Independent Assessment of Indianapolis Power & Light’s Downtown Underground Network

Final version December 13, 2011

Prepared for the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission by

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Executive Summary

In September, 2011, in response to a recent increase in network incidents, O’Neill Management Consulting, LLC, was engaged by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) to audit the electrical network in downtown Indianapolis, which is owned and operated by Indianapolis Power & Light (IPL), a subsidiary of AES Corporation. Our firm was selected by the IURC from a list of qualified vendors developed by a process of requests for proposal and competitive bids.

Our findings can be summarized as follows: The electrical network in downtown Indianapolis is well designed and regularly maintained. Notwithstanding a higher incidence of recent events, detailed in our report below, the risk to the citizens of, and visitors to, Indianapolis has historically been low; lower, in fact, than in many other major cities’ downtown areas that are served by similar underground facilities. There is risk, but that risk has been, until recently, acceptably low.

An analogy can be made to modes of transport such as driving a car, riding in an airplane, or walking the sidewalks. In those modes, the risk is managed by a process that, when it works well, investigates every significant instance of equipment or operator failure, tracing its root cause, and then mandating appropriate remedial action, which might be a traffic citation, an equipment recall, or a mandated change in the design of cars, airplanes, or sidewalks and crossings. As new modes of failure are discovered, new remedies are put in place.

Our findings, detailed below, indicate that, based on our examination of the recent and past incidents and our audit of the current system condition and practices in comparison to those of other utilities, there is an immediate need to improve the process by which IPL finds, documents, and remediates failures in its electrical system in downtown Indianapolis. The recommendations contained in this report, if acted upon, can further reduce the risk of service interruption, collateral damage, and possible injury associated with the system.

Summarizing, there is not a single, overarching cause for the recent higher frequency of incidents; consequently, our recommendations are threefold, representing three interrelated processes. We find IPL can improve its processes associated with the downtown electrical system by:

- More effectively finding and documenting the causes of equipment failure, including an increased situational awareness to be applied to the inspection process, focused on finding the root causes of incipient failure, and following up with appropriate repair or replacement. The occurrence of the November 19, 2011 incident only reinforces this recommendation, placing an immediate emphasis on steam leaks in proximity to electric facilities as a priority.
- Evaluating and, as appropriate, adopting certain changes to the design of the equipment used and the standards specified for maintenance and construction, e.g., we suggest an alternative way to terminate the primary cable into the network transformer, a place which has been the source of some of the failures in the past two years.

- Continuing to implement, and even accelerating, IPL’s adoption of utility asset management practices that are focused on cost-effectively achieving optimal system performance through a combination of condition-based maintenance and/or replacement of equipment and the selective application of technology.

The event of November 19, 2011 adds new emphasis and urgency to these issues. It is our opinion that if changes are not made along the lines we suggest, IPL can expect to continue to see network incidents at the rate experienced in 2010-2011, i.e., 3 to 5 per year. This is unacceptable for a system as well-designed as the Indianapolis downtown underground system, especially given the frequency of inspection and rate of replacement of vault equipment. Moreover, spending more money on inspections or replacement will not solve the problem if the myopia in the current inspection process is not addressed. That ‘failure to see deeply’ includes a failure to recognize the severity of a situation in which a manhole might be judged too hot to inspect, and yet that condition might be allowed to persist for over a year.

Because of the urgency of the current situation, we expressed to the IURC and to IPL that we had concerns about the steam-related causes of the November 19 incident, urging immediate action, and not to wait for the report and the public meeting. The IURC then directed us to convey our specific concerns to IPL, and directed IPL to respond. IPL has done so. We have reviewed their recent actions and affirm their appropriateness, namely (with our specific concerns listed as the main bullets, and what we understand to be IPL’s response below each one in blue):

- Identify the locations of all the manholes and vaults with historical and current steam leaks and/or labeled by the field crews as “high temperature” manholes.
  - In the week of November 28th IPL identified 21 manholes that were too hot to enter earlier this year. IPL then dispatched crews to inspect them.

- Capture current and historical measured temperatures.
  - Of those, IPL found 15 were now normal, but 6 were still too hot to enter.

- Perform targeted condition assessments e.g., looking for pitted cables, missing porcelain cable supports, leaking joints/splices, cable off rack and on manhole floor, wet manholes, duct runs located on the bottom of the manhole, steam coming from the duct mouths.
  - For the 15, IPL inspected them and found no indications of imminent failure
  - For the 6, IPL notified Citizens Thermal of their location and requested immediate action be taken to correct the situation. In addition, a meeting was held on December 8th involving senior management of both
companies to discuss the need for increased cooperation on resolving such situations.

- Rank locations based on severity, and create repair/replace decision points.
  - For the 6 holes, IPL will, once they are safe to enter, pull a sample of cable from the ducts, noting where they would cross the steam line, and send them to a lab for analysis. Depending on that analysis, they commit to make appropriate repairs, which may include replacement of all cable in certain duct runs.

In addition, we discussed the details, such as mapping the locations and ensuring public access was not an issue, and preparing contingency plans. While we were satisfied with the responses we received, we will be more assured when IPL has a process and technology in place to assure that when the crew says “no imminent concerns were found” we could be sure they were looking with the right situational awareness, as described in our report.

We would hold this up as the kind of response that IPL should make to this entire report, taking each recommendation as an opportunity to achieve the performance that all parties involved should want – a return to a more normal rate of incidents, say, one or two per year, maybe even fewer, as in the four years from 2006 to 2010 when the only incident was when the Indianapolis Fire Department asked IPL to shut down a network in 2007 in order to deal with a fire caused by a customer’s equipment.

Once this report has been made public, the IURC will want to engage IPL in a process of commitment to implementation of those findings that are found to be valid and compelling. This may involve some iterative communications about what is meant, how certain objectives might best be achieved, and so forth. Typically, after a report of this type, regulators and utilities agree on a quantified list of commitments and a schedule of status reporting on the progress of the commitments. No doubt such a process will take place in this instance as well, which will allow the recommendations made in this report to improve the performance of the Indianapolis downtown underground system.

Finally, we affirm that IPL cooperated fully in responding to our requests for information and in making available to us in a timely way its staff and its facilities for our interview and inspection. The company was given an opportunity to review and comment on our findings of fact. Our conclusions remain our own. We expect that the company will receive them positively and act upon them diligently.
Section 1: Background

1.1 System overview

The following are some key statistics regarding IPL’s Indianapolis downtown underground network (as distinct from the rest of the IPL system):

- Approximately contained within the area known as the Mile Square, bounded by East, West, North and South Streets, the territory is approximately 9 blocks by 9 blocks, or a mile long on each side, which, if exactly 9x9 and a mile square, would have 20 named streets (10 N-S and 10 E-W), 20 miles of roadway, and 180 block-long sections of roadway, each 586 feet long.

- Serves 1,834 customers, with a peak demand of 133 MW, 4.4 percent of total system load (average peak load of 72.5kW per customer, or 11 times IPL’s overall average of 6.6kW per customer, and 2 times its overall average of 31.2kW per commercial and industrial customers combined).

- 625 miles of concrete-encased conduits (average of 6.25 conduits in each street).

- 1,266 manholes in the network area (average of 7 manholes in each of the 180 block-long sections of street in a 9x9 block square).

- 139 network vaults (average 1.4 in each four-sided block).

- 315 network transformers (average 2.3 per vault, with the most common count being one, and many having two, three, or more).

- 367,131 feet (69.5 miles) of network primary cable (42 circuits, each averaging 1.65 miles).

- 648,489 feet (122.8 miles) of network secondary cable (three-phase).

- Divided into five secondary network areas fed from three substations:
  - Edison, off* Massachusetts Avenue to the northeast
  - Gardner Lane, off* Kentucky Avenue to the southwest
  - Substation Number 3, off* Market Street, to the east of the monument

*Position not exact, for security.
Map of area served by the five secondary networks (Edison East and Edison West, Gardner Lane North and Gardner Lane South, and Substation Number 3):

See section 1.4 for a primer on urban underground network systems
1.2 Incidents

In September 2011, in response to a recent spate of publicly noticeable incidents, O'Neill Management Consulting, LLC was engaged by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) to audit the electrical network in downtown Indianapolis. This network is owned and operated by Indianapolis Power and Light (IPL), a subsidiary of AES Corporation.

The events that caused the heightened level of concern earlier this year about Indianapolis's underground network system were four events in 2011 and three in 2010. Prior to 2010, other than a brief network shutdown in 2007 due to an Indianapolis Fire Department request to cut power to the source of a fire, there had been no significant incidents on the network system since three that occurred in 2005. Moreover, the events that occurred in the first half of 2011 occurred in January, April, May, and June. Clearly, three events in three months represented a higher frequency and shorter time between events than had been the case in recent history. The IURC asked IPL to prepare, as part of its participation in a July 7, 2011 public meeting, a set of responses to specific questions about these events in the underground network system. Those responses are contained in a 20-page report which we have included as Appendix A.

As part of that report, IPL provided a detailed explanation of nine events: the three in 2005, the three in 2010, and the first three in 2011, ending with the May 31 event (not including the June 20 event, since the report was dated June 30). We have reviewed the explanations which IPL provided for each of the events and find them reasonable and likely to be an accurate depiction of the events and their root cause. We noted, however, that a more extensive database of the information gathered about each event was lacking, and we therefore recommend that the company adopt a formal procedure for documenting each such event, including the circumstances before and after the event, the root cause, and the subsequent remedial action. The event of November 19, 2011, which occurred as this report was being finalized and caused a one-week delay in its release as we took time to go on site and make further observations, acted as another example of the process.

The 12 significant underground network events that have occurred from January 1, 2005 through the date of this report are summarized in the table below. See Appendix A for more details on ten of those events, and section 6.5 for our observations on the November 19th event.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Jan 2005</td>
<td>114 W. North St.</td>
<td>Secondary fire, multiple manholes</td>
<td>Cable fault in duct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jan 2005</td>
<td>137 W. Market St.</td>
<td>Secondary fire; explosion at Bookland Bldg.</td>
<td>Steam leak; CO leak to bldg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Responsible Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Sep 2005</td>
<td>Talbot &amp; Vermont</td>
<td>Primary fault fed by network protector failure</td>
<td>NP failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov 2007</td>
<td>456 N. Meridian St.</td>
<td>Fire in customer equip.; IFD request; shutdown Edison W.</td>
<td>Insufficient time/crews to isolate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Aug 2010</td>
<td>342 Mass. Ave.</td>
<td>Primary splice failure on one feeder caused splice failure on another, blew MH cover</td>
<td>Overload on undersized primary section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan 2011</td>
<td>E. Mich. &amp; NJ St.</td>
<td>Secondary failure &amp; fire; two other secondary MH events</td>
<td>Cable fault in MH; gas fuel for other two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr 2011</td>
<td>20 W. Court St.</td>
<td>Secondary MH event caused by cust. junction box failure</td>
<td>No service limiters here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 2011</td>
<td>46 N. Capitol St.</td>
<td>Fault in primary termination chamber of west Xfmr.</td>
<td>Possibly due to untaped ends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jun 2011</td>
<td>326 E. New York</td>
<td>Cable fault in duct</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov 2011</td>
<td>S. Delaware &amp; E. Pearl</td>
<td>Secondary failure &amp; fire in two MH’s</td>
<td>Possible old steam leak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See Appendix A for more details.

We will have more to say below about how these events fit into the overall picture of the system condition and the company's maintenance and replacement practices. For now, we simply comment on the following key aspects:

1) While three events in three months warrants the attention which the IURC has given to this topic, 12 events over almost 7 years is not a particular high frequency when compared to the experience of many other similar utilities.

2) Three of the 12 events, or 25 percent, were the result of failures in customer equipment, not IPL equipment or procedures.

3) Another 3 of the 12 events were either caused by or exacerbated by the failure of equipment from another public utility, in particular a steam leak for two and a probable gas leak for another.

4) Another 2 were caused by failures in the primary termination chamber of network transformers. We will have more to say about this cause and its potential remediation in a later section of our report, but here we note that this is not the classic ‘aged cable’ failure mode, since the faults were not in the duct, but in the termination chamber and were likely caused by a combination of mechanical stress from unsupported cable and inadequate taping on the termination. In that sense, they were more akin to splice failures than deteriorated insulation due to age.
5) One was caused by a network protector failure. We will also have more to say about that cause and its remediation in a later section of the report.

6) Finally we noted no significant deficiency in the company's response to each of these 12 situations. Therefore, our recommendations will focus on avoiding the future occurrence of similar incidents, rather than improvements to how the company prepares for or responds to such incidents.

The incident on November 19 deserves some additional mention. In one sense, this most recent outage is not significantly different than the other eleven listed in the table above. Of course, since it happened recently and even during the course of the audit, it got significant attention. One of our team (Charlie Fijnvandraat) flew to Indianapolis within days of the event to observe the site and the process IPL used to gather data, draw conclusions, and take appropriate action. Both of us interacted extensively with IPL that week and somewhat the following week. We emphasized that our role was still one of a third-party auditor, and IPL understood that. We also interacted in a quite limited way with the IURC, essentially just to ensure them that we would include this latest incident in our report, and would alter our recommendations accordingly, if necessary. As a result, we asked for and received permission to delay the delivery of the report by one week. That delay was caused not only by our wanting to have a sufficiently definitive root cause analysis, but also because our interaction with what was going on somewhat disrupted the writing and review we had intended to complete at that time.

Even before the incident, though, earlier drafts of our report included comments that pointed out that the physical environment in which the Indianapolis underground network operates has both benign and harsh aspects. The benign part is how dry the holes are and how well they drain. The harsh part is the extensive system of steam lines, their consequent proximity to many IPL manholes and ducts, and especially the fact that there are so many active leaks, a fact we noticed just driving around the city. Our inspections of vaults and manholes (See Appendix D) noted the existence of many hot holes, and our review of the inspection records noted many too hot even to inspect, and thus lacunae in the records. Clearly, the Market Street incident in 2005 showed how a steam leak could deteriorate cable. All of this led us to conclude, even before the November 19 incident, that steam leaks would be a major area of future concern for IPL.

In the weeks following the incident, we emphasized to IPL that we would observe the actions which IPL undertook to allow it to immediately determine the extent of such risk and make plans to mitigate it as soon as possible. We noted with approval IPL’s action plan to review its records for hot holes and to immediately re-inspect them if possible and if not, to strongly request from Citizens Thermal that those holes be made cool enough to inspect. The November 19 incident gave us a heightened sense of urgency about this issue, not to mention the desire to take effective action before the city was to receive a large influx of visitors and publicity.

In addition to our activity observing what was going on after the incident, we reached out to some of our sources in the industry to confirm our knowledge of some of the factors involved. We confirmed from personnel at ConEdison, for example, that they had
experience with varnished cambric lead cable, and that it did have the property that when exposed to high temperature, whether from an overload or an external heat source, the varnish in the cotton fabric (cambric) tape that acts as both an insulating and lubricating agent could become waxy and might form gaps that would facilitate water ingress, thus setting up the conditions for an incipient fault, arcing, vaporization of combustible hydrocarbons, and consequent combustion and burnout.

In section 6.5 below, we discuss the November 19th event in more detail, as part of our assessment of IPL’s asset management approach (and after the reader has had the benefit of the sections on System Design, Maintenance, etc.).
1.3 Response to the incidents

Earlier this year, in response to the increasing frequency of incidents in the Indianapolis downtown underground network system, the IURC asked IPL to report on the situation. The first report was included as part of the annual summer preparedness briefing that IPL does for the IURC. In addition, the IURC scheduled a public meeting for July 7, 2011. In preparation for that meeting, the IURC sent a list of 14 questions for IPL to address at the meeting. IPL's responses are included as Appendix A of this report. The IURC also asked IPL if it would be appropriate to have a third party audit the situation and report to the IURC on it. The Company agreed, and this report is the result of that request.

On IPL's part, its response to the situation included a complete inspection ("full sweep") of all of the manholes in the downtown area, to be accomplished over a period of a few months, in contrast to the five-year inspection cycle that the company normally performs. In addition, the company undertook the following five initiatives, details of which were included in the 2011 Summer Preparedness presentation and also in the response to the 14 questions for the July 7 public meeting:

1) Install two-way communication and control devices on all network protectors

2) Install primary cable fault detectors

3) Install secondary cable limiters at select locations

4) Evaluate the use of infrared thermal imaging in manhole and vault inspections

5) Pilot the use of special manhole covers that provide a combination of locking and over-pressurization relief

It is our opinion that these responses by the IURC and IPL were appropriate for the situation. In the recommendations section of this report we comment on these and other actions the company should take, including those that would address the steam-related incident on November 19, 2011.
1.4 The Audit

IPL issued a request for quotation for an audit of the IPL downtown underground network on August 1, 2011, with a bid due date of August 15, for award by September 15, and with the final report due no later than November 30. The request was sent to six companies with qualifications in this area. Five responded with bids. IPL reviewed the bids and recommended three companies to the IURC for its selection of the winning bidder. The IURC reviewed the three bids and selected O'Neill Management Consulting, LLC as the firm to conduct the audit.

The bid submitted by O'Neill Management Consulting proposed a two-person team consisting of Daniel O'Neill and Charles Fijnvandraat (“Fay-van-drott”). Their resumes are included as Appendix C. The work plan included on-site interviews of IPL personnel and inspections of IPL manholes and vaults, as well as industry research, a written report, and a public presentation to the IURC. Mr. O'Neill is a well-known consultant on reliability and asset management in the utility industry, with over 25 years of utility industry experience, and has published over 50 papers and has led over 75 engagements. His experience in downtown underground networks includes having consulted for Consolidated Edison of New York, Potomac Electric Power Company in Washington, DC, Entergy, and a number of other companies. He also led a review of stray voltage in underground secondary networks in Massachusetts for the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities. Mr. Fijnvandraat has worked both as a consultant and as a utility manager in the context of underground secondary networks including as an employee of Northeast Utilities in Springfield, MA, and of NStar in Boston; and as a consultant for Consolidated Edison of New York, Potomac Electric Power Company, and the Long Island Power Authority. He is a contributing author of a tutorial on secondary networks for the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).

After being awarded the engagement, Mr. O'Neill and Mr. Fijnvandraat contacted the IURC and IPL and made arrangements to begin the audit. The first step was the issuance of data requests to IPL and the scheduling of a site visit for the week of September 19. The site visit included interviews with 12 IPL managers and inspection of 12 manhole and vault locations as well as the three substations that serve the Indianapolis downtown underground network.

Our industry research included a review of relevant documents from the Internet and our own libraries, discussions with our key contacts at other utilities that operate significant underground secondary networks, and also manufacturers of network and substation equipment.

Throughout the audit the personnel at Indianapolis Power and Light were very cooperative and responsive, making themselves available for interview in person and by phone, and also sending us the information we requested in a timely way.
1.5 Primer on Underground Electric Distribution Systems

There are several ways load is served in metropolitan areas:

1) Radial distribution
2) Spot networks
3) Secondary grid network

Below, we present some basic information about these systems. The information is basically generic, with an occasional comment about how it applies to IPL.

Radial Distribution Systems:

Radial distribution is the typical design that most customers would recognize, in which a single high voltage (supply) line is installed on poles, direct buried (as in industrial parks and residential developments) and to a lesser degree, constructed underground as part of a manhole and duct system. Radial distribution is the predominant design in the utility industry, reflecting that most utilities serve customers via an overhead, poles-and-wires design, which may then transition to radial underground in suburban subdivisions and campuses.

Example of a typical radial distribution system showing primary (e.g. 13.2kV) and secondary voltages (120/240 single phase) to various homes
**Spot Network Systems**

Spot network systems are typically used in the urban centers where two or more distribution primary lines (e.g. 13.2kV) are supplied to network class transformers which convert the primary voltage to a secondary voltage of 120/208 or 277/480 volts that supply a single customer. It is called a spot network because it uses network-type transformers whose secondary network side terminals are interconnected by cables or a bus. It is very reliable because the secondary connections are from multiple primary sources. Nevertheless, a failure at the common customer collector bus will result in a customer outage.

**Characteristics of a Spot Network:**

1. A spot network is supplied by two or more feeders. IPL has customers that are supplied with up to four primary feeder sources.
2. Due to fault current conditions, most utilities apply fusing on the secondary side of the transformers prior to connection to the customer bus. IPL uses in-line current (cable limiter) fusing on the 120/208V voltage and current limiting fusing on the 277/480V voltage.

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**Secondary Network Grid**

A secondary network grid is a distribution system in which customers are served from a set of three-phase, four-wire, low-voltage circuits supplied by multiple network transformers whose low-voltage terminals are connected to the low-voltage circuits through network protectors.
The secondary network system has two or more high-voltage primary feeders, with each primary feeder typically supplying 10 to 30 network transformers, depending on network size and design.

The system also includes automatic protective devices intended to isolate faulted primary feeders, network transformers, or low-voltage cable sections while maintaining service to the customers served from the low-voltage circuits.

Characteristics of a Secondary network grid:

1. Typical underground networks are located under various streets and alleys in a manhole and duct system. The IPL network is similarly configured.
2. The manholes used can be made from brick or concrete and vary in size from 4 foot by 6 foot for cable manholes to 6 by 8 or larger for transformers vaults. IPL has similar sizes, including some manholes where no more than one individual can fit and work.
3. Duct systems that route the cables from manhole to manhole and to and from vaults range in diameter from 3.5 inch to 6 or more inches and can be constructed with terracotta tile, fiber, or the current design that uses PVC pipe.
4. Systems are designed to be redundant, such that failure of any one piece of equipment (e.g., cable section, transformer) does not result in a customer outage.
5. Each network is supplied by two or more primary feeders, often five or six.
6. The primary feeders are generally supplied by the same substation (also true at IPL).
7. The secondary connection from the transformer to the network can be multiple connection splices, elbows, or open bus secondary. IPL uses the open bus secondary design.
8. Secondary grid voltages can be either 120/208 or 277/480 volts. IPL’s grid is 120/208 with selected spot network services with 120/208 or 277/480 volts.
9. Transformers range from 300, 500, 750, 1000, 1500, 2000, and 2500 kVA.
10. Secondary protectors can be non-submersible or submersible housings, and ratings in the 800 amp to 6200 amp range are common. IPL uses submersible housings with ratings dependent on the load being served.
Typical Network Secondary Grid

Sample of Secondary Network Grid at IPL
Network Equipment

**Network Transformer:**

Transformers are designed to be either submersible or non-submersible, located inside a dry building vault or in an underground street or sidewalk vault. IEEE C37.12.40 is the standard which goes into greater detail on material and electrical properties of a submersible network transformer.

The purpose of the transformer is to take the primary voltage, which at IPL is nominally 13.2kV, and step it down to secondary or customer utilization voltage. In the IPL network system this voltage would be either 120/208volts (the secondary grid or smaller spot network locations) or 277/480volts for larger spot networks. IPL also specifies the transformer to have a three-position primary switch, which will allow the transformer to be disconnected and also to be placed in the ground position.
Network Protector:

The network protector is installed on the secondary side of the transformer. The purpose of the protector is to be a circuit breaker with automatic open and close capabilities based on various algorithms programmed into relays associated with the protector. The two basic roles of the sensing algorithms are to either disconnect the transformer from the secondary grid in the event of a primary fault anywhere on the primary feeder supplying the particular transformer, or open and close depending on load requirements in the secondary grid.
Picture of submersible network protector, showing the relays and circuit breaker (Not IPL)
Section 2 – System Design and Specification

2.1 IPL System design and specification

The downtown network in Indianapolis is designed along lines that are similar to secondary networks in many other major cities. In Indianapolis, there are five separate secondary networks, each fed by a separate group of feeders. This compares with many other cities (see the table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Secondary networks</th>
<th>Transformers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York, NY</td>
<td>74 (36 in Manhattan alone)</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>45 (+4 in MD)</td>
<td>3471 (+567)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>10 (+2 in Oakland)</td>
<td>1120 (+221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle, WA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas-Ft.Worth, TX</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indianapolis, IN</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>315</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester, MA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, MS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Springs, CO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Bend, IN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Wayne, IN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield, MA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton Rouge, LA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Rock, AR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows secondary network grids only. Many cities also have feeder groups that serve primary selective customers or groups of spot networks only. Most of the secondary grids shown above have a mixture of grid-only transformers and spot network transformers. IPL is similar, in having some spot networks attached to grid feeders and some spots with dedicated feeders, as well as some dedicated feeders for primary selective customers only. Notably, some major cities such as downtown Los Angeles, CA, downtown Vancouver, BC, and downtown Bellevue, WA, have no secondary networks at all. They supply their larger customers with radial but redundant (often dual) primary feeds.

