[CITE: Stites,
et al. v. RCI Development & DNR, 11 CADDNAR 381 (2008)]
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 381]
Cause #: 06-184W
Caption: Stites, et al. v. RCI Development & DNR
Administrative Law Judge: Lucas
Attorneys: Thomas (Claimants); Hazelrigg (RCI); Knotek
(DNR)
Date: July 16, 2008
[NOTE: ON AUGUST 18, 2008, STITES, RELUE AND WALTERS FILED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE STEUBEN CIRCUIT COURT (76C01-0808-MI-274). ON DECEMBER 19, 2008, THE STEUBEN CIRCUIT COURT ENTERED ITS ORDER DISMISSING THE CASE FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. ON AUGUST 12, 2009, THE COURT OF APPEALS ENTERED ITS ORDER (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT.]
FINAL ORDER
The license for a “group
pier” by the Department of Natural Resources in favor of RCI Development LCC is
affirmed under conditions approved by the Department and as more particularly
depicted in Finding 18. The number of boats
which may lawfully be moored to the group pier is limited to a maximum of
36. As used in this order, the term
“boat” has the meaning set forth in 312 IAC 1-1-4.5.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Statement of the Case and Jurisdiction
1. Scott Stites (“Stites”),
David M. Relue (“Relue”), Mark Pontecorvo (“Pontecorvo”) and Peter J. Walters
(“Walters”) separately initiated timely requests with the Natural Resources
Commission (the “Commission”) for administrative reviews of license PL-20374 issued
by the Department of Natural Resources (the “DNR”) to RCI Development LLC
(“RCI”) under IC 14-26-2 (sometimes referred to as the “Lakes Preservation
Act”), and under 312 IAC 11-1 through 312 IAC 11-5, rules adopted to assist
with implementation of the Lakes Preservation Act, for construction activities
within the Third Basin of Crooked Lake (the “Third Basin”) in Steuben County,
Indiana.
2. Crooked Lake in
3. Stites, Relue, Pontecorvo
and Walters are collectively referred to as the “Claimants”. RCI and the DNR are collectively referred to
as the “Respondents”. The Claimants and
the Respondents are collectively referred to as the “Parties”.
4. Service of the requests
for administrative review by the Claimants was made upon the Respondents.
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 382]
5. By agreement of the
Parties, the separate proceedings initiated by the four Claimants were
consolidated as captioned above in Administrative Cause Number 06-184W. “Report of Concurrent Prehearing Conference
and Notice of Telephone Status Conference”, p. 1 (December 7, 2006).
6. The DNR is the licensing
and regulatory authority for the Lakes Preservation Act and 312 IAC 11-1
through 312 IAC 11-5. See, most notably,
IC 14-26-2-23.
7. The Commission is the
“ultimate authority” for the DNR under IC 4-21.5 (sometimes referred to as the
“Administrative Orders and Procedures Act” or “AOPA”) and rules adopted under
312 IAC 3-1 to assist the Commission with its implementation of AOPA. IC 14-10-2-4 and IC 4-21.5-1-15.
8. The Commission appoints
administrative law judges to conduct proceedings under AOPA. IC 14-10-2-2.
Stephen L. Lucas was appointed the administrative law judge for this
proceeding.
9. AOPA provides in IC 4-21.5-3-32 that an agency
is required to index final orders and may rely upon indexed orders as
precedent. A decision interpreting the
Lakes Preservation Act or 312 IAC 11-1 through 312 IAC 11-5 is also governed by
IC 4-21.5-3-27(c). The Commission has
adopted Caddnar as its indexing of final orders under AOPA. Establishment
of Division of Hearings; Indexing of Final Adjudicative Agency Decisions;
Transcript Fees, Information Bulletin #1 (Second Amendment), DIN:
20061011-IR-312060438NRA, Indiana Legislative Services Agency (October 13,
2006). Decisions indexed in Caddnar are
cited in this Order.
10. Administrative review of
a DNR licensing determination is conducted de novo. Rather than deferring to the DNR
determination, de novo review requires the administrative law judge to consider
and apply proper weight to the evidence presented. Crafton,
et al. v
11. At each stage of a
proceeding, the party requesting that an agency take action or asserting an
affirmative defense has the “burden of going forward” and the “burden of
persuasion” (sometimes collectively referred to as the “burden of proof”) with
the evidence. IC 4-21.5-3-14(c).
