Public Health and Healthcare Readiness Assessments RFP
Attachment N – Indiana Department of Homeland Security's Integrated Preparedness Plan (IPP)
RFP 24-77468

INTEGRATED PREPAREDNESS PLAN (IPP)

State of Indiana

Indiana Department of Homeland Security

Years Covered: 2024-2026

Rev. October 2020
HSEEP

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OVERVIEW

Exercise Name	Integrated Preparedness Plan Workshop (IPPW)
IPPW Date	May 11, 2023
Scope	The purpose of the Integrated Preparedness Planning Workshop (IPPW) is to consider the range of preparedness activities within the Integrated Preparedness Cycle and, along with the guidance provided by senior leaders, identify and set preparedness priorities and schedule preparedness activities for the multi-year Integrated Preparedness Plan (IPP) cycle. The workshop offered a hybrid attendance, both in-person and virtual via Microsoft Teams.
Objective	To develop the next three-year planning, organization, equipment, training and exercise (POETE) priorities based on threats and hazards; areas for improvement and capabilities; external sources and requirements; and accreditation standards and regulations.
Sponsor	Indiana Department of Homeland Security (IDHS)
Participating Organizations	See Appendix A: Participating Organizations

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FEMA revised the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) in 2020 and introduced the integrated preparedness planning workshop (IPPW), formerly known as the training exercise planning workshop (TEPW). Prior to 2020, the state of Indiana hosted a TEPW and presented the multi-year training exercise plan (MYTEP). The state introduced the IPPW for the first time, virtually, in fall of 2020 due to COVID-19 safety considerations. The former TEPW model did not support the integration of risk assessments, planning efforts, grant priorities and other preparedness activities to drive exercise activities. The IPPW ensures that risk assessments, plans and trainings are scheduled and conducted prior to conducting an exercise in a more integrated, concerted effort.

In the past, counties rolled up their multi-year training and exercise needs to the IDHS district level, and the district level would then hold a TEPW to combine all training and exercise needs in the district to submit to IDHS. IDHS would compile all 10 districts' training and exercise needs to create a statewide MYTEP. In 2020, IDHS lifted the requirement of district TEPWs (now IPPWs).

IDHS encourages local partners to adopt the IPPW, but partners can continue holding a TEPW to develop a MYTEP, if preferred. Counties are encouraged to create their multi-year plan and schedule of preparedness activities. Training needs identified in the jurisdiction's stakeholder preparedness review (SPR) and/or training survey may be added to the jurisdiction's integrated preparedness schedule (IPS). The district level is then encouraged to hold an IPPW in early spring, before the state's IPPW, to collect all preparedness needs in the district to submit a district multi-year integrated preparedness plan (IPP) and IPS to IDHS. Districts are welcome to hold their annual IPPW at the same time as their health partners if groups would prefer to combine efforts. IDHS asks for county and/or district IPPs/IPSs to be submitted to exercise@dhs.IN.gov by May annually for incorporation into the state IPPW. IDHS will facilitate the state IPPW annually in May.

The State IPPW's multi-year preparedness priorities will be based on state-specific priorities, and IDHS-sponsored north, central and south priorities (IDHS Districts 1-4, 5-7 and 8-10 respectively). Any counties' submissions of either an IPPW survey, IPP/IPS (or MYTEP) will be provided for reference of local activities. The outcome of the IPPW will be the development of the IPP and IPS covering the next three years. Each year's IPP and IPS supersedes the previous years.

IDHS has adopted a more progressive approach and incorporated planning, organization, equipment, training and exercise (POETE). The exercise program will build series with a year of planning with seminars and/or workshops, the second-year building in training with discussion-based exercises (tabletops and/or games) and the third year will include an operations-based exercise (drill, functional or full scale.) A single priority for the north, central or south will be the

focus of that three-year program, and the north, central and south will be on a different rotation from one another. Corrective actions will be incorporated into the objectives in the following year.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the integrated preparedness plan (IPP) is to document an organization's overall preparedness activities and preparedness priorities for a specific multi-year period. These priorities are linked to corresponding capabilities and, if applicable, a rationale based on existing strategic guidance, threat assessments, corrective actions from previous exercises or other factors. This IPP identifies the preparedness activities that will help the organization build and sustain the capabilities needed to address its preparedness priorities.