Moreover, the number of feeders serving each network in Indianapolis is comparable to that in many other cities. Although in New York City the typical network is quite large, with 20 or 30 feeders, in other cities it is typical to see each network fed by five or six feeders. For example, most of Pepco's secondary networks in Washington, DC have six feeders, though some have as many as thirteen.
One of the advantages of Pepco’s six-feeder design is that it will tend to have an emergency capacity that is comparable to its normal capacity. For example, if each of the six feeders is rated at approximately 7.5 MVA, then the total capacity of each such six-feeder network under normal conditions would be 45 MVA. If the typical emergency rating for such a feeder were 9 MVA, i.e., it could be expected to carry that load for a limited time, say, one daily load cycle, then, if one of the feeders were to fail, the remaining five could still carry a load equal to the full normal capacity of the network for a limited time while the faulted feeder was being restored, since 5 times 9 equals 45, which is also the product of 6 times 7.5. It is because the emergency rating of primary cable is typically 20 percent higher than the normal rating of such cable that the six-feeder design has this property.

The five underground secondary networks that serve Indianapolis can be described as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edison West</td>
<td>5 feeders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edison East</td>
<td>5 feeders, and 4 feeders to spot networks near the Monument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner Lane North</td>
<td>6 feeders, including 3 shared with South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner Lane South</td>
<td>8 feeders, including 3 shared with North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substation #3</td>
<td>9 feeders, not including a backup to Edison, and the 4kV feeders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The configuration of the IPL network feeders and the sizes of the transformers connected to them are also quite typical, as shown in the table below. When it comes to network transformers, the workhorses of the industry are the 500kVAs, while the 1000s and 1500s are common in spot networks and as larger transformers on the grids.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grid Networks</th>
<th>Network Transformers by Size (kVA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edison</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub #3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As such, the IPL downtown underground secondary network feeders are similar in size and configuration to the typical six-feeder networks, including the fact that they are fed by split buses with bus ties across to other transformer buses.

The five underground secondary networks that serve Indianapolis are comparable to those in other cities in another way, namely in their history. The history of electric distribution in United States begins with the overhead systems of Edison coming out of The Pearl Street Station in New York City and similar generating station-based distribution systems in other cities. The early underground systems were often DC networks, while later networks used alternating current systems. In fact, in many cities DC networks continued to exist at the turn of the twenty-first century, supporting large motor loads such as elevators. In Indianapolis, before 1928 the downtown area was mainly served by DC networks; it was then that the decision was made to expand the AC
networks. Eventually, the DC networks were replaced with AC-driven inverters for such loads.

Similarly, early systems tended to be based on 4,000-Volt (4kV) primary feeders, whereas later systems are 15 kV class, e.g., 12.5kV, 13.2kV, or 13.8kV. In Indianapolis, a 1959 report (Technical Report 142) describes the three secondary networks at the time: Perry K, with sixteen 4kV feeders, Toledo, with eight 13.2kV feeders, and Substation #3, with eight 13.2kV feeders. IPL converted the remaining (Perry K) 4kV systems to 13.2kV in the early 1980s, around the time of the construction of the Hoosier Dome and the Convention Center. IPL’s 15kV-class voltage is sometimes referred to as 13.8kV because it is often run at that level at the substation bus, so that voltage at the end of the longer lines still meets the standard. This is not uncommon in the industry. Substation Number 3, which is the oldest of the three substations that support the five secondary networks in Indianapolis, still has some 4kV feeders that support chiller load through direct primary feeds.

The other two substations that support the other four secondary networks, namely, Edison and Gardner Lane are quite similar to each other. Edison had 4kV circuits at one time, but is now all 13kV, and Gardner Lane is a newer substation that is virtually a copy of Edison in many ways, having three incoming transmission lines, three 40 MVA power transformers, and three split-bus metal-clad switchgear houses. The Edison substation serves the two northern networks - Edison East and Edison West. The Gardner Lane substation serves the two southern and western networks - Gardner Lane North, and Gardner Lane South.

In addition to these five secondary networks, IPL serves Indianapolis with two other modes of underground distribution, as is true for most other large cities as well, namely spot networks and primary selective. As noted above, spot networks are essentially secondary networks located at a single building or campus and consist of primary feeds to two or more network transformers connected on the low side to a secondary bus from which the customer draws service. Primary selective service involves two or more primary feeds to one or more switches from which the customer takes primary service. All three of these modes of service are considered more reliable than standard radial service, with perhaps the most reliable being spot networks, especially when the primary feeds to the spot network come from separate feeders, which themselves may originate from separate substation buses.

Part of the evolution of urban underground electric systems has been, for Indianapolis as well as other cities, that load has been gradually taken off of the secondary network grids and converted to spot network or primary selective loads, especially as blocks are redeveloped into larger buildings or campuses.

Equipment used by IPL in its underground system in Indianapolis is comparable to that used by most other utilities in their urban underground systems. The primary cable is a combination of the older paper-insulated lead-covered (PILC) cable and the more modern solid dielectric cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) or ethylene propylene rubber (EPR) insulated cable. There is some debate in the industry as to whether PILC should be
replaced even when it is not failing, but the general consensus is that PILC that is not failing need not be replaced.

IPL’s network transformers are of standard type and typical sizes, and have the standard network protector on the low side (to open in the event of reverse current so that the network cannot feed a primary fault) and also a switch chamber on the primary end. In a later section we comment on some possible modifications to the specification of the network transformer and protector that might avoid some modes of failure, but IPL is not alone in having the type of specification it currently has.

The secondary cable is of typical size (most mains being 3-350MCM), but the type is somewhat less common, namely a high degree of PILC cable and some varnished cambric lead covered (VCLC). Many other utilities have a preponderance of rubber or polyethylene-insulated secondary cable, which itself can be an issue in terms of providing a source of combustion when arcing causes it to gasify. IPL told us that they avoided rubber/polyethylene for secondary because of the IPL system’s high exposure to steam in many manholes. This paucity of combustible hydrocarbons may be quite significant in causing IPL to have fewer secondary manhole incidents. Another notable exception is that many other utilities connect a large number of their secondary network customers as single-phase load whereas at IPL almost all the secondary network customers (ninety-five percent) receive three-phase service.

The vaults, manholes, and ducts used by the Indianapolis secondary networks are again typical of those in other cities, except that the size of the IPL manholes is perhaps somewhat smaller than many. The more notable difference in the IPL manholes is that they are much drier than those in many other cities with large secondary networks. Many of these other cities have large rivers running through them or are in coastal areas and see flooding of manholes fairly consistently, often requiring sump pumps as opposed to the French drain system that seems to work well for the IPL manholes.

Other features of the IPL downtown underground system that are typical of other utilities’ systems are:

- Moderately loaded (with capacity for at least one contingency, i.e. one feeder outage): The loads per feeder and per transformer are typical for a 13kV system, i.e., feeders operating in the 300 to 400 amp range, and network transformers being on average 50 to 60 percent loaded during peak periods

- Configuration of feeders and transformers: each feeder carries only a portion of the load in an area, and the transformers in an area are fed from more than one feeder

- Designed to have the secondary burn in the clear in the event of a fault, i.e., the mains (secondary ties between transformers) are generally 350 MCM and do not have limiters (in-line fuses).

In summary, our experience indicates that the design of the downtown Indianapolis underground network is consistent with peers in the industry, with four notable features:
- The manholes and ducts are drier than most
- The exposure to steam is greater than most
- The connection to customers is almost exclusively three-phase
- The secondary cable is predominantly PILC, not insulated with polyethylene or rubber

As we discuss the performance of the system in the remainder of this report, these features will be seen to be significant.
Section 3: System Condition

3.1 Summary of age and type

In this section we present our assessment of the condition of the Indianapolis downtown underground network system, beginning with the summary of its age and type, and with the next sections addressing condition. In the previous section we described the system design and specifications. We also outlined the history of the system. From that discussion it should be clear that IPL’s downtown underground network has elements that are from the 1930-70’s, elements from the 1980’s, when the last conversion from 4kV to 13kV took place, and still other elements of the more recent vintage due to replacement or growth. In this regard the system is comparable to underground secondary network systems in other major cities, since all of them originated in the early days of electric distribution in the United States and have experienced only limited changes since that time, mainly due to voltage conversion and the transition toward more use of spot networks and primary selective systems and away from dependence on the secondary grid. As a result, many spot networks and primary selective vaults are of a later vintage than nearby secondary grid vaults.

With this background it is easier to interpret tables of age distribution of equipment such as we present below.

### Age Distribution of Network Transformers

For network transformers, which would include those used for spot networks, the distribution clearly shows some aggressive replacement (or growth, but probably not so much the latter) in the last ten years. We can also see the effect of having done the Perry K conversion from 4kV to 13kV in the 1980’s, since the values for the group between 10 and 20 years is quite low, and the group from 20-30 years (1980-1990) is the second
largest. The values in the earlier years reflect the fact that the other substations were 13kV as far back as the 1950’s.

The situation for the network protectors is not as easy to visualize, but can still be gleaned from the data. Unfortunately, IPL’s records on network protectors were missing the date of manufacture for most of the network protectors. We were able to fill in some of the values with serial number vintage information obtained directly from some manufacturers (Eaton, GE, Richards). Nevertheless, as the following graph shows, over 35 percent of the network protectors are still not identified by date of manufacture, and hence, age. From the units that do have ages, we can see that at least 33 percent of the network protectors are over 50 years old, and at least 19 percent are over 60 years old. This is in contrast to the network transformers, for which the percentage over 60 years old was less than 5 percent of the total.

![Age Distribution of Network Protectors](image)

This conclusion agrees with what we learned in our interviews, namely that when the conversion from 4kV to 13kV was done, most of the network protectors were not changed out along with the transformers, since the network protectors deal only with the secondary voltage, which remained unchanged.

From IPL’s records on network protectors we were also able to confirm that at least 48 units were Westinghouse manufactured between 1949-1957, when, due to a shortage of copper, aluminum was predominately substituted for the bus. This design is known to be susceptible to deterioration from exposure of the bus to salt water (which should not happen, but can if there is a leak allowing water ingress). The corrosion can lead to the development of hydrogen gas, which is highly combustible and can lead to an over-pressurization (explosion), which in some case has been known to dislodge the doors of the network protector in environments that are wet and salt-prone. While not all units
during this time period were built with an aluminum bus, our experience has shown the units built in the early to mid fifties time period were likely to be aluminum, and depending on factory runs, the outside years are also possible. Due to the difficulty in visually determining if the bus is aluminum or copper, a solution lies in measuring the thickness required to match the ampacity rating (aluminum would be thicker).

The cable in IPL’s downtown underground network is of varying vintages, with the secondary cable likely to be the oldest, since the primary cable would likely have been changed with the upgrade from 4kV to 13kV. When cables require repair, if it is in the manhole, it may be spliced, but if it is in the duct, it needs to be pulled out and replaced. Thus, repairs often involve installing new cable. Without an analysis of the cable vintages, which at best might be obtained from mass-asset accounting records, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that the primary cable age distribution is comparable to the network transformer distribution, and the secondary cable age distribution is comparable to the network protector distribution.

The type of cable varies due to specific configurations, but a good general rule is that the 13.2kV primary cable is 750MCM or less and the 120/208V secondary cable is 350MCM or more for the mains or ties between transformers.
3.2 Evidence from inspections

When it comes to assessing system condition, age alone is not a very good indicator. Even relatively new equipment, if it is subjected to harsh operating conditions and is not well maintained, will suffer in comparison to older equipment in benign environments. In that regard, the underground environment in Indianapolis is a mixture of both harsh and benign environments. On the one hand we observed, in contrast to many other major cities, that manholes in downtown Indianapolis are relatively dry and drain well even after a hard rain. On the other hand, Indianapolis, with the second largest steam system in the nation, has many manholes that are quite hot and present a harsh environment for electric cable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City (Company)</th>
<th>2009 Energy Sales (mlb)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York (Con Edison)</td>
<td>23,000,000 (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis (Citizens Thermal)</td>
<td>5,831,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia (Veolia)</td>
<td>3,596,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto (Enwave)</td>
<td>2,500,000 (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston (Veolia)</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit Thermal</td>
<td>1,880,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee (We Energies)</td>
<td>1,800,000 (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City (Veolia)</td>
<td>1,800,000 (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore (Veolia)</td>
<td>1,600,000 (est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis (NRG)</td>
<td>1,438,999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to how well-maintained the equipment is, the picture is once again a mixture of favorable and unfavorable factors. On the favorable side, we noted that equipment in general was not allowed to remain in service after it showed serious signs of deterioration. Our examination of the storeroom yard, which acts as the graveyard for equipment taken out of service and on its way to being scrapped, evidenced many examples of equipment that warranted being taken out of service. (See Appendix D). And conversely, we saw no equipment in service that was in as poor condition as what was in the graveyard. Also, we noted considerable evidence that regular maintenance was being performed on the equipment.

On the unfavorable side, we noted that many conditions were allowed to continue which in time were likely to cause stresses and ultimately failure. From what we could tell, this was not due to a lack of resources but rather a failure to recognize the conditions that would lead to future failure. We got a sense that the crews and their managers were more in the mode of corrective maintenance than preventive, that is, more focused on what was in imminent danger of failure rather than what might fail under different circumstances or over a longer period of time. Examples of this are noted in Appendix D, and our findings
are also based on our review of pictures taken in the “full sweep” inspections of 2011 and also the earlier inspections in 2005. The conditions included:

1) Unsupported cable (not properly racked)
2) Missing mechanical stress protectors (rack arm saddles and duct edge shoes)
3) Oil leaks (from the oil-impregnated paper in the cable, its dielectric fluid)
4) Low oil in tanks that are part of the transformer
5) Transformer nitrogen blanket pressure too high (could cause gasket failure)
6) Excessive cable bending
7) Uncapped and/or unmarked cable retired in place

To be clear, these conditions may not be direct, immediate threats to public safety or continuity of service, but they do speak to an opportunity to shift toward a more preventive, less corrective mode that could preclude the need for extra resources to avoid poorer performance in the future. In Appendix B we address the issue from a human factors point of view, referring to the problem as a common one of “looking, but not seeing”, or what has been called in some industries (including the military and police/fire) the need for “situational awareness”, the ability to relate what you are seeing to what it means for accomplishment of the mission.

This aspect of our assessment affects our recommendations regarding remediation actions by IPL. For example, while we understand and laud IPL’s offering to shorten the manhole and vault inspection cycles, we are not inclined to endorse this as a solution in the long run. The five-year cycle for manholes and three-year for vaults should be quite adequate, provided the inspections accomplish what they should. On the other hand, if the crews doing the inspection are going to continue to ignore the kinds of conditions highlighted above, then inspecting more frequently is just a waste of time and money. It was an appropriate immediate reaction to the increased frequency of events, but a more considered response would be to fix the myopia in the inspection process.
3.3 Condition by type of equipment

In this section, we comment on system condition by the different types of equipment in service in the Indianapolis downtown underground network. For brevity and focus, we adopt a ‘notes’ style for this section.

**Substations:** Overall, the substations are clean, i.e., very little debris or extraneous equipment lying around. Metal-clad breaker cabinets looked good, despite some surface rust (e.g. in Station #3), but with no gaping holes. Relays with inspection cards showing greater than the standard PM cycle of 8 years were not what we expected. Some were last tested in the late 1990’s, based on cards attached to the equipment. A transformer with a nitrogen blanket of 4 to 5 psi was, in our judgment, too high. Condition of the batteries was excellent (like new). The quarterly inspection form appears appropriate, in particular based on the condition of the stations, e.g., various relay targets cleared, etc.

**Cable:** Too much unsupported cable and some leaking secondary cable/joints. Many missing duct shoes and rack arm saddles. Splices installed in line with other splices instead of cutting out old splice (although there would still be two splices, both would be new and properly supported). Secondary not routinely installed above the primary.

To the plus side, approximately 95 percent of the secondary load is three-phase (the rule is anything above a 200 amp main is three-phase). Many other utilities would allow up to 400 amp mains to be single phase, which can cause overload if not properly balanced and monitored for load growth. IPL typically runs three sets of secondary and due to limited congestion in the manholes, we had the sense that crews likely will follow Engineering recommendation to connect to the right sets of mains, as opposed to the difficulty other utilities that have in more congested mains with the consequent unbalanced load.

**Manhole conditions:** Overall, manholes are in reasonably good condition with respect to civil construction, with not a lot of falling bricks or chipped concrete, nor falling or rusting roof beams. Some manholes are quite small (only big enough for one person). A significant plus is that the majority of the manholes are dry (from the 2005 inspection records, indications were that about 90 percent of the inspected manholes had less than a few inches of water). A significant negative is the high amount of steam impact (so much so that IPL does not use non-metal rack arms nor rubber/polyethylene-covered secondary cable). Also, new manholes often do not have flush duct mouths.

**Vault Rooms:** Overall, very roomy and clean. For example, one vault we visited is over 40 years old, yet in very good condition. Transformers have lots of room around them and the secondary bus areas are clean (though one vault that had a failure in 2011 still had a missing barrier board, due to the 5 inch clearance from the edge of the grating). There are many unsupported transition joints (leading to stresses on the lead wipes on the termination compartments). The worst vault we inspected was the one that had a failure in 2011, with primary leaning on secondary cable, and a light switch within inches of the secondary bus (and behind the barrier board, so one could not see the switch, one needed to “feel” for it).
**Termination chambers:** Source of some recent failures. One mechanism of failure is cracked lead terminations due to unsupported primary cable. Also to a degree, primary switches have oil level gauges, and at one location, we noticed the gauge showed it being overfilled, which could indicate a leak from another compartment.

**Network Transformers:** Deflector shields keep debris off the secondary and protector but the way it is situated, it puts the debris on the top of the transformer. Still, with relatively dry manholes and lightly loaded equipment (leaves and dirt create a blanket on top of the transformer) this is not a significant issue. Another plus is the use of bottom rails, purchased with the transformer and then also installed on additional rails garnered from salvage.

Another observation on why there was little rust on the bottom of the transformers is because IPL installs them in the middle of the vault. Most utilities will slide them to the side, scraping the bottom of the transformer.

The transformers are relatively new, due to the conversion to 13.2kV.

**Network Protectors:** Old age (kept the same ones when converting to 13.2kV), different types, work practice to vent all units before operating, and no process to ensure doors are sealed properly, e.g., using nitrogen or the available Schrader valves.

Interestingly, during the one week we were first there, there were two separate failures on the protectors due to manhole flooding. Per IPL’s specifications, IPL buys submersible equipment that is designed to operate underwater. Fortunately, they rarely have to at IPL due to the significant amount of dry manholes, but they should be able to, as they do in many other utilities.

We could not find any record of protector mis-operation or of situations of alive on backfeed that other utilities report.
3.4 Maintenance Planned and Completed

IPL has delineated its downtown underground network inspection and maintenance program as follows (from Appendix A, repeated here for the reader’s convenience):

- “A five-year inspection cycle of its manholes in the downtown area. The industry standard for good utility practice is to inspect manholes on a four-to-ten-year cycle. This means we enter and inspect about 260 manholes each year. [~1,266 manholes in inspection cycle]
- We do a visual inspection of the structural condition of the manhole, looking for any water infiltration issues and any other conditions that warrant further investigation.
- We inspect for damage to the fireproofing tapes on the cables, which help protect the cables from external heat.
- We visually inspect splices for leaking and swelling, which indicates they need to be replaced.
- We visually inspect for the presence and condition of duct sealing material, which prevents gases in the manhole from entering customer buildings.
- We take current readings on all secondary cables, making note of any cable with 0 current or greater than 200 amps of current for further investigation. Here, we are looking for cables that may have experienced a short circuit and are open, or cables that are approaching their maximum capacity. Further review is performed by the crew on those circuits indicating 0 current to determine if a cable has opened and appropriate action is taken. If these conditions exist, Network Engineering follows up and corrective actions are taken.
- Network protectors are on a three-year inspection cycle to make sure they operate correctly and to verify their operating settings. A general vault inspection is also made at the same time as the network protector testing.

Additional aspects of the plan incorporated within the last 10 years include:

- In 2011, an infra-red (IR) camera was added as an additional preventive maintenance testing tool. The camera is used to look for potential hot spots on the network protectors, primary oil switches, and incoming primary cable feed to the transformers.
- Vault cleaning has been expanded to include an inspection of the vault structure and a visual inspection of the equipment. The structure is inspected to determine wall, roof, and drainage issues. The transformer is checked for potential leaks, rust, oil or other abnormal conditions. Ladders, vault lighting circuits, bus work, steam penetrations are also recorded conditions of the inspection. IR temperature guns (digital numeric display of temperature) were added for temperature recording in 2009.
- Beginning in 2005, manhole inspections included inspecting and repacking of service ducts as needed.”

The text above describes a good system of inspection and maintenance. However, as we have noted above under “Evidence from inspections” and as evidenced in the descriptions and pictures in Appendix D, we found that the actual work performed did not always measure up to the description above, with some instances of various potentially fault-
producing conditions left either unrecognized or unfixed. Our sense from discussions with the crews and supervision is that the issue is more the former (unrecognized) than the latter (recognized, but intentionally not done). We discuss the problem in more detail in Appendix B below on the human factors involved in “Looking, but not seeing”.

A review of IPL records as well as interviews with personnel indicated that IPL tends to follow up well when it finds conditions that require immediate attention, such as a leaking splice or badly compromised insulation. As we have demonstrated in Appendix D, we feel IPL does not respond as consistently well to conditions that merely add stress which might lead to a fault in the not-so-immediate future, e.g., unsupported cable, missing rack arm saddles or duct shoes.
Section 4: System Performance

4.1 Measures of system performance

The performance of electric distribution systems is typically measured by a combination of system averages and worst-performing specific locations. Much has been written and need not be repeated here about the system averages like SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index), CAIDI (Customer Average Interruption Duration Index), and the product of those two indices, SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index). Such system averages tell a lot about the typical radial distribution system, which often has a frequency index close to 1.0 and a duration of perhaps 90 minutes, yielding a SAIDI of 90 minutes as well. These measures typically exclude outages of less than one minute (or five minutes in some jurisdictions), for which there is a separate measure, MAIFI (Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index), and also outages due to major events like hurricanes, blizzards, and the like. Finally, there are measures like CEMIn (Customers Experiencing n or more Multiple Interruptions) and CELIDn (Customers Experiencing Long Interruption Durations of n minutes or more), which are typically expressed as a percent of the total number of customers, e.g., 5 percent, and represent the ‘worst cases’ of performance.

All of these measures are appropriate for the typical radial system, but usually tell little about a downtown underground system, especially one with grid and spot networks, since the frequency of customer interruptions for such systems is very low, often less than 0.1, as opposed to 1.0, and so, even though the duration of customer interruptions can be long, the overall SAIDI will typically be a very low number, perhaps less than 10 minutes per year.