12. Where the DNR issues a
license authorizing activities under the Lakes Preservation Act and 312 IAC
11-1 through 312 IAC 11-5, “the burden of proof rests with the person seeking
to set aside” the license. Wawasee Property Owners, et al. v. Wawasee
Real Estate & DNR, 11 Caddnar 88, 94 (2007).
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 383]
13. Administrative
review in this proceeding was conducted de novo.
14.
RCI’s original application for a “group pier” license was submitted to the DNR
in February 2006 and would have included three structures for the mooring of
boats and a fourth for pedestrian fishing.
Each of these piers would have extended at a perpendicular from the
shoreline. The main section of the piers
would have been five feet wide with three feet wide slips attached to moor the
boats. The longest pier for mooring
boats was the central of the three and would have extended approximately 156
feet from the shoreline. From this
central pier, and near its lakeward end, would have been an extension at a
right angle (in other words, roughly parallel to the shoreline) that would have
been approximately 200 feet long. This
extension would have continued nearly to the most southeasterly of the three
mooring piers, with the effect of creating the perception of a rectangular harbor
within RCI’s control.
15.
The DNR reviewed the application and reduced the dimensions of the group
pier. The longest pier was reduced from
a maximum 156 feet to 149 feet from the shoreline, and the mouth was opened to
lessen the perception of a private rectangular harbor. As described in a “Certificate of Approval”[1]
issued on September 19, 2006, the license would have authorized the following
configuration:
Four (4) temporary group piers will be
placed in front of the Common Area frontage to provide access and mooring
facilities for Beach Club Estates. Piers
‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ will be 4’ wide. Pier
‘D’ will be 10’ wide. Pier ‘A’ will
extend 99’ into the lake and will have three (3) 3’ wide walkways extending 20’
feet from the northwest side of the pier.
Pier ‘A’ will accommodate 6 water craft and will be located
approximately 52’ southeast of the northwest property line. Pier ‘B’ will extend 149’ feet into the lake
and will have five (5) 3’ wide walkways extending 20’ from the northwest side
of the pier. In addition, Pier ‘B’ will
have a 4’ wide by 50’ long extension parallel with the shoreline on the
southeast side of the pier. The
extension will have two (2) 3’ wide walkways extending 20’ feet from both the
northeast and southeast sides of the extension.
Pier ‘B’ will accommodate 20 water craft and will be located
approximately 111’ southeast of the northwest property line. Pier ‘C’ will extend 141’ into the lake and
will have five (5) 3’ wide walkways extending 20’ from the southeast side of
the pier. Pier ‘C’ will accommodate 10
water craft and will be located approximately 152’ northwest of the southeast
property line. Pier ‘D’ will extend 40’
into the lake and will be used as a fishing pier. Pier ‘D’ will not be used to accommodate
water craft. Pier ‘D’ will be located
approximately 77’ northwest of the southeast property line. The piers will be supported by auger poles,
which will be placed in the lakebed using hand held tools. Also, 4 to 5 tree stumps at or near the
shoreline will be removed….
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 384]
16.
The initial prehearing conference was conducted on December 6, 2006. During the conference, the “Claimants
indicated they were concerned that safety hazards would be posed by the length
of temporary piers approved in [PL-20374].
As stated by Peter Walters, ‘All of us have one common concern’, and ‘we
do not wish to be obstructionist.’ The
license would allow ‘docks’[2]
to extend ‘very radically’ into the open waters of the Third Basin of Crooked
17.
On April 20, 2007, the administrative law judge made an entry entitled “Orders
regarding Preparation for and Conduct of Hearing”. This entry reflected that RCI would seek a
modified version of PL-20374, as described in the course of this proceeding,
rather than in the form originally approved by the DNR. The DNR had indicated the modified version
was approvable by the agency (as was the version described in Finding 15), but the Claimants continued to have
objections. On March 9, an entry entitled
“Report of Second Telephone Status Conference with Supplemental Matters, Notice
of Third Telephone Status Conference and Notice of Hearing” had been made to
help memorialize a March 6, 2007 status conference. The March 9 entry reflected in part 1C: “In
response to a question from the Claimants, RCI Development indicated it
intended to pursue the modified license rather than the original license. The terms of the modified license are
therefore for consideration in this proceeding.” In the April 20, 2007 entry, the administrative
law judge ordered the DNR to cause “a true and accurate copy of the modified
license to be filed by May 1, 2007.”