The IPP should lay out a jurisdiction's/organization's threats, hazards and risks along with other internal and external factors that influence the preparedness priorities for the applicable multi-year cycle. Preparedness priorities, corresponding capabilities and rationale (as needed) are included in the IPP with multi-year calendars outlining all preparedness activities.

The IPP is designed to be a living document that can be updated and refined annually or as needed to inform the continuous improvement of a jurisdiction's/organization's ability to build, sustain and deliver capabilities.

Attachment 2 is the State Integrated Preparedness Schedule 2024-2026, which includes a calendar for all aspects of the preparedness cycle.

PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITY CONSIDERATIONS

IDHS determined its preparedness priorities by participation from the whole community process and in listing the factors for consideration and subsequent decisions from the 2023 Integrated Preparedness Planning Workshop (IPPW) process.

When selecting the state and northern Indiana's preparedness priorities starting in 2026, lead-up working groups/IPPWs were held in advance of this comprehensive IPPW. Central and south did not need to identify a preparedness priority starting in 2026 because they already have activities extending into that year (by the nature of the north, central and south three-year series rotations.)

Data collected for this IPPW was obtained from the Indiana hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA) and threat and hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA), stakeholder preparedness review (SPR) reports, corrective actions and past after-action reports (AARs) and improvement plans (IPs).

These documents informed the development of the priorities and aided in identifying the specific priorities for the period addressed in the IPP.

THREATS, HAZARDS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS

THREATS, HAZARDS AND RISKS

The threats, hazards and risks that informed the development of the below preparedness priorities are a result of each jurisdiction's submitted HIRA, THIRA and SPR.

The HIRA and THIRA are conducted every three years. The SPR assessment is conducted annually.

CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND IMPROVEMENT PLANS

All local jurisdictions submit their individual THIRA and SPR results based on lessons learned during real world events and/or scheduled exercises. The culmination of this data is seen in Appendix C as the top priorities across the state and reflect known and potentially unknown gap analysis and risk assessment in current plans, policies and procedures. This data also includes known instances where there are no plans and/or there is a lack of training to follow to the plan that is in place.

EXTERNAL SOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT (HIRA)

The HIRA's purpose is to assess the risk and consequence identification, planning, exercise, response, recovery, mitigation and strategic decision making. Hazards and threats are identified in three categories: man-made, natural and technological.

Each hazard or threat is evaluated thoroughly and scored based on criteria using the Calculated Priority Risk Index (CPRI) that measures probability, severity, duration and warnings to each type of event. See chart below:

HIRA CPRI TABLE: RISK RATING SCALE			
<1.5 -1.99 Low Risk	**2.0 - 2.50 Moderate Risk**	**2.51 - 2.90 High Risk**	**>2.91 – 4.0 Severe Risk**

This allows the community to know which hazards have a higher propensity, allowing for a more effective prioritization and allocation of limited financial, material and human resources.

The identification of risk and the associated information gathered, compiled and analyzed is a continual process. The analysis is data driven, focusing on actual, historical events and experiences over the past 50 years and their scientific and economic influences. The most severe hazards set the foundation for the THIRA Step 1.

THREAT AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENTS (THIRA)

The THIRA is a three-step risk assessment completed every three years. THIRA Step 1 is the identification of threats and hazards affecting communities based on the same three categories (man-made, natural and technological) as the HIRA and assigning mission areas. All five (5) mission areas and all three (3) categories must be identified. Communities consider if the threat or hazard is reasonably likely to affect the community and if the impact of the threat or hazard challenges at least one of the National Preparedness Goal's 32 core capabilities more than any other threat or hazard.

In THIRA Step 2, communities create context descriptions and estimate the impacts of the threats and hazards identified in Step 1. They detail a threat or hazard needed to identify the impacts it will have on a community and includes critical details such as location, magnitude and time of an incident. Communities also assess common emergency management metrics, such as number of affected populations, number of fatalities and number of people requiring shelter. The THIRA process uses a uniform set of common metrics known as standardized impact language.

