CPOWER March 31, 2023 Comments to the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission on the Implementation of FERC Order 2222

I. CPower Description

Enerwise Global Technologies, LLC, d/b/a CPower Energy Management (“CPower”) is an Aggregator of Retail Customers (“ARC”) participating in the PJM Interconnection, LLC (“PJM”) and Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”) wholesale electricity markets, and as an ARC operating in Indiana pursuant to applicable utility tariffs approved by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“IURC” or “Commission”). CPower participate in several Regional Transmission Organization and Independent System Operator (“RTO/ISO”) and distribution utility Distributed Energy Resource (“DER”) programs throughout the United States, and currently manages approximately 6.3GW of DER capacity.

II. CPower Comments

CPOWER attended the Commission’s Stakeholder Meeting held on March 2, 2023 and appreciates this opportunity to offer comments regarding the implementation of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) Order 2222. CPower’s comments will cover the following four areas:

- Simplify the orderly integration of DERs by focusing on Indiana policies
- Addressing Demand Response (“DR”) Aggregation first will simplify consideration of DER integration
- Build Upon Work Already Done in Indiana – Improve Current Tariffs Applicable to ARCs
- Regulation of ARCs

A. Simplify the orderly integration of DERs by focusing on Indiana policies

Much of the discussion during the March 2, 2023 workshop revolved around the issues surrounding the MISO and PJM implementation of Order 2222. Virtually all such discussions involved issues under the jurisdiction of the FERC that are not before the IURC. Even when final decisions on MISO and PJM Order 2222 compliance are issued, the resolution of the processes and procedures and business rules to implement the Order will still need to occur at MISO and PJM and will take many months to several years in the process.

Having these discussions in this stakeholder process overcomplicates things. The IURC has an ample body of policy responsibility and jurisdiction regardless of how the details of the FERC-jurisdictional matters are finally resolved. CPower respectfully recommends that future stakeholder activities focus exclusively on the important and relevant policy areas that are under the IURC’s jurisdiction.

Progress on important questions at the IURC will undoubtedly get bogged down if the stakeholder process is permitted to become another forum to discuss FERC jurisdictional issues, or MISO and PJM procedures. Deliberations over FERC issues in the stakeholder process will divert stakeholder and IURC resources from the primary focus on important questions of state policy. Moreover, while ARCs seek to participate and assist in the development of Indiana policies toward DER integration, ARCs including
CPower operate in multiple jurisdiction and cannot devote resources to deliberating FERC issues repeatedly across several jurisdictions.

The IURC of course has a right to participate in FERC policy development and at MISO and PJM. For reasons of efficiency and focus however, CPower respectfully requests that the stakeholder process focus on matters of state policy and not become a forum to inform the IURC’s positions on FERC or PJM or MISO issues. While some Order 2222 issues are complex, there are several important foundational elements that are not particularly challenging and not dependent upon resolution of the more complicated matters.

B. Addressing Demand Response (“DR”) Aggregation first will simplify consideration of DER integration.

The Commission should initiate its consideration of Indiana utilities’ Order 2222 implementation and DER integration by focusing on policies relating to aggregation of Demand Response (“DR”). DR Aggregation is the ideal on-ramp to full integration of aggregations of other DERs.

The IURC already has a head start, having been an early adopter of models involving ARC DR participation with utilities and customers. Nevertheless, Indiana ARC policies need refinements and improvements to improve the model design and doing so will advance and simplify the process integration of other DERs and implementation of Order 2222 by Indiana utilities.

Demand Response (“DR”) is one type of DER of course. In fact, it is by far the most abundant of all types of DERs. By contrast to some of the weighty issues of Order 2222 involving the aggregation of heterogeneous DERs with injections, there are already active DR participation models in each both PJM and MISO. There is also two decades of experience working with DR resources that are widely deployed already. The issues associated with DR integration in wholesale market are well known and understood. There are few new issues to grapple with DR as a resource generally, but there is still much work left to do on the ARC coordination and procurement models for utilities in Indiana.

DR is less complex than other DERs because DR does not require interconnections or interconnection agreements, or require detailed studies of power flows and system topology. DR does not deal with injections from behind the meter,¹ etc. Unlike other DERs, with DR there is no concern about utility override protocols, or other special procedures that are necessary.

¹ During the workshop a panelist made a comment about “DR with injections” when asked about the complexity of DER integration. That discussion combined two different issues and may have left workshop participants with the wrong impression. Per FERC policy, DR does not involve injections to the grid. A customer participating in DR may in limited situations have a battery or distributed generation resource that is configured to run in parallel with the grid and without a relay that would prevent power flows back to the grid. When one of these other types of DERs is behind the meter, it will have an interconnection agreement with the utility related to the activities of the battery or distributed generator that is distinct from DR activity. When PJM held the discussions about “DR with injections” referred to in the workshop it was for the purpose of clarifying that demand response does not involve injections, and a participant cannot receive DR credit for injections. For more information see https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/subcommittees/ders/20181004/20181004-item-09-status.
While DR as a resource is less complex than full DER integration, the consideration of issues related to Indiana utilities and ARC cooperation and interaction are the same for DR as a stand alone resource as it will be for heterogeneous DER aggregation. Accordingly, as an incremental step toward addressing DER aggregation, reviewing DR aggregation concepts is a rational and appropriate place to start.

C. Build Upon Work Already Done in Indiana – Improve Current Tariffs Applicable to ARCs

The single most important work the Commission can do with respect to integration of DR/DER aggregation and ARCs is to get the models right. Fortunately, Indiana has a foundation to build upon for ARC participation because Indiana utilities all have various tariffs that authorize participation of ARCs working with customers to develop DR resources. Indiana was an early pioneer in this regard, having adopted versions of the current tariffs several years ago when DR participation in wholesale markets was in its relative infancy. Experience with these tariffs since their adoption several years ago and policy developments across many states indicate that certain features of the model are suboptimal and need to be revisited. This should occur before expanding the discussion to include heterogeneous DER integration. Focusing on the existing tariffs first will also have the advantage of expediting progress in the stakeholder process. What follows are observations of certain challenges related to Indiana utilities’ applicable ARC tariffs and suggestions on those challenges can be addressed.

1. Portfolio aggregation

One of the most vital characteristics of aggregation is the ability to have performance measurement at the portfolio level. Today, with the possible exception of Duke Energy’s Rate MBDR – Market Based Demand Response tariff,² none of Indiana’s tariff’s applicable to ARC’s permit portfolio aggregation. The reason that participation by ARCs under Indiana’s utility DR tariffs is very low is directly related to the inability to have portfolio level performance management.

Portfolio level measurement is extremely important for at least two important reasons. First, portfolio level measurement of DR permits many more customers to participate in DR and thereby creates a much larger addressable market. Second, portfolio aggregation is vital to ensure strong performance during dispatches and to manage performance risk.

Customers’ flexibility potential is diverse. Some customers are very flexible, others can only be flexible at certain times, or for a certain amount of time. Many customers have the potential to overperform under certain conditions and will tend to underperform under other conditions.

² CPower cannot confirm whether in fact Duke administers Rate MBDR in a way that permits portfolio level performance measurement. The conclusion that the Rate MBDR may permit portfolio aggregation is based upon a sentence describing how settlements are handled under the tariff: “Company shall pay or charge an ARC for the ARC’s customer portfolio performance amount under this Rider under separate check or wire transfer as specified in the applicable service agreement.” [Emphasis added].
Meanwhile, DR programs have broad performance obligations with penalties or costly “buy through” pricing for non-performance.