18.
On April 23, 2007, the DNR responded to the April 20 entry by the filing of a
“Notice of Filing of Modified Proposal for Pier Configuration of Respondent RCI
Development LLC of February 12, 2007”.
Included with the April 23, 2007 filing was the following drawing:
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 385]
19.
The configuration depicted in Finding 18 is
the configuration at issue in this proceeding.
The configuration was an attempt by RCI to accommodate the Claimants’
concerns for potential impacts to high-speed boating as outlined in Finding 16.
None of the parties objected to the entry described in Finding 17.
The configuration depicted in Finding 18 is within the scope of an
approvable license under the application of de novo review.
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 386]
Public and Riparian
Rights, including Management of Boating Operations
20.
First Sergeant William Snyder has served
as a Conservation Officer with the DNR since 1973. He has enforced boating laws in
21. Snyder testified that one
of his professional responsibilities with the DNR was to review the potential
impacts of facilities, for which a license is sought under the Lakes
Preservation Act, on the riparian rights of neighbors and on the rights of the
public to use a public freshwater lake.
22. Snyder testified that for
“group piers”, and for individual piers in crowded areas, he reviews the
available space and the amount of facilities and traffic which would be
concentrated in that space. “One of the
first things”[3] he does
is review how facilities and traffic would impact the license applicant’s
neighbors and their riparian rights.
Unless an applicant has an agreement with a neighbor, Snyder testified
he would make a “negative response” if the result would be to encroach upon the
neighbor’s riparian zone. Secondly, he
would review whether an application would have the effect of segregating a
portion of public waters for the private use of the applicant’s clients. Where there is a “taking or an appearance of
taking of” public waters, his comments would also be negative toward the
application.
23. In response to a question
by the Claimants, Snyder testified he was not limited to a review of
navigational issues as they pertained to entry into the high-speed boating area
of the general public. He would also evaluate
the effect of navigation upon neighbors, and there were numerous instances
where the relationship to neighbors was a primary issue, but conflicts with
neighboring riparian owners was not a major issue with the RCI application. “I look at it in all forms and manners and
not just out into the deep water or out into the high-speed traffic.”
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 387]
24. Snyder testified he
viewed negatively the application described in Finding
14 because a narrow opening between the longest pier, and the pier
southeast of the longest pier, gave the appearance of private exclusivity to
the rectangular area bounded by those piers.
The configuration gave the appearance of a private taking of public
waters.
25. Neil David Ledet
testified he also reviewed a license application for the construction of “group
piers” for the potential impact on public use.
For
a group pier, he would “try to point out issues that might relate to excessive
piers that are basically converting private water to public use.” The first proposal as described in Finding 14 had a “very long L-shape” to the
pier. In reviewing this proposal, he was
concerned for the impact to “open space” available for public use. Also, this proposal had 36 slips but appeared
to demonstrate a capacity for mooring more than 36 boats. He sought to clarify the intentions of RCI
and to achieve greater specificity through the licensure process, incorporating
a limitation on the number of boats which could be moored as a condition of the
license.
26. Sgt. Snyder said that
similarly to the approach expressed by Ledet in his testimony, he also typically
seeks specificity regarding the number and location of boats to be moored in a
group pier. He sought this specificity
from RCI as a condition of the license.
27.
On cross examination by the Claimants, Ledet testified he originally
recommended denial of the license application.
One of the reasons for changing his position to a recommendation of
approval was that RCI subsequently reduced the lineal frontage of the piers
resulting from the former long L-shaped pier.
Also, the opening to the area between the longest pier and the pier to
the southeast of the longest pier was widened, and the modification would offer
a visual perspective that was less discouraging of public usage. He testified the DNR did not have a formula
for determining the degree of these modifications.
28.
Snyder testified that his concerns for configuration of the license application
described in Finding 14 were resolved for the
license as described in Finding 15. The opening was widened, and the appearance
of converting public water to private usage was ameliorated. This issue was also adequately addressed for
the license described in Finding 18 that is at
issue.
29.
