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** May 28, 2025
- **Location:** Lake County Government Center - 2293 N. Main Street Crown Point, IN 46307
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot Comparison
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** Ballots on VVPAT – 4,676
- **Audit Seed Number:** 64348700337393045069
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Crown Point School Corporation Referendum
 - Hobart School Corporation Referendum
- **Results:**
 - The randomized sample of both referendum questions totaling 55 ballots were inspected for a CVR to VVPAT match. All inspected ballots resulted in 100% CVR/VVPAT match rate. **The 100% match rate gives a 99 percent confidence level that the election equipment used in Lake County functioned properly, resulting in correctly reported election outcomes for the 2025 Special Election.**

More information detailing the Lake County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix C*.

In Closing

Completion of these post-election audits present statistical confidence confirming the election systems used in the 2025 Special Election by Clark and Lake Counties functioned with no major malfunctions, resulting in correctly reported election outcomes for audited contests in all both counties.

The attached Post-Election Audit Information & Resources (*Appendix A*) provides additional information on post-election audits and the procedures utilized by the State of Indiana. The Post-Election Audit Reports (*Appendix B & C*) detail all activities relating to a county's respective post-election audit. Reviewing this information and these reports can assist in gaining a full-scope understanding of post-election audits in Indiana.

VSTOP would like to thank the Clark County Clerk's Office and Lake County Board of Elections and Registration for their coordination, the County Election Boards for their voluntary request for audit designation, and the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving designation of these seven counties. VSTOP is appreciative to the SOS's Office for their authorization and support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

APPENDIX A

Post-Election Audit Information & Resources

Post-Election Audit Resources & Information

- [2024 Indiana Election Code Audit Statutes – IC 3-12-13 1-7](#)
- [A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits – Dr. Mark Lindeman and Dr. Philip Stark](#)
- [Stark Ballot Comparison Risk-Limiting Audit Tool](#)
- [Stark Ballot-Polling Risk-Limiting Audit Tool](#)
- [U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2022 Report: Election Audits Across the United States](#)
- [National Conference of State Legislatures 2022 Report: Risk-Limiting Audits](#)
- [Verified Voting – What is an RLA?](#)
- [The Carter Center Risk-Limiting Audit Guide](#)

APPENDIX B

Clark County Audit Report

TO: Clark County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Chairman, Andy Steele
Election Board Member, Tony Singleton
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Ryan Lynch

DATE: 6/12/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2025 Clark County Special Post-Election Audit

On May 21, 2025, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Clark County, Indiana, of its 2025 Special Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Clark County formally requested designation on April 28, 2025 via a County Election Board Resolution. Clark County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Clark County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the County Clerk and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on May 21, 2025 at the Clark County Government Center in Jeffersonville, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the single contest based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

Clark County's Special Election contained a single referendum question for voters in the Silver Creek School Corporation. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using all ballot types and the county's certified reported results. VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly.

It was also initially determined this audit would be completed with an intended 1 percent risk-limit/99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch an outcome error if there was one, and only a 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any outcome errors. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full recount, and an audit is not a recount. For this type of post-election audit, the confidence level is dependent on the contest's margin and the random sample of ballots drawn.

While it is intended to reach a 99 percent confidence level for this audit, VSTOP established that election outcomes can be confirmed with statistical confidence using risk-limits ranging from 9 percent to 1 percent and respective confidence levels ranging 91 to 99 percent. For an audit to significantly confirm election outcomes, the sample of audited ballots **MUST** reach 91 to 99 percent confidence. Should the confidence level not be reached in the initial sample of ballots it **DOES NOT** mean there is an error in election outcomes. It just means more ballots will need to be sampled until there is, at minimum, a 91 percent confidence level reported for the sample of the audited contest.

After contest selection, risk-limit definition, and ballot inventory testing, all pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** May 21, 2025
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up/Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** County Government Complex – 501 E Court Ave Jeffersonville, IN 47130
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:** All Ballots Cast in Special Election – 3,998
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Public Question Selected for Audit:**
 - Silver Creek School Corporation Referendum
 - Diluted Margin – 88.07%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 11

While only 11 ballots were estimated for inspection to achieve the 1 percent risk limit, VSTOP and County Election Officials agreed it would inspect at least three times the estimated sample size. While the statistics of the audit will not change, it bolsters public confidence in the audit by sampling more than required minimum number of ballots.