In THIRA Step 3, communities establish capability targets, which describe the level of capability a community plans to work toward achieving for each of the 32 core capabilities. To create a capability target, communities fill in the blanks within the standardized target language to show the level of capability they want to achieve. FEMA developed standardized target language for each capability based on previous THIRA targets submitted by communities, the National Planning Frameworks, the critical tasks in the Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) and community and interagency feedback of the targets.

STAKEHOLDER PREPAREDNESS REVIEW (SPR)

The SPR is an annual three-step self-assessment of a community's capability levels based on the capability targets identified in the THIRA.

The purpose of Step 1 of the SPR is to assess and describe a community's current capability and how the capability has changed during the last year. This step determines five quantitative data-points identifying the community's beginning capability, loss of capability, capability sustained, capability built and the current capability. Communities then identify based on each of the POETE areas of planning, organization, equipment, training and exercises in which they lost, sustained and built capability, and develop free-text descriptions explaining specific actions, investments, resources or external factors that led to the changes in capability. Finally,

SPR 1 asks communities to rate the level of confidence in each capability from 1-5 with 5 being the highest confidence.

In SPR Step 2, communities describe the capability gap between the capability target they set in THIRA Step 3 and the current capability determined in SPR Step 1 and describe how they plan to address those capability gaps based on the relevant POETE area. A community has a capability gap if the current capability is less than the capability target. After identifying that capability gap, communities then assign a priority rating (high priority, medium priority and low priority) to identify how important it is to achieve that capability target.

The purpose of Step 3 of the SPR is to indicate the extent to which relevant funding sources including but not limited to a community's own resources and federal and state grants played a role in building and sustaining the capabilities assessed by the capability targets.

A complete list of Mission Areas and corresponding Core Capabilities and descriptions can be found in the Indiana Lifeline Crosswalk – IPP attachment (page 10).

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS, ACCREDITATION AND REGULATIONS

POST-KATRINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REFORM ACT OF 2006

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 authorizes FEMA to make grants available for the purpose of providing a system of emergency preparedness for the protection of life and property in the United States from hazards and to vest responsibility for emergency preparedness jointly in the federal government and states.

The EMPG program plays an important role in the implementation of the National Preparedness System as it supports the building, sustainment and delivery of core capabilities essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal of a secure and resilient nation. The Act requires an annual report from any state or territory receiving federal preparedness assistance administered by the Department of Homeland Security Title VI of the Stafford Act.

INDIANA CODE 10-14-3: EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND DISASTER LAW

- IC 10-14-3-7 – Declaration of purposes
- IC 10-14-3-9 – State emergency operations plan; local and interjurisdictional disaster plans
- IC 10-14-3-10.8 – Intrastate mutual aid program
- IC 10-14-3-16 – Director of local organizations; mutual aid arrangements
- IC 10-14-3-18 – County emergency management advisory council; local emergency management organizations; power of political subdivisions; public work

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACCREDITATION PROGRAM

The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is an independent non-profit organization that fosters excellence and accountability in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Programs by establishing standards applied in a peer reviewed process.

The EMAP Standard is a rigorous yet scalable industry standard for emergency management programs. It is flexible in design so that programs of varying sizes, with different populations, risks and resources can use it as a blueprint for improvement and can attain compliance with the standard. The standard was collaboratively developed through a series of working groups of emergency management stakeholders from government, business and other sectors, and continues to evolve to represent the best in emergency management. Exercises, evaluations and corrective action programs are evaluated during the EMAP accreditation assessment. In order to obtain accreditation, IDHS must demonstrate that it manages a program that has an exercise, evaluation and corrective action process that regularly tests the knowledge, skills, abilities and experience of emergency personnel as well as the plans, policies, procedures, equipment and facilities.

STATE PROGRAM PRIORITIES

The following multi-year preparedness priorities were carried over from the 2022 IPPW or are newly developed priorities utilizing the 2018-2022 HIRA CPRI averages and fostering discussion leading up to and during the state IPPW in 2023.

- Wabash Valley
- Human Disease Outbreak (tentative)
- Cybersecurity
- Continuity

WABASH VALLEY

Target start date: 2019
Target completion date: 2025

This preparedness priority began in 2019 when Indiana's Wabash Valley plan was written with IDHS and FEMA. The plan was then updated in 2020. Following discussions in 2021, it was determined that the plan needed further updates before holding exercises.