As testified by both Ledet and Snyder, modifications from the original license
application were made to reduce the length of the L-shaped pier and to open
what had appeared to convert public waters to a private rectangular bay. These modifications are memorialized by the
license described in Finding 18 and support
the public trust within the Lakes Preservation Act. The preponderance of the evidence is the DNR
properly factored and implemented its responsibilities with respect to the
public trust. A similar result would have
applied to the licensed described by Finding 15.
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 388]
30. Snyder
testified his primary subject of review for pier licensure is directed to
navigational safety issues. Applicants
sometimes seek authorization for piers that extend 175 feet or 185 feet from
the shoreline. With the statutory
restriction on high-speed motorboat operations within 200 feet of the
shoreline, piers of this length can present navigational safety issues. Snyder testified he generally seeks to limit
piers to not more than 150 feet from the shoreline. Because the license application described in
Finding 14 would have authorized a pier that extended 154 feet from the
shoreline, he commented negatively upon this application. Neither the license described in Finding 15
and previously approved by the DNR, nor the license described in Finding 18 and
at issue in this proceeding, would authorize a pier that would extend more than
150 feet from the shoreline. With the
designs of the group pier described in Finding 15 and in Finding 18, including
the limitation to mooring of 36 boats and a limitation of pier length to less
than 150 feet from the shoreline, he testified his professional opinion was
that the configuration would provide adequately for navigational safety.
31. Scott Stites testified to
considerable practical experience in the operation of motorboats on the
32. First Sgt. William Snyder
is, however, the only professional law enforcement officer to offer an opinion
as to navigational safety issues. He is
a long-time resident of
33. The group
pier described in Finding 18 that is at issue, including the limitation to
mooring of 36 boats and a limitation of pier length to less than 150 feet from
the shoreline, is a configuration which provides adequately for navigational
safety. The same result would apply for
the group pier described in Finding 15.
The preponderance of the evidence supports issuance of the group pier as
configured in Finding 18 and would also have supported issuance of the group
pier as configured in Finding 15. The
Claimants have not sustained their burden of proof with respect to navigational
safety.
Licensure and Group Piers
34.
The Indiana General Assembly directed the Commission to adopt rules to provide
objective standards for issuing licenses under IC 14-26-2-23, including
standards for the configuration of piers, boat stations, platforms, and similar
structures. The standards are to exempt
any class of activities from licensing, including temporary structures, if the
Commission finds that the class is unlikely to pose more than a minimal potential
for harm to the public rights described in IC 14-26-2-5. IC 14-26-2-23(e).
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 389]
35.
The “public rights” referenced in IC 14-26-2-5 are “natural resources and the
natural scenic beauty of
36. The law is stated
succinctly by the Court of Appeals of
37.
Applying these statutory authorities, and particularly IC 14-26-2-23(e), the
Commission has developed a regulatory design that authorizes the placement of
temporary piers, boat stations, and similar structures under a partial
exemption that is commonly referred to as a “general license”. Under this regulatory design, a qualified
structure can be placed within a public freshwater lake without obtaining a
prior written license (or what is sometimes called an “individual license”)
from the DNR. Clauss v. DNR, 11 Caddnar 150, 152 (2007).
38.
As provided in pertinent part in 312 IAC 11-3-1(a) and (b):
(a) The
placement of a temporary structure…is authorized without a written license
issued by the [DNR under the Lakes Preservation Act and 312 IAC 11-3] if the
temporary structure qualifies under this section.
(b) In order for a temporary structure to qualify, the
structure must satisfy each of the following:
(1) Be easily removable.
(2) Not infringe on the access of an adjacent
landowner to the public freshwater lake.
(3) Not unduly restrict navigation.
(4) Not be unusually wide or long relative to similar
structures within the vicinity on the same public freshwater lake.
(5) Not extend more than one hundred fifty (150) feet
from the…shoreline [or water line].
(6) If a pier, not extend over water that is
continuously more than six (6) feet deep to a distance of one hundred fifty
(150) feet from the…shoreline [or water line].
(7) Not be a marina.
(8) Not be a group pier.
(9) Be placed by…a riparian owner.
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 390]
39.
A person who
acts under 312 IAC 11-3-1(a) and (b) has a general license with conditions that
have been codified by rule, and a person who purports to act under the rule’s
authority but who violates the conditions, violates the license.