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the Clark County Government Complex at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the start of the audit.

By approximately 11:00 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and audit set-up was complete. Clark County's public, post-election audit officially began at 11:05 AM.

The VSTOP personnel who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director

The Clark County Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Ryan Lynch, County Clerk
- Angela Cornett, Election Administrator
- Piper Mathis, Election Clerk
- Darla Stahl, Absentee Board

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Polling Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to hand inspect ballots and record contest choices on sampled ballots until there is statistical evidence (at minimum a 91 percent confidence level) that a full hand count would confirm the certified outcome. VSTOP and County Election Officials set an intended risk-limit to better estimate sample sizes, but because polling-audits use a random sample of ballots, achieving a set risk limit is unpredictable. The closer the contest is, the greater the likelihood additional ballots will need to be counted to reach an acceptable risk limit/confidence level. As stated previously, the intended risk-limit of 1 percent was set for Clark County. However, the audit can stop and be considered successfully completed once the audit has hand sampled and counted enough ballots to achieve a risk limit ranging from 9 to 1 percent (91 to 99 percent confidence level). **VSTOP has significant practical confidence in reported election outcomes when statistical confidence levels ranging 91-99 percent are achieved.**

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP Senior Director, Dr. Jay Bagga and Election Systems Audit Specialist, Matt Housley. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process. A ballot-polling audit method was used. In a Ballot-Polling Audit, votes are hand counted until there is convincing evidence (91-99 percent confidence) that the election outcome of the audit would match the election outcome of the tabulated results. While the estimated sample for this audit was 11 ballots, VSTOP and Clark County Election Officials decided to sample at least three times the number of needed ballots for greater public confidence. The sample was drawn in live-time using a random seed number generated by 20 virtual rolls of a 10-sided die. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Clark County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

67551266111033846247

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots were generated. As a best practice for Ballot Polling Audits, a sample greater than the estimated sample size is drawn. Should the confidence level not be reached through the inspection of the estimated sample ballots, additional sampled ballots would need to be inspected. A total of 35 ballots were drawn for sample. The images below feature the Stark Audit Tool visualizing the information described above.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots

Seed:	67551266111033846247
Number of ballots:	3998
Current sample number:	35
Draw this many ballots:	35
<input type="button" value="draw sample"/> <input type="button" value="reset"/>	

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests:	3998	Smallest margin (votes): 3,521. Diluted margin: 88.07%.
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Contest 1. Contest name: Silver Creek School Corp Referendum

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	YES	Votes: 238
Candidate 2 Name:	NO	Votes: 3759

Audit parameters


Risk limit:	1%	Expected sample size: 11.
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Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Referendum Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Audit Results

- Silver Creek School Corp Referendum
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for an initial sample of 35 ballots. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each yes/no selection into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range for all three contests. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence that the 2025 Special Election was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**

Audit progress



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit and >99 percent Confidence Level were met after 35 inspected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP can report that the 2025 Special Election outcome can be confirmed with significant statistical confidence through successful completion of this post-election audit. VSTOP would like to thank the Clark County Clerk's Office: Ryan Lynch and Angela Cornett, for their coordination, the Clark County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Clark County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2025 Special Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all Special Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2025 Special Post-Election Audit.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga



Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX C

Lake County Audit Report

TO: Lake County Board of Elections and Registration

CC: Board of Elections Chairman, Kevin Smith
Board of Elections Member, John Reed
Board of Elections Member, Michael Mellon
Board of Elections Member, Mara Candelaria Reardon
County Clerk, Mike Brown
Director, Michelle Fajman
Assistant Director, Jessica Messler

DATE: 6/12/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2025 Lake County Special Post-Election Audit

On May 28, 2025, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Lake County, Indiana, for the 2025 Special Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Lake County formally requested designation on April 15, 2025 via a County Election Board Resolution. Lake County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Lake County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the Director, Michelle Fajman, Assistant Director, Jessica Messler, and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on May 28, 2025 at the Lake County Government Center in Crown Point, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised that due to the 2025 Special Election voting systems including vote records for both referendums on multiple machines, these public questions would be audited together using a combined randomized sample of both referendums. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