Customers with flexibility potential but limited capabilities have substantial value. Nevertheless, they may not be a good fit for a DR program if they are unable to meet all of the program requirements. Customers are reluctant to participate in programs in which they are unable to meet all of the requirements and may face substantial penalties. This leads to low participation in the programs.

By contrast, when performance is assessed at the portfolio level, an ARC is able to pool together a larger and more diverse customer set with varying flexibilities to create a reliable and firm resource. Through proper portfolio management, the ARC is able create firm DR resources that can meet obligations and minimize penalty exposure and pass on risk mitigation to customers. See Figure 1.

Figure 1

In order to manage resources as a portfolio, portfolio aggregation must include the ability to offset some customers’ overperformance with the underperformance of other customers by measuring performance at the level of the aggregation. This is something that is not available under the tariff provisions applicable to ARCs today in Indiana.

To be clear, there are penalties, and there should be penalties if there is underperformance of the ARC’s portfolio. There may also be additional compensation available in certain situations for overall overperformance of the portfolio. With portfolio level management of an ARC’s resources, the
ARC is able to manage risk across its portfolio and through its relationship with customers that participate in that portfolio. In this way, portfolio aggregation works in some ways similar to how insurance companies manage risk.

2. How to Create Portfolio Aggregation Under Indiana Utility DR Tariffs

The challenge with the current utility tariffs stems from the fact that the utility is the lead MISO market participant representing customers DR registrations, including when there is an ARC that is managing the DR resource. Indiana utility tariffs should be modified so that the ARC, and not the utility is the lead MISO market participant that is representing its enrolled customer DR capabilities.

Because the current tariffs are structured so that the utility as the MISO or PJM lead market participant for DR participation, all aspects of DR activities must pass through the utility, including compensation and penalties. Although the utility is assessed performance at the portfolio level for all DR registrations by MISO or PJM, the utility does not subsequently parse out the portfolio performance to the customers enrolled by the ARC (and it would be exceedingly complex to do so). Rather the utility passes each individual customer’s performance back to each customer, thus eliminating the possibility to perform the vital portfolio management function. In order to allow for portfolio aggregation by ARC’s the tariffs need to be modified to make the ARC the lead market participant with the wholesale market for customers’ DR capabilities.3

Under both MISO and PJM rules, a utility may represent customers as the electric distribution company and load serving entity, and an ARC may represent the customer participating in MISO or PJM DR programs. There is no requirement that these roles be performed by the same entity, and there is no double counting that occurs when the utility and the ARC serve in these distinct roles. The other challenge with the current approach in Indiana is that it creates a costly and burden on the on the utility to handle individual customer DR registrations to receive credit from PJM or MISO, and manage settlement and disposition of payments and penalties to customers. This is duplicative and wasteful because the ARC also has to do all of these things too. Why not just let the ARC do it and provide the utility whatever information that in needs?

A much better and more efficient model is for the ARC to serve as the lead market participant handling MISO or PJM facing responsibilities for customers’ DR participation, while making sure that utilities have all of the information they need about ARC and customer performance. All such responsibilities and any regulatory requirements may be adopted in an “Aggregator Coordination Tariff” that would govern the relationship and allocation of responsibilities between the utility and the ARC and the utility’s customers.

Under a model in which the ARC serves as the lead market participant, the ARC transfers resource adequacy credits to the utility (capacity), and the ARC receives compensation from the utility. All other aspects of customer DR participation with MISO or PJM, including DR registrations, testing and dispatch, communications, performance and penalty assessments, etc. are managed by the ARC. A graphic of how the current and suggested framework work appears in Figure 2.

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3 This is not to suggest that a customer be foreclosed from enrolling in DR directly with a utility or that a customer cannot serve as its own ARC.
Current Indiana Model

Suggested Indiana Model
D. Regulation of ARCs

During the March 2nd workshop there was discussion about whether an ARC is, or should be considered a “Utility,” as that term is defined under Indiana law. To be clear, whether a DER Aggregator is considered a utility or not, CPower acknowledges and recognizes that ARCs are subject to regulation by the IURC. The IURC has been granted the authority to regulate DERs and DER Aggregators as it deems appropriate pursuant to IC §8-1-40.1-4 regardless of whether DER Aggregators are considered utilities or not.

1. Where ARC regulation should live.

CPower agrees with comments by Indiana Michigan Power Company that some issues with respect ARC regulation may be appropriate for formal rulemaking, while others may be addressed on an individual company basis. In particular, as is current practice, individual regulatory requirements applicable to ARCs may be established through Indiana utility tariffs applicable to individual utilities.

CPower respectfully suggests that the concept be refined such that the responsibilities and requirements applicable to ARC and utilities be clearly set forth in an “Aggregator Coordination Tariff” that is subject to review and approval by the Commission. The concept of an Aggregator Coordination Tariff is adapted from how utilities in states with retail competition interact with retail suppliers. Although ARCs are not retail suppliers, the same model can serve well to provide clarity regarding roles and responsibilities between the utility and the ARC and impose appropriate regulatory requirements.

While having separate Aggregator Coordination Tariffs that may have some differences between companies is workable, there is virtue in having consistency as far as possible and reasonable. There should be a model version, with adaptations as required by utility. It will be important going forward in Indiana that companies not have radically different ways of working and interfacing with ARCs such that the ARC will need to develop bespoke back office functions in order to work with each utility.

2. Topic Areas of State Regulation.

There is a fair amount of diversity across jurisdictions in terms of the areas that state commissions have adopted regulatory requirements applicable to ARCs. A hopefully useful overview of state topic areas for state regulation is explored in a whitepaper published by CPower that is appended to these comments, including citations to various state regulatory policies.

Although states are permitted under FERC precedents to regulate ARCs, a majority of states have not adopted separate state ARC regulations. Regardless of state requirements, ARCs are subject to the jurisdiction of the FERC for DR activities and are subject to the tariff requirements and rules of MISO and PJM. As such, a number of states have not found it necessary to regulate ARCs. Some states have adopted a light hand form of regulation, such as registration and reporting. At the other end of the spectrum, both New York and California have adopted an extensive body of regulation governing ARC business activities.

Appropriate areas for consideration of regulation include rates, terms and conditions of utility procurements of DR from ARCs, as well as the types and models of procurement from DR. While the preceding section comments discuss a model referred to as a DR Feed In Tariff that is most akin to what
exists currently in Indiana under utility tariffs, there are other models of procurement and they are not all mutually exclusive. Such other models would include ARCs participation in utility all source procurements to procure capacity to meet utility requirements under a PJM Fixed Resource Requirement Plan or MISO Fixed Resource Adequacy Plan. Procurement of DR from ARCs, whether pursuant to a utility tariff or utility procurement is an appropriate area for state regulation.

Another area for consideration for ARC regulations to information exchanges between utilities and ARCs. This may include rules related to utility customer meter data access and customer authorizations for ARC access to customer data, procedures for the exchange of data, and standards relating to privacy and security of customer data that passes from utilities to ARCs. Utilities may also have information from ARCs related to customer activities with customers to support resource planning and utility planning.