Moreover, such a number does not really focus on what matters in such systems, because all of the measures mentioned above are weighted by the number of customers, with each customer representing one meter. Yet in the downtown area, one meter might be one high-rise building, with multiple banks of elevators, any one of which may have people in them when the power goes out, and also people on high floors that would need to be evacuated in the event of a loss of power. Envisioning such difficulties gives insight into why the reliability expectations for downtown areas is so much higher than other areas, and why the design is correspondingly more reliable than the standard radial design. In fact, in some cities, there are laws or regulations that require buildings of more than five or six floors to have elevators, and even stipulations that certain areas or types of buildings will be served by a redundant design like a network.

For such a system, it is difficult to develop a measure of reliability that can be measured on a quarterly or even an annual basis. Rather, like the bulk transmission system, the performance of the system is probably best measured on a ten-year basis. For planning and decision-making, then, such systems need to deal with the probability of major events like a network shutdown (like the August 14, 2003 northeast blackout). The industry has well-developed tools for planning on such a basis at the bulk power level, with reserve ratios and contingency analyses. For urban secondary networks, there is not generally an overall network risk indicator. ConEdison is an exception, having
developed an index they call the Network Reliability Index, which is essentially the probability that any given network (ConEdison has 74 networks) might suffer conditions which might lead to a network shutdown.

What many utilities do in this regard, and what we would recommend for IPL, is to measure and analyze their performance in terms of the failure rate of the network equipment and also the completion rate of their scheduled maintenance.
4.2 Trends in performance

The chart below shows the number of equipment failures on the IPL downtown underground network equipment for the last ten and two-thirds years, totaling 309 failures, an average of 29 per year.

![Underground Network Equipment Failures](chart)

This chart combines various types of equipment failure – primary cable, network transformers, network protectors, and secondary events – to yield an overall view of the network performance. Most of these failures caused no interruption to customers because of the redundancy of the design. The level and trend of these failures, however, can be used as an appropriate gauge of the potential for events that would interrupt customers or cause a network incident.

In reviewing a graph like this we have to assume that the data given us is correct and consistent. Sometimes we have seen that when a new system is put into place, the trend of outages changes due to better reporting, not the underlying performance. We know of no such complicating factor here, and we take the data as given. From the graph it is clear that the number of events increased significantly after 2003 from an average of 15 per year to a level of approximately 31 per year from 2004 to 2009, and then began to trend upward for 2010-2011. Clearly, this is also reflected in the increased frequency of network incidents that is the reason for this report. Yet, as we saw, after the three incidents in 2005, there were no incidents until 2007, which was not an IPL equipment failure but a network shutdown caused by an IFD order to cut power to a building fire caused by customer equipment. Likewise, the first event in 2010 was caused by a fire in a customer transformer. It was not until the two events in August 2010 that incidents occurred that were caused by failures in IPL equipment. This is why monitoring the number of such publicly visible incidents is not sufficiently proactive. What must be monitored and controlled is the number of equipment failures like the ones in the chart above. What one might hope to accomplish by following the recommendations of this report is to reverse the recent trend and in fact bring failures back to a level such as it was before 2004.
Another view of the same figures is by the location of the equipment that failed, as shown in the chart below.

In this chart, the failures were first segregated by cause, with Other including causes like third-party dig-ins, customer equipment failure, and human error. We also included in Other the failures due to substation equipment, so that we could focus on failures in the network itself caused by failure of IPL network equipment. Then we grouped the failures further as to whether they occurred in the vault, typically on the network protector or the transformer, but possibly also bus work. Next we grouped all failure in the duct, which included both primary and secondary cable failure in the duct. Finally, we grouped failures in the manhole, including splice failures and cable failures that occurred in the manhole itself. In this regard it is interesting to note that the recent increase in failures can be traced mainly to failures in the manhole, since the sum of all the other sources is relatively constant from 2004 through 2011 to date. Note: this does not include the latest incident on November 19, which would have been classified as a failure in duct that led to further failures in the manhole.

We also examined the failures by month and by which substation was the source, and found nothing unusual or worth commenting on in this report.
4.3 Comparisons with other utilities

When measuring performance of a system, trending is a primary method, but benchmarking against other systems is important as well. Over the years, attempts have been made to benchmark downtown underground network systems. We are aware of at least three such efforts (we helped facilitate two), but their data is proprietary. Nevertheless, there is enough data in the public record to draw a picture of what other downtown underground systems experience in terms of system performance, and we can use that to describe what we already know from our proprietary sources.

IPL, in its July 7 report to the IURC cited the following data from Washington, DC, and Massachusetts (from Appendix A):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Manhole Events</th>
<th># of Manholes</th>
<th># of Vaults</th>
<th># yrs of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Pepco</td>
<td>Jan 2000- Dec 2000</td>
<td>48 n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 2001- July 2001</td>
<td>46 n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>NSTAR</td>
<td>July 2004 - Dec 2005</td>
<td>44 38000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Grid</td>
<td>Aug 2004 - Dec 2005</td>
<td>20 20735</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WMECO</td>
<td>June 1999- Dec 2005</td>
<td>30 3750</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unitil</td>
<td>1998- Dec 2005</td>
<td>0 192</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We would point out that Pepco makes an annual report to the Public Utility Commission of the District of Columbia, and the report for the calendar year 2010 shows 111 manhole events. As IPL points out, there are varying definitions across the industry of what qualifies as a “manhole event”, which makes comparison difficult, but Pepco has been reporting such events since at least 2000 and has refined its methodology to a point of high credibility. As the Pepco report states: “During 2010, there were a total of 111 reportable manhole events in the District of Columbia. Two of these events were not attributable to Pepco equipment or actions. Of the 111 manhole events in 2010, 82 were classified as Smoking Manholes (S), 25 were classified as Manhole Explosions (E), and 4 were classified as Manhole Fires (F). There were 82 events in 2009.”

Another utility that has reported manhole events consistently for a long time is ConEdison of New York. Because of the size of its system, any numbers tend to be not very comparable to other systems. It reports manhole events for the five boroughs in the low thousands, with most of them, as in DC, reported as ‘smoking manholes’, a smaller number as manhole fires, and an even smaller number as explosions.

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The California Public Utility Commission requires utilities in the state to report incidents that involve personal injury (hospitalization) or damage (over $20,000). The incidents are contained in an annual Safety and Reliability Report which had been published from 1998 through 2007. Since the incidents are defined so narrowly and since many cities in the state do not even have secondary networks (downtown Los Angeles has none, and the metro area only has one, in Long Beach), the count of underground incidents, typically less than 50 per year for the whole state, is not very relevant to this study, but does demonstrate that they do happen with some regularity yet serious incidents are rare. Almost half of the underground incidents in California are caused by dig-ins, and the rest are caused mainly by cable, splice, or transformer failure, many of which may be on radial underground systems. Notably, in August, 2005, PG&E in San Francisco had an explosion in a transformer vault, in which one of the four transformers in the vault had a failure in the primary termination chamber, a failure mode experienced twice in the last five years by equipment at IPL.

In June of this year there was a vault fire in Morristown, NJ, followed by a manhole fire with injury in August. A fire in the previous year severely damaged the town library. The cause of that fire is still being disputed by the electric company, Jersey Central Power & Light (JCP&L). The secondary network in Morristown is approximately the size of any one of the five networks in Indianapolis, i.e., it has five feeders, 50 transformers, 1,100 customers, and 10 MVA of load. In September, the Board of Public Utilities of New Jersey (the commission) directed JCP&L to appoint a Special Reliability Master (an independent consultant) to do an assessment.

What is especially notable when comparing IPL’s performance with that of other underground systems is that it does not have many ‘merely smoking’ manholes. Its incidents seem to more often fall into the category of fires or explosions (“over-pressurization” events). This may be due to the fact that it has relatively dry holes and does not have much secondary cable with insulation made of rubber or polyethylene. The latter can vaporize in the presence of electrical arcing, and create combustible gases which may at first merely smoke, but if allowed to migrate to a structure and collect there, may combust with more force.

An additional item worth noting is that in interviews with IPL personnel, when asked if there were reports of electric shock coming from energized network structures, they reported none. We have heard similar reports from southern utilities that do not see much snow/salt, but northern utilities have recognized this type of event as an issue, including ConEdison, where a customer fatality was involved in such an incident in January of 2004, and Massachusetts, where a study was done in 2005 (by a team led by Dan O’Neill when he was with Navigant Consulting) after some reports of animals being shocked in Boston.

In summary, the rate of underground network incidents (12 in the last seven years) is relatively low, but obviously the recent rate of five per year in 2011 is alarming and should be addressed to bring the rate back down to the long-run average of less than two per year, or even less.
Section 5: Emergency Management

5.1 Emergency Planning

Indianapolis Power and Light has an Emergency Management function that is typical of that of similar utilities in many ways:

- It is mainly oriented toward preparing for and responding to storms that hit the overhead system.
- It is based on the principles of the Incident Command System, now called the National Incident Management System (NIMS).
- It is documented by a formal plan, which is regularly updated and tested through drills and exercises.

The plan was developed with the assistance of Laura Kaplan, a former Florida Power & Light storm manager, and is typical of plans developed with her assistance, having extensive checklists, contact information, and process descriptions.

Coordination between IPL and local emergency management functions is facilitated by the fact that Marion County is essentially the same as the city of Indianapolis, with a joint City/County Council and the joint 911 facility. The manager in charge of IPL emergency management spends significant time each year with the Indianapolis Fire Department. Similarly, since Indianapolis is the state capital, coordination with the state emergency management is not a problem. And, as a member of MISO, which is headquartered in nearby Carmel, Indiana, IPL participates in MISO’s annual restoration drill each autumn.

While, for the most part, the emergency management function emphasizes restoration of the overhead system, the existence of the downtown network is recognized in terms of its being one of the last loads to be shed. The Indiana state emergency operations center is located in the state office building which is fed by the secondary network. IPL has experience with secondary networks after a complete network shut down, most recently in November of 2007 when Edison West was shut down for four hours on the orders of the Indianapolis Fire Department because of a fire in the basement of the Post Office at 456 N. Meridian. Today, the coordination required is easily accomplished with SCADA, but some of the more experienced IPL personnel can recall standing in substations with their hands on the pistol grips of switches and timing the feeder closes with radios and a “3..2..1..” countdown.

Our assessment is that the emergency management function at IPL is in no need of further improvement as it relates to the operation of the downtown underground network or its restoration during emergencies. One area we did not explore is how well the company communicates with customers and the public when network incidents happen.
Section 6 Asset Management

6.1 Asset Management

Asset management in asset-intensive industries is a combination of processes and methods designed to optimize the performance of asset-intensive systems.

In its most basic form it involves minimizing the amount of expenditure required to achieve a given level of reliability performance, or alternatively, maximizing the reliability performance for given level of expenditure. Typically, such optimization is accomplished through application of a process of project prioritization that awards higher scores for projects that achieve better reliability or reduced risk. More broadly, asset management includes the optimal specification of the equipment used in the system, defining roles and required training for employees, and redefining regulatory and customer relations for better alignment with company goals.

Since the utility industry, along with the energy industry, is certainly asset-intensive, it has embraced asset management concepts as they began to be articulated in the last twenty years, beginning with British companies in England, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, and then spreading to many companies in the United States and other nations as well.

To some extent, asset management was originally envisioned as a way to separate engineering and operations, allowing companies to manage multiple operating companies with a common set of specifications and processes, which in turn would facilitate the process of acquisition and integration, as well as the process of outsourcing operations of acquired companies to different third-party entities through detailed service agreements. For various reasons, such separation has rarely been accomplished, and the result has been that asset management has been more of a way of reengineering companies' processes rather than legally separating them into different entities.

Considering that many US companies are in their second or third wave of adopting, discarding, and then re-adopting asset management practices, the asset management initiatives at IPL are relatively new, being only a few years old, and have not advanced much beyond some project prioritization and role redefining. In our experience one of the pitfalls of committing a company to asset management can be an excessive concentration on the philosophy of asset management, including such heavily philosophical approaches as the British PAS 55 standards, or an intensive effort at building extensive databases. We have opined elsewhere that a more effective approach to adopting asset management can be to identify the key decisions to be made, using existing data resources, and then build a plan to acquire only that data that is critical to making good decisions.

For most companies, the key performance indicators that drive an asset management approach are systemwide indices of reliability such as SAIDI, SAIFI, and CAIDI. These need to be supplemented by other indices that capture worst-performing devices and that
target pockets of poor reliability in terms of frequency or duration (See Section 4.1 above on measures of system performance.)

For downtown underground network systems, however, this approach is inadequate because such systems tend to be highly reliable over many years until they are interrupted by notable failures such as those recently experienced in Indianapolis.

Such systems are better served by an approach comparable to what must be used for transmission and substation reliability, namely one that identifies the risk of a serious event and monitors and manages that risk over time through the application of the appropriate inspection, maintenance and renewal/replacement programs.

In other words, for downtown underground networks, where failures can lead to incidents involving explosions or fires, it is not sufficient to monitor such catastrophic events and try to control them as they occur. Rather, the proper approach is to monitor those conditions that are likely to lead to more serious events, i.e., incipient faults, overloads, or stress-causing conditions, and to prioritize such conditions and then mitigate them as appropriate in a timely way. This is why regular inspection of underground network vaults and manholes is so essential to maintaining the health of a downtown underground network, along with well-administered standards for connecting new load and upgrades to the system, as well as monitoring and modeling feeders and secondary mains to avoid potential overloads.
6.2 Capital spending and maintenance

The table below shows capital spending and maintenance expense for the downtown underground network area from the year 2000 through 2011 year-to-date. The numbers are taken from the company's response to the questions posed by the IURC for the July 7 public meeting (Appendix A). That response also provides plausible explanations for many of the variations that appear in the numbers. In particular, for the capital expenditures, the company has explained that in 2005 there were four major additions to the network, including the Conrad Hotel, the Simon office building, the Hudson condominiums, and the Homewood Suites Hotel. In 2007, work on the Cultural Trail began ramping up and has continued through 2011. In 2008, the increase in spending is attributable to providing service to Lucas Oil Stadium, and the increase in 2010 and 2011 is attributable to the start of relocation work for the Georgia Street prior to the upcoming Super Bowl.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Downtown UG Network Area</th>
<th>UG Non-Network Area</th>
<th>Total UG Capital Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$2,298,445</td>
<td>$18,200,740</td>
<td>$20,499,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$798,012</td>
<td>$19,525,405</td>
<td>$20,323,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$1,010,730</td>
<td>$19,943,938</td>
<td>$20,954,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$1,024,313</td>
<td>$26,023,139</td>
<td>$27,047,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1,869,913</td>
<td>$18,213,189</td>
<td>$20,083,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$3,218,865</td>
<td>$19,221,403</td>
<td>$22,440,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$2,260,853</td>
<td>$19,988,977</td>
<td>$22,249,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$2,618,414</td>
<td>$20,302,278</td>
<td>$22,920,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$4,593,963</td>
<td>$16,751,397</td>
<td>$21,345,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$6,071,673</td>
<td>$13,584,576</td>
<td>$19,656,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 YTD</td>
<td>$5,224,799</td>
<td>$6,791,042</td>
<td>$12,015,841</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the company in its response did not make mention of the pattern in the early 2000s, it is clear that spending dropped considerably from the year 2000 to 2001, and remained at a low level for 2002 and 2003, rebounding only in 2004 and 2005 back to its previous level and beyond. We are aware of the events that may have contributed to that pattern, including the acquisition of IPL by AES in 2000 and the attempts by AES to take cash out of the utility operations, especially in the financial exigency of 2003. While further discussion of the events of that era might be interesting to some and quite colorful, we would relegate that to historical interest and conclude our discussion of this area with the comment that the current level of capital spending seems quite adequate for a network of this size.

With regard to maintenance expense (see the table below), we note that the peak in 2005 and 2007 has not been achieved of late. We expect that is due to some extent to the large amount of capital work that is required of the same workforce that might have to do the maintenance. We would expect and recommend that maintenance will return to normal levels once capital construction returns to normal levels as well. Again, the bottom line
is that a combined spending on capital and maintenance of $4.5 to $5.0 million should be adequate for a network of this size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Downtown UG Network Area</th>
<th>UG Non-Network Area</th>
<th>Total UG Maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$4,349,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$4,353,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$3,420,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$3,361,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1,129,017</td>
<td>$2,953,399</td>
<td>$4,082,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$1,759,071</td>
<td>$3,048,405</td>
<td>$4,807,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$1,373,129</td>
<td>$2,597,986</td>
<td>$3,971,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$1,844,163</td>
<td>$2,647,764</td>
<td>$4,491,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$1,470,764</td>
<td>$2,981,070</td>
<td>$4,451,834</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$1,529,371</td>
<td>$2,872,771</td>
<td>$4,402,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$1,036,397</td>
<td>$3,243,648</td>
<td>$4,280,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 YTD</td>
<td>$477,334</td>
<td>$1,179,689</td>
<td>$1,657,023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: For the period 2000 through 2003 the specific maintenance costs for the Downtown Underground Network cannot be broken out from the total dollars spent on underground maintenance. The total UG maintenance expenditures are relatively consistent throughout the period. IPL believes the split in underground expenditures between the downtown and the other underground areas in 2000–2003 would likely be similar to that in 2004 and beyond.
6.3 Maintenance and replacement

Some of the key decisions that are the focus of an asset management approach are decisions regarding the amount and type of maintenance and preventive replacement. Much has been written about the issue of aging utility infrastructure which is the result of the booming and the expansion of utility systems in the 1960s and 1970s. As those assets reach ages of 40 and 50 years old, they are presumed to be reaching the end of their useful lives having already surpassed their accounting lives which often were 30 to 35 years. In fact, much of the utility industry's concern and commentary about this issue arose in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the assets reached the end of their accounting lives. Experience has shown, however, that most utility assets have lasted much longer than their accounting lives, and the rise in failure rates which some have predicted to occur in this era has not materialized.

From an asset management point of view, the proper focus of this discussion is the failure rate of utility assets, i.e., the percentage of each class of assets which can be said to have ‘failed’, meaning requiring being taken out of service or requiring a major overhaul. For many classes of utility assets, from substation transformers to poles, underground cable, and substation transformers, the failure rate has been quite low, on the order of half of one percent per year. Clearly if this were to continue it would imply a 200 year asset life. No one expects such a long tenure but what we can expect is that the failure rate will rise, not precipitously but gradually, over the next few decades, to the point where failure rates might reach five percent in a few decades and even higher thereafter.

A classic example of such a calculation is the failure rate for distribution wooden poles: many utilities inspect wooden poles on a 10-year cycle, that is, they inspect 10 percent of their poles each year. Most find a pole reject rate of 5 to 10 percent. This implies a failure rate for the pole population of not 5 to 10 percent but 1/2 to 1 percent, since it is 5 to 10 percent of the 10 percent that are inspected each year. Also, this is not really the ‘failure’ rate but the rate at which they fail inspection, with actual failure perhaps still years away for many.

In the context of underground network equipment, it is common practice for utilities to inspect their underground vaults at a frequency of 3 to 5 years, and their manholes at a lower frequency, perhaps 5 to 10 years, if at all. During such inspections any abnormal conditions are noted and prioritized for repair, which in some cases might be immediate and others might be scheduled for some time during the year or merely to be re-inspected at a later date if the conditions are not serious. The purpose of such inspections is twofold. First, to find any incipient fault conditions which might lead to a fault in the near term and should therefore be corrected promptly, and second, conditions which might cause stress on equipment that will over a longer period of time lead to fault conditions. Examples of the former might be evidence of oil that might be leaking from a splice or from a transformer or network protector, and examples of the latter might be evidence of excessive bending of a cable because it had fallen off of its rack, or excessive wear at some point on the cable because the porcelain or plastic shoe attaching it to the rack was broken or missing, or a duct edge was not protected.
In other industries, and in other aspects of the utility industry, the terms corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance are often used to describe the two kinds of maintenance and inspection conditions we are describing, that is, corrective maintenance would be that which is done to repair equipment that has failed or is in imminent danger of failure, and preventive maintenance is the repair of equipment that, if not attended to, would tend to lead to failures over a longer period of time. A common observation is that companies which fail to do enough preventive maintenance find themselves ultimately overwhelmed with the volume of corrective maintenance that is required. Therefore, striking an optimal balance between the two is a key asset management decision.

At IPL the volume of corrective maintenance is sufficiently low as to suggest that preventive maintenance has not been systematically curtailed. Nevertheless, in our inspections of underground vaults and manholes at IPL we have observed some instances in which certain opportunities to perform preventive maintenance seem to have been missed. Our sense is that these opportunities were missed not so much for reasons of intentional deferral of maintenance but rather for a lack of situational awareness regarding the opportunities presented by certain conditions. We comment on this at greater length in Appendix B, "Situational Awareness".

Another key asset management decision in this same vein is commonly called the "repair or replace" decision. In some instances in which an asset is sufficiently old or in such poor condition that its repair is made overly difficult or expensive due to obsolescent design or parts, or the likelihood of additional repair being required too soon, the more cost-effective option may be to replace the equipment with a new or completely refurbished item. A good example of that is contained in our analysis of the network protector issue:

The role of a network protector is to monitor and protect the secondary grid from primary over voltage conditions (based on load conditions) and source faults and/or loss of voltage when the primary feeder is shut off due to switching. It is basically an automatic air circuit breaker installed between the secondary side of the network transformer and the secondary network.

Internally, the “brains” and logic reside in the relays installed inside the network protectors. Relays can either be electromechanical, solid state or the newer microprocessor-based technology. The function of the relays is critical and the logic needs to work properly in order to sense conditions such as reverse current flow, indicating back feed conditions of the secondary grid supplying the primary, or isolation via opening and closing of the protector (switch) to supply customer voltage and current.

Network protectors are mounted on either the secondary side of the network transformer or as in some utilities, mounted remotely in adjacent vaults/switch rooms. At IPL, network protectors are connected directly to the secondary side of the network transformer.
Based on our review of other utility specifications, including discussions with a protector manufacturer, we see opportunities for IPL to investigate improvements on how they specify network protectors, an example being the use of the Schrader valve. IPL has historically purchased this type of valve and in fact during our field observation all protectors that were viewed had such a valve installed.

At IPL, however, it is not being used. As background information, those utilities that have this valve (and most do) use it to allow the crews to place a positive pressure within the protector with an inert gas, nitrogen, to check for proper seals around the door and connection points to the transformer and secondary cable potheads.

Historically one of the leading causes of failures in the industry is water ingress into the protector compartment thus shorting out components. This is the reason most utilities install and use this type of system. A review of IPL failures rates indicates that IPL may also be seeing failures of this device from water ingress.

We therefore recommend IPL review and evaluate its material specification for network protectors for the following opportunities

- Upgrading to a stainless steel case (will typically add 8 to 10 percent to the cost of a protector (using 316L or 314 grade stainless steel)
- Continue to purchase protectors with Schrader values (or equivalent), but use it.

- Consider emerging improvements in the market place:
  - Dual voltage 1800 amp protectors to reduce inventory
  - Quick disconnect and adjusting sealing, protector door handles. It was noted that IPL is currently evaluating a vendor’s quick disconnect handles.
  - Water proof relays (newer versions of microprocessor relays are typically already designed as such), along with water proof CT’s and trip coils.
  - Relays which address arc flash concerns (and reduce available fault current), outside the protector fuses.

Finally, a key aspect of asset management is the continuing development of equipment specifications. While we found no reason to change the specification of either primary or secondary cable, we felt that the failures in the termination chamber of the network transformers indicated a need to revise the specification of that equipment, and even evaluate the retrofit of that specification to existing units in a programmed way. The details of that finding follow:

The transformers used in the underground network system are designed to a more robust design than those used in overhead and radial underground configurations, i.e., what most customers see on residential streets.