40.
A person who wishes to place a temporary pier or other temporary structure,
which does not meet each of the conditions of 312 IAC 11-3-1(b), is
disqualified from obtaining a general license.
The person is not disqualified from obtaining an individual
license. A person who demonstrates to
the DNR that granting an individual license would not harm the public rights
described in Finding 35 may be entitled to an individual license.
41.
A person who is disqualified from a general license because the person seeks an
authorization which is inconsistent with subdivision (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
(6), or (9) of 312 IAC 11-3-1(b) would be required to demonstrate the inconsistency
would not harm these public rights.
Typically, the person would be required to reconcile only the particular
inconsistency. For example, a proposed
pier which was inconsistent with the general license exclusively because it
would “infringe on the access of an adjacent landowner” would be disqualified
from a general license under 312 IAC 11-3-1(b)(2). An applicant who demonstrated that the
adjacent landowner consented to any infringement could qualify for an
individual license.
42.
A person who is disqualified from a general license, because the persons seeks
an authorization for a “marina” under 312 IAC 11-3-1(b)(7) or a “group pier”
under 312 IAC 11-3-1(b)(8), must demonstrate to the DNR that the totality of an
individual license would not violate the public rights described in Finding 35. Because
the Commission has determined the potential for harm posed by a “marina” or a
“group pier” is greater than that for a lesser temporary structure, the
demonstration is required before the structure is placed rather than
afterwards. Stated in the alternative,
the Commission has determined that a “marina” or a “group pier” poses “more
than a minimal potential for harm to the public rights described in IC
14-26-2-5.” The Commission has
determined exercise of the authority provided in IC 14-26-2-23(e) would be
inappropriate for a “marina” or a “group pier”.
43.
The Claimants contend in their proposed “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law” that the Commission has not adopted “objective standards” for “group
piers”. While the contention is accurate
in a literal sense, it fails to place “group piers” within the context of the
Commission’s broader permitting structure.
The same standards as apply to a person, who acts under the authority of
a general license under 312 IAC 11-3-1(a) and (b), are properly referenced in
the review of an individual license for a “group pier”.
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 391]
44. First Sgt. Snyder
testified that “group piers” were excepted from qualification for a general
license to reverse the presumption pertaining to their placement. For a pier that qualifies for the general
license, a property owner may place the structure without completing the DNR’s
review process for individual licenses.
Another person may yet contest the placement, and an administrative
review by the Commission would result, but the pier would already be in
place. For a “group pier”, the option of
a general license is unavailable. As a
result, the DNR’s licensure review process must be completed before a group
pier is placed. Snyder testified the
potential for high traffic caused by a group pier was “one of the factors” why
a group pier is an exception to qualification for a general license. His testimony is persuasive.
45.
The DNR’s scrutiny of a “group pier” under the rule is more focused because it
is provided in advance of placement of a structure. In contrast, the after-the-fact observation
of the myriad of temporary piers placed under a general license is likely to be
less intensive. Requiring a person who
places a “group pier” to apply for a written license causes the DNR to evaluate
a structure, for compliance with the statutory protections of public rights
afforded by the Lakes Preservation Act, before placement of the structure.
46. In response to a question
by the DNR, Snyder testified that RCI could have sold 50 parcels along the
shoreline rather than develop the site as a condominium. If the result “wasn’t encroaching on the
neighbor” and was not otherwise in contradiction of 312 IAC 11-3-1, a person
could place a pier as long as 150 feet from the shore under the authority of a
general license. He testified it “was
done on the north shore” of
47. Since there are not
standards with exclusive application to “group piers”, the Claimants would
interpret the Commission’s determination to except them from qualification
under the general license as effectively prohibiting the licensure. If the Commission had intended to prohibit
the licensure of “group piers”, it would have so stated. The Claimants’ tortured interpretation is
unsupported within the context of 312 IAC 3-11-3 and would violate the
balancing of public rights and riparian rights as referenced in Lake of the Woods v. Ralston, cited
previously.
48. The Commission might
accomplish additional regulatory goals by adopting standards specifically
applicable to “group piers”, but even in the absence of these standards, its
policy pronouncement that advance scrutiny is to be given to “group piers”
serves a valid regulatory purpose. With
the added scrutiny provided by the DNR in evaluating a “group pier”, a level of
protection is afforded which is appropriate to the Lakes Preservation Act and
likely superior to what would have been afforded had development occurred
within the parameters of the general license.