3. Regulation of the ARC-customer contractual relationships should be very limited or avoided.

While ARCs are subject to extensive regulation by the IURC, there is a valid concern about applying rate regulation to ARC contracts with customers, as applies to public utilities under IC §8-1-2-4. Rate regulation requires that all similarly situated customers in the same class be charged the same rates, and discrimination amongst customers and classes is prohibited (See IC §§8-1-2-103 through 8-1-2-105).

Rate regulation or other economic regulation of contracts between ARCs and customers is problematic for ARCs because the flexibility capabilities of customers is not aligned with traditional customer class distinctions used with rate regulation. As discussed in the discussion of portfolio aggregation above, customers’ flexibility potential is quite diverse. Even very similar customers in the same type of business and same rate class for utility billing purposes may have very different flexibility characteristics. If ARC-customer relationships are subject to rate regulation, then the ability to have flexible business arrangements necessary to foster the development of DR and DERs may be lost.

DER Aggregators also do not have many of the attributes of traditional utilities. For example, ARCs do not have captive customers and cannot disconnect vital utility services. Beyond basic consumer protection and ensuring cooperation with customers’ utilities, there is no justification to extend rate regulation to ARCs.

While there is a variety of state regulation of ARC activities, no state commission in the United States has determined to makes ARC-customer contractual relationships subject to rate regulation. Extending rate regulation to ARCs may well have a chilling effect on ARCs willingness to do business in Indiana.

The authority of the Commission to regulate ARCs granted pursuant to IC §8-1-40.1-4 makes it unnecessary to regulate ARCs as utilities under Indiana law. If the Commission nevertheless elects to treat ARCs as utilities, the Commission should adopt a policy of alternative utility regulation pursuant to IC §8-1-2.5 and broadly decline jurisdiction over economic regulation of ARC-customer contractual relationships.
III. Conclusion

CPOWER appreciates this opportunity to submit comments and looks forward to continuing to work with the Commission, utilities, and stakeholders regarding stakeholders. The above comments do not address all of the relevant issues related to Order 2222 or DER integration. Rather these comments are geared toward constructive next steps following the discussion at the stakeholder meeting on March 2, 2023. CPOWER believes that its principal recommendation herein for the Commission to start with a review of existing utility DR tariffs applicable to ARCs and evaluate potential refinements is the best path forward and will go a long way toward preparing for the eventual integration of DERs and full implementation of Order 2222.

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APPENDIX

Regulating Demand Response and Aggregators in the Midwest While Safeguarding Local Jurisdiction: A Guide for State Regulatory Commissions, Electric Cooperatives and Municipal Electric Utilities

by Peter Dotson-Westphalen and Kenneth D. Schisler
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Introduction

This whitepaper addresses the long-standing reluctance of Midwestern state regulatory commissions, electric cooperatives and municipal electric utilities to permit Aggregators of Retail Customers ("ARCs") to provide demand response ("DR") services in Regional Transmission Organization/Independent System Operator ("RTO/ISO") markets and utility programs. State utility regulators and the boards or councils that typically self-regulate electric cooperatives and municipal electric utilities have long been concerned about whether they possess the authority to regulate ARCs. These entities are collectively referred to by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") as the Relevant Electric Retail Regulatory Authority, and more commonly are referred to by the acronym “RERRA,” which will be utilized here throughout.

RERRAs have a legitimate responsibility to ensure that ARC activities do not interfere or conflict with regulated utility service and are consistent with the regulatory model and policies of the state or jurisdiction the RERRAs regulate. This whitepaper approaches the question of RERRA jurisdiction head on and provides a framework for RERRA regulation of ARCs. This analysis will also correct inaccurate assertions that allowing ARC participation will bypass retail regulation.

The intent here is that Midwestern RERRAs will feel empowered to adopt policies to leverage ARCs in a way that is fully compatible with state and local policies of utility regulation and good utility practice. As experts in demand-side flexibility and customer-facing energy management, ARCs work with utilities and customers to increase the efficiency and reliability of the grid and enhance resource planning and can promote competitiveness and economic well-being across the Midwest through advanced technologies and innovations.

1. For ease of reference in this whitepaper, the terms “utility” and “customer” used throughout this whitepaper are meant to include electric cooperatives and members of electric cooperatives, respectively.
Executive Summary

ARCs represent DR and other Distributed Energy Resources (“DER”) participation in most wholesale electricity markets in North America and throughout the world. ARCs operate in states and regions served by all models of utility regulation, including traditional rate-of-return regulation of investor-owned utilities, cooperatives and municipal utilities, and areas where retail supply competition is permitted for some or all customers.

However, ARCs are not as prevalent in the Midwestern United States in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”) and Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) market regions. This whitepaper discusses the reasons for this distinction, which are as much historical as regulatory, and details how RERRAs in the Midwest can leverage the efficiency and reliability benefits and technology innovation that ARCs bring to electricity markets, while at the same time safeguarding and respecting state commission regulatory jurisdiction and the self-regulation policies of municipal utilities and electric cooperatives.

A typical concern of regulators and cooperative and municipal utility leaders with respect to ARCs involves whether and to what extent ARCs may be regulated by state and local regulators. Another concern is whether ARC activities, if permitted to operate in a utility territory, will conflict with utility resource planning activities or otherwise interfere with rate regulation and unfairly shift costs to other customers. All of these are legitimate questions that are explored in this whitepaper to demonstrate how ARCs may cooperate with utilities in ways that promote efficiency, resiliency and innovation and support a clean-energy future.

RERRAs have several avenues available to regulate ARCs that provide services to retail customers and the relationship between ARCs and electric utilities subject to RERRA jurisdiction. This paper discusses how RERRA regulatory jurisdiction is accommodated and supported under federal law and regulation, as well as the basis for state and local regulation of ARCs. It also provides a helpful framework for how Midwestern RERRAs can facilitate the benefits that ARCs offer by increasing DR participation, while also addressing RERRAs’ primary concerns.
Resource Adequacy and Preparing for the Future Grid

The grid-supply mix is changing — and at an increasingly rapid pace — as intermittent energy resources become more common and energy consumption patterns shift more dramatically.

ARCs can play an important role in developing portfolios of DR resources that meet resource adequacy requirements. When there is not adequate supply to meet system needs, this can lead to high clearing prices in capacity markets as well as threaten grid operators’ ability to maintain reliability. This was clearly evident in MISO’s 2022/23 Planning Resource Auction, in which the North and Central regions were 1.23 GW short of meeting the Planning Reserve Margin Requirements established for the auction. This shortfall resulted in prices in these regions clearing at the Cost of New Entry, the administratively set price of how much it would cost to build a new generator. For utilities and customers exposed to these high prices, the auction results came as a shock. It can take several years to have new generation facilities sited, interconnected and approved to operate in the market. By contrast, ARCs all over the world have demonstrated the ability to develop significant DR resource portfolios that meet resource adequacy needs very quickly — often in a matter of months.

The need for fast-acting, flexible resources to help grid operators maintain system balance will become increasingly important and valuable as intermittent supply resources more frequently replace traditional generation. ARC-enabled DR, particularly where automation is enabled, is able to respond quickly and reliably, and can provide cost-effective ancillary services to RTOs/ISOs.