The Wabash Valley Seismic Zone is in the Midwest and includes southwest Indiana. This seismic zone can produce magnitude 7.0 earthquakes, per the Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC).

Priorities include:

- Save and sustain lives,
- Ensure the health and safety of responders and the public,
- Protect property, including critical infrastructure,
- Limit economic loss, and
- Ensure functioning civil government.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

The chart below depicts the corresponding capabilities in detail.

CORE CAPABILITY	RESOURCE REQUIRED	QUANTITY
Planning	— —	— —
Public Information and Warning	Public information officers	2 full teams
Operational Coordination	IMAT personnel	4
Critical Transportation	Infrastructure inspection personnel	130 teams
Environmental Response/Health and Safety	HAZMAT remediation teams	80
Fatality Management Services	Fatality management teams	6
	Safety personnel	6
	Family assistance teams	6
	IMERT and DMORTs	3
Fire Management and Suppression	Incident management teams	4
	Water tender strike teams	10
	Engine strike teams	40
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	Reverse-osmosis filtration systems	40
	Meals ready-to-eat (MREs), per week	8,876,000
Mass Care Services	Shelters	2,338
	Shelter cots, blankets (1:2 ratio)	467,526
	Shelter teams	2,338
Mass Search and Rescue Operations	Type I teams	2
	Type II teams	4
	Type III teams	40
	Type IV teams	16
On-scene Security, Protection & Law Enforcement	Law enforcement officers	6,320
Operational Communications	Communication personnel	42
	Radios, 700/800 MHz	100
Healthcare & Emergency Medical Services	Medical evacuation helicopters	48
	Ambulance strike teams	40

RATIONALE

An incident of this magnitude will prove to be catastrophic for Indiana. Resources within the state and numbers of trained personnel will not be sufficient for the required response. Resources outside of Indiana will be required to appropriately respond to an event this size.

PLANNING FACTORS

The Natural Hazards Planning Manager has written the Wabash Valley Plan that will be exercised. See the Wabash Valley earthquake plan for a detailed list of planning factors based on each of the emergency support functions (ESFs).

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

The IDHS executive director and IDHS staff will provide overall direction of response activities of all state agencies. These duties will be carried out through the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC). Field operations will be coordinated through the local EOCs and the SEOC.

Acting under the authority of the governor, the IDHS executive director is responsible for initial oversight of disaster response operations, including gaining situational awareness of the magnitude of the event. In addition, each state department and agency will continue to maintain its roles and responsibilities in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations.

The IDHS director of emergency management will act as the primary coordinator for disaster operations and will outline critical resources, equipment and services that may require the expenditure of funds to manage and stabilize emergency situations.

Equipment Factors

Both transportation and utility lifelines are expected to be largely damaged throughout Indiana. Moderate or more severe structural damage is expected, though structural damage to transportation infrastructure, utility facilities and facility equipment is likely. Equipment at some facilities may be inoperable due to small deformations of supports or other structural components.

- INDOT will coordinate highway-opening information for distribution to the public in support of evacuation, medical transport and paratransit vehicles.
- Emergency Alert System (EAS) equipment can directly monitor the National Weather Service (NWS) for local weather and other emergency alerts, which local broadcast stations, cable systems and other EAS participants can then rebroadcast, providing an almost immediate relay of local emergency messages to the public.
- Diesel backup generator with fuel sufficient for 30 days of continuous broadcasting without commercial power.
- Landline, satellite and HF radio connectivity to FEMA operation centers.
- Special EAS encoder/decoders (ENDECs) with unique EAS codes.
- Appropriate location, generally just outside a major city area for survivability.
- Fallout shelter (not required for new Primary Entry Points (PEPs)), on-site food and special lightning protection.