The role of a network transformer is to convert the distribution voltage (at IPL it is 13.2kV) to the typical customer utilization voltage of 120/208 volts for small commercial customers and 277/480 volts for larger commercial facilities.

Recognizing the unique operating conditions of placing a transformer in a below surface vault, ANSI (American National Standards Institute) and in 2006 IEEE (Institute of Electric Electronic Engineers) updated the standards outlining the design and operating characteristics of secondary network transformers. This standard is known as IEEE 37.12.40 (2006) titled IEEE Standard Requirements for Secondary Network Transformers, Subway and Vault Types (Liquid Immersed).

While the standard may appear to go into significant details of the construction and material, this standard in fact merely outlines certain recommended electrical, dimensional, and mechanical characteristics and is not intended to be representative of all options and designs commercially available and ultimately selected by individual utilities for their particular systems.

Consequently, each utility, based on operating philosophy and field conditions, specifies different material, paint, radiator cooling, primary switch compartments (internal or external), and connection points for the primary cables and secondary protectors.
IPL transformer built to current material specifications

Lead wipes for primary cable connection

Termination Compartment

Primary Switch

Undercoating Paint for rust prevention

Picture of another utility’s transformer design showing horizontally mounted elbows on the primary switch

IPL Transformer: Close up view of PILC primary cable termination compartment

Horizontal mounted Primary Switch Elbows

Picture of another utility’s transformer design using “T” body Primary Elbows.
A review of IPL’s historical failures along with field observations at both the Morris Street Service Center where network transformers are recycled or retired along with observations of in-service network transformers in several underground vaults, indicates opportunities to review IPL transformer specifications to improve future system performance.

One key source of failure is corrosion on the top of the transformer cover and along the primary cable termination compartments. Unlike other utilities in the industry that operate network systems located in high water table areas, near lakes, rivers and salt water harbors that result in corrosion on the bottom of the transformers, IPL does not experience much corrosion on the bottom of the network transformers. This is likely due to the relative dry manholes and the historic practice of installing transformers on 2 to 6 inch rails. Based on conversations with IPL staff, their experience confirmed that corrosion on the bottom of the transformers is not an issue, although corrosion on the top of the transformers is, precipitated by debris (leaves, cigarette filters, etc.) that falls through the cooling grates and settles on top of the transformer.

In fact, IPL has installed in the past several years, non-conducting deflector shields on the secondary side of the transformer to attempt to mitigate this impact. These deflector shields were observed during our field audit of selected vaults. While it did prevent debris from collecting on the top of the network protector, it had limited success in keeping debris off the remaining top of the transformer.

In addition, a review of IPL material specification for network transformers also indicates a proactive approach by requesting additional zinc oxide paint (a corrosion resistant material) in addition to additional paint/material to be placed on the bottom 2 feet of the transformer. While this is a good practice in the industry, it has less value at IPL, yet may still be worthwhile doing – in a particular recognizing that a small percent of IPL manholes do in fact get wet and stay wet, and one cannot know where each transformer may ultimately be installed, e.g., if it is used as a replacement transformer for one that failed.

One recommendation that should be considered, and other utilities have adopted, is the specification that selected sections of the transformer be constructed of stainless steel. Again, our survey of various utilities along with discussions with a transformer manufacturer indicates selected use of stainless steel, with some utilities specifying complete stainless steel transformer housing.

Our experience has shown that this will typically add 20 percent to the price of the existing, non-stainless versions. At IPL, complete stainless steel housings may be unnecessary, in particular with the low failure rates due to corrosion on the bottom of the transformers, but selected use, such as a stainless steel covers including the primary switch compartment, should be considered.

As for the primary (high voltage) termination compartment, IPL currently specifies lead wipe potheads and a separate termination compartment mounted on top of the primary switch.
Again, a survey of several of utilities with similar or larger network systems, along with conversations with a leading transformer manufacture, reveals very few utilities still have that design. Lead wipe potheads and associated termination compartments have been known in the industry to have a higher failure rate, with issues surrounding stress cracks around the lead wipes allowing water ingress into the termination compartment.

A common design standard in the industry is to use an elbow design. This elbow is either a 200 amp class load break (not often used) or the more popular and frequently used 600 amp bolted, non-load break elbow. The benefit of using the elbow design is it allows the redesign of the primary compartment such that you can eliminate not only the lead wipes but also the termination compartment. Based on field observations at IPL, the elbow design, and likely the 600 amp variety can be installed since sufficient clearances between the top of the primary compartment and vault roofs are available.

Another advantage of redesigning the primary side of the transformer is that it allows IPL to incorporate other design changes such as relocating the oil sampling valve to the side of the compartment away from being directly below the primary switch contacts, thus diminishing the impact of contaminants and air bubbles that can be created around the switch contacts when a sampling value is located directly underneath.

As for fluids, IPL currently specifies mineral oil based dielectric fluids. Based on conversations with IPL staff along with the others in the industry we agree that reviewing the change to higher flash point fluid such as FR3 (Envirotemp) is an item that IPL should consider. For the main tank, some utilities also use FR3 (Envirotemp) and IPL may want to consider that in the future if failure rates and locations requirements warrant so.

Reviewing IPL’s current standard, we found opportunities to tighten this specification to remove any ambiguity. For example, the standard states to build the transformer to ANSI 37.12. It should specifically state the latest version and the subsection that pertains directly to network submersible transformers, that being IEEE C37.12.40 (2006).

IPL should also be aware that this standard is in the process of being updated in 2012. One change of the newer standard will be better clarification of the design and operating characteristics of the primary switch.

In that regard, one of the processes that should be part of an effective asset management function is the review of standards and procedures with respect to any known changes in regulatory requirements. An example of such a change is the recent revisions in arc flash exposure limits, which has caused significant changes in the industry.

While a detailed discussion on the physics and associated calculations of arc flash energy is not the intent of this section, there are some very good discussions available from other sources on understanding OSHA, NFPA and NESC requirements.
In particular the following standards are useful in understanding the arc flash issue in the underground network area:

- IEEE Standard C37.20.07 (Arc Resistant Testing)
- IEEE Standard C37.20.07 (Arc Flash Calculations and Testing)
- IEEE Standard C37.108 (Guide for the Protection of Network Transformers)

In the network area, protector manufacturers are also creating new products to reduce the amount of arc exposure and available voltage used in the fault current calculations.

Based on recent discussions with various manufacturers, IPL should continue to hold discussions with the various protector manufacturers along these lines:

- Managing the risk of removing secondary fuses and how some manufacturers are moving them to separate enclosures outside of the protector.
- Enclosed or energized component isolation via adding additional barriers
- Increased use of the primary switch to isolation the high voltage side
- Remote racking devices
- Current limiting fuses at lower fault levels.
- Temperature and sudden pressure sensors to trip upstream devices
6.4 Failure analysis

In order for asset management techniques to achieve the goal of optimum performance of the system, a critical element is failure analysis. A simple example will suffice: If a certain piece of equipment has an overall annual failure rate of one-half of one percent, then a renewal/replacement strategy would have to renew/replace 200 units to avoid one failure. But if a subset of the asset type can be identified that fails at an annual rate of 5 percent, then the strategy can achieve the same goal by renewing/replacing only 20 units, a tenfold increase in effectiveness.

So, how does one find such a key insight? The answer is a combination of developing a database of equipment characteristics (condition, age, type, model, manufacturer, loading, etc.) and then doing failure analysis on that data, i.e., determining what were the characteristics of the equipment when, where, and how it failed.

Moreover, this supports another key element of asset management: risk management. Any system with multiple operating parts is subject to the possibility of failure of some kind. A good asset management process manages risk by identifying the drivers of the probability of failure and also the consequences in terms of service interruptions, collateral damage, or other consequences.

We can see this process at work all around us. Every day, we experience the risk of driving a car, riding in an airplane, or walking the streets. Normally, we think of that risk as acceptably low. What keeps it low is a process that, when it works well, investigates every significant instance of equipment or operator failure, tracing its root cause, and then mandating appropriate remedial action, which might be a traffic citation, an equipment recall, or a mandated change in the design of cars, airplanes, or sidewalks and crossings. As new modes of failure are discovered, new remedies are put in place.

The process of failure analysis at IPL is at an intermediate level. As significant failures take place, knowledgeable personnel are asked to assess what went wrong. If a root cause is found that could lead to other failures, actions are taken. An example of this is when, in the mid-1990’s, IPL experienced a catastrophic failure of a network protector, with minor injury to an employee. IPL’s investigation of the matter found industry discussion pointing to a problem with a certain kind of network protector for which the curing process of the insulating boards around the internal bus was defective, which led to the release of toluene gas, a combustible gas. As a result, IPL instructed its crews to vent all network protectors before switch operation. One can see the stenciled instructions today.

As it turns out, since the problem was only a curing issue, and only for network protectors of a certain vintage from a certain manufacturer, it was not necessary to vent all network protectors before operating them, and in fact might lead to unnecessary ingress of water or contaminants in some situations if doors are not properly sealed. Moreover, today, over a decade later, there may no longer be such a need, since the curing has likely taken place by now. An analysis of gas from a sample of the protectors would confirm that.
On the other hand, the industry also discovered that the network protectors that used aluminum for a bus, due to a shortage of copper, exposed that equipment to a risk from salt water contamination of the aluminum, with hydrogen gas being a potential result. IPL still has a few dozen of such network protectors on its system. We have recommended their replacement.

It is this approach that is likely to yield the most effective, and certainly the most cost-effective results. From time to time we observe utility managers who recommend the wholesale replacement of equipment in a certain area or of a certain age, etc. Such programs are not as good as they sound, because ultimately there are constraints on doing such work, not just financial but logistical in terms of knowledgeable workers (or even contractors) and the disruption of customers and businesses. The better approach is to identify the cause of failure and do well-targeted renewal or replacement, along with a maintenance program that inspects condition and brings about repairs to return equipment to good operating condition.

When we began this study, we asked IPL for detailed analyses of the previous failures. We were told that they did not exist in a useable form, other than the write-up presented to the IURC at the July 7 meeting (Appendix A). This is a situation that needs to be remedied, and we planned early on to include that as a finding in our report. As it turns out, just before the report was due, we had an opportunity to observe firsthand the current IPL process for researching and documenting the root cause of a significant incident.
6.5 The November 19 incident – example of root cause analysis

On Saturday evening, November 19, 2011 at 9:26 PM the Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD) received a call of a car on fire on Delaware south of Washington. When IFD units arrived at 9:30 PM, they found a car parked on the west side of Delaware, across from where Pearl Street connects from the east, with smoke coming out of a manhole under the car. Firemen smashed open the windows to ensure no one was inside.

The manhole was IPL’s manhole number V22-10, which has a slotted manhole cover and contains various secondary cables and also two primary circuits from Station 3, the 303 and 309 circuits.

Due to the nature and intensity of the fire, the 303 and 309 circuits opened up automatically based on relays at Substation #3 sensing a fault on each circuit. This occurred as at 9:31 PM and 9:33 PM respectively. At the same time, IFD alerted IPL’s Distribution Operations Control Center (DOCC) by a direct line that exists between IFD and the DOCC. A troubleshooter was dispatched and the Director of Power Delivery Systems Operations was alerted, who in turn notified the Vice President of Power delivery that there were indications a network incident had taken place.

The troubleshooter arrived on the scene at 9:49 PM, and the Director arrived at 10:25 PM, having been in communication by phone on the way. At that time the fire was still burning, with smoke coming from two manholes, V22-10 on the west side of S. Delaware and Pearl Street, and V32-00 on the east side of the street, in the intersection with Pearl Street.

The IPL Director discussed the situation with the IFD Incident Commander on scene and a decision was made to let the fire burn itself out. Electrically, the situation was that the two primary circuits in the area were already de-energized by the automatic relays at the substation, and the secondary voltage was being fed by the secondary network that
surrounds the area (the Substation #3 network, one of the five in Indianapolis). In such situations, it is common utility practice to let the secondary “burn in the clear”. IPL, like many others in the industry (but not all) uses no fuses on the “mains” (or “ties”) between secondary network transformers, and the design is that with normally sized cable, like IPL’s typical 350 MCM, such a fire will self-extinguish in a short amount of time. IPL judged that by 10:30PM the fire was out in V22-10, and diminished but still smoldering with occasional flare-ups in V32-00. By 11:00 PM both fires were out. The Vice President had arrived around 10:45 PM. The first underground crew arrived at 11:00 PM (the troubleshooter is not a full crew), and began to isolate the fault by cutting secondary cable in the area, a common practice.

At the same time, around 11 PM, decisions were made to release all but one IFD vehicle, and to allow the police to open all the streets in the area except Delaware. The final IFD vehicle was released at 11:34 PM.

We at O’Neill Management Consulting were notified of this event the following morning, Sunday November 20, 2011. Through a series of phone calls with the Director of Power Delivery Operations, we were briefed on the restoration efforts and root cause analysis that was underway.

We observed that a process was being followed, forms were being filled out, investigation teams were created, and forensic collection data had begun, including relay targets, failed material, and site pictures.

On Monday, November 21, 2011 we followed up with several additional conference calls with IPL and the IURC on IPL’s progress and observations. We agreed that it would be beneficial for us to observe firsthand IPL’s efforts, and we informed IPL that we would be sending one of our team members, Charlie Fijnvandraat, to Indianapolis on Tuesday November 22nd.

The purpose of our site visit was to observe how IPL approached this network incident, so that we could incorporate any insights we might have into our final report, which was due November 30. We suspected this activity might delay our report somewhat, but it was agreed that a short delay would be warranted in order to incorporate fully this latest incident.

Below is our synopsis of our observations from the two days we were on site (Tuesday November 22 through Wednesday November 23rd).

Observation of Field Restoration – Quality of Construction

We physically inspected the vault at 24 S. Delaware. This is the location of a 750 KVA network transformer. We also physically inspected (went down into) manhole V22-10 the location of the fire (and where the primary circuits 303 and 309 failed), and we visited Substation #3.
As shown in the picture below, MH V22-10 is an older style circular brick manhole that is approximately 8 feet deep by 6 feet wide. As part of the restoration, IPL crews had installed new primary for the 303 and 309 circuits. Replacement of the secondary was deemed unnecessary based on analysis of the need for voltage support in the area.

Overall the primary cable was properly supported on new rack arms, duct mouth protection was installed, and while the majority of the cable rack arms did have porcelain cable support (saddles), and two rack arms did not. To be fair, it is possible that that these remaining two would be installed during final cleanup of the manhole. Still we mention it because we have noted that deficiency elsewhere in this report (Appendix D).

As for the vault at 24 S. Delaware, based on analysis of recent load, this vault will no longer be needed and the transformer and secondary/primary cable will be removed. Based on nameplate history, the transformer was installed in 1983 and the protector was manufactured in 1953.

We support the decision to retire these units, not solely based on a detailed review of the loadflow study (though via a verbal discussion it appears that IPL approached the analysis using sound engineering principles), but also based on an assessment of the equipment condition.
As we observed in similar locations (though not at this location) during our field audit in September, the protector, while it did operate correctly during this recent fault event, does exhibit external and internal rust, indicating moisture ingress either from the Schrader valve or improper door seal, and has electromechanical relays installed that require more detailed maintenance and are not SCADA-ready. As for the transformer, it is in good visual condition and after successful acceptance testing at the Morris Street facility, may be a candidate to be placed back in stock.

At Station #3, we observed clean circuit breaker cubicles for the 303 and 309 circuits and noticed all relays protecting the network, including those for circuits 303 and 309, were recently maintained in October, 2011.

During our field audits in September, our records indicated that the relay on the 309 circuit was last maintained in February 1997.
We observed that IPL is using a formal, three-page form to guide them in the collection of information to facilitate root cause analysis. This current form, version 2, was originally created in August of this year after the occurrence of a previous fault.

Based on lessons learned from this event, IPL indicated that they will be updating this form, adding additional criteria such as station relay targets, previous maintenance records, and inspection history, including the results from the “full sweeps” done in 2005 and 2011.

We observed the process of determining the root cause as it developed. The initial information was limited to the maps, the timing of the two primary circuit opens, the IFD information, and the smoking manholes and dislodged covers (two nearby manholes for the primary circuit 303 had dislodged covers - ajar, but on the rings - when IPL first arrived on the scene). Within the next few days more pieces of information became available:

- The maps had shown, and examination of the secondary cable coming from the manholes confirmed, that the cable was not the typical 350MCM, but the larger 500MCM (recollections of IPL staff were that it had been installed in anticipation of load in the area that had not materialized). Because of the fire that had burned so thoroughly in the manhole, it was not possible to pull the cable out for inspection of the damage done to the cable in the duct. Also, the cable type was varnished cambric lead-covered (VCLC), not the more typical paper-insulated lead covered (PILC). That it was 500MCM provided a clue as to why it had not burned in the clear more quickly.

- From examining maps it was clear that a 20-inch steam line ran perpendicular to the duct connecting the two holes that were smoking November 19, which was
why the secondary ducts were on the floor of the manholes instead of the normal chest level (to go under the steam line which they had to cross).

Scene of November 19, 2011 incident on S. Delaware at Pearl

- Inspection of the vault at 24 S. Delaware showed that the network protector there had opened, as it should have, so that the network would not feed the primary fault on feeder 309, and that two of the network protector fuses were blown.

- Examination of the inspection records from the full sweep of 2005 showed that a steam leak at that time had caused the V22-10 hole to be too hot to be inspected.

- Records of e-mails indicated that the repair of that steam leak was not accomplished until mid-2006.

By November 28, permits had been obtained and resources gathered to excavate the street at the point between the manholes in order to see more clearly what had taken place in the duct:

- It was clear that the 500MCM secondary cables in the four ducts (arranged in a two-over-two configuration) had burned in the clear a few feet east of the location of the steam line.

- The steam line, which was no longer very hot, having been repaired years before, was encased in concrete and lay essentially on top of the IPL ducts (and was below and to the east of an abandoned gas line).
Excavation of the street between the two IPL manholes in the November 19 incident

In the meantime, we had queried some of our experienced contacts in the industry, and we passed along to IPL what they had said about VCLC cable and how it has a known failure mode when exposed to high temperatures, either by internal loading or external heat source, namely, the normally pliable ‘varnish’ turns into a hard waxy substance that allows gaps to form, facilitating water ingress and dielectric failure.

While final judgment may await the results of forensic tests on the cable that should be sent to outside labs for analysis, we feel confident that the final analysis will confirm IPL’s current hypothesis that the root cause of the failure was the damage to the cable caused by the extended exposure to steam in the 2005-2006 timeframe (and before?), and that it was probably only the light load, thicker cable, and typically dry conditions that prevented it from failing sometime sooner. That the ducts were on the floor did not help the situation in terms of moisture.

It is sometimes hard to appreciate why a condition like this chooses a particular (only moderately wet) night to fail so catastrophically, but experience in the industry indicates that the “straw that breaks the camel’s back” can be an event that would otherwise seem insignificant, such as a dirt-clogged drain that would normally siphon the moisture away, but that night did not (for example only).

We would encourage IPL to use this incident as a catalyst to further examine similar situations throughout the downtown area and take preventive measures quickly. From their response to the previous spate of incidents, we think it is reasonable to expect a rapid deployment of forces, inside and outside if necessary, to address the following immediate concerns:
- Identifying the locations of all the manholes and vaults with historical and current steam leaks and/or labeled by the field crews as “high temperature” manholes
- Capturing current and historical measured temperatures
- Performing targeted condition assessments e.g., looking for pitted cables, missing porcelain cable supports, leaking joints/splices, cable off rack and on manhole floor, wet manholes, duct runs located on the bottom of the manhole, steam coming from the duct mouths
- Rank locations based on severity, and create repair/replace decision points

Moreover, we would encourage IPL to use this incident to further formalize and sharpen its process and method for root cause and failure analysis. The process we observed was a good one, but it could be improved, beginning with the comments we have made above.
**Section 7: Organization and Staffing**

### 7.1 Work planning and resources

For many years IPL had a dedicated set of crews to work on the downtown underground network system. In 1994 IPL developed a program to create a position, beginning with an approved apprenticeship, of a substation mechanic who would be qualified to work in the substation or in the underground network system. While this approach gave the company some flexibility in staffing major work, the sense we got is that there is still a significant specialization among the crews in terms of which mechanics work on the downtown underground network.

In the section that typically works in that area, there are 14 people, including one section leader, six crew leaders, and seven mechanics, who typically work as 4 three-person crews, and sometimes as two-person crews for network protector maintenance. In addition, there are three more sections with crews qualified to work on the underground if needed. For the most part, they work on substations throughout the IPL system.

From our interviews and field work we got the sense that many would prefer the substation work to working in the cramped, dirty, sometimes hot IPL manholes and vaults. IPL will need to work to maintain a fully qualified staff to serve this area. This is a challenge other utilities face as well in these modern times.

We asked for a detailed analysis of work planning that would show each planned maintenance task, project work, and typical reactive work with the requisite number of hours, which in turn would be compared with the available staff. No such formal planning tool was available. We recommended it be developed. It appeared that the staffing was sufficient to do the currently proposed level of maintenance, especially provided the capital work associated with recent civic improvements was scheduled to return to a more normal level. For example, with 1,266 manholes and 139 vaults, a five-year inspection cycle on the manholes and a three-year cycle on the vaults would imply 253 manhole inspections and 46 vault inspection per year, which might require approximately 1,886 person-hours, assuming 6 to 8 person-hours per inspection:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilities to be inspected</th>
<th>Inspections per year</th>
<th>Person-hours per inspection</th>
<th>Required hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manholes</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaults</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>299</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,886</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With 13 persons other than the section leader, the section would have 27,040 total hours available in a year’s worth of forty-hour weeks. Assuming even only half of that time were actually available for work (“wrench time”), or 13,520 person-hours, it is clear that the time required to perform the inspections themselves would only amount to 14 percent of available work time. IPL committed to increase the cycle to three years on manholes and two years on vaults. That would increase the annual inspections to 422 manholes and
69.5 vaults, which would require 3,088 hours, or 64 percent more, but still within the likely capability if other work begins to return to normal. The work to do the necessary repairs found by the inspection needs to be added as well, but still looks feasible without additional staffing.

IPL has used contractors when needed to supplement its workforce, not only for construction but also for maintenance, as evidenced by the work done in June and July for the “full sweep” that inspected all the manholes in a short period of time, splitting the work between company and contractor crews.
Section 8: Technology

8.1 Technology and secondary networks

From the above discussions of the history of the secondary networks in Indianapolis and the rest of the country it should be obvious that the underlying equipment and systems for operating and maintaining secondary networks is hardly modern. What may not be as obvious but is nevertheless true is that while innovations in information and communications technology have seen considerable application in the rest of electric transmission and distribution, as evidenced by the ubiquitous discussions about “smart grids”, the application of such technology to underground secondary networks has been limited. In some cities it would be fair to say that the technology is at least 50 years old.

Some of the technologies that have made their way to the secondary grids in other companies and at IPL are:

- SCADA or RMS
- Loadflow modeling
- AM/FM or GIS
- Thermal imaging
- Fault direction indicators
- Vented, locking, or lift/locking manholes covers
- Remote data capture for inspection results via handheld devices

Each of these is reviewed in turn below.
8.2 SCADA

Even as innovations in computer and telecommunications technology began to be adopted in utility T&D operations in the latter half of the twentieth century, very little of that saw its way into underground secondary networks. One of the key innovations in transmission and distribution in general came to be called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), which allowed utility control centers to remotely monitor the status and control the operations of equipment in key locations such as substations. IPL has such technology in its substations, including those serving the downtown area. Many utilities with some smaller, rural substations do not have SCADA to all stations.