Additionally, RERRAs located in RTO/ISO regions must prepare for the implementation of wholesale market participation models that include DER aggregations pursuant to FERC Order 2222, which requires each RTO/ISO to develop a wholesale market participation model that allows DER and DR aggregations to provide and be compensated for wholesale market services. DR is often cited as the largest potential DER on the grid. It is also the easiest DER to develop and integrate into the grid. Enabling ARC DR participation now, in advance of the implementation of the wholesale DER model, can provide Midwestern RERRAs and utilities with a valuable on-ramp to gain experience with ARCs and DERs. Increasing ARC participation in the Midwest will also have the added benefits of assisting in meeting reliability needs and reducing costs.


3. Order No. 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2020); Codified at 18 C.F.R. §35.28(g) (12) (2022).

Changing Models for Harnessing Flexibility Through Load Management

Conventional mass market utility load management applications rely on assets such as binary, on/off air conditioning control switches, thermostats and pool pump controls. These typically homogeneous approaches can serve many customers but provide little flexibility for customers to customize participation based upon lifestyle, schedules or preferences.

Furthermore, some traditional utility load control programs are becoming obsolete and are unable to meet the grid’s need for greater flexibility. Ironically, the pace at which utility load management programs are becoming obsolete is accelerating as customer appliances are becoming smarter and more advanced. As an example, central air conditioning systems widely sold in the market to residential customers today have variable speed modes of operations that “learn” to operate through artificial intelligence and change modes to optimize energy efficiency. Conventional utility load control programs that only cycle power on and off do not work very well with this newer innovation — and can potentially void warranties of customers’ appliances. Though the smart appliances themselves can be efficiently and reliably controlled remotely through digital communications, they are not designed to have the power cut off repeatedly as a load control strategy — they are smarter than that.

Even if participation in a utility load control program does not void customer warranties, externally operated on/off load control switches override advanced features that dynamically operate units to optimize performance and efficiency. Increasingly, customers with these advanced appliances cannot be served by utility load control programs, but they can be served by ARCs who can have custom integrations with manufacturers and can digitally control appliances in a way they are designed to be controlled.

Traditional programs designed for commercial and industrial customers also face challenges and are not able to develop the latent DR potential that exists. Commercial and industrial interruptible load management programs under utility tariffs have standard rules around availability, duration, number of dispatches and penalties for non-performance. The standard rules may work for some businesses, but not all. For example, while a car wash and a grocery store use energy very differently, they typically must adapt to the same standard tariff framework. While some businesses can adapt to the standard framework, those that cannot are often left without options.
Consider the requirements for participation as a DR capacity resource in the MISO market as a Load Modifying Resource (“LMR”). Customers participating as LMRs must be available to be called upon at least 16 times per year\(^5\) for at least four consecutive hours during each event.\(^6\) Though some customers can meet these requirements, not all can do so. A customer that has significant load flexibility capabilities but cannot meet all the MISO requirements would likely not enroll in the utility program and expose itself to penalties for non-performance. On the other hand, ARCs can harness the load flexibility of customers even if they are unsuitable for the utility program. This is because RTO/ISO rules permit performance aggregation, in which overperformance by some customers is netted against underperformance of others.\(^7\) ARCs can build portfolios of customers with diverse capabilities in order to meet the requirements rather than requiring each customer to meet every requirement.

While the rules vary from region to region, performance aggregation is a feature of every RTO/ISO market and managing portfolios to optimize performance is a core competency and value proposition of ARCs. ARCs have aggregation capabilities that are superior to regulated utilities because ARCs can customize participation arrangements and terms for customers, but utilities are legally prevented from doing so. The flexibility that ARCs possess enables them to not only serve more diverse customers, but also to perform consistently at a very high level of reliability under widely varying conditions.

Also, utility load management programs, whether designed for residential, commercial or industrial customers, must operate as a one-size-fits-all to avoid customer cross-subsidization and free ridership as well as ensure non-discriminatory service to customers. Public utilities, by virtue of being a monopoly service provider, face regulatory challenges administering programs that meet the diversity of dynamic energy management options available to customers. Most utilities have only one or a very small number of utility load management options, if they have an option at all.

To be clear, there are successful utility demand-side programs, and utilities are working with technology providers to continue to develop innovative load-management applications. There is, however, an emerging reality that utility DR programs alone cannot suit the diversity of today’s technologies and customer preferences. Nor will they be able to meet the increasingly complex future for the grid.

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5. While LMR availability and testing requirements have increased in recent years, following FERC’s recent acceptance of MISO’s proposed changes to move from an annual to seasonal capacity market, beginning with the 2023-24 MISO Planning Year LMRs must be available for at least 16 events per year if they participate in all four seasons. See, Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 180 FERC ¶ 61,141 (2022); see also, MISO, FERC Electric Tariff, Module E-1, § 69A.3.5 (42.0.0).

6. Id.

ARCs Operating Under All Regulatory Structures

ARCs can and do operate flexibly under a variety of regulatory and market models and have proven adept at managing the diversity of energy management technologies available to customers today. ARCs are traditionally not regulated as public utilities and do not face the same challenges and impediments in providing energy management services to a diverse group of customers. Indeed, a hallmark of the ARC business model is the ability to manage performance risk across a diverse group of customers by aggregating customers into groups that are appropriate for specific needs or services.

Additionally, ARCs have:

- Gained significant experience in helping customers identify and execute load flexibility strategies.
- Enabled customers to participate in DR programs that allow them to provide valuable grid services that can be monetized at both the bulk power system and distribution system levels.
- Built and continue to innovate technologies that help customers view and manage their energy usage and monitor their performance during DR events in real-time.
- Developed and deployed capabilities for two-way communications and controls.
- Automated load reduction and DER optimization strategies to reduce the impacts to customers’ daily operations or comfort.
- Established relationships with commercial and industrial facilities in markets where ARCs are currently allowed to operate. These relationships can be leveraged to quickly scale up participation in DR programs when new programs allow for ARC participation, thereby bringing new resources to market faster than it would take for a new generator to be built from the ground up.

The ARC Dilemma and a RERRA Solution

ARCs have participated in RTO/ISO wholesale electricity markets in the US since the 2000s. ARCs were a new type of agent — they were neither a utility nor wholesale supplier, but were nevertheless subject to regulation by FERC. “ARC” did not exist in the regulatory lexicon in any widespread use until FERC adopted the term in 2008. Today, ARCs are known by several terms, such as curtailment service providers, responsible interface parties, or DR/DER aggregators or providers.

Although FERC asserted jurisdiction over ARC participation in wholesale markets from the beginning, questions lingered in the 2000s over whether FERC regulation preempted state and local jurisdiction and the extent to which RERRAs could also regulate ARCs. In an attempt to clarify the jurisdictional question, FERC codified new regulation in what came to be known as the “Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule” in Order 719 in 2008.

In an effort to clarify that FERC was not trying to usurp state and local regulation, FERC provided that RERRAs would have the ability to determine retail customer eligibility to participate in wholesale market DR. The regulation establishes that RERRAs have the authority to opt out in the case of large utilities or opt in in the case of smaller utilities. The timing of ARCs’ debut and Order 719 was unfortunate, coming not long after the crisis created by Enron. As a result, a perception grew in some circles that ARCs, while not competitive retail suppliers, were part of the utility deregulation movement, which had been rejected...
in the majority of Midwestern states. It could be said there was concern that ARCs were the proverbial “camel’s nose under the tent” for promoting retail competition policies in states that had not deregulated retail supply of electricity or were otherwise inconsistent with traditional utility regulation.