The benefits of the Commission’s policy pronouncement are illustrated in
this proceeding. The preponderance of
the evidence demonstrates that the group pier as configured in Finding 18 authorizes the mooring of fewer boats,
and with a lesser impact to the public trust, than would have been occasioned
by the placement of piers under the terms of general licenses located at 50
separate parcels.
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 392]
Fish, Wildlife, or
Botanical Resources
49.
Scott Andrew Banfield is a biologist who lives in
50.
Banfield testified he is familiar with the
51.
Scott Stites testified concerning measurements of water depth taken in the
vicinity of RCI’s piers, but he testified he was unaware of the legal elevation
of the
52.
Banfield testified that boats disturbing sediments on a lakebed can “cause
problems from a biological standpoint.
If you’re disturbing sediment that’s on the bottom, or generally
sediment in a lake, or soil on the land for that matter, has nutrients attached
to it. There’s a nutrient exchange that
takes place when you disturb the sediments….
Nutrients that are exchanged from that sediment go into the water, at
large, in the rest of the lake and have an effect on the water quality and the
water clarity of the lake.” Where
sediments are exchanged, and particularly phosphorous, the growth of algae and
other plants is accelerated. He
testified the videotape recording described in Finding
50 was consistent with a disturbance of the bottom of the
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 393]
53.
Banfield testified that different areas of the
54.
Banfield testified
55.
On cross examination by the DNR, Banfield testified that from a biological
standpoint, he would prefer that piers be designed so “the boat movement and
the boat mooring is as far out away from shore as possible.” As a result, the license proposal which would
have the least adverse effect to biological resources was the license approved
on September 19, 2006 and described in Finding 15. An intermediate adverse effect would result
from the configuration described in Finding 18
and at issue in this proceeding. The
worst adverse effect to biological resources resulted from the configuration supported
by the Claimants because this configuration resulted in the most boat movement
and mooring close to shore. He agreed the
DNR’s limit on the number of boats that could be moored demonstrated sensitivity
to biological concerns, as well as the agency’s desire to limit boat density on
the
56.
Neil David Ledet testified he has been a full-time employee of the DNR since
1976. He is a District Fisheries
Biologist who works mainly in Steuben, Lagrange, and
57.
Ledet testified that in performing a license review, he would examine the
proposed project and attempt to “consider potential impacts from that
project.” For a group pier, he “would
look at the environmental impacts.”
Ledet would seek to minimize any potential negative impacts to fish,
wildlife, or botanical resources. His
review included consideration of the value of near-shore vegetation, and to the
extent practical, the DNR would try to position piers away from desirable
vegetation.
58.
Ledet testified he believed the license described in Finding
15 minimized potential adverse impacts to fish, wildlife, or botanical
resources. The proposal described in Finding 18, and at issue in this proceeding, was not his most “preferred
choice, but I recommended that the [DNR] accept it.” The configuration preferred by the Claimants
was unacceptable, from a biological perspective, because more boats would be
brought into shallow water and disturbances to sediments could occur,
particularly during low-flow conditions in the
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 394]
59. Ledet testified he personally visited the
60. On cross examination by the Claimants, Ledet testified he
originally recommended denial of the license application. One of the reasons for changing his position
to a recommendation of approval was that RCI subsequently clarified limits on
the number of boats which could lawfully be moored. RCI agreed to limit the total number of
moored boats to 36, inclusive of pontoon boats, bass boats, personal
watercraft, and other types of boats.
This limitation effectively placed a ceiling of two boats for each
condominium unit, a number compatible with the number of boats typically moored
by other landowners along the
61.
The testimonies of Banfield and Ledet express very similar professional
opinions in terms of the biological impacts of boats and of piers other
structures that are placed in proximity to the shoreline. Construction along the shoreline should be
minimized. Fewer structures and fewer
boats tend to cause fewer negative impacts to fish, wildlife or botanical
resources than do more structures and more boats. The disturbance of sediments is to be
minimized. Each of these opinions is
found to be persuasive.
62.