It was also determined this audit would be completed with a 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch a major voting system

malfuction if there was one, and only 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any major system malfunctions. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full inspection of every ballot, which is a recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Lake County's Voting System Vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT). VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly. All pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** May 28, 2025
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up/Pre-Audit Meeting 10:30 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Lake County Government Center - 2293 N. Main Street Crown Point, IN 46307
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:**
Absentee In-Person Early Voting & Election Day Ballots on VVPAT – 4,676
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Public Questions Selected for Audit:**
 - Crown Point School Corp Referendum
 - Hobart School Corp Referendum
 - Smallest Diluted Margin – 19.44%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 53 Ballots

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the County Government Center at approximately 10:30 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the conducting of the audit. By approximately 11:00 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and the audit set-up was complete. Lake County's public, post-election audit officially began just after 11:05 AM.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director
- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist

The Lake County Election Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Michelle Fajman, Director LCBER
- Jessica Messler, Assistant Director LCBER
- Gina Alavanja, Election and Registration Clerk

- Joel Rodriguez, Registration Administrator
- Jerry Schmitt, Election Administrator
- Juanita Trivunovic, Election Clerk

Lake County Voting System Vendor, MicroVote, had Steve Shamo, General Manager, participating and providing support during the audit as well.

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Comparison Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to inspect ballots for a match between the CVR and VVPAT. Every ballot's CVR should match its VVPAT counterpart, resulting in a 100% match rate. Lake County Election Officials alongside the VSTOP Team manually inspect the ballot's CVR to the VVPAT for the selected public questions and track the match rate through the required number of ballots to sample. After the required number of ballots have been sampled, the VSTOP Team enters the match information into the Stark Audit Tool and as long as there are zero non-matches, the audit will be successfully completed.

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP Senior Director, Dr. Jay Bagga and Election Systems Audit Specialist, Matt Housley. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process. A ballot-comparison audit method was used. In a Ballot-Comparison Audit, the digital CVR (Cast Vote Record) is reviewed and matched with the VVPAT (Voter-Verifiable/Verified Paper Audit Trail) to ensure all sampled ballots CVR and VVPAT records match 100%. The audit needed to inspect at least 53 ballots total between the two contests to achieve a 99% confidence level in the voting systems' functionality. The sample was drawn in live-time using a random seed number generated by 20 rolls of a 10-sided die. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Lake County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

64348700337393045069

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots was generated. VSTOP drew an initial sample size of 55 ballots. Both referendum questions were reviewed using ballots from this initial sample. The images below feature the Stark Audit Tool visualizing the information described above.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballot Cards

Seed:	64348700337393045069
Number of ballot cards:	4676
Current sample number:	55
Draw this many ballot cards:	55
<input type="button" value="draw sample"/> <input type="button" value="reset"/>	

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 4676 Smallest margin (votes): 909. Diluted margin: 19.44%.

Contest 1. Contest name: Crown Point School Corp
 Contest type: plurality super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name: YES	Votes: 2678	
Candidate 2 Name: NO	Votes: 549	

Contest 2. Contest name: Hobart School Corp
 Contest type: plurality super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name: YES	Votes: 1179	
Candidate 2 Name: NO	Votes: 270	

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates of differences (as decimal numbers):
 Overstatements. 1-vote: 0.001 2-vote: 0.0001
 Understatements. 1-vote: 0.001 2-vote: 0.0001

Starting size

Round up 1-vote differences. Round up 2-vote differences.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of U.S. House Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Inspected by County Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team, each ballot was reviewed for the CVR to VVPAT match for ballots cast in the Special Election. This sample achieved the set 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. The inspection of the sample of ballots generated the following results.

Audit Results

- Crown Point School Corp Referendum
- Hobart School Corp Referendum
 - The randomized sample of both referendum questions totaling 55 ballots were inspected for a CVR to VVPAT match. All inspected ballots resulted in 100% CVR/VVPAT match rate. **The 100% match rate gives a 99 percent confidence level that the election equipment used in Lake County functioned properly, resulting in correctly reported election outcomes for the 2025 Special Election.**

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 55

1-vote overstatements:	<input type="text" value="0"/>	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	<input type="text" value="0"/>	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	<input type="text" value="0"/>	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	<input type="text" value="0"/>	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Audit complete

If no more differences are observed: 50.

If differences continue at the same rates: 50.

Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing 1% Risk Limit and 99 % Confidence Level were met after 50 inspected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank Director, Michelle Fajman, and Assistant Director, Jessica Messler, for their coordination, the Lake County Board of Elections and Registration for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Lake County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2025 Special Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all Special Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2025 Special Post-Election Audit.

For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga




Co-Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Co-Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program