Unfortunately, the structure of the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule also led to early incorrect interpretations that the RERRA’s authority was a binary decision to allow or disallow ARCs to participate, and that if permitted, the RERRA could not regulate ARC activities. In response to the assertion that ARCs were related to utility deregulation that was disfavored in many Midwestern states, and perceiving an “all or nothing” choice, many Midwestern RERRAs with traditional regulation passed temporary or permanent restrictions on ARC participation. Although there have been a few changes, most of the restrictions adopted by RERRAs in the late 2000s remain today.

This perception that ARC participation was inconsistent with traditional regulation, and that therefore regulated states should prohibit ARCs, did not take hold in other parts of the US. For example, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia are traditionally regulated states in which DR participation through ARCs has always been permitted. California, which largely re-regulated its retail utility market following the Enron crisis, not only continued to permit ARCs, but leveraged ARCs to implement important demand-side innovations in partnership with regulated utilities.

States with traditional utility regulation, as well as electric cooperatives and municipal electric utilities, have a particular interest in protecting their regulatory authorities.

To the extent that ARCs are permitted to operate in a utility subject to a RERRA’s jurisdiction, RERRAs want to see that ARC activities are coordinated with that utility’s resource planning and operations of the local utility.

RERRAs also have ratemaking considerations. RERRAs want to make sure that DR participation does not create cross-subsidies or cost shifting or other distortions of retail rate design. These are valid issues for RERRAs, and any policy permitting ARC participation should be in full harmony with retail regulatory models at the state and local level. The remainder of this whitepaper is devoted to explaining why RERRAs do not need to cede jurisdiction to FERC if ARCs are permitted, and outlines why RERRAs have ample authority to create or impose regulatory requirements they deem appropriate.

RERRAs Have Plenary Jurisdiction to Regulate ARCs Under the Opt-Out/In Rule

While RERRAs have several avenues for asserting jurisdiction over ARCs and ARC activities pursuant to traditional regulatory authorities under state laws, the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule itself is a powerful tool for RERRAs to exercise jurisdiction to regulate ARCs authorized under federal law. RERRA jurisdiction under the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule is analyzed below, followed by RERRA jurisdiction pursuant to state and local law in the following section.

While the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule gives RERRAs the authority to simply opt out or opt in, it also creates authority for states to establish conditions and limitations on ARC participation. These conditions and limitations include requirements that ARCs comply with requirements established by the RERRA. In other words, the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule provides RERRAs regulatory jurisdiction to establish the criteria and requirements for ARCs to provide services to retail customers in RTO/ISO markets.

FERC emphasized in Order 719 that its decision to require RTO/ISO markets to permit DR aggregators was to be implemented in a way that

*“Wholesale demand response as implemented in the Rule is a program of cooperative federalism, in which the States retain the last word.”*

– U.S. Supreme Court in “EPSA v. FERC”

11. EPSA v. FERC, 136 S. Ct. 760, slip op. at 25 (2016) (referring to the ability of a RERRA to opt out or not opt in.)
Not An All-or-Nothing Decision

Despite its deferential language, FERC did not articulate what, if any, conditions states could impose if they decided to opt in. FERC’s language in Order 719 was ironically too broad in that it did not clearly articulate that states could place whatever conditions they wanted on allowing DR aggregation. This unfortunately left state regulators with the mistaken impression that permitting DR aggregation may be an “all or nothing” proposition. This incorrect view held that states could either 1) opt out and preserve all retail regulatory jurisdiction over DR, or 2) opt in and cede such authorities to FERC. In the face of this false choice, several Midwestern states opted out.

FERC later cleared up this issue by making clear that it intended broad deference to states. As part of the PJM Interconnection, LLC (“PJM”) compliance proposal pursuant to the then newly adopted Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule, PJM originally proposed an “all or nothing” approach that would not permit RERRAs to attach conditions or requirements to an opt-in to allow DR aggregation.14 Noting that “Order No. 719-A [] clarified that [RERRAs] retain substantial flexibility in establishing requirements for eligibility of retail customers to provide demand response,” FERC rejected PJM’s approach and required the RTO to submit revisions on compliance that would permit retail regulatory authorities to condition eligibility of retail customers to participate in PJM’s DR programs.15 PJM subsequently revised its proposal to permit RERRAs to establish conditions for ARC participation. In its second order accepting the revisions, FERC stated:

We will accept PJM’s compliance filing as it relates to eligibility determinations. PJM’s proposed revisions appropriately recognize the right of a retail regulatory authority to condition the eligibility of retail customers to participate in PJM’s [DR] Programs.16

This clarification in 2010 was unfortunately too little, too late. By the time that FERC’s exceptionally deferential approach to RERRA jurisdiction was fully clarified, the die was cast. Many Midwestern states had already opted out or otherwise did not pick up on this clarification resulting from a proceeding applicable to a different region.

Finally, perhaps the only remaining loose end with respect to RERRA flexibility under the Opt-Out/ Opt-In Rule relates to whether a RERRA can change its mind once it opts in, with or without conditions. Can a RERRA revoke or modify a decision to opt in? FERC has addressed that issue as well, and the answer is a resounding yes. In the same PJM compliance case discussed above, FERC was confronted with the question of what to do if a RERRA revokes its opt-in while a resource is actively participating in an RTO/ISO capacity market during a delivery year. FERC determined that a revocation of an opt-in by a RERRA will be applied prospectively. Any ARC resource that was committed under an annual program would be permitted to fulfill its

12. Id. at P 155.
15. Id. at P 22.
commitment in the current delivery year when the opt-in was in effect. However, such resources would be subject to the new RERRA determination for any future participation. In light of FERC’s deferential approach to RERRA jurisdiction, a total or near total ban on DR aggregators is not necessary to protect RERRA jurisdiction. Quite the contrary, the Opt-Out/ Opt-In Rule establishes the right of RERRAs to establish and enforce their own regulatory requirements. A far more constructive approach to RERRA regulation is to allow ARC participation subject to requirements that RERRAs deem appropriate, adapted to local needs and preferences.

Regulating ARCs Under the State Regulatory Authorities

In addition to the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule, RERRAs have tools and authorities to regulate ARCs pursuant to state law and policy. RERRAs are created or authorized under statutes or state constitutions, which typically establish the powers and duties of a state commission or the authority of electric cooperatives or municipal electrical utilities (typically under local regulation or self-regulation provisions). Statutes must be analyzed on a state-by-state basis, but the statutory grant of authority may include authority to directly regulate entities, such as ARCs providing energy services in the state.

Even without a statute that authorizes direct regulation of ARCs, RERRAs have broad jurisdiction to regulate utilities, and therefore can regulate ARCs through the utilities they regulate. The Missouri Public Service Commission Staff has recommended precisely such an approach to ensuring that the retail regulatory jurisdiction is retained.