Attempts to use radio communications to implement SCADA on underground secondary networks down to the level of the vaults were often stymied by the subterranean nature of the networks. Some companies overcame that obstacle by using a power line carrier (PLC) technology to poll network transformers and protectors. For secondary networks, this is often called a Remote Monitoring System (RMS), since it emphasizes the monitoring function and may not even have a control capability. Today, fiber optic cable technology has been added to the communication channel mix, allowing companies with sufficient usable duct space to have high-bandwidth communications connectivity to the equipment in network vaults. In addition, the replacement of older electromechanical relays for the network protectors with modern microelectronic processor-based relays, as well as technology leaps in back office computer processing power, has made the integration of both communication channels (Power Line Carrier or Fiber) much easier and the information that can be obtained, much richer.

In a recent survey of 11 utilities conducted by Pepco of Washington, DC and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), in which IPL participated, the degree of application of RMS or SCADA for their underground secondary networks was mixed:

“Seven utilities reported that they had remote monitoring schemes (RMS). Three utilities did not have any monitoring scheme. Of the seven utilities with RMS, two used PLC communications technology. Three utilities used fiber for communications. One utility used radio communications. One utility did not report details on the communications for its RMS.”

Many of these companies have only recently begun to move in this direction, which is also true of IPL, with its own project to bring SCADA to the secondary network vaults. The following response is typical of what many other companies would have answered as recently as a few years ago, i.e. no RMS to the vaults except for some pilots that did not move to full implementation, often because of indecision about which communications technology to adopt (reminiscent of many Smart Grid projects as well):

“Currently for the most part only substation circuit breakers are monitored. The information is reported through RTU’s at the substation to the control center where the information is available in the EMS. There have been two pilot projects that installed monitors on the network protectors and the secondaries and reported
the information to a remote computer terminal via dial up modem. We are initiating a project to install the Eaton Vaultgard system on 37 secondary network protectors. The communication will be two-way, allowing monitoring and remote operation of the network protector. The means of communication will either be radio or fiber. Both options are still being reviewed.”

At IPL, the Network SCADA project is underway, and represents a significant expenditure of dollars and resources (the field crews are used to confirm remote data capture). The project uses fiber optic cable in IPL duct. In its July 7 report to the IURC, IPL committed to completing the project and reported:

Approximately 44 percent of the required fiber optic cable has been installed, and 177 of 315 network relays have been installed for this project.

From the descriptions provided us we developed some concerns that the project may not be optimized to achieve the results such technology could provide. In the past ten years IPL has in some form or another sponsored pilot programs to introduce SCADA in the underground network system. In 2009 a large-scale program was approved to remotely monitor and operate all 315 network protectors via SCADA. Per the project justification statement, the final in-service date is scheduled for 2013.

In the project justification statement for the current Network SCADA system, IPL had identified the following benefits:

- Optimizing Maintenance for both Manholes and Protectors
- Better manage the time spent performing switching times during primary circuit outages (planned and unplanned), and
- Provide a clearer view of system operating conditions

Based on a review of the project justification statement for this project we would recommend another review of the project in light of the recent incidents this year and subsequent changes to the inspection cycles.

Also, based on our experiences at other utilities that are in various stages of SCADA implementation, along with our discussions with various vendors in this space, we would recommend IPL’s asset management group investigate these issues:

- Understand, resolve and leverage lessons learned from any connections issues associated with the current roll out. Currently IPL has 190 network relays upgraded/installed with 68 currently providing SCADA communication.
- Opportunities to create real time reports. Examples we have seen at other utilities include reports revolving around transformer temperature. For example Tier 1 reports indicating which units are >20 degrees below nameplate rating with notification via email, Tier 2 reports which are operating at or above name rating, with notification via text to cell phones. Also utilities have created alarms points
around protectors pumping (open and closing several times a minute – indicating a faulty relay)

- Metrics and scorecards on real and historical conditions. E.g. number of protectors not closed or opened in the previous six months, current loading conditions, number of manholes with water, etc.

- Other information, driven by system failure rates and system operating conditions. Such as Voltage, Current, Open/Close, but also Temperature, presence of water, internal component pressure (Transformer/Protector), etc.

- Real time modeling of the system. For example during summer heat waves or during heavy rain periods.

- Optimize the maintenance/repair process via creating new targeted maintenance programs. For example some utilities that have a corrosion issue on the bottom of the transformers monitor manhole moisture along with internal transformer pressure/oil levels to determine certain transformer locations that require additional field visits. For IPL, this may be monitoring water presence in the protector, protector open/close counts, and loading of adjacent transformers and closed protectors to determine a prioritized list of locations to be inspected.

- Opportunities, cost and benefits of extending the remote monitoring to within the secondary grid e.g. to those secondary/primary manholes exhibiting characteristics of previous failures such as proximity to high temperature sources (steam). Currently the effort at IPL has focused on the transformer/protector vault locations.

While it was beyond the scope of our effort to dig more deeply into what was right and wrong about this project, we do think it warranted to review the costs and objectives before finalizing the implementation, on the hope that some clearer picture of what data is needed and what it costs to get it would better steer whatever flexibility may remain.
8.3 Loadflow modeling

The industry has used computerized loadflow software for many years, especially in the bulk transmission studies and then also at the distribution level to confirm adequate voltage levels on feeders as load is added or configurations change. For the distribution networks, the software was appropriate for radial distribution, where the flow of power is from the source at the substation to the load distributed along the length of the feeder and its taps. Unfortunately, the software often did not work well for secondary networks. As a result, the flows in secondary networks were basically unknown. In transmission networks, with SCADA measurement at various nodes, the modeling worked well, but in distribution, where only the larger customers had interval metering (the rest only recorded a single monthly amount), it was difficult to get an accurate loadflow.

Nevertheless, the industry has recognized the need. ConEdison has worked for over a decade to refine its tool to model each of its 74 networks. That process has yielded promising results, and is still ongoing. In Washington, DC, after the Georgetown incidents in the late 1990’s, Pepco committed to developing loadflow models for its networks. The recent Pepco-led survey mentioned above also asked about loadflow modeling and found five of the ten utilities that responded to that question use Cooper’s CYMEDIST program. Entergy had worked with CYME to advance the state of that program and has applied it to its New Orleans networks, with plans to do so for networks in Jackson, Little Rock, and Baton Rouge.

IPL’s current efforts to use CYMEDIST to model its networks should be encouraged.
8.4 GIS/facilities records

Similarly, in the application of Automated Mapping/Facilities Management (AM/FM) of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software, the radial systems at utilities saw significant development, while the underground secondary networks were often left with maps that were at best computer aided design (CAD)-assisted renderings of old maps. Part of the problem was that with radial systems the geographic aspects were very important, with considerable distances involved and facilities that followed contours of roads and rivers. In downtown secondary networks, the geography was fairly straightforward, often just numbered streets and named avenues. But more significantly, secondary network vaults and some manholes were more like substation facilities than poles and lines, with more essential detail in the configuration within the vault or manhole than was revealed in the geography between them.

Nevertheless, as technology has become easier to apply, at this time almost all major companies have begun to put their underground secondary networks on GIS, and IPL should continue its efforts in this regard.
8.5 Thermal imaging

Infrared or thermal imaging used to involve very expensive equipment which required skilled technicians to properly use. Modern units are smaller, less expensive, and easier to use. As such, the value of such technology is easily worth the cost, and more and more companies, including IPL are adopting it. Below is an example of a thermal image captured during the “full sweep” in July.

In its July 7 report to the IURC, IPL committed to evaluate the use of thermal imaging:

“Evaluate Thermal Imaging. Projected Completion Date: 08/01/2011.
The purpose of this initiative is to evaluate the effectiveness of thermal imaging through infrared cameras on components of the Downtown Network system. IPL has been using thermal imaging on the overhead transmission and distribution systems and on substation facilities for a number of years. These efforts have proven to be effective in finding problems before they become a failure and potential outage. Early thermal imaging cameras were very large and bulky and did not lend themselves for use in the confined spaces found on the Downtown Network system. As the thermal imaging technology has matured, the size of the equipment has decreased significantly. There are now hand-held devices about the size of a large flashlight that can be used in confined spaces. IPL has purchased two hand-held infrared cameras, which it is piloting in the full sweep of manholes and vaults. Test inspections with the cameras began on June 3, 2011. Initial results have shown that the cameras can be effective on connections and terminations.”
8.6 Fault direction indicators

Fault direction indicators have had a mixed history in utility operations. They have been used for years in radial systems, including radial underground systems. Current technology is considered reasonably accurate and reliable. The main decision is whether to carry it with you, leave it in the hole, or have it transmit to an above-ground receiver. The latter is the most expensive but most useful; the first is the least expensive but requires re-attachment each time. The optimal deployment is probably a mix of the three, depending on the nature of the hole, with a heavy emphasis on having an ample supply of carry-with-you-units, and a well thought-out deployment of fixed units. The fixed units are generally blinking lights that can be seen from above through a vented cover or by popping the lid. IPL has committed (in July, See Appendix A) to install primary cable fault detectors that can be read remotely from street level:

“The purpose of this initiative is to install a device on the primary network cables that detects when fault current has passed through it. This device is called a fault detector or fault indicator. Fault detectors are used in an underground system to help determine the location of the fault. IPL will be able to read the device remotely from street level without having to enter the manhole. This will result in a considerable time savings to locate a cable fault and will reduce overall feeder restoration time. This project is in the design phase. Equipment purchase is expected to commence first quarter 2012.”

As the IPL note makes clear, the value of this technology is to allow faster location of a primary fault, which would facilitate faster restoration. Its only impact on manhole incidents would be that by finding and restoring primary faults more quickly it would avoid the strain on secondary cable that can result from a primary feeder going out (requiring the other nearby transformers to feed the buses of the transformers that are out, which would be done through the secondary ties). The fault finders would also help in reducing the amount of DC high-potential testing (“thumping”) that is normally done to find a fault on a primary feeder, thus reducing strain on the primary cable.
8.7 Vented, locking, or lift/locking manholes covers

The utility industry has investigated for the last decade or more the technologies for reducing manhole incidents, including the buildup of combustible gases that can dislodge manhole covers, creating an obvious safety hazard in itself, to say nothing of the hazard from the over-pressurization that caused it, should someone be next to the hole or over it, as was the case for an unoccupied car in the November 19 incident.

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has a testing center in Lenox, MA, that was used to test various technologies, using realistic manholes and real explosions. EPRI also led a multi-utility study of the issue, and some individual states have commissioned studies. From that study came pilots of a vented covers, which were found generally to reduce the number of explosions, because the combustible gases could vent before ignition, but increase the number of ‘smokers’, i.e., fires without explosions, due to allowing more ingress of water and contaminants which facilitate arcing in cracked cable.

Another solution was tethered manholes, i.e., attaching a chain-like tether to the manhole to restrain it from flying very far. This was shown to be not very effective, as videos from the Lenox facility clearly demonstrate. Similarly, attempts to lock down the cover proven ineffective, as a sufficiently forceful explosion would then lift the manhole and its seating out of the concrete, causing damage and possible dislodgement of the manhole roof.

The technology that is gaining acceptance today is the concept of a cover which does not lock down the cover tightly, but instead allows it to lift slightly (a few inches), and then come back down in place, what we might call a lifting/locking approach. It has been shown that this approach actually reduces the force of some of the more highly charged situations by allowing the exploding gas to rush out, but in a way that denies access of inrushing air to the hole, robbing the explosion of oxygen needed to mix with the fuel for complete combustion, essentially creating an oxygen-starved explosion. This is the technology, with its patented name Swiveloc, which IPL has committed to install in certain high-security locations. As IPL said in its July 7 report to the IURC (Appendix A, question 11):

IPL is working with the supplier to finalize the design of the manhole cover so that it will fit IPL’s existing manhole rings. IPL expects to take delivery of the first of these covers by early September of 2011. Approximately 75 of these covers will be installed around Lucas Oil Stadium and along Georgia Street prior to the Super Bowl.

We recommend selective use of this technology.
8.8 Remote data capture for inspection results via handheld devices

As mentioned in the section on Asset Management, a key step in creating an ability to centrally manage all of the activities related to asset maintenance and renewal is to capture information on asset condition. One of the key sources of such information is the periodic inspections done by field crews. Bringing that data back to a centralized repository in a timely way, allowing multiple users to access and review this data, is greatly facilitated by a system of handheld devices used by the field crews.

Handheld technology, like most other technology, has been advancing by leaps and bounds, falling in price and size (and therefore portability) while increasing in computing and communications capability. We have seen several innovative applications, and we would recommend that IPL begin to investigate and evaluate how such technology can become an important part of its asset management initiative.

The benefits of moving to an electronic inspection form can be illustrated by looking at a sample of the IPL the inspection program for the underground network system. For example using the following programs;

1. Network Protectors – Every two years. Population 315 protectors
2. Network Transformer Dissolved Gas Analysis (DGA) on the transformer main tank, termination chambers, and primary oil switch chambers, assume every 2 years, population 315 transformers
3. Network Equipment vaults – Every two years, population 139 vaults
4. Network Manhole inspection – every two years, population 1266 manholes
5. Substations – Visually every month, Forms used quarterly, three substations,

Assuming that the average form consists of four pages, annually IPL will complete over 1030 site inspection’s generating approximately 4120 pages of inspection information.

This information will need to be scheduled, completed in the field, reviewed and possibly reassigned for a revisit, and then forwarded to the Engineering/Asset Management groups for review, trending and root cause analysis.

Our experience has shown that in such a paper-intensive process, the challenges associated with multiple handoffs and transcribing of information to tracking spreadsheets, repair tickets, and follow up is prone with time consuming activities and occasional lost information.

In addition the ability to prioritize the repair of open issues along with trending of issues are difficult with a paper process that is measured in weeks/months versus days and possibly hours/minutes (depending on the use of automatic notification capabilities of various software programs on the market today) of electronic inspection forms.

Based on our work in this area, we would recommend IPL investigate the benefits of shifting targeted, high frequency/high value activities currently being done using paper
inspection forms to electronic data capture. In addition, we would recommend defining
the software requirements prior to spending significant time on determining the hardware
that will be used to perform the task.

Various software vendors can also provide guidance on the payback and cost-benefit
analysis, and this analysis should not only include hard tangibles such as labor hours’
savings in the field and office but IPL’s value in avoiding future outages and savings
associated with repair or replace decisions on life extension and/or reduced maintenance
costs.

And lastly, significant time should be spent in understanding and selecting key questions,
de-cluttering the form, driving specific business rules to the individual performing the
inspection. An example we have seen at other utilities includes, for example, asking
what nitrogen pressure is on the substation transformer, if it is outside the utility
acceptable limits, the software then asks for the individual to either reduce pressure or
repair/replace the regulator. Another example is while performing network relay
maintenance, certain manufacturers have different settings, therefore what device or
manufacturer the individual is testing will determine the go/no go parameters. And
finally, other utilities will ask the individual for a condition assessment of a device or
reading on a gauge, and as a check and balance, require the individual to embed a picture
of that device into the form.

This is what we would call as driving the business rules down to the individual
performing the inspection, in essence guiding them to perform a certain task and/or based
on a previous answer provided.
Section 9: Conclusions and Recommendations

9.1 Conclusions

In this section we summarize our key findings and conclusions, taken from the previous sections of the report (and as further summarized in the Executive Summary).

- System Design – The underground network system in Indianapolis is well designed, with features typical of other downtown network systems throughout the United States. There is no need to change the fundamental design of the system in terms of the number and type of feeders, the configuration of feeders and transformers, the size and type of equipment (with the exception of some details of specification on which we elaborate below). The capacity is adequate and the redundancy is good. One could say that the overlap of the steam system is a design problem, but we believe that is better handled as part of the condition.

- System Condition – The condition of the system is not as good as the design. This is true for three main reasons: environment, maintenance, and the vintage/type of certain specific types of equipment, i.e.,
  
  - The environment, while benign in terms of being drier than most cities, is harsh in places because of the extensive (second largest in the US) steam system which causes some manholes to be too hot to enter and some ducts to be so hot the cable may be over its rating.
  
  - The maintenance of the system needs to be improved by a program of re-training and re-focusing the dedicated work force to observe and record conditions that could lead to failures, and to do the necessary repairs.
  
  - The age of the system is not significantly different than many other comparable cities, but there are some pieces of equipment that have a design that many other utilities have moved away from, for example, the termination chambers of the network transformers, and the aluminum bus in some network protectors, and some aspects that may allow water ingress.

- Asset Management – IPL is in the earlier stages of the application of asset management and needs to improve in order to reach the level that many other utilities have achieved and to which most aspire. While IPL has done some prioritization and resource planning, it lacks the databases and tools to plan in a modern way the maintenance and replacement of its facilities. It needs a better process for failure analysis.

- Technology – IPL has begun to apply technology to its downtown underground system. It is not uncommon to find in other utilities as well that many technological
advances, including automated mapping, geographic information systems, and outage management systems are implemented in the overhead system and residential underground but not in the downtown underground network. The SCADA project needs to be re-examined and possibly re-directed for best value and impact. The other technological steps IPL is taking appear warranted and likely to be effective and appropriate if deployed in the right way.
9.2 Recommendations

Flowing from the findings and conclusions are the following recommendations, detailed earlier in the report.

The first five listed immediately below carry our highest emphasis:

1) Immediately identify and address, presumably through coordination with Citizens Thermal, all manholes that have been too hot to safely enter and inspect. After mitigating the heat, inspect the holes, including measuring the current in all secondary leading from each such manhole. Where necessary, replace cable that has been significantly damaged by the heat.

2) Improve the program of inspection and repair of manholes and vaults, re-focusing the work force on finding not just conditions indicative of imminent failure but also those that might cause excessive stress or might lead to a failure under some not unlikely circumstances. Furthermore, do the repairs indicated by such an enhanced program of inspection.

3) Begin a program of retrofitting termination chambers with elbow fittings, and specifying such equipment for new or replacement network transformers. Also, protect the tops of network transformers with deflector shields, and specify corrosion-resistant tops for new transformers.

4) Begin a program of replacement of certain failure-prone network protectors, such as those with an aluminum bus, and also those that show evidence of water ingress despite being designed to be submersible. In some cases, a simple repair may suffice to remediate the latter condition. Continue to replace network transformers and network protectors found to be in such poor condition that failure is likely.

5) Improve the process of asset management by dedicating additional resources to development of equipment databases and processes that facilitate effective failure analysis and resource planning for condition-based equipment maintenance and replacement that goes beyond imminent failure.

The next five recommendations represent a second tier, or next level:

6) Evaluate technology for electronic capture of field inspection findings through the use of handheld devices, such as tablets, smart phones, or other means. Integrate this with recommendations 1), 2), and 5) above.
7) Re-examine the SCADA project, re-focusing on the data that such equipment will capture, and managing the stages of implementation so as to get benefits from even partial implementation as the project progresses.

8) Continue to deploy small-scale technological advances such as thermal imaging, fault direction indicators, and lift/locking manhole covers in selected locations.

9) Continue to develop automated mapping/GIS data and applications for the downtown underground network, and develop models of secondary loads flows in the networks.

10) Re-evaluate Dissolved Gas Analysis on network transformers, and explore the possibilities for fire retardant dielectric in vaults.
9.3 Obtaining commitment for implementation

Once this report has been made public, the IURC will want to engage IPL in a process of commitment to implementation of those findings that are found to be valid and compelling. This may involve some iterative communications about what is meant, how certain objectives might best be achieved, and so forth. Typically, after a report of this type, regulators and utilities agree on a quantified list of commitments and a schedule of status reporting on the progress of the commitments. No doubt such a process will take place in this instance as well, which will allow the recommendations made in this report to improve the performance of the Indianapolis downtown underground system.

1. As part of your presentation on July 7th please explain how the downtown network system works, in terms of system protection. Explain the various components and their characteristics (cables, transformers, circuit breakers, etc.) and what happens when various components fail, as well as what causes explosions, fire, and smoke. Explain the interface with customer-owned equipment.

IPL Response:

A secondary network system has been recognized for many years by the utility industry as an economical way to provide a high degree of reliability to downtown areas with a high concentration of loads. A secondary network consists of a grid of cables operating at the same voltage level with multiple sources feeding into the grid. In IPL’s case this is 120/208 volts. This grid is energized at numerous supply points from network transformers served from multiple 13,800 volt primary feeders. The system is designed so that the loss of any one component will not cause a loss of service. The key to the design of the secondary network system is its redundancy.

Components

The components that make up a secondary network system include:

- Manholes: These are used as junction/splicing points for the underground cables. Workers physically enter these structures, which vary in size but are typically 5 feet wide by 10 feet long. Manholes are considered a confined space and require additional safety precautions to be followed for entry.

- Conduit system: This is the pathway between manholes and vaults for the underground cables; it is also referred to as a duct line. These are typically four- or five-inch diameter conduits made of clay tile, fiber material, or PVC plastic. The conduits are arranged in groups of four to twelve individual conduits. The group of conduits is then encased in a concrete envelope for added physical protection.

- Transformer vault: These structures house the underground network transformers. Typically a vault consists of one to four compartments also referred to as bays. The size of the bay is typically 10 feet by 20 feet. Each bay generally contains one network transformer. A grating in the vault roof provides ventilation and an access door allows personnel entry into the vault. Most vaults contain openings between the bays that allow a worker to move from one bay to another. There is a collector bus comprised of individual copper bars to which cables connect that runs the length of the vault through each bay. The bus is supported from the ceiling of the vault by insulators. The output of the network transformer connects...
to this collector bus. Service cables to customers and network secondary cables between vaults also connect to the collector bus. The vault is considered a confined space and requires additional safety precautions to be followed for entry.

- Primary cables: IPL’s primary network cables operate at 13,800 volts. These are installed in the manholes and conduits from the source substation to the underground network transformers in the vaults.

- Secondary Cables: These cables are operated at 120/208 volts and connect transformer vault collector buses to other transformer vault collector buses through manholes and the conduit system. Customer service cables may also connect to the secondary cables in the manholes through which secondary cables pass.

- Cable limiter: This is a protective device similar to a fuse. It is used to isolate cables that have experienced a failure from the secondary network system. IPL also uses cable limiters on certain size service cables that connect to the secondary cables. These may be installed in a vault or in a manhole. Cable limiters will clear short circuit conditions or faults that have high sustained current flowing through them. Cable limiters will not reliably clear an arcing fault where the current is fluctuating rapidly from high to low.

- Network transformer: The underground network transformer brings the voltage down from the primary voltage of 13,800 volts to the secondary level of service voltages of either 120/208 volts or 277/480 volts depending on the application. Network transformers can range in size from 500 KVA to 2,000 KVA. There are three parts to a network transformer. First there is a primary termination chamber where the underground primary cables connect to the network transformer. Right below that is a primary switch compartment, which contains a three position non-load break switch. Those positions are Open, Closed, and Ground. The ground position is used for safety when personnel are working on the primary cables. The third compartment is the main tank, which contains the core and coil assembly of the transformer. All three compartments contain insulating oil and are separate from each other.

- Network protector: This device connects to the low voltage secondary terminals of the network transformer. It acts like the circuit breaker in a home except it operates on the direction of power flow rather than on the magnitude of fault current. The network protector is designed to open if power tries to flow from the secondary network system back through the transformer into the primary cables. This flow could occur when a primary cable fails and the substation circuit breaker opens to de-energize the primary cable. The network protector opens to stop reverse current flow from the vault collector bus back through the transformer and out through the primary cable to the fault. There are also fuses in the network protector that will open and isolate a fault on the secondary side of the network transformer to prevent a possible failure of the network transformer.
The network protector is a critical component that allows a secondary network system to function.

- Secondary network vault: IPL’s secondary network vaults are operated at 120/208 volts and connect through secondary cables that tie multiple network transformers together.

