FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT :    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

D. ERIC HALL    DAVID W. STONE, IV
Anderson, Indiana    Anderson, Indiana

BRUCE SNOW,                    )
                                 )
Appellant-Petitioner,            )
                                 )
vs.                              )    No. 48A02-0402-CV-137
    )    
ANITA R. (SNOW                   ) RINCKER,    )
                                 )
Appellee-Respondent.             )

If the court orders support for a child’s educational expenses at an institution of higher learning under subsection (a), the court shall reduce other child support for that child that:
is duplicated by the educational support order; and
would otherwise be paid to the custodial parent.

Further, the commentary to Ind. Child Support Guideline 6 addresses educational support and provided the following at the time of Rincker’s petition and the hearing: See footnote
Extraordinary educational expenses may be for elementary, secondary or postsecondary education, and should be limited to reasonable and necessary expenses for attending private or special schools, institutions of higher learning, and trade, business or technical schools to meet the particular educational needs of the child.
 

If the Court determines that an award of postsecondary educational expenses is appropriate, it should apportion the expenses between the parents and the child, taking into consideration scholarships, grants, student loans, summer and school year employment and other costreducing programs available to the student.  These sources of assistance should be credited to the child’s share of the educational expense.
 

Child.Supp. G. 6, commentary. “In determining whether to order either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college education, the court must consider whether and to what extent the parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child’s college expenses.” Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991).
The trial court ordered Snow to pay 59% of the $26,549.38 cost of Meghan’s schooling for the 2003-2004 school year, or $15,664.13. Snow points out that this amount is 37% of his annual income of $41,704. As for the 2004-2005 school year and the 2005-2006 school year, the trial court ordered Meghan to pay 33% of the cost and Snow to pay 59% of the remainder at the rate of $100 per week. This amounts to a total cost to Snow of $22,037 for the 2004-2005 school year, $5,314 for the summer of 2005, and $11,622 for the 2005-2006 school year. Snow argues that the cost of Meghan’s college expenses at Saint Louis University is beyond his ability to pay. He contends that his contribution should have been capped at the costs of a state-supported university. See Million v. Swager, 807 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding trial court’s order to pay college expenses at Cornell University where the obligation was capped at $4,000.00 per year, which is approximately one third of the expenses at a state school, in recognition of the parents’ incomes).
Although the language of Child Support Guideline 6 is optional, we agree with Snow that the trial court should have capped his contribution at the costs of a state-supported university. The order requires Snow to pay 59 percent of the balance of Meghan’s college expenses. Whether or not Snow presented evidence of his expenses, it is apparent that this is a significant burden for someone who earns approximately $41,700 per year. After deducting from Snow’s income for federalSee footnote and state See footnote taxes, the order leaves Snow with approximately $18,757 during the 2003-04 school year with which he can support himself.See footnote The situation only worsens in the 2004-05 school year and 2005 summer session, when his obligation increases to $27,351. Assuming Snow’s gross pay remains relatively static, this portion of the order requires Snow to pay approximately 79 percent of his gross wagesSee footnote for that school year toward Meghan’s higher education expenses, leaving him with a mere $7,070 on which he can live. This is well below the 2004 poverty level for a one-person household of $9,827 per year.See footnote It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to plunge a father into poverty to pay for a degree that could be earned at a less expensive, state-supported university. Because the order requires Snow to pay such an excessive portion of his gross income for Meghan’s schooling, it appears that perhaps the trial court was trying to “even the playing field,” considering Rincker had incurred $50,000 in prior loans for Meghan’s schooling while Snow had not contributed to her higher education expenses. If that is the case, we cannot condone an order of “makeup payments,” especially considering Rincker did not request of the trial court that Snow contribute to Meghan’s higher education expenses until shortly before her twenty-first birthday.
Even though the trial court ordered Snow to pay the 2004-05 and 2005-06 expenses at the rate of $100 per week, the order required Snow to pay the 2003-04 expenses of $15,664.13 in a lump sum. The lump sum in addition to the enormity of the percentage of Snow’s salary that is in question leads us to conclude that we must reverse the order of the trial court on this issue.

In discussing the post-secondary education worksheet, the commentary also provides that the trial court “may wish to consider in the category of ‘Other’ educational costs (Line B(5) of the Worksheet) such items as transportation, car insurance, clothing, entertainment and incidental expenses.” Id.
    Initially, we note that Meghan’s car was “paid off,” and the trial court did not order Snow to pay any expense related to a car payment. Exhibit B. All of the other expenses of which Snow complains fit squarely within the definition of “Other” education expenses that the trial court may consider. Even though the trial court was not required to consider these expenses, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to do so. As for Snow’s contention that “school expenses” and “college expenses” were not specifically defined, the trial court relied upon Respondent’s Exhibit B, which contains an itemized list of Meghan’s expenses, in fashioning its order. Thus, the items included within school expenses or college expenses were sufficiently identifiable.

SHARPNACK, JUDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part

     I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including certain expenses as educational expenses and that the trial court did not err by failing to specifically order Rincker to pay a portion of the education expenses. However, I disagree that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Snow to pay a portion of Meghan’s expenses at St. Louis University.
Snow argues that the cost of Meghan’s college expenses at St. Louis University is beyond his ability to pay and that his contribution should have been capped at the cost of state-supported school. I disagree for two reasons. First, my review of the record reveals little about Snow’s financial status except that Snow makes $41,700 and is not married. Snow presented no evidence of his expenses, tax burdens, or the poverty level and presented no factual basis for us to determine that the trial court’s order is an abuse of discretion. Other than his assertions that the expense of Meghan’s college is excessive, Snow has made no showing of an unacceptable economic burden. Further, the trial court took Snow’s ability to pay into consideration by ordering him to pay the graduate school expenses at the rate of $100.00 per week rather than in a lump sum.
Second, although the commentary to Ind. Child Support Guideline 6 provides that the trial court “may limit consideration of college expenses to the cost of state supported colleges and universities or otherwise may require that the income level of the family and the achievement level of the child be sufficient to justify the expense of private school,” the commentary does not mandate that the trial court limit the expenses to the cost of state schools. Child.Supp. G. 6, commentary (emphasis added). While the limitation of college expenses to the cost of a state school may be reasonable in particular circumstances, see Million, 807 N.E.2d at 145, it is not a benchmark. Rather, the particular circumstances of the case must be considered.
Here, Meghan is an exceptional student, and her particular course of study is offered only at a limited number of colleges in the United States. Further, Snow offered nothing regarding his financial status other than his gross income to establish what a burden Meghan’s college expenses at St. Louis University might be. Thus, while limiting college expenses to the cost of a state school, as the trial court did in Million, may be an acceptable resolution in some circumstances, I cannot conclude under the circumstances presented in the record before us that the trial court abused its discretion by choosing to do otherwise. Consequently, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.