RERRAs rely upon their direct regulatory jurisdiction over utilities to regulate all manner of utility business practices. Since ARCs need to do business with and otherwise need the cooperation of utilities in a variety of ways, RERRAs can regulate ARCs by regulating the utility’s relationship with ARCs. This type of regulation of businesses doing business with regulated utilities is commonplace. RERRAs do not directly regulate banks or tree-trimming companies, or any number of other businesses that work with utilities. Yet, because RERRAs do regulate the utility and can regulate the arrangements that a utility makes with vendors and others, RERRAs can impose requirements that banks, tree-trimming companies and all manner of vendors must comply with if they want to do business with the utility. Similarly, if ARCs want to do business with utilities, RERRAs can require that ARCs play by the rules they establish.

Some have suggested that ARCs may be regulated as public utilities. For a variety of reasons, this approach is impractical, and no state currently regulates ARCs as public utilities. ARCs do not sell electricity or distribute power or operate poles, wires or substations. Nor do ARCs require a franchise to operate or have a monopoly over a service territory or have an obligation to serve customers as utilities typically do. From a federal regulatory standpoint, FERC assiduously avoided ARCs participating in DR as public utilities under the Federal Power Act.
Even if it may be possible to regulate ARCs as a form of public utility – it is not advisable to do so. Rate regulation does not serve the DR business well because customers are quite different in their abilities to perform as resources. The first problem with regulating ARCs as utilities is the non-discrimination obligation that typically comes with regulation of utilities. The value of the DR that each customer can provide can be quite different and therefore needs to be priced accordingly.

- Some customers may be able to respond very reliably, while others may be less so.
- Some customers can respond for a short duration, while others can respond for longer periods.
- Some customers can tolerate frequent dispatches, others not.
- Some can respond 24/7, while others can respond only during business hours.
- Some customers can respond on very short notice or automatically, while others need more advance notice of events.
- And the list goes on.

ARCs manage this diversity through a portfolio of resources, and contract with customers for the value they bring. Individual customers within an ARC’s portfolio may receive different compensation depending upon the value that customer can provide.

By comparison to the ARC model, the typical approach that regulated utilities have taken to demand-side management programs as a regulated service is to provide a single, one-size-fits-all set of rules and requirements. This approach avoids the non-discrimination problem, but it also means that a lot of latent DR capability will not be realized because customers who cannot fit the mold of the tariff are not able to participate. A major part of the value proposition of ARCs is that they can offer services to more customers with a diverse set of capabilities to participate in DR because they have flexibility of contract that is not easily achieved if ARCs are regulated as utilities.

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**Existing Models of ARC Regulation by RERRAs**

As discussed in a prior section, the ability to impose conditions when a RERRA opts in to permit ARC participation is black letter law. There are a variety of examples of RERRAs adopting various local requirements under the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule. Several RERRAs that permit ARCs have elected not to pursue ARC regulations or have adopted relatively light regulation. Several other RERRAs have adopted more comprehensive approaches that regulate the interactions between the ARC and utilities as well as ARCs and retail customers.

Perhaps the most comprehensive example of regulation relying upon the Opt-Out/Opt-In Rule for jurisdiction has been adopted by the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”). The ARC rules in California, known as Rule 24 (applicable to Pacific Gas & Electric) and Southern California Edison (applicable to San Diego Gas & Electric) clearly define how ARCs may interact with utilities and customers. The rules exist in the form of tariffs approved by the CPUC for each of California’s jurisdictional investor-owned utilities.

Rules 24/32 apply to any ARC seeking to aggregate a utility’s customers for participation in either the utility’s DR programs or programs in the California ISO market. The rule requires an ARC to have a service agreement in place with a utility and specifies the roles and responsibilities of ARCs as well as the utilities and meter data access requirements. The rule also requires ARCs to register with the CPUC, which allows regulatory oversight and provides consumer protections in the form of customer notification requirements, posting of a performance bond and complaint resolution and enforcement actions in the event of violations.


22. See, Southern California Edison, Rule 24 Direct Participation Demand Response, available at: https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M037/K189/37189001.pdf.

New York has adopted a similar framework of regulations for ARCs, the Uniform Business Practices for Distributed Energy Resource Suppliers (“NY UBP DERS”). Technically, the New York rules are related to state jurisdictional retail DR programs rather than RTO/ISO programs. However, the rules are de facto applicable to ARCs participating in the New York Independent System Operator programs because New York’s utility DR programs that permit ARC participation are designed to work in harmony with NYISO participation. The state’s DR programs provide distribution-level services for utilities that are distinct and different from wholesale market products and allow for dual participation by retail customers in the NYISO’s market. ARCs in New York overwhelmingly seek to participate under both the utility programs and NYISO programs, and thus are subject to the NY UBP DERS. Like the California Rules 24/32, the NY UBP DERS rules may be instructive for any state seeking to adopt business rules for ARCs.

Several RERRAs have taken a lighter approach to regulation, mostly consisting of informational disclosures and registration by ARCs, and perhaps a bond requirement and periodic reporting. These regulations stop short of some of the more extensive requirements found in the California and New York examples. Ohio and Maryland are two states that require ARCs to register as energy brokers/retail suppliers and to comply with requirements applicable to retail suppliers. Although ARCs are not retail suppliers and do not sell electricity at wholesale or retail, these states have elected to apply the body of regulatory requirements applicable to retail suppliers to ARCs participating in the RTO/ISO markets.

RERRAs with jurisdiction over the smaller Opt-In utilities have also adopted regulatory requirements covering ARCs. For example, Cleveland Public Power (“CPP”) establishes qualifications for ARCs and requires CPP approval to operate. The rules also place a 30 MW soft cap on participation that is waivable at the discretion of CPP, which does so on a case-by-case basis. In this way, CPP can keep track of the ARCs operating in its service territory and has contacts with each ARC in the event any concerns arise.

In addition to establishing rules for ARC participation, some RERRAs have elected to exercise jurisdiction to restrict participation to specific customers or customer classes. For example, the Michigan Public Service Commission (“MPSC”) is in the process of evaluating ARC participation in the Michigan market. As an initial step toward reversing its total restriction on ARC participation, the MPSC has allowed any customer that participates in retail competition to participate in DR through an ARC. This is the result of a modification of a prior decision that was a complete ban on aggregator participation. The decision to open DR aggregation to retail competition customers can best be viewed as a transitional step for Michigan. The MPSC has opened another proceeding to further review whether the restriction on all customers should be lifted. Additionally, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (“MPUC”) is expected to soon initiate a docketed proceeding to explore several issues, including whether it should remove the Opt-Out from allowing ARCs to participate and what regulations should be in place to oversee ARC participation.
DR Procurement Models Conforming to Utility Requirements

A DR Feed in Tariff (“DR FIT”) is an approach whereby the utility has a standard offer available through a tariff, under which it will purchase DR resources that qualify for participation as resources in RTO/ISO DR programs. The ARC registers its DR resources as a part of the utility’s resource portfolio with the RTO/ISO. The ability for the utility to obtain resource adequacy credit for the resources developed from the utility’s customers makes this approach particularly attractive from a resource planning perspective.

An early version of the DR FIT approach was adopted by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“IURC”) for Indiana Michigan Company customers for participation in PJM’s DR programs and is still in effect today. The approach approved by the IURC functions well, but experience has demonstrated that it could be improved upon, as discussed below.