- Spot network transformer vaults: These vaults operate at 277/480 volts and serve a single building. Typically, the vault collector buses are not connected to other 277/480v buses.

System Configuration

The Indianapolis Downtown Network system is divided into five independent secondary network areas. Each of these secondary network areas is served by four to five primary network feeders from one of three substations that serve the downtown area. There are no ties between the secondary network systems. They each operate independently from one another. There are no ties between the primary network feeders, which operate independently from each other.

Causes of Interruptions

The primary and secondary cables used for the Downtown Network system are very reliable. The insulation systems of these cables have shown they will perform well for more than 50 plus years with some lasting over 100 years. Because of the long, expected service life, the cable manufacturers do not publish an expected service life value. The connection points or splice points are inherently the weakest points in any underground system. As such, these are the areas where failures are most likely to occur. These are the weak points because these connections are made in the manholes or vaults. While workers take great care to keep contamination and moisture away from the splice work being performed, they are still working underground in a harsh environment. The splicing technology has improved over time. Since the early 1990’s, IPL has used heat shrink technology for most of its splices. These splices are easier to install and have greater tolerance for field conditions.

Voids (air pockets) or contaminants in the splice are common causes of splice or termination failure. Either of these will cause areas of high electrical stress in the splice and, over time, eventually lead to a failure of the splice.

Downtown Indianapolis also has an active steam heat pipe system, which contributes to failures on the electrical network due to excessive heat. Heat radiating from steam lines with deteriorated insulation or steam leaking from steam pipes near electrical facilities will cause degradation of the components of the electrical network system. Excessive heat causes splice materials and cable insulation to deteriorate and eventually lose their insulating properties, resulting in an electrical failure.
Road salts and other ice melting chemicals can cause corrosion and deterioration of the electrical components as well. This can allow moisture to infiltrate the electrical components and can lead to a failure.

Failure of customer owned equipment connected to IPL’s secondary network system can also lead to problems and failures on IPL’s components. This can be at the primary voltage level of 13,800 volts or at the secondary voltage level.

Event Sequences
The network system is designed with redundancy in order to provide continuous service to customers when a system abnormality, such as a primary cable failure, occurs.

When a primary cable failure occurs, the protective relays at the source substation detect a problem and signal the substation circuit breaker at the beginning of the primary cable circuit to open. For underground network feeders the circuit breaker opens typically within 0.1 seconds and stays open. The network protectors on the transformers connected to the faulting primary cable circuit will immediately open on reverse power flow from the secondary network back toward the primary network. This isolates the faulted feeder from the rest of the network system and results in no customer outages. The System Operators in the Transmission Operations Control Center are signaled through the Energy Control system that the circuit breaker opened. They dispatch the appropriate personnel to respond.

When a network secondary cable failure occurs, fault current will flow toward the fault from both directions. The fault current will melt the cable in two at the short circuit point thus clearing the fault. Most secondary cable faults are isolated without incident. Infrequently, secondary cable faults can result in a fire or an over-pressurization event.

An over-pressurization event can occur when the levels of carbon monoxide and other combustible gases build up in the manhole above their lower explosive limit. The combustible gases can include natural gas, methane gas from the sewers, and other gas created from the smoldering or burning of the cable insulation. The most prominent gas generated from burning cable insulation is carbon monoxide which has a lower explosive limit of 12 percent. If there is an ignition source such as arcing at the short circuit point, the combustible gases in the manhole can be ignited. The pressure in the manhole will build rapidly and can dislodge one or more manhole covers.

Interface to Customer-Owned Equipment
IPL owns and maintains the network primary and secondary cables, vault, network transformers and other associated equipment, including the metering equipment. The customer is required to extend their secondary service cables to an IPL manhole or vault. The demarcation point between IPL and the customer is the point where the customer’s cables connect to the IPL distribution network. The details on service requirements for customers are provided in IPL’s Electric Service and Meter Manual (a.k.a., “The Gold
This book provides details about IPL’s requirements for service, the customer’s responsibilities, and how the metering equipment will be installed. IPL requires an inspection certification from the City of Indianapolis Electrical Inspector before a service will be connected and energized.

2. Please provide the root cause of each over-pressurization event with underground utility plant that occurred on January 8, 2005 and any other event that has occurred through May 1, 2011, including events on August 17, 2010, August 19, 2010, January 30, 2011, and April 27, 2011. Also, please explain. For purposes of identifying the actual number of pressurized events in the downtown area during this period, an event should be defined as a single occurrence on a single day at a single location. Please provide a description of the root analysis methodology employed.

IPL Response:

The information below provides details and analysis of over-pressurization manhole and vault events that have occurred from January 1, 2005 through May 1, 2011.

1) January 4, 2005 – 114 W. North Street. The network secondary cables short circuited and resulted in a sustained secondary network fire. There were multiple manhole covers that were dislodged in this event. It was necessary to de-energize that portion of the secondary network to contain the fire and minimize further damage to the network system. There were customer outages associated with this event until the damaged area could be isolated and the secondary network re-energized.

**IPL actions:** IPL was not able to determine an exact cause for the failure of the secondary cable due to the fire damage. IPL replaced more than 2,000 feet of network primary and network secondary cables that were damaged as a result of this incident.

2) January 8, 2005 – 137 W. Market Street. The network secondary cables between two IPL manholes in the 100 block of West Market Street failed from excessive heat coming from a leak in a Citizens Thermal steam line located directly below the duct line. A secondary network fire occurred resulting in damage to primary and secondary cables in the area and an over-pressurization event occurred in the basement of the Bookland Building at 137 W. Market Street. Carbon monoxide gas from the secondary network fire entered the basement of the building through the service entrance conduits. The fire department investigation did not determine the ignition source, but the pilot light on a gas water heater in the basement may have been the source that ignited the carbon monoxide gas.

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3 This publication is available at http://apps.iplpower.com/goldbook/Goldbook.html
**IPL actions:** A leak in a steam line directly below the IPL duct bank caused a deterioration and failure of IPL network secondary cables at the point of the steam leak. Carbon monoxide gas from the faulted network secondary cables was able to enter the basement of the building at 137 Market due to the lack of duct-sealing materials in the service conduits to the building. The duct-sealing materials had been removed to facilitate a service upgrade that was in progress, and they had not yet been replaced.

IPL works closely with Citizens Energy when gas or steam incidents occur to coordinate service restoration. Citizens Energy made repairs to their steam line. After this event, IPL inspected the downtown manhole system with an emphasis on inspecting and repacking service ducts as needed to generally prevent water and gases from entering customer premises through IPL structures.

3) **September 8, 2005 - Talbot and Vermont Street.** A network primary cable on Edison Feeder UG 431 faulted in the duct line at North and Capitol. The network protector on Edison Feeder UG 431 at 117 E. Michigan Street failed to open on reverse power flow. The secondary network continued to supply fault current to the faulted feeder. The secondary network tie cables between the 117 E. Michigan Street Vault and the 114 E. Vermont Street vault failed from carrying fault current for an extended period of time. The secondary cable failure damaged Edison Network Feeder UG 412, causing it to relay out of service. One manhole did have an over-pressurization event during this incident.

**IPL actions:** The cause of the initial primary cable fault was not determined. The cable did fail in the duct line between manholes. The subsequent events were the result of the network protector failing to open on reverse power flow. IPL replaced the UG 431 transformer and network protector in the 117 E. Michigan Street Vault. Network protectors in the adjacent vault were all tested to confirm that they would operate correctly. All damaged primary and secondary cables were replaced.

4) **February 17, 2010 – 215 E. Ohio Street.** A customer owned transformer at this location suffered an internal electrical failure. The tank on the transformer ruptured resulting in an oil fire that was contained to the transformer vault. There was no damage to any IPL facilities.

**IPL actions:** IPL did not perform a root cause analysis for this incident because it was customer owned equipment that failed and IPL’s facilities were not damaged in the event. The customer did not require IPL to install temporary facilities. They were able to repower their building from the two remaining transformers, and the transformer involved in this event was replaced by the customer.

5) **August 18, 2010 – 535 Massachusetts Avenue.** The question referred to an incident on August 17, 2010, but the actual date was August 18, 2010. A failure occurred in the primary termination chamber on the network transformer
connected to Edison Substation Feeder UG 422 in this vault. A small flash fire occurred and flames came through the vault grating.

IPL actions: The network transformer was replaced.

6) August 19, 2010 – 342 Massachusetts Avenue. At 4:18 a.m. Edison Substation Feeder UG 459 relayed out of service for a splice failure. There was no manhole over-pressurization event associated with this failure. At 8:16 a.m. Edison Substation Feeder UG 449 relayed out of service from a splice failure. There was a manhole over-pressurization event associated with this second splice failure with the manhole cover becoming dislodged. When Feeder UG 459 relayed out of service from the first splice failure, the load current it had been carrying was picked up on Feeder UG 449. Our investigation revealed an undersized section of underground primary cable in the Feeder UG 449 circuit where the second splice failure occurred. We believe that heating from the higher load current flowing through this section of cable from the first splice failure contributed to the second splice failure.

IPL actions: An undersized section cable resulted in overheating of the cable. This heat was transferred to the splice causing it to fail. The section of cable was replaced with larger cable. IPL inspected the adjacent sections of cable to verify that the cable data records matched the cable that was in the field. No other discrepancies were found.

7) January 30, 2011 – E. Michigan Street & New Jersey Street. At 6:36 a.m. the Indianapolis Fire Department was dispatched on the report of a gas odor in the vicinity of the Athenaeum on the southeast corner of Michigan and New Jersey. At 6:38 a.m. a manhole over-pressurization event occurred in the intersection of Michigan and New Jersey. IPL determined that a secondary cable failed in that manhole. Over the next few minutes two additional manhole over-pressurization events occurred. One occurred while a fire truck was parked over a manhole and the second was in a manhole next to the Athenaeum. There was no damage to the fire truck, but a window was broken at the Athenaeum. IPL believes that a combustible gas, possibly natural gas, was present in the manhole/duct line system and contributed to the two later manhole events. We do not believe that a sufficient quantity of carbon monoxide would have been generated from the original secondary cable fault to sustain the latter two manhole events.

IPL actions: IPL installed new secondary cable and splices.

8) April 27, 2011 – 20 W. Court Street. Around 6:00 a.m. a failure occurred involving customer owned cables in the customer’s junction box. This failure on the customer’s service cables led to a failure of IPL secondary cables in a manhole just outside the building. When the IPL secondary cable failed, a manhole over-pressurization event occurred. The IPL secondary cables failed from the high amounts of current flowing through the cable to the faulted cables in the customer’s building.
**IPL actions:** A customer-owned secondary cable failed between the customer’s Junction Box and his main switchgear. Fault current flowing to this fault lead to a failure of IPL’s network secondary cable in a manhole just outside the customer’s building. IPL replaced 300 feet of secondary cable and installed cable limiters on the service cables going to 20 W. Court. IPL also required the customer to install cable limiters on his cables where they connect to the main switchgear.

In most cases, IPL performs an investigation to determine the root cause of an event. These investigations are conducted by either Operations personnel or Network Engineering personnel. The investigation methods include a site visit to examine conditions at the location of the event, visual inspection of the faulted equipment, and a review of system data available from the Energy Control System, including event messages, sequence of events, equipment status, recorded voltages and currents. In some cases, faulted equipment may be sent to a lab or a vendor for further analysis. When damage to the affected electrical components is too severe, or when outside factors clearly caused the event, we proceed to replacing the damaged components.

3. **Please provide an analysis of the incident that occurred on May 31, 2011 on the Capitol Street side of the Indiana Statehouse.**

**IPL Response:**

On May 31, 2011 at 4:59 p.m. IPL’s underground Feeder UG 641 relayed out of service. A few minutes later IPL received a report from the Indianapolis Fire Department of a possible electrical fire at 46 N. Capitol on the west side of the Indiana State Capitol Building. IPL personnel were dispatched to the scene to meet the Fire Department. Upon arrival at the scene, IPL personnel determined that a failure had occurred in the Primary Termination Chamber on the West Transformer in the North Bay of the 46 N. Capitol vault. The transformer in question is connected to the UG 641 circuit that relayed.

Upon further investigation, IPL determined that the stress termination on the center phase in the termination chamber failed. The cable faulted to ground in the chamber with some collateral damage to two of the three cables. The arc from the failure likely heated the mineral oil in the chamber, breaking the oil down into various gases. The pressure in the termination chamber likely built to the point that the cover ruptured, releasing the gases and hot oil, which likely would have been ignited from the arc. There were approximately 10 gallons of mineral oil in the termination chamber. This likely resulted in a brief flash fire until the oil was quickly consumed and the fire went out. Confirmed accounts by conversation with a credible eyewitness indicated duration of the flash fire above the grating was less than 10 seconds.

The exact reason for the failure of the stress termination cannot be determined because it was completely consumed in the arcing from the fault. The likely cause for this type of failure would be some type of void in the stress relief tape. The void would have created an area of high electrical stresses which would have led to the failure. The oil level in the
termination chamber or possible contamination, such as moisture in the mineral oil, would not cause this type of failure.

**IPL actions:** IPL will be replacing the network transformer involved in this event. We are working to schedule this change-out. IPL also plans to conduct oil quality tests and Dissolved Gas Analysis on all 315 network transformers. This testing requires that the transformer be de-energized, which requires taking the network feeders serving the transformers out of service. Ambient temperatures and loading on the network feeders must be lower than current conditions before we can schedule this work. We will commence work on this project as soon as we can reliably do so.

4. **Please provide information related to the number of over-pressurization events with underground plant experienced at utilities similarly situated to IPL. The IURC is most interested in underground facilities in urban downtown areas in similarly-sized Midwestern cities over the past five years. We would like a minimum of three additional examples for comparison purposes.**

**IPL Response:**

IPL has not identified a publicly available study of the number of “over-pressurization events” for the past five years in similarly-sized Midwestern cities.

IPL’s research indicates inconsistent definitions of network events and the date ranges for such events. Because of this inconsistency, IPL recommends caution in using this information to draw definitive conclusions. In communications with IPL, industry experts and Electric Power Research Institute (“EPRI”) staff echoed these concerns about consistency of the available information. Subject to these caveats, the information IPL was able to find from the District of Columbia and Massachusetts is presented below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Manhole Events</th>
<th># of Manholes</th>
<th># of Vaults</th>
<th># yrs of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DC&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Pepco</td>
<td>Jan 2000- Dec 2000</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 2001- July 2001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>NSTAR</td>
<td>July 2004 - Dec 2005</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Grid</td>
<td>Aug 2004 - Dec 2005</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20735</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WMECO</td>
<td>June 1999- Dec 2005</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3750</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unitil</td>
<td>1998- Dec 2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5. Please provide details regarding IPL's process for qualifying customers for interconnection with IPL underground facilities and whether any periodic inspections are performed by IPL or if any certifications are maintained on the condition of the said interconnection facilities and customer equipment. What training and/or certification is 1) required of and 2) provided by IPL for customers who interconnect with IPL via its underground facilities?

IPL Response:

In order to take service from IPL, customers are required to have a qualified electrician install the service facilities and obtain the necessary permits from the City of Indianapolis. The electrician must install the customer’s equipment according to the current version of the National Electric Code (NEC) and meet IPL’s requirements for service as outlined in IPL’s Electric Service and Meter Manual. For all new services or service upgrades downtown, a member of IPL’s Network Engineering group will meet with the customer’s electrician to review the proposed work. The application for a permit from the City of Indianapolis triggers an inspection of the customer’s electrical service equipment by the city electrical inspector. Once the electrical inspector determines the installation is compliant with all applicable current codes, IPL installs the meters and makes the final connection to the IPL underground system. While the NEC is updated every two years, it is not retroactive. As customers upgrade electrical systems to accommodate changes or building additions, any new facilities must meet the current NEC requirements. Customers are not required to modify or upgrade existing facilities not involved in the upgrade. As mentioned in the response to Question 1, IPL’s service requirements are posted on its website as Electric Service and Meter Requirements (“The Gold Book”).

6. Is IPL aware of the extent to which other peer group electric utilities regularly inspect customer-owned equipment that connects to the utility’s underground facilities?

IPL Response:

IPL is not aware of any peer electric utility that regularly inspects customer owned equipment connecting to its underground facilities.
7. Please provide, to the extent IPL is aware, details of the requirements that utilities from other states follow that address issues related to the over-pressurization of underground utility plant.

IPL Response:

Electric utilities strive to utilize best practices to provide safe and reliable service to their customers. Utilities throughout the United States are required to abide by the following codes and agency rules:

  - Clearances and operations
- Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA)
  - Adequate training for electrical line workers
  - Confined Space entry procedures
  - Signing, signaling, flagging
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Rules
  - PCB oil testing and containment
  - SPCC (Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures)
- Local Electrical Permitting Practices
  - Connect only after inspection is complete and approved by appropriate permitting authority (such as the City of Indianapolis)

IPL researched regulatory reporting requirements from other states and reports the following:

California

CA PUC began an investigation into PG&E underground network events in late spring 2011.

Connecticut

In April 2007, the PUC required CL&P to continue a four-year inspection program of manholes and to replace a portion of its secondary network over a five-year period and to report project status quarterly. (Docket No. 06-10-21) In addition, the utility is required to file transmission and distribution maintenance plans on a two-year cycle. (Docket No 86-12-03) CL&P agreed to highlight network maintenance in future reports.

Massachusetts

The Department of Telecommunications and Energy (“DTE”) initiated an “Independent Assessment of Dislodged Manhole Covers” in 2005 and required the four subject utilities to implement the following recommendations of the report: 1) create a technical working group - including DTE staff - to standardize definitions and event reporting; 2) complete inspections on a five-year cycle; 3) report quarterly findings; 4) document and log splicing activity; 5) complete failure analysis; and 6) file annual reports.
New York

Following a 1999 power outage, the New York DPS initiated an investigation of Con Edison underground incidents (Case 99-E-0930). On March 15, 2000, DPS Staff issued a report that contained 44 recommendations for the company to implement. The Commission ordered Con Edison to implement all of the recommendations and required Con Edison to file quarterly status reports on its plans to implement the recommendations. Con Edison subsequently filed a Petition requesting modification to allow reporting on a semi-annual basis (Nov 1 and May 1), which the Commission approved. In the first two years following the May 2000 order, Con Edison implemented 32 of the recommendations. As of May 1, 2011, Con Edison has completed all but one of the 44 recommendations.

District of Columbia

The DC PSC initiated an investigation and independent assessment following a series of manhole explosions in the late 1990s. Following independent reports by Stone & Webster and Siemens, the PSC ordered PEPCO to inspect manholes on a four year cycle, test new technologies such as remote monitoring and manhole covers that limit displacement in pressurization events, complete seasonal modeling and report quarterly and annual reports to the PSC.
8. **For each year since 2000, what has been IPL’s total capital investment in underground facilities? Please provide information that details the amount spent on the downtown area in particular.**

IPL Response:

The table below shows the capital investment made in underground facilities for the years 2000 through 2011 year to date ("YTD"). The column labeled Downtown Underground Network Area is the area that comprises the secondary network area. The column labeled Underground Non-Network area is the balance of the IPL service territory served from the general distribution system with underground facilities. These values represent capital investment in new facilities to serve new or load additions, system upgrades, and replacement of facilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Downtown UG Network Area</th>
<th>UG Non-Network Area</th>
<th>Total UG Capital Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$2,298,445</td>
<td>$18,200,740</td>
<td>$20,499,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$798,012</td>
<td>$19,525,405</td>
<td>$20,323,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$1,010,730</td>
<td>$19,943,938</td>
<td>$20,954,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$1,024,313</td>
<td>$26,023,139</td>
<td>$27,047,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1,869,913</td>
<td>$18,213,189</td>
<td>$20,083,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$3,218,865</td>
<td>$19,221,403</td>
<td>$22,440,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$2,260,853</td>
<td>$19,988,977</td>
<td>$22,249,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$2,618,414</td>
<td>$20,302,278</td>
<td>$22,920,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$4,593,963</td>
<td>$16,751,397</td>
<td>$21,345,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$6,071,673</td>
<td>$13,584,576</td>
<td>$19,656,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 YTD</td>
<td>$5,224,799</td>
<td>$6,791,042</td>
<td>$12,015,841</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Downtown UG Network Area** - Work on the Cultural Trail began ramping up in 2007 and has continued through 2011. This project has required relocation and replacement of underground facilities including duct lines, primary cables, and secondary cables. In 2005, there were 4 major additions to the network including the Conrad Hotel, the Simon Office Building, Hudson Condos, and Homewood Suites Hotel. In 2008, the increase in spending is attributable to providing service to Lucas Oil Stadium. The increase in 2010 and 2011 YTD is attributed to the start of relocation work for the Georgia Street upgrades led by the City of Indianapolis.

**UG Non-Network Area** – The large increase in spending in 2003 can be attributed to the burial of several substation exit circuits for the interstate I-70 entrance to the new Indianapolis International Airport. In addition, 2003 saw a larger than normal expenditure for new UG commercial projects. The reduced expenditures that started in 2007 and continue to present are directly related to the slowdown in the economy.

9. **For each year since 2000, what have been IPL’s total maintenance expenditures for underground facilities? Please provide information that details the amount spent**
on the downtown area in particular.

IPL Response:

The table below shows the maintenance expenditures made in underground facilities for the years 2000 through 2011 YTD. The column labeled Downtown Underground Network Area is the area that comprises the secondary network area. The column labeled Underground Non-Network area is the balance of the IPL service territory served from the general distribution system with underground facilities. The values represent expenses for repairs of facilities, inspections, routine maintenance, and any non-capitalized work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Downtown UG Network Area</th>
<th>UG Non-Network Area</th>
<th>Total UG Maintenance Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$4,349,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$4,353,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$3,420,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>See Note 1</td>
<td>$3,361,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$1,129,017</td>
<td>$2,953,399</td>
<td>$4,082,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$1,759,071</td>
<td>$3,048,405</td>
<td>$4,807,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$1,373,129</td>
<td>$2,597,986</td>
<td>$3,971,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$1,844,163</td>
<td>$2,647,764</td>
<td>$4,491,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>$1,470,764</td>
<td>$2,981,070</td>
<td>$4,451,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>$1,529,371</td>
<td>$2,872,771</td>
<td>$4,402,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$1,036,397</td>
<td>$3,243,648</td>
<td>$4,280,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 YTD</td>
<td>$477,334</td>
<td>$1,179,689</td>
<td>$1,657,023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: For the period 2000 through 2003 the specific maintenance costs for the Downtown Underground Network cannot be broken out from the total dollars spent on underground maintenance. The total UG maintenance expenditures are relatively consistent throughout the period. We believe the split in underground expenditures between the downtown and the other underground areas in 2000-2003 would likely be similar to that in 2004 and beyond.

10. Does IPL have a long-term maintenance plan? Has IPL changed its underground maintenance practices over the last 10 years? If yes, please explain the specific changes and the reasons for each change.

IPL Response:

Yes, IPL has a long-term maintenance plan that includes the following features:

- A five-year inspection cycle of its manholes in the downtown area. The industry standard for good utility practice is to inspect manholes on a four-to-ten-year
cycle. This means we enter and inspect about 260 manholes each year. [~1,266 manholes in inspection cycle]

- We do a visual inspection of the structural condition of the manhole, looking for any water infiltration issues and any other conditions that warrant further investigation.
- We inspect for damage to the fireproofing tapes on the cables, which help protect the cables from external heat.
- We visually inspect splices for leaking and swelling, which indicates they need to be replaced.
- We visually inspect for the presence and condition of duct sealing material, which prevents gases in the manhole from entering customer buildings.
- We take current readings on all secondary cables, making note of any cable with 0 current or greater than 200 amps of current for further investigation. Here, we are looking for cables that may have experienced a short circuit and are open, or cables that are approaching their maximum capacity. Further review is performed by the crew on those circuits indicating 0 current to determine if a cable has opened and appropriate action is taken. If these conditions exist, Network Engineering follows up and corrective actions are taken.