- Deployable assets such as the mobile intel-repeater system (MIRS) and cache radios are managed by IDHS, IPSC, ISP and various other host agencies for day-to-day operations and during large-scale incident response.
- Two deployable MIRSs are equipped with 5-channel, 800-MHz conventional National Public Safety Planning Advisory Committee (NPSPAC) frequencies to offload users from the trunked system or for standalone coverage in an incident area. These have a range of 8–10 miles. The MIRS can connect to existing T1 telecommunication circuits with instantaneous results. Each MIRS houses a Motorola Motobridge to provide interoperable communications among VHF, UHF and other radio systems.
- Sixteen satellite transponders, broadband global area network (BGAN), are available to support one (1) to 11 users. Each contains built-in Wi-Fi and supports data communications.
- Indiana has 180 Motorola APEX 4000 cache radios, Type III, P25, 700/800 band. These radios have a talk group capacity of 192 channels and are preprogrammed with National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) interoperability channels.
- Belt clips, chargers and antenna included with deployment.
- 100 spare batteries and six multi-unit, six port bank chargers also available
- The Telecommunicator Emergency Response Taskforce (TERT) in Indiana has one team leader, six supervisors, 42 telecommunicators and one Finance Section chief. It can quickly mobilize and deploy to assist communications centers during disasters.
- IDHS and the IDOC director of emergency response operations provides resources (i.e., offender work crews, vehicles, drivers, heavy equipment, etc.).
- The National Guard provides specialized equipment, personnel or subject matter experts.
- Indiana Department of Health (IDOH) provides mass casualty and fatality management, mental health services, medical supplies management and distribution, immunizations, epidemiological surveillance, laboratory services, environmental health, food safety and long-term care.

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

- E0174: Hazus for Earthquake and Tsunami
- IS0008.a: Building for the Earthquakes of Tomorrow: Complying with EO 12699
- IS0325: Earthquake Basics: Science, Risk, and Mitigation

- AWR-328: All Hazards Preparedness for Animals in Disasters

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Wabash Valley Seminar – Spring of 2023
- Wabash Valley TTX – Fall of 2024
- Wabash Valley operations-based exercise – 2025
    - There may be an opportunity to combine efforts with Homeland Defender.

SUPPORTING FUNDING

No grant funding is currently supporting the Wabash Valley exercise series. Grant funding will need to be applied for to support the tabletop exercise and operations-based exercise. If a full-scale exercise takes place in 2025, potential funding sources to apply for may include the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) fund.

HUMAN DISEASE OUTBREAK (TENTATIVE)

Per the Governor's Public Health Commission Report Recommendation 22, IDHS and Indiana Department of Health (IDOH) are to coordinate public health emergencies through training exercises. IDHS and IDOH staff developed a training and exercise proposal in early 2023 and that is forecasted to be presented to both agencies' leadership after the IDHS COVID-19 AAR is developed. Once training and exercise priority direction is set, language will be added to this plan. It has not been determined how many years this will be a preparedness priority. Reference the 2022 Integrated Preparedness Plan covering years 2023-2025.

CYBERSECURITY

Target start date: 2021
Target completion date: 2025

This preparedness priority was established in the 2018 Indiana Cybersecurity Strategy written by the Indiana Executive Council on Cybersecurity, which is chaired by the executive director of Indiana Department of Homeland Security. The plan was updated in October 2021 and will be updated again in 2024. It is important that the state of Indiana, public and private partners continue to conduct cyber exercises over the next few years. Because of the integration of cybersecurity in all other hazards, it is prudent to add a cyber component (when appropriate) to additional exercises in this plan if applicable and resources allow.

Priorities include:

- Save and sustain lives,
- Ensure the health and safety of responders and the public,
- Protect property,
- Limit economic loss, and

- Ensure functioning civil government.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

Cybersecurity, environmental response/health and safety, public health, healthcare and emergency medical services, critical transportation, infrastructure systems, logistics and supply chain management public information and warning, operational coordination, interdiction and disruption, fatality management services, situational assessment, mass care services, on-scene security, protection and law enforcement, and operational communications.

The following may also be impacted:

- Emergency services
- Water and/or wastewater
- Energy
- Elections

RATIONALE

Since the first Indiana Cybersecurity Strategy was approved in 2018, a lot has changed in the world of cybersecurity. But nothing has moved the state of business, workplace culture and technology more than the months that followed Indiana's pandemic shut down in March 2020. The reality of how interconnected we all are became even more evident when home became our new workplace and all the cyber risks that followed.