Under the DR FIT, the ARC works with a utility’s customers under a utility tariff that governs the relationship between the utility and the ARC as well as the ARC’s business practices. The terms of the utility tariff for DR participation mirror the requirements for participation as capacity under rules in the relevant RTO/ISO. When an ARC enrolls a customer, the ARC handles RTO/ISO registration requirements and assigns the

resource to the utility's RTO/ISO account. The ARC, not the utility or the customer, is responsible to the RTO/ISO for performance and compliance obligations, including any penalties for non-performance. The utility pays the ARC according to the terms of the utility tariff, and the ARC pays the customer according to the contractual terms agreed to between the ARC and the customer.

Under the DR FIT approach, the utility is purchasing the DR capabilities of its customers represented by an ARC. The utility uses the credit that it receives for the capacity resource coming from the utility’s customers in satisfying its obligation as a load serving entity (“LSE”). In this way, the utility can incorporate the DR resources developed in its service territory in its short- and long-term resource plans.

ARC participation enables more robust participation and more and diverse customer participation by leveraging the resources and expertise of ARCs to market the program to customers, enable participation and complete enrollments. Utilities often have limited resources and personnel to address all the requirements of DR customer enablement to develop a robust participation level. For most ARCs, developing and managing DR and DER resource potential is all they do.
A particularly attractive feature of the DR FIT approach is that the utility is purchasing the resource at a price stated in the tariff rather than relying upon the RTO/ISO capacity auction, which is complex and can involve uncertainty at the time of enrollment and volatile pricing. As an example, take MISO’s Planning Resource Auction, which is conducted a few months before the start of the planning year. Clearing prices in the auction have seen drastic swings in recent years.

The rules require that all participating resources register before the auction is conducted – before the price is known. However, customers are understandably reluctant to commit to an enrollment before they understand pricing components. This design component of the MISO capacity is much less favorable towards developing and maintaining robust DR participation when compared with a firm price that enables certainty for customers before they commit.

The Indiana Model was an important and constructive innovation that demonstrated that ARCs can and do work with and cooperate with utilities operating under a traditional regulatory framework. Experience with it has resulted in a couple of valuable lessons that could be improved upon in program design of future DR FIT approaches.

One feature of the Indiana Model that has proven challenging is that every individual customer under the program is required to make a minimum four-year commitment in order to begin participation, and to provide a three-year notice to discontinue participation. This is decidedly unattractive for customers. At the same time, it is understandable that the utility wants certainty regarding future years. This term could be corrected by requiring any required commitment periods to run to the ARC, rather than the individual customer. That way, an ARC could enroll a new customer if a customer wants to disenroll or reduce its level of participation.

Another challenge of the Indiana Model is that performance is measured and penalties, if applicable, are assessed at the individual customer level. This precludes an ARC’s ability to engage in portfolio performance aggregation where overperformance of some customers may be netted against underperformance by other customers. Without the ability to manage performance at the portfolio level, the ARC must pass performance penalty exposure on to customers. Whereas, with portfolio performance aggregation, ARCs can insulate customers from penalties, which is a particularly attractive feature for customers. This challenge would also be easy to resolve by evaluating the performance of the ARC’s enrolled customers at the portfolio level and allowing for aggregation.
**DR PPAs with Utilities**

Another way to integrate ARC activities with utility resource planning is to facilitate ARC eligibility to participate in utility procurements, either as part of an “all source” procurement or a procurement that is designed to either specifically procure DR or procure attributes that DR can provide. As part of the terms of participation in the procurement, the RERRA would conditionally opt in to allow ARC participation and include whatever regulatory requirements deemed necessary as part of the procurement.

One example of this approach is utilized by the Illinois Power Agency (“IPA”), which procures energy and capacity on behalf of several utilities. The IPA conducts a state-run procurement that is open to DR and ARCs as well as generation suppliers. The procurement is for resources to meet a utility’s resource adequacy obligations under the MISO Fixed Resource Adequacy Plan. If an ARC is awarded a contract pursuant to the IPA procurement, the ARC enters into a power purchase agreement (“PPA”)-style agreement (such as a forward Zonal Resource Credit contract) with the utility. To fulfill the agreement, the ARC registers DR customers and transfers the associated credits to the utility’s MISO account to satisfy its resource adequacy requirements as a load-serving entity. Then the ARC is paid by the utility according to the agreement. As the market participant representing the resources, the ARC (and not the utility) is responsible and liable to MISO for all market participation requirements and subject to MISO charges and penalties, as appropriate.

The benefits of enabling the DR PPA approach include providing utilities and other LSEs with longer-term certainty of the resources they can rely upon in their resource plans, as well as providing price certainty to ARCs and customers providing these resources.

**ARC-Facilitated DR Program Administration**

DR program administration for utilities by ARCs entails utilities entering contracts with ARCs to design, implement and administer DR programs within a utility’s service territory. This approach is currently in use by several utilities in the Midwest and allows for regulatory oversight by a RERRA. The ARC is subject to applicable RERRA regulation because it operates as a vendor under contract to the utility.

Under the DR program administration approach, utilities can contract with one or more ARCs to run programs, thereby leveraging the experience and innovation of ARCs to enable customer participation within the DR program(s). The utility may utilize the DR programs as the utility and its regulator deems best. For example, the utility may register the DR program participants in one or more RTO/ISO DR programs and receive credit for the resources to offset its obligation to procure capacity, energy or ancillary services. Alternatively, the utility may operate the program outside of the wholesale market and deploy DR to peak shave or dispatch DR for economic or reliability reasons.

An advantage of the DR Program Administration model is that the RERRA and utility can more directly control the ARC managing the program to ensure that it is developing resource potential to its fullest. In rural areas where DR opportunities may be sparse, there may be few or no ARCs willing to invest resources to develop the limited DR potential unless they are working closely with the RERRA on an exclusive basis. Rather than risk that customers will miss out on opportunities to earn revenue to remain competitive and innovate, a better approach in such cases may be to contract with a single ARC that will focus on the utility’s customers or an electric cooperative’s members.

One drawback of the DR Program Administration approach is that it can limit the benefits that competition amongst ARCs can provide. It can also be cumbersome for companies with national footprints. Customers with hundreds or thousands of stores and facilities nationwide may prefer to work with a single ARC or only use a few who can help them participate in the many programs available where their stores or facilities are located.
Conditional Opt-In

This approach is appropriate for a RERRA that wants to allow customers to participate in DR but may not want to commit the utility to purchasing the DR from customers to meet the utility’s resource needs or does not have the resources to devote to a DR program. The RERRA and the utility may nevertheless want to have a means to obtain information from the ARC about the activities of customers in the utility’s service territory or for other reasons. Under this approach, the RERRA would opt in to allow participation of ARCs in an RTO/ISO program and attach conditions to the opt-in to ensure that ARCs are subject to appropriate requirements. Rule 24/32 in California discussed in the previous section is an example of a conditional opt-in.