Banfield and Ledet also agree that the pier configuration which would be most
harmful to fish, wildlife and botanical resources is the one advocated by the
Claimants. While the Claimants would
have boating activities near to shore, this location is the most hostile to the
maintenance of biological resources in their natural state. The pier configuration that would be
advocated by Banfield and Ledet, at least if measured solely by a biological
standard, would place piers or boat stations into the deeper waters of the
63.
The testimony of Banfield and Ledet help to illustrate the tightrope that is
the Lakes Preservation Act. The Indiana
General Assembly has sought to preserve our public freshwater lakes in as
natural a state as practicable, but also allowing for recreational uses and
recognizing the rights of riparian owners.
What is ideal to address biological concerns is not what is ideal to
address boating safety concerns. The testimonies
of the biologists do not advance the position of the Claimants unless it is for
the proposition that RCI’s riparian ownership affords it nothing. Neither the Lakes Preservation Act nor Lake of the
Woods v. Ralston, cited previously,
supports the latter proposition. The license
described in Finding 18 seeks successfully to
achieve the balancing of interests anticipated by the Lakes Preservation Act.
[VOLUME 11, PAGE 395]
Public Opinion
64. The Claimants submitted
into evidence April 2007 letters from approximately 175 residents of
65. Generally, an
66.
The only powers conferred on the Commission pertinent to this proceeding are
those of the Lakes Preservation Act.
67.
A condominium development may be regulated through local planning and zoning,
but the Lakes Preservation Act does not confer power to the Commission to regulate
RCI through planning or zoning.
68.
The Lakes Preservation Act could make the approval of a construction activity,
including the placement of “group piers”, contingent upon approval by a
majority of riparian owners. By
illustration, IC 14-26-2-12(a)(2) provides that the DNR cannot issue a permit
for the construction of a channel into a public freshwater lake unless “the
applicant proves that fifty-one percent (51%) of the property owners abutting
the shoreline of the lake approve the channel construction.”
69.
No provision similar to the one in IC 14-26-2-12(a)(2) applies to group piers
within public freshwater lakes. In the
absence of statutory authority, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to determine
RCI’s license application based upon public opinion.
Affirmation of License for
Group Pier
70.
Based upon de novo review, the preponderance of the evidence supports the
issuance of the license as described in Finding 18. The DNR properly evaluated the considerations
of the Lakes Preservation Act in balance with the riparian rights of RCI in
approving this license. Reasonable
safety is provided to boaters and to the general public where responsible
boating activities are pursued.
Appropriate provision is made for the enjoyment of the public trust. Due consideration was given to fish, wildlife
and botanical resources. The Claimants
have not met their burden of proof to set aside the license.
[1] A variety of terms are used to describe authorizations required for activities, governed by the Lakes Preservation Act and similar laws, for which DNR approval is required. These terms include “license”, “permit” and “certificate of approval”. AOPA defines each of these terms as a “license” at IC 4-21.5-1-8. The term “license” is generally used in these Findings and is intended to apply the inclusive language of IC 4-21.5-1-8.
[2] “In
Hoosier vernacular, the terms ‘dock’, ‘pier’, and even ‘slip’ and ‘wharf’, are
used almost interchangeably. The Natural
Resources Commission has observed: ‘A “pier” is a long narrow structure
extending from the shore into a body of water and used as a landing place for
boats or used for recreational purposes.
A “dock” is a slip or waterway that is between two piers or cut into the
land for the berthing of boats.’” Hayman
v. DNR and Thorne v. Wetstone, 9 Caddnar 144, 148 (2004) citing Piering v. Ryan and Caso, 9 Caddnar 123,
130 (2003); Snyder, et al. v. Linder, et
al., 9 Caddnar 45, 49 (2002); and Glossary, 6 Waters and Water Rights, pp. 904 and 929 (The Michie Company
1991, 1994 Replacement). Although the term used is of little significance, for
clarity and consistency, the definitions applied in Hayman are applied here. In this context, the structures adjacent
to RCI’s property and extending into the
[3] The court reporter has not been requested to prepare a transcript of testimony at hearing. If a witness is shown as being quoted in these findings, the statement is as nearly verbatim as could be determined by the administrative law judge. If a transcript is subsequently prepared that indicates different wording, the transcript shall be considered the official record and a quotation as paraphrasing the witness testimony.