- Network protectors are on a three-year inspection cycle to make sure they operate correctly and to verify their operating settings. A general vault inspection is also made at the same time as the network protector testing.

Additional aspects of the plan incorporated within the last 10 years include:

- In 2011, an infra-red (IR) camera was added as an additional preventive maintenance testing tool. The camera is used to look for potential hot spots on the network protectors, primary oil switches, and incoming primary cable feed to the transformers.

- Vault cleaning has been expanded to include an inspection of the vault structure and a visual inspection of the equipment. The structure is inspected to determine wall, roof, and drainage issues. The transformer is checked for potential leaks, rust, oil or other abnormal conditions. Ladders, vault lighting circuits, bus work, steam penetrations are also recorded conditions of the inspection. IR temperature guns (digital numeric display of temperature) were added for temperature recording in 2009.

- Beginning in 2005, manhole inspections included inspecting and repacking of service ducts as needed.

11. **IPL, as part of its Summer Preparedness Presentation, listed five new initiatives**
it was taking in regard to the downtown network system. Please explain each of these in more detail as to cost, effectiveness, and retro-fit applicability and provide a timeline for the implementation of each.

IPL Response:

IPL has undertaken five initiatives to improve the Downtown Network system. These initiatives were briefly discussed at the 2011 Summer Preparedness meeting and are described in more detail below. In addition, IPL is in the process of completing a full inspection sweep of all manholes in the Downtown Secondary Network area.

• Network SCADA Projected Completion Date: 4/1/2013

The purpose of this initiative is to install a control system, known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (“SCADA”) that will provide two-way communication and control with all of the network protectors on the Downtown Network. This system will provide various analog values such as voltages and currents at the Network Protector. The system will also provide for remote control of the Network Protector. This will allow IPL’s System Operators to Open or Close a Network Protector remotely and eliminates the need for an IPL employee to enter the vault to perform that task.

The project involves installing an underground fiber optic communication system. The fiber optic cable will be installed utilizing existing IPL conduits. The protection relay in the network protector will be replaced with one that has two-way communication capability. The relay will be connected to the fiber optic communication system. The network SCADA system will be operated through IPL’s existing Energy Control System in the Transmission Operations Control Center.

Approximately 44 percent of the required fiber optic cable has been installed, and 177 of 315 network relays have been installed for this project.

• Primary Cable fault detectors Projected Completion Date: 12/31/2012

The purpose of this initiative is to install a device on the primary network cables that detects when fault current has passed through it. This device is called a fault detector or fault indicator. Fault detectors are used in an underground system to help determine the location of the fault. IPL will be able to read the device remotely from street level without having to enter the manhole. This will result in a considerable time savings to locate a cable fault and will reduce overall feeder restoration time. This project is in the design phase. Equipment purchase is expected to commence first quarter 2012.

• Install cable limiters at select locations Study Completion Date: August 1, 2012

The purpose of this initiative is to assess the feasibility of installing additional cable limiters at certain locations on the secondary network system to provide an additional
level of protection. These additional cable limiters could help to isolate faulted secondary cables and reduce the risk of secondary network events. Care must be taken in the placement of these additional cable limiters in order not to increase secondary network events. The determination of the possible locations for placement of these cable limiters requires detailed models of the secondary network system, as well as performance of both power flow and fault current studies. Work has begun to develop the necessary electrical models needed for the studies to determine if and where additional cable limiters should be installed. A timeline for installation of additional cable limiters will be developed after the modeling and analysis is complete. Our plan is to complete the study and analysis phase by August 1, 2012.

- Evaluate Thermal Imaging  Projected Completion Date: 08/01/2011

The purpose of this initiative is to evaluate the effectiveness of thermal imaging through infrared cameras on components of the Downtown Network system. IPL has been using thermal imaging on the overhead transmission and distribution systems and on substation facilities for a number of years. These efforts have proven to be effective in finding problems before they become a failure and potential outage. Early thermal imaging cameras were very large and bulky and did not lend themselves for use in the confined spaces found on the Downtown Network system. As the thermal imaging technology has matured, the size of the equipment has decreased significantly. There are now hand-held devices about the size of a large flashlight that can be used in confined spaces. IPL has purchased two hand-held infrared cameras, which it is piloting in the full sweep of manholes and vaults. Test inspections with the cameras began on June 3, 2011. Initial results have shown that the cameras can be effective on connections and terminations.

- Combination Locking and Pressure relieving manhole covers

Project Completion Date: 9/2011 to take delivery of the first covers

The purpose of this initiative is to install and evaluate the effectiveness of a manhole cover that can be locked in place to prevent unauthorized access to the underground facilities, while, at the same time, allow gases in the manhole to vent in case of an over-pressurization. Until recently, no such product existed. A Michigan-based company working with EPRI has now developed a manhole cover that is locked in place through a mechanism attached to the underside of the cover. This mechanism will allow the cover to rise three to four inches and vent the pressure that can build up during an over-pressurization event. This locking manhole cover was used by Detroit Edison when Detroit hosted the Super Bowl in 2009. The security protocols for the Super Bowl require that manhole covers within the security perimeter be secured. With Indianapolis hosting the 2012 Super Bowl, IPL has been investigating the use of these covers.

IPL is working with the supplier to finalize the design of the manhole cover so that it will fit IPL’s existing manhole rings. IPL expects to take delivery of the first of these...
covers by early September of 2011. Approximately 75 of these covers will be installed around Lucas Oil Stadium and along Georgia Street prior to the Super Bowl.

12. If IPL were to design and install a downtown network today, would the technology be similar to the existing network, or would it be different? If different, can any new plant added today take advantage of the new technology?

IPL Response:
The basic components/theory of a network would remain the same, i.e., vaults, manholes, network transformers, network protectors, cable, single contingency design, concrete encased duct banks, etc.

An underground network built today would also have a SCADA system. This technology facilitates remote control and monitoring of the network system. As mentioned in response to Question 11, IPL is in the process of installing such a system for its Downtown Network.

13. Please explain the extent to which IPL coordinates with or shares information with Citizens Energy in regard to underground plant and emergency response in the downtown network system area.

IPL Response:
IPL has a very open relationship with Citizens Energy and Thermal. The utilities all respond in a timely manner to field events and emergency conditions to protect the public and maintain reliable services. Concerns we have with each other receive a timely response. When steam leaks are found that could jeopardize IPL’s electric facilities, Citizens Thermal is contacted and they address the issue.

IPL has a good rapport with all utilities occupying the same area in the downtown Indianapolis.

14. Please explain how IPL coordinates with emergency responders in the event of a downtown underground explosion or fire.

IPL Response:
IPL and the Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD) have established specific protocols to respond to Downtown Network incidents. Whenever IFD makes a run on a report of a manhole event or other electrical issue in the downtown area, they notify the IPL Distribution Operations Control Center (IPL DOCC). This call is made via a direct phone line between the IFD Dispatch Center and the IPL DOCC. IPL immediately dispatches a truck to the reported location. IPL DOCC will immediately notify the IPL Transmission Operations Control Center (IPL TOCC) of the event. IPL TOCC will then
notify the appropriate Network Operations leadership of the event so they can also respond to the scene. Upon arrival on the scene, IFD is to secure the area and take a defensive position. They are not to enter manholes or vaults and they are not supposed to put water or chemicals on any fire in a manhole or vault until IPL personnel arrive on the scene and determine the safe way for IFD to proceed. The safety of the public and the firefighters is our number one priority.
Appendix B - Situational Awareness

Looking, but not Seeing

This Appendix addresses the phenomenon of what might be called “looking but not seeing”. It can be related to an area of inquiry often called “human factors”, i.e., not an issue with the equipment, and not even the training as such, but a deeper issue in how human beings process information and translate it into actions. It has applications in the military (where the remedy is often termed ‘situational awareness’), worker safety, aviation, ‘quality’ in manufacturing, and so on. Because of the special nature of this issue, the style of this Appendix is different than the rest of the report.

The problem of looking, but not seeing

To understand what is “looking but not seeing”, one need look no further than the top of a typical utility pole. To the layman, it is probably an eyesore, a necessary evil in the modern world, and seems to be a collection of wires and wood. The layman will tend to notice if the pole is leaning, and think that it shouldn’t, but generally will not ‘see’ much else. Actually, the tilt of the pole is not all that likely to cause an electrical fault, unless it is quite severe. What else there is to see there is a lot, if only one knows how to look. For example, the layman will not tend to notice that:

- The pole is divided into a wire zone at the top and a communications zone, the latter being usually the four feet below the neutral wire that marks the bottom of the wire zone.

- The wires in the communications zone, being cable and telephone, have small insulators, if any, (the wire itself may be sufficiently insulated), whereas the wires in the wire zone, since they conduct electricity at much higher voltages, are supported by large ceramic or composite insulators, with larger insulators for higher voltages.

- The wire zone may be primary voltage only, or may have secondary voltage (120 volts, or regular house current) as well, with the latter emanating from a transformer (that looks like a big trash can mounted up on the pole, or sometimes three). It may even have transmission voltages, although the layman might notice how much taller and thicker such poles are.

- The primary may be single phase (with a primary conductor on top, and a neutral wire below) or three-phase (three wires and one neutral below), with the occasional exception being two-phase or where the neutral is on top, as a shield for lightning.

- The three-phase wire may be vertically oriented or horizontal, and may switch from the one to the other at various points along the route, likewise switching
from one side of the road to another, and there are various styles of attachment of
the three phases (8 or 10-foot crossarm, ‘armless’, alley arm, etc.).

- The pole may be guyed or not, depending on whether it is inline or at a corner, or
  supporting street lights, etc.

- The conductor between the poles may be thick or thin, covered or not, suspended
  in a tight catenary pattern of ‘sag’, or loose due to poor construction.

All of these aspects of the top of a utility pole (which the layman may simply refer to as a
‘telephone pole’) are evident to the eye of one who knows what to look for, but they are
basically invisible to one who does not. Even for the more trained eye, who might
readily see all of the aspects noted above, there might be other things not as evident, such
as the carbon path on insulators and crossarms that is caused by ‘tracking’, the initial
stages of electrical arcing that may eventually cause a fault if a sufficient path is formed
to ground or to another phase (which, in alternating current systems, is another way to
fault).

Similarly, in underground secondary networks and in the substations that supply them,
there are aspects of construction and condition that may be seen, even by a trained
technician, but may go unnoticed. This is the problem of ‘looking, but not seeing’ to
which the body of this report refers. Selected specific examples of this that the
investigators noted are listed below:

- The leaking splice
- The tank low on oil
- The tracking on the secondary bus
- The oil on the ground at the substation
- The over-pressured transformers
- The relays that don’t add up

The solution to this problem

Experience has shown that human factors issues can be addressed through a combination
of special training (not just the usual technical training), checklists, and labeling. At a
more intensive level it can be communicated through felt experiences, vicarious or direct,
that communicate the problem and ‘bring it home’. This may include alarms, additional
supervision, and discipline/incentive systems. There is a reason why industrial vehicles
now alarm whenever they are put into reverse, and why airline cockpits now announce
‘pull up!’ under certain conditions.
For IPL, the solution needs to be worked out in a planned, concerted effort. It cannot be simply dictated like a prescription. It must be custom fitted to the workforce and the issues involved. Such a program is beyond the scope of this report. The report contains enough instances to point to the problem and to create the groundwork for an IPL effort to address the problem and remedy it.
Appendix C – Resumes of Audit team

Daniel E. O’Neill

Dan O’Neill is President and Managing Consultant of O’Neill Management Consulting, LLC, specializing in serving utility clients. He has personally led more than 75 engagements with many of the largest utilities as his clients, and has played a leading role in asset management, emergency management, and electric T&D reliability/gas system integrity, speaking at conferences, publishing in industry journals, and acting as a resource for many in the industry.

In addition, Mr. O’Neill has over twenty-five years of industry experience, including four years as a utility financial executive and the remainder with major consulting firms serving the industry. Besides his work in asset management, reliability, emergency preparedness and service restoration, he has consulted on decision analysis, Smart Grid, activity-based budgeting, work management, and information systems.

He holds a Ph.D. in economics from MIT, taught at Georgia Tech's College of Industrial Management, and is past president of the Atlanta Economics Club and of The Planning Forum’s Atlanta Chapter.

Professional Experience

» Assisted a Northeast urban utility with the largest amount of load served by secondary networks to adopt strategies to measure and reduce the likelihood of network failure and to cost-effectively manage programs to reduce other network problems such as manhole events, network transformer events, and energized structures (‘stray voltage’). Also led a study of stray voltage for all investor-owned utilities in Massachusetts. Also helped evaluate mitigation programs for the utility with the second-largest amount of load served by secondary networks.

» Led reliability and asset management-related decision analysis projects for sixteen major utilities, allowing them to save millions of dollars and improve reliability by prioritizing capital and maintenance projects related to electric reliability and gas system integrity. The method focuses on the cost-effectiveness of reliability and asset management programs based on explicit activity-based decision models of risk, reliability and system integrity.

» Led electric reliability assessments for ten major utilities, including coaching for three before and during external audits of their reliability functions. Also led two engagements involved in auditing and/or restating the reliability indices (SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI) of two major companies.
Assisted two companies in establishing and developing their capabilities in failure analysis, including a detailed set of procedures, analytical and statistical tools to assist in root cause analysis, and guidance in developing effective failure analysis incident reports.

Led two reviews of electric distribution capacity planning methods, with process and system improvements and a method to evaluate distributed resource alternatives. Also led a study to estimate the marginal cost of additional capacity based on multiple regression analysis.

Led a review of storm restoration best practices and developed a storm mobilization model for a major utility operating in both the MidAtlantic and the MidWest. The model allows the company to use weather forecasts to more accurately and quantitatively predict damage and resource requirements in order to mobilize more effectively in the early stages of a storm. Then applied the same approach at three other companies. Also assisted two other companies in quantifying the relationship of outages to weather.

Assisted a global manufacturer in assessing market trends in the North American utility equipment market relating to aging infrastructure, Smart Grid, and automated meter infrastructure. Also assisted one utility in planning its “Utility of the Future” initiative, and assisted another in assessing the business case for its Smart Grid investments.

Assisted a major Mid-Atlantic utility in documenting its compliance with NERC Standards, specifically FAC003, the bulk transmission vegetation management standard. Also led a vegetation management program redesign for a multi-state utility, and, for the suburban territory of a northeastern utility, audited the performance of a global vegetation management contractor.

Led a survey of outage communication practices of over a dozen companies. Also helped a major utility implement improved estimated restoration time procedures through better data analysis and better use of existing systems.

Directed strategy studies at three major utilities including a competitive wholesale market assessment with explicit modeling of market-clearing prices for capacity and energy in the eastern U.S., a telecom market entry strategy for an electric and gas utility, and for a major public power generation and transmission authority, led separate efforts to optimize its coal options for fuel mix, inventory and transport and to optimize its fossil clean air programs.

At a UK regional electricity company, directed quick-win process improvements focused on call centre and back office functions.

Conducted information system planning efforts at five utilities to determine the scope and best-in-class design of new transmission and distribution work management systems, outage management systems or geographic information systems.

Led efforts at three utilities to re-design their financial and operational reporting to reflect the cost and impact of major work activities such as new construction, line clearing, pipe replacement, etc. Also assisted in setting up transfer prices for internal products/services.

Analyzed the business case for over ten major mergers, acquisitions, or divestitures, and led the distribution merger integration team for the merger of an electric company and a gas company.

Publications and Presentations


» “AEP-Ohio’s Line Inspection Programs - Moving Beyond Compliance,” EEI TD&M Conference, Seattle, October 7, 2008 (paper by R. Ivinskas, with assistance from Dan O’Neill).


» “Myths and Realities in Projecting the Trend of Future URD Cable Failures, A Comparison Study," EEI TD&M Conference, Houston, April 4, 2006.


» “Project Prioritization,” EEI TD&M Conference, Spring 2003, St. Louis, April 7, 2003, with Malcolm Thaden.


» “A Road Map to the Next Level of Reliability,” Public Power, November-December, 2000, with Howard Friedman.


» “Keeping the Lights On: A Discussion of Current Trends in Reliability Regulation,” EUCI Electric System Reliability In a Competitive Environment Conference, Denver, November 9, 1999


Regulatory Experience of Daniel E. O’Neill

**Expert witness**

- Assisted the Massachusetts Attorney General, providing expert technical assistance that included pre-filed testimony, life testimony, help with data requests, briefs, replies, etc. on the following dockets:
  - DPU 10-79 National Grid Electric cost tracker (the predecessor to the current docket for which we are proposing)
  - DPU 11-1,2 Unitil Rate Case, electric and gas
  - DPU 11-3 National Grid December 2010 Storm response
- Prepared testimony which was filed and then heard before the Philadelphia Gas Commission (with cross-examination by the People’s Counsel and also by Bargaining Unit Counsel), in the matter of Philadelphia Gas Works’ proposed FY 1995-96 Capital and Operating Budget & Five-Year Forecasts and 1995 Debt Service Coverage Gap, June-July, 1995. At the time, Mr. O’Neill was the lead subject matter expert for EDS Management Consulting Services. Mr. O’Neill led an update in 1997 while he was still with EDS, and again in 2000, while he was with Navigant Consulting. Both updates were filed before the Philadelphia Gas Commission and testified to by PGW staff alone, with Mr. O’Neill available but not required to testify.
- Prepared testimony for NSTAR (including Boston Edison, Commonwealth Electric, Cambridge Electric Light, and NSTAR Gas) for a filing before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities in the matter of Estimating Marginal Costs for Electric and Natural Gas Distribution Service. The testimony was not filed due to a settlement that obviated the need for the testimony.

**Performing commission-mandated audits**

- Project Director for an Independent Assessment of Stray Voltage in Underground Distribution Systems of Massachusetts Electric Companies, commissioned by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (then called the Department of Telecommunications and
Energy), in May of 2005 and completed in December, 2005 (while Mr. O'Neill was with Navigant Consulting) as part of the Department's safety investigations. The four Massachusetts electric utilities covered by the report were directed by the Department to comply with the recommendations of the report.

- Performed an audit of the accuracy of the Reliability Reporting of NSTAR Electric Company for the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office, in cooperation with the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities in early 2006. The audit was the result of a settlement agreement between the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (then called the Department of Telecommunications and Energy), in the matter of Docket 05-85, which required that NSTAR would engage an independent consultant, acceptable to the Massachusetts Attorney General, to conduct an audit of NSTAR’s annual reporting system for SAIDI and SAIFI and to assist in recalculating those indices for the years 1996-2005 as per the Service Quality Standards set forth in Docket 99-84.

- Leading subject matter expert for a team of consultants from UMS Group that performed a third-party audit of the reliability performance of Metropolitan Edison (a FirstEnergy company) for the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission completed in June, 2007. This audit was the result of the company’s not meeting its reliability targets which had been set in a 2004 agreement between the company and the PA PUC staff (see Joint Petition for Settlement of Proceeding at Docket No. I-00040102). The company accepted and implemented the audit recommendations and subsequently met the targets.

- Leading subject matter expert for a team of consultants from UMS Group that performed a third-party focused assessment of the reliability performance of The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (a FirstEnergy company) for the Public Utility Commission of Ohio in 2007, as a result of an agreement stemming from Docket cases 07-551-EL-AIR, 07-552-EL-ATA, 07-553-EL-AIM, and 07-554-EL-UNC. Similar to the PA case above, the agreement stipulated that the company would accept certain targets for reliability performance in 2006 and 2007, and that if those targets were missed, a third-party consultant would be retained to provide the PUCO Staff with an independent assessment of the company’s infrastructure and operating practices. The targets were missed in 2006, and the assessment was engaged. It was completed in October, 2007. The company subsequently implemented the recommendations and achieved the targets.

- Leading subject matter expert for a team of consultants from UMS Group that performed a third-party audit of the reliability performance of Pennsylvania Electric Company (Penelec, a FirstEnergy company) for the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission. This audit was similar to the MetEd audit mentioned above, stemming from the same issue, i.e., Penelec’s not meeting its reliability targets, only in 2007 rather than in 2006. The audit was commenced in November, 2008 and completed in February, 2009. The company has complied with the audit recommendations and subsequently met its targets.

Preparation for and assistance with commission-mandated audits

- Assisted Entergy (through its external counsel) in preparing for and responding to a third-party Service Quality Assessment which was a stipulation in an agreement between the company and the staff of the Public Utility Commission of Texas in the matter of Docket 18249, Entergy Gulf States, Inc. Service Quality Issues (severed from Docket 16705). Mr. O’Neill also continued to work with Entergy as it implemented the recommendations of the audit over the next two years to satisfy the requirements of the order, which would allow the company to restore a 60 basis-point penalty to its allowed return on equity.

- Assisted Commonwealth Edison (through its external counsel) in preparing for and responding to two third-party focused management audits of its Reliability and Supply Adequacy, which were the result of a settlement in the matter of a suit before the Illinois Commerce Commission (Illinois’ public service commission) by the People of Illinois, represented by Illinois Attorney General James E. Ryan, versus Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket 98-0514, February-May, 1999. Mr. O’Neill also assisted Commonwealth
Edison in filing its first Annual Reliability Report to the Illinois Commerce Commission and also a report to the City of Chicago after the events of the summer of 1999.

- Assisted Consolidated Edison Company of New York in preparing for and responding to a third-party focused management audit of its emergency response ordered by the New York Public Service Commission, case 06-M-1078, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Audit the Performance of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. in Response to Outage Emergencies, after a series of storm-related outages in 2006 (the audit was done in 2007).
Charles A. Fijnvandraat, P.E.


- 24+ years experience as a consultant and utility manager at NSTAR and Northeast Utilities
- Expert witness in Regulatory Proceedings involving T&D storm audits, rate case, and annual capital tracker filings
- Project management experience for fast track multi-million dollar Transmission, Substation and Distribution upgrades and new construction
- Utility Management experience creating procedures and controls to measure compliance to FERC/NERC/NPCC Protection and Control Reliability Standards
- Significant asset management and reliability experience, focused on large capital project prioritization, expense reduction, work force optimization, customer satisfaction, and regulatory compliance
- Working member of the IEEE committees on “Distribution System Design” and “Distribution Networks Task Force”. Including contributing member for writing and publication of P1366 Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices, Underground Network Tutorial
- Former Executive Board Member, Edison Electric Institute (EEI) Transmission/Substation Group
- Published author and speaker at various IEEE, EEI and other industry sponsored forums
- Registered Professional Engineer in Connecticut and Hawaii

Utility Management and Consulting Clients

NSTAR, NU, KCP&L, LIPA, Exelon – ComEd & PECO, PHI–PEPCo, PHI-Conectiv, SCE, Entergy, ConEdison, AEP, Progress Energy, PacifiCorp, Cinergy, Customer Care Research Consortium, NGrid, PPL, Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (Consumer Advocacy)
Sample Experience – as a utility consultant

- Served as the technical subject matter expert working with several clients to create a reliability risk mitigation plan associated with the central business district load areas.

- Served as the Technical subject matter for the State of Massachusetts Attorney General’s office, under Docket 10-79 Distribution Capital Tracker filing, Docket 11-01 Unitil Electric Rate Case asking for increased Vegetation budget levels along with 2008 Storm Cost recovery, Docket 11-02 Unitil Gas Rate Case for Cast Iron Main and Bare Steel accelerated replacement, and Docket 11-03 NGRID December 26 2010 Storm Performance audit. Deliverables included writing information requests, pre-filed testimony, testifying at evidentiary hearings, and supporting initial and final briefs.