The utility may purchase the credits associated with DR resources developed by the ARC but is not obligated to do so. The ARC may register resources in the RTO/ISO DR programs, and the resource credit would go to the utility (or other LSE) purchasing the credit. Although the utility will not receive credit for a resource if it is not the ultimate purchaser, the RERRA may nevertheless impose regulatory requirements upon ARCs as a condition of the opt-in election or pursuant to state jurisdiction. One advantage of this approach is that customers may still be able to participate in DR even if their own utility does not have a need for additional resources. Another advantage is that the ability to sell DR to other utilities or LSEs enhances the liquidity of the RTO/ISO market, which increases market efficiency and reduces costs for all customers.
## Pros/Cons of Approaches to Regulating ARC Participation

While the section above lays out the options available for state regulators, it is important to discuss the merits and detractors when considering which approach may yield the most benefits. The table below offers some helpful context for balancing regulatory oversight, contribution of ARC-enabled participation towards resource adequacy ("RA") and the full potential of benefits to the grid and all consumers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARC Participation Option</th>
<th>Allows Regulatory Oversight by RERRA</th>
<th>Contributes to Utility/LSE Resource Adequacy</th>
<th>Maximizes Latent DR Potential &amp; Participation</th>
<th>Enables ARC-provided benefits</th>
<th>Allows Customer Selection of ARCs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DR Feed in Tariff</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC DR PPAs</td>
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<td>Conditional Opt In</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Up to the RERRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC-facilitated DR Program Administration for Utilities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Depends upon design</td>
<td>Typically, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Tariff (w/o ARC participation)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Examples of ARC Participation in the Midwest

To provide further context of the approaches to enabling ARCs that RERRAs should consider, it’s helpful to provide examples of these models in use today in areas of the Midwest.

**DR Feed in Tariff:**

**Indiana Michigan Company DR Tariff**

Indiana Michigan Company has a retail tariff in which customers can be enrolled to participate in the PJM demand response programs through the utility. The capacity credits from customers enrolled in the program are assigned to meet the utility’s resource adequacy obligation. The price paid to customers for participation as a capacity resource is based upon a trailing three-year average of the PJM capacity auction price. Customers are permitted to contract with, and enroll in the program through ARCs, although the tariff requirements run to each individual customer.

**Xcel Energy Peak Flex Credit Pilot (MN)**

On March 15, 2022, the MPUC approved Xcel Energy’s proposed Peak Flex Credit pilot program in Docket No. E002/M-21-101. The MPUC took the opportunity to explore aggregator participation and doubled the pilot size (in MW), creating two tranches of 43MW. One of the tranches is dedicated to participants directly enrolled through Xcel Energy, with a second tranche open to third-party aggregators. On Sept. 8, 2022, the MPUC approved Xcel Energy’s final compliance filing, and the tariff became effective as of Sept. 12, 2022.

Interested aggregators must first be approved by Xcel to participate in the pilot by executing an Aggregator Agreement and satisfying the eligibility requirements. In addition to the base tariff provisions that outline the program parameters that will be applicable to all customers, the Aggregator Agreement contains additional requirements to which participating aggregators must adhere. As the pilot is to be administered via a utility tariff, there is regulatory oversight by the MPUC.
**ARC DR PPA:**

**Illinois Power Agency Block Energy and Capacity Procurement (Ameren Illinois)**

The Illinois Power Agency ("IPA") each year administers one or more procurement events soliciting suppliers capable of delivering ZRCs in MISO Zone 4 for the prompt Planning Year (and sometimes for future Planning Year) on behalf of customers whose LSE is the Ameren Illinois Company ("AIC"). The procurement events are open to all entities capable of registering capacity resources, including LMRs, and converting the resources' MWs into ZRCs in the MISO Module E Capacity Tracking ("MECT") tool. Successful bidders must execute a bilateral contract with the IPA and adhere to all provisions of the contract, which is subject to oversight and approval by the Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC"). Following contract execution and upon successful resource registration with MISO, the supplier must transfer the ZRCs to AIC within the MECT. AIC then uses the transferred ZRCs to meet its RA obligation as an LSE.

As the bilateral contracting structure is reviewed and approved by the ICC, the ICC as the state regulator can confirm that appropriate provisions are in place to ensure the delivery of ZRCs by the supplier, beyond the rules and regulations applicable to a MISO Market Participant, subject to jurisdiction by FERC.

**ARC-Facilitated DR Program Administration:**

**Montana-Dakota Utilities DR Program**

Since 2012, CPower has administered a turnkey DR program for commercial and industrial customers for Montana-Dakota Utilities ("MDU"). CPower has handled all customer recruitment (assisted at times by MDU account managers), load curtailment engineering plans, dispatch and performance verification for participating customers. MDU registers the participants with MISO as LMRs and uses the Zonal Resource Credits ("ZRCs") to meet resource adequacy requirements.
Conclusion

Hopefully, this whitepaper proves informative and useful to RERRAs and helps to dispel popular misconceptions about whether RERRAs may maintain regulatory oversight over ARCs should a RERRA choose to explore the enabling models described here. DR is a powerful tool that can be leveraged to meet resource adequacy needs, as well as to help reliability and provide flexibility as the grid transitions. ARCs are best positioned to maximize the potential of DR through aggregating customers with differing capabilities and enabling ARCs through one of these models should be considered.

RERRAs and utilities are encouraged to consider the ideas and models adopted in various other regions and utilities discussed in this whitepaper.
Conclusion

For easy access, all the decisions, tariffs and documents cited in this whitepaper have been collected and are available for download:

https://cpowerenergymanagement.com/midwest-dr-framework-sources

The authors are also available to discuss any of the topics raised herein, and invite interested individuals to contact them:

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Peter has 15 years of experience in the energy industry, primarily focused on Demand Response (DR), beginning at Constellation Energy and most recently with CPower Energy Management, one of the nation’s leading providers of demand response (DR), distributed energy resources (DER) and energy management services. In his role as Sr. Director Market Development, he has advocated to advance DR/DER interests in ISO/RTO stakeholder groups and with state and federal regulatory bodies. He has also managed wholesale and retail DR portfolios across the CAISO, ERCOT, MISO and NYISO markets. He previously served as chair of NYISO’s Price Responsive Load Working Group, vice-chair of ERCOT’s Demand Side Working Group and chair of Advanced Energy Management Alliance’s New York/New England and Texas committees. Peter holds a BA in Environmental Studies from the University of Vermont and is a Certified Energy Manager.

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Ken brings nearly three decades of policy leadership on innovation in clean and advanced energy technologies. Ken leads CPower’s regulatory and government affairs team, having previously served in similar roles at both Vicinity Energy and EnerNOC/Enel. Ken collaborates with public officials, regulators, power exchange and system operators, academia and industry peers to unleash the potential of demand-side resources. In addition to work throughout North America’s wholesale and retail electricity markets, Ken has extensive international experience in market development and public policy promoting distributed energy resource policies in South America, Asia and Europe. Ken served as chair of the Maryland Public Service Commission from 2003-2007 and as a member of the Maryland House of Delegates from 1991-2003. From 2012-2019, he was a guest lecturer on retail markets and demand-side management at the Summer School on Regulation of Electric Utilities, Florence School of Regulation, Florence, Italy. Ken graduated with honor from the University of Maryland School of Law and earned a B.S. in Biology and Chemistry from Salisbury University.
About CPower

CPower Energy is the national leader of grid balancing and reliability solutions, creating a Customer-Powered Grid™ that will enable a flexible, clean and dependable energy future. With 6.3 GW of capacity at more than 17,000 sites across the U.S., we unlock the full value of distributed energy resources to strengthen the grid when and where it’s needed most. CPower is based in Baltimore, Maryland and is owned by LS Power, a development, investment, and operating company focused on the power and energy infrastructure sector. For more information, visit: www.cpowerenergymanagement.com.