- Served as the technical subject matter expert for several clients, to implement a decision-analytic model for prioritizing core Transmission/Distribution capital and maintenance expenditures, including load relief, reliability, service connections, relocations, failures, preventive maintenance and information technology (total budgets under review $2.2 billion).

- Served as the Transmission/Distribution Operations subject matter expert on the team that was tasked with reviewing a multi-state utility accounting practices for compliance to GAAP and FERC regulations.

- Served as the Technical and Regulatory subject matter expert to support a client to develop organizational changes and enhanced work process and linked scorecards to improve storm emergency response times and measure and manage community and regulatory communication.

- Served on the Senior Executive team supporting the Long Island Power Authority’s Management Outsourcing Agreement (MSA) with KeySpan Energy (annual capital budget of $299 million). Deliverables include defining systems and performance metrics to optimize and measure expense and capital investment rates of return and ensure compliance to contractual agreements.

Sample Experience – as a utility manager

- Underground Network Engineering Manager responsible for conducting a risk assessment of the Boston network (1300 transformer units) after a spike in manhole explosions in 2005 in the historic North end of Boston.

- Defined and staffed a new Substation Performance and Reliability department. Oversaw the analysis and targeted design changes for control and protection relays, transformers, and circuit breakers/metal clad. Also responsible to support new equipment acceptance testing and updating preventative maintenance procedures.

- Created systems and score cards to monitor utilities compliance efforts to FERC/NERC/NPCC Protection and Control (PRC) reliability standards. In particular PRC-002; Regional Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting, PRC-005; Protection System Maintenance and Testing, PRC-008; Under frequency load shedding, and PRC-012; Special Protection Systems.

- Led cross organization teams to define, measure and implement, targeted 4kV substation expense and prioritized capital investments, resulting in stepwise improvements in 4kV substation performance (2nd year results: 70% reduction in 4kV Substation class outages, a savings of ~ 2300 labor hours).

- Key sponsor and team leader responsible for leading cross organizational teams to define and implement the Substation long range reliability plan. Deliverables include top down analysis of historical expense and capital investments in the context of cost, performance and best in class practices, (2nd year results: 80% reduction in Southern Regional substation frequency of outages, a savings of ~ 1500 emergency response hours)
Served as the subject matter expert on the Planned Outage Communication team, implementing tactical changes to the Customer communication outage messages and estimated time of restoration predication algorithms, supporting year over year improvements within the J.D. Powers Customer Satisfaction survey rankings.

Served as the Emergency Response Branch Director responsible for the team that creates pre and current Storm Damage estimates, linking Resource and Material requirements to estimated time of restoration and cost. Tools include leveraging GIS technology (asset inventory, topography, prior outage/weather patterns), historical expense and capital investments, SCADA, OMS and System Demand Response Curves.

Served as the Divisional Operations Manager responsible for overall substation and underground distribution (including the Network System) performance and reliability standards and environmental compliance.

Publications and Presentations

- “Underground Network Tutorial”, Pre-conference workshop at the IEEE T&D conference Calgary, October 2009 and New Orleans, April 2010
- “Asset Management – Spending Prioritization for the T&D system”, Pre-conference workshop at the T&D World Conference, Indianapolis IN., May 2004
- “Risk and Return on Investment at LIPA”, EPRI Asset Management Conference, June 2003, co-presented with LIPA.
- “Taking Utility Maintenance to the Next Level”, EPRI Substation Diagnostics Conference, February 2001, co-presented with LIPA.
Appendix D – Observations from our field inspections

[separate file, due to size]
APPENDIX D – Observations from our field inspections

Summary of locations inspected:

From September 20-23, 2011, all three network substations were visually inspected along with 4 Transformer vaults and 11 cable manholes. In addition the Morris Street service center Transformer Repair/Retirement shop and stock room inventory of network transformers and protectors were inspected.

Below is a summary of the locations and dates of inspection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of Inspection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Vault Location #1</td>
<td>20-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhole Location #1</td>
<td>20-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhole Location #2</td>
<td>20-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhole Location #3</td>
<td>20-Sep-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Vault Location #2</td>
<td>20-Sep-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer Vault Location #3</td>
<td>20-Sep-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris Street Stock Room and Transformer Repair area</td>
<td>20-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transformer Vault Location #4</td>
<td>21-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edison Substation</td>
<td>21-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gardner Substation</td>
<td>21-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Substation Number 3</td>
<td>21-Sep-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhole Location #4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhole Location #11</td>
<td>22-Sep-11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Our inspection of the site of the November 19, 2011 incident is contained in section 6.5 of the main body of the report.

The following sections that follow are the inspection forms and associated pictures and comments.
**Date of Visual Inspection:** Tuesday September 20, 2011

**Individuals on Site:** Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

**Location:** Transformer Vault Location #1

**Observations:** Overall clean manhole with limited debris. Please see notes below on various pictures

**Pictures:**

Side walk of two transformer vault with limited trees to collect debris in manhole
View of recently replaced transformer from Secondary Protector side showing the condition of the manhole floor and how it is clean of leaves and other debris

View of second transformer installed over rails to keep transformer cool and dry. Note the lack of rust or collected debris
View of secondary side of the two transformers and how they connect to the secondary collector bus

View from of Secondary Cable and Collector bus to customers and street grid. The conditions of roof and collector bus are in good condition with some tree leaves on top of the transformer.
View of secondary cables entering properly sealed duct to customer service location.

View of secondary cables. The use of limiters (Secondary fuses) is applied only to secondary cables to customers’ services and are not used for those cables supplying the secondary grid. Note the dust and debris on secondary collector bus. While dusty, most utilities in the industry have experienced limited amounts of failures on similar 120/208 voltage busses.
View of Primary Cables to one of the transformers that are properly supported by cable holders.

View of primary cables on second transformer located in the Vault. Note the temperature gauge is showing a normally loaded transformer with a maximum temperature reading within acceptable range (red wipe arm)
**Date of Visual Inspection:** Tuesday September 20, 2011

**Individuals on Site:** Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

**Location:** Manhole Location #1

**Background information on location:**
Circular manhole with primary and secondary cable. Supplied out of the Edison Substation supplying the Edison East Grid

**Observations:** See pictures below for comments

**Pictures:**

Solid cover manhole located on Monument Circle
View showing 3 inches of water in manhole and limited space, a characteristic of these types of older style brick manholes

View of Primary cables installed on top racks and secondary on the bottom. Also no duct porcelain supports used on the rack arm to avoid possible damage to the cable during cyclic cable movement
**Date of Visual Inspection:** Tuesday September 20, 2011

**Individuals on Site:** Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

**Location:** Manhole Location #2

**Background information on location:**
Supplied out of the Edison Substation supplying the Edison West Grid

**Observations:** Please see pictures

**Pictures:**

Recently rebuilt manhole, note the lack of porcelain supports on the cable rack arms along with the selected use of cable protectors (duct shoes) on the duct mouths to prevent damage on the cable during cyclical cable load movement
Recently rebuilt manhole showing IPL standard construction to used “bell” flared duct when entering the manhole to avoid the need to use duct cable protection (duct shoes). Though this shows some rough concrete still exists on duct mouth and either it should have been chipped out or a duct shoe installed.
New manhole showing French drain with no sump pump. Note the wet floor from previous day’s rain, but no standing puddles indicating the relative well draining manholes. Unlike coastal utilities and those near large bodies of fresh water, IPL’s manhole appear to be well draining and do not fill up and remain filled with water.

New (EPR) Primary cable with properly installed arc proof tape but selected use of porcelain cable supports.

**During new construction, porcelain cable protection is inconsistently installed**
View of new primary cable installed with one side of splices supported but other side is not. Both sides of the splice should be supported to avoid undue stress on splice.

Citizens steam manhole located 15 feet from electric manhole vault. This manhole apparently had a steam leak thus possibly requiring Citizens to warn the public of a “Hot” temperature manhole cover. Note this was no longer actively leaking or warm. Note also the logo of the former owner, Indianapolis Power Company.
**Date of Visual Inspection:**  Tuesday September 20, 2011

**Individuals on Site:** Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

**Location:** Manhole Location #3

**Background information on location:**
Supplied out of the Edison Substation supplying the Edison West Grid

**Observations:** Please see comments on pictures below

**Pictures:**

View showing the approximate 15 foot separation of Citizens steam manholes and a IPL electric manhole, that per the crews, is a known manhole that is considered very warm due to proximately to steam lines.
Steam Manhole cover showing previous owner Indianapolis Power and Light Company

Other entrance to Steam manhole showing newer owner Citizens Thermal Energy
View of manhole showing water in manhole, one set of primary cables properly supported with porcelain shoes and other primary cable not supported

View of abandoned secondary cable. Recommendation would be to label abandoned cable and to cap the ends. Also note also the clarity of the water in the manhole indicating that it is not free standing thus highlighting that the manhole typically drains well.
Inconsistent use of cable protection installed on Duct Mouths

View showing smaller brick manhole and cable duct mouth with out duct shoes
Date of Visual Inspection:  Tuesday September 20, 2011

Individuals on Site:  Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

Location:  Transformer Vault Location #2

Background information on location:
Supplied out of the Edison Substation supplying the Edison West Grid

Observations:  See pictures below for comments

Pictures:

View from top of manhole showing dry vault and French drain
View showing primary cable coming from the transformer is properly supported but the transition splices are not, thus adding to cable stress at the duct mouth.

View of Transformer high side switch showing transformer oil gauge indicating properly filled transformer. Also rust where the transformer name plate was attached.
View of bottom of transformer showing IPL practice of installing equipment on rails to facilitate transformer cooling and avoid rust on bottom of the transformer

View of secondary cable connecting to secondary collector bus

View of top of secondary collector buss showing current limiting fuses and clean, non-tracking barrier boards and support arms
**Date of Visual Inspection**: Tuesday September 20, 2011

**Individuals on Site**: Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

**Location**: Transformer Vault Location #3

**Background information on location**: Supplied out of the Edison Substation supplying the Edison West Grid

**Observations**: See Comments below

**Pictures**:

View of transformer vault showing leaves and other litter on top of transformer. Also note the deflector board that was installed over the secondary protector to shield it from leaves etc.
View showing rails that the transformer was purchased with resting on small blocks. Note the lack of rust.

Bottom view of the second transformer showing transformer rails and lack of rust on bottom of the transformer
View of transformer primary cable supported on one end, and use of transition joint (PILC to PILC)

Picture showing duct openings sealed on both Primary and Secondary (typically observed only secondary to the customers)
Date of Visual Inspection:  Tuesday September 20, 2011

Individuals on Site:  Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering)

Location:  Morris Street Stock Room and Transformer Repair area

Background information on location:
Review transformer repair and disposal area to determine condition of equipment either failed in service or removed due to capacity upgrades.  Also review of condition and amounts of spare transformers and protectors to determine storage practices and quanity and quality of equipment.

Observations:  Please see pictures

Pictures:

A picture of a network transformer that is scheduled to be disposed.  Note the rust around the primary cable potheads on the termination switch
A picture of a network transformer that is scheduled to be disposed. Note the rust around the connection point for the network Protector and the lack of rust on the transformer bottom.

A picture of a network transformer that is scheduled to be disposed. Note the common rust point on top of the transformer (point between the removal lid and the transformer tank) and also the rust around the primary termination switch compartment.
A picture of a network transformer that is scheduled to be disposed. Note the rust around the no load tap changer ports and rest of the top of the transformer – a common rust point for IPL due to accumulation of debris blowing in the vault (e.g. leaves and cigarettes filters)

Network protector being processed for disposal. Note the rust around door frame cover
Covered location of network transformers and secondary protectors

Picture of transformer inventory showing equipment on pallets and properly sealed
Spare Network Protector (used but reconditioned by IPL transformer shop)
Spare (new) Transformer showing additional rust proofing paint on bottom of transformer along with the front view showing the Termination and Primary switch compartment.
Date of Visual Inspection: Tuesday September 21, 2011

Individuals on Site: Charlie Fijnvandraat and Dan O’Neill (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Major Underground Projects Distribution Engineering), Bob Vasel (Major Distribution Projects), Mike Holtsclaw (Director Power Delivery System Operations), Jim Page (Operations)

Location: Transformer Vault Location #4

Observations: Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

One of four transformers installed. Note the phasing tubes installed in the front of the Primary switch compartment that IPL does not use.
View of several of the transformer in adjoining vaults. Note the fire suppression doors that will close in the event of a fire.

Picture of Secondary collector bus. Bus is well supported and visually in good condition
Nameplate of secondary protector showing a date of manufacture of September 1988

Clipboard showing protector preventative maintenance occurred in 2008 and 2009.
**Date of Visual Inspection:** Tuesday September 21, 2011

**Individuals on Site:** Charlie Fijnvandraat and Dan O’Neill (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Major Underground Projects Distribution Engineering), Bob Vasel (Major Distribution Projects), Mike Holtsclaw (Director Power Delivery System Operations), Jim Page (Operations)

**Location:** Edison Substation

**Map Number:**

**Manhole Number:**

**Background information on location:**

**Observations:** Please see the pictures below for comments

**Pictures:**

Substation Yard was uncluttered and metal clad switch gear was in good shape
Network circuit 420N indicating last relay Preventative Maintenance was performed December 1987, a 24 year cycle. Industry practice is typically to perform Relay PM on a 4 to 8 year cycle.

Underground feeder 413, indicating last Relay Preventative Maintenance was performed September 2011.
Underground feeder 422 indicating last relay preventative maintenance was performed in December 1989 and December 1990 for a cycle of 22 years and 21 years respectively. Common industry practice is to maintain the relays on a 4 to 8 year cycle.

Clip board showing Operating record of the 411 circuit. History shows one cable fault in April 1990 and previous work practice of annual proof testing of the cable in 1988.
Outgoing feeder cable compartment inside the metal clad was rust free and cable compartment electrical clearances appear to be adequate
Date of Visual Inspection: Tuesday September 21, 2011

Individuals on Site: Charlie Fijnvandraat and Dan O’Neill (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Major Underground Projects Distribution Engineering), Bob Vasel (Major Distribution Projects), Mike Holtsclaw (Director Power Delivery System Operations), Jim Page (Operations)

Location: Gardner Substation

Map Number:

Manhole Number:

Background information on location:

Observations: Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

Relay for 650N Bus overload protection last Preventative Maintenance test on September 2011
Relay for 650N Bus Differential last preventative maintenance occurred on February 1997, 14 years ago. Common industry practice is to maintain on a 4 to 8 year cycle.

Relay for Underground circuit 622, last preventative maintenance occurred on January 2005.
Relay for Underground circuit 612, last preventative maintenance occurred on September 2011

Picture of a well maintained battery bank. Also relatively young battery (most utilities average age is in the 10 to 15 year period
Picture of substation transformer showing slight oil leaks near the bottom of the radiators flanges. Also observed was all transformer properly working with none broken or clogged with debris.

Picture showing slight rust on bottom of metal clad and side entry point on transformer. Also from the field notes, it appears that the overhead bus duct, connecting the transformer to the metal clad was re-roofed, possibly to repair water leaks.
Two pictures of the Substation Transformer Nitrogen blanket system. The first shows the last stage or internal to the transformer pressure. Rule of thumb at most utilities are that it should be 1.5 to 2 lb. IPL is at 3 lb. Second picture shows the recent nitrogen bottle that was replaced in March 2011 was initially installed in December 2009 lasting 15 months. This indicates a relative well gasketed or sealed transformer.
Date of Visual Inspection: Tuesday September 21, 2011

Individuals on Site: Charlie Fijnvandraat and Dan O’Neill (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Major Underground Projects Distribution Engineering), Bob Vasel (Major Distribution Projects), Mike Holtsclaw (Director Power Delivery System Operations), Jim Page (Operations)

Location: #3 Substation

Map Number:

Manhole Number:

Background information on location:

Observations: Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

Picture showing typical city design of a substation with limited real Estate.
Picture of inside of a feeder breaker compartment showing that the enclosure is sound and clean.
Picture of front section of the feeder breaker controls showing slight rust on the bottom of the compartment. Key to keeping the rust at bay is routine repair and ensuring cabinet heaters are working and are doing so year round.
Picture of transformer conservator tank indicating low oil. Also peeling paint on metal clad, but appears to have not caused rust or metal fatigue.

Picture of Feeder 309 relay showing last maintenance occurred on February 1997, 14 years ago. Common utility practice is 4 to 8 year PM cycle.

Picture of a very clean and well maintained battery installed in 2006. Common utility practice is to keep battery average age between 12 to 15 years.
Date of Visual Inspection: Thursday September 22, 2011

Individuals on Site: Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering and two man network crew

Location: Manhole Location #4

Background information on location: Per the crews, a known high temperature manhole due to adjacent steam leaks

Observations: Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

Picture showing semi-wet manhole, likely due to the two days of previous rain, though interesting to see that it is not completely filled thus indicating a dry, well draining Manhole. Also note primary cable that is located on the floor of the manhole whereas it should have been installed on the wall rack arms.
Picture showing improperly racked primary cable and what appears to be a temporary secondary cable end cap.

Picture showing properly capped secondary cable.
IPL MH installed with slotted cover due to high temperature steam leaks.

Citizens Thermal MH with active steam leak.

Active steam leak on Citizens Thermal MH.
**Date of Visual Inspection:** Thursday September 22, 2011

**Individuals on Site:** Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two-person network crew

**Location:** Manhole Location #5

**Observations:** Please see the pictures below for comments

**Pictures:**

![Picture of IPL manhole with solid cover](image-url)
Picture showing lack of porcelain shoes on the rack support arms and secondary cable underneath primary cable (Common utility practice is to install primary below secondary).
Date of Visual Inspection:  Thursday September 22, 2011

Individuals on Site:  Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering and two man network crew

Location:  Manhole Location #6

Background information on location:  Manhole carries only secondary wire

Observations:  Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

Location of manhole near building door.  Note the steam venting from the building
Picture of abandoned in place secondary cable. Common practice in the industry is try to remove the cable, and if not possible, to place end caps on the cable and label that it is abandoned and out of service.

Picture of recently installed triplex secondary cable. Note the use of porcelain shoes on the rack arms.
Date of Visual Inspection: Thursday September 22, 2011

Individuals on Site: Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

Location: Manhole Location #7

Observations: Please see pictures below

Pictures:

![Picture of the two side by side building electrical vaults.](image-url)
Picture of 2011 replaced network transformer. The gray material on the top of the secondary protector and cables is the remnants of the liquid gasket material used to seal the manhole roof. The barrier board that was left on the secondary cables, should have been installed prior to the roof section being installed to avoid the drips of this gasket material. It is unclear what the impact (e.g. dielectric strength/tracking) this will cause on the low voltage, insulated cable and tape.
Picture of network Protector Inspection form indicating protector was last tested in 2006, 2008 and 2009. The average count of 4 per year indicate a normally operating (e.g. opening and closing due to load) protector.

Picture of secondary bus support. Note the tabs for installation of a barrier board to recognize the close proximately to the vault grate. Likely the barrier board was removed in the past but has not been reinstalled.

Picture of the top of the same secondary collector bus, showing dirty porcelain insulators (likely from the previous failure/fire in this manhole in 2011). Also interesting to note is the amount of rust on the metal support bars indicating water ingress from the close proximately of the vault grate. Standard utility practice and what was observed in other IPL vaults inspected, this secondary bus typically would not be installed this close to the
grate. As mentioned in the previous pictures description, it appears a barrier board was once installed here but no longer is.

Picture of Westinghouse network protector, indicating per the serial number (33Y7687) that it is a 1953 vintage that used aluminum bus bars. In the early fifties Westinghouse, due to shortages of copper, produced aluminum bus network protectors.
Picture of the protector showing various surface rust. Based on the nameplate, this was manufactured in 1953.

Picture of the top of the secondary protector showing surface rust
Date of Visual Inspection: Thursday September 22, 2011

Individuals on Site: Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

Location: Manhole Location #8

Observations: Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

![Picture](image-url)

Picture shows various debris on top of and along side of the transformer. What is interesting is the lack of standing water and associated water marks on the wall, indicating a relative dry manhole. Note this picture was taken after two days of rain fall.
Picture of the top of the network transformer showing slight debris on the top. Also this is a shared manhole with the 4kV cable that supplies office chillers (switches on the right hand side of the picture)

Picture shows the bottom of the network transformer, how it is installed on rails on to avoid accelerating rusting on the bottom of the transformer. This is a leading practice in the industry and the as this pictures shows, it minimizes the common rust points on the bottom of the transformer
Picture shows primary cable coming from the transformer, and unsupported transition joints (common practice in the industry is to support the splices to avoid undue strain on the joint)

Picture of Secondary collector bus showing dusty porcelain insulators (but no indication of tracking), and visually solid supports, framing, and ceiling condition
Picture showing network protector maintenance going back to 2006. Protector was maintained in 2006, 2008 and then in 2009. Average annual numbers of operations of 4 indicate a protector that routinely stays closed through the year but has shown to be reliably open when called upon.
**Date of Visual Inspection:** Thursday September 22, 2011

**Individuals on Site:** Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering) and two man network crew

**Location:** Manhole Location #9

**Observations:** Please see the pictures below for comments

**Pictures:**

Manhole location in front of substation entry fence. The cover is non slotted.

Picture showing secondary installed below primary (common industry practice is to install secondary above primary) and primary looping in a tight radius above other cables in the duct versus common practice of looping around the manhole. A good practice followed in the industry and also at IPL is the use of arc proofing tape on the primary cables.
Abandoned (De-energized primary – assumed since it was spray painted “Red” a previous work practice to recognize primary voltage cable) laying on top of an energized primary cable. Bottom picture shows the lack of end caps results in leaking dielectric fluid onto the primary cable below laying on the bottom of the manhole floor – which should have been supported, soiling the arc proofing tape.

Unknown is if the primary cable on the top picture was soiled by this abandoned primary cable or if it an active joint/cable leak.
Picture of improvised cable protection on rack arm. Common practice is to use porcelain shoes.

Picture of abandoned primary cable (IPL previous practice was to spray paint red any PILC that was considered Primary to distinguish it from similar sized secondary cable). Common practice in the industry is to either remove, or if not possible, to install an end cap and label.
Picture of abandoned in place secondary cable with leaking dielectric
Date of Visual Inspection:  Thursday September 22, 2011

Individuals on Site:  Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering and two man network crew

Location:  Manhole Location #10

Background information on location:  Supply from Gardner South Substation, Manhole in the alley, non slotted manhole cover with primary and secondary cable installed.

Observations:  Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

Location of manhole in alley way.  Note the non slotted cover.
Showing recently abandoned in place. Per the crews, this job was completed in the beginning of this year, yet has not been scheduled to removed. Also secondary PILC cable has heat shrinks installed appearing to be a repair of broken PILC protective outside covering

Picture shows in the upper right corner, abandoned primary cable that has not been removed. Also shows rough openings of duct mouths, thus the reason most utilities and IPL does so inconsistently, though in this picture they have, plastic split duct to protect the cable
Date of Visual Inspection: Thursday September 22, 2011

Individuals on Site: Charlie Fijnvandraat (O’Neill Management Consulting) Rick Leffler (Manager of Underground Projects Distribution Engineering and two man network crew)

Location: Manhole Location #11

Background information on location: Supply from Gardner Substation, Manhole has also a 4kv feeder #701 with an active PILC dielectric leak

Observations: Please see the pictures below for comments

Pictures:

Picture shows close proximity of secondary cable near 4kV primary 701 line (assumed secondary cable since IPL’s standard is arc proof tape all primary cable)
While difficult to see within the jumble of secondary cable (the cable that is not arc proofed) the 4kV feeder 701 is located behind the secondary and had a visibly active dielectric leak, resulting in a dielectric staining on the manhole floor.