This, of course, is compounded by the fact that the overall leading cause of cybersecurity breaches are still people. According to the Verizon 2021 Data Breach report, 85 percent of breaches were caused by a human element. The report also found that 61 percent of attacks involved use of unauthorized credentials, and phishing rose to 36 percent (up from 25 percent). And when one phishing exercise — like a malicious email — hits its target, the whole organization is at risk of compromise.

A cyber emergency will prove to be catastrophic for Indiana. Resources within the state and the number of trained personnel will not be sufficient for the required response. Resources outside of the state government will be required to appropriately respond to an event this size.

PLANNING FACTORS

The IDHS Cybersecurity and Risk Assessment Planning Manager coordinates response planning with stakeholders including the cybersecurity program director for the Indiana Executive Council on Cybersecurity and other key personnel to update the State Cybersecurity Response Annex to the State Emergency Operations Plan. There is also a County Cybersecurity Response Plan Template that has been developed and shared with county EMAs and is located on the Indiana Cybersecurity Hub. Several planning factors include:

- Socially engineered malware, phishing attacks, denial of service attacks and a wide variety of other threats can be developed and launched from anywhere, including other countries, and impact systems in Indiana.
- The vast majority of information technology infrastructure is owned and operated by private sector organizations.
- Local government entities, academic organizations and state agencies also maintain large, complex information networks.
- Government entities are, for the most part, unaware of cybersecurity incidents that impact private sector organizations. The overwhelming majority of cybersecurity incidents are managed without the involvement of local, state or federal government agencies.
- The type, complexity and duration of a state response to a cybersecurity incident may vary widely depending on the target organization and the nature of the attack.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

The IDHS executive director and IDHS staff will provide overall direction of response activities of all state agencies. These duties will be carried out through the SEOC. Field operations will be coordinated through the local EOCs and the SEOC.

Acting under the authority of the governor, the IDHS executive director is responsible for initial oversight of disaster response operations, including gaining situational awareness of the magnitude of the event. In addition, each state department and agency will continue to maintain its roles and responsibilities in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations.

The IDHS director of emergency management and preparedness is the primary coordinator for disaster operations and will outline critical resources, equipment and services that may require the expenditure of funds to manage and stabilize emergency situations.

Because of the technical expertise required for a cyber emergency, it will be imperative for IDHS to work with the established cyber liaison officers, the Indiana Cyber Advisory Group (CAG) and other partners outlined in the Cybersecurity Emergency Response Annex.

The CAG provides operational guidance and subject-matter expertise in support of a coordinated state cyber incident response. Designated agency representatives include:

1. Chief information officer, or designee (IOT)
2. Commander, intelligence and investigative technologies or designee (ISP)
3. Defensive cyber programs lead, or designee (INNG)
4. State of Indiana cybersecurity program director, or designee (IECC)

5. Director, emergency management and preparedness, or designee (IDHS)
6. Selected subject-matter experts and/or industry representatives (primarily pulled form IECC partners and additional private sector partners)

Equipment Factors

Equipment may depend on the kind of cyberattack and the cascading effects of the attack, but at the most basic level, the following would be needed:

- Computer equipment
- Operable communications equipment
- Detection equipment
- Logistical support equipment

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

These course recommendations are intended to familiarize emergency managers with cybersecurity terminology, core concepts and best practices. Training providers include the FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI), Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (TEEX), Norwich University (NUARI), University of Texas San Antonio (UTSA) and the Criminal Justice Institute (CJI). Detailed course information is available in the FEMA National Preparedness Course Catalog.

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

Basic

- AWR-136: Essentials of Community Cyber Security
- AWR-175-W: Information Security for Everyone
- AWR-176-W: Disaster Recovery for Information Systems

Intermediate

- AWR-169-W: Cyber Incident Analysis and Response
- AWR-177-W: Information Risk Management
- AWR-366-W: Developing a Cyber Security Annex for Incident Response
- IS0523: Resilient Accord: Exercising Continuity Plans for Cyber Incidents
- E0553: Resilient Accord: Cyber Security Planning Workshop

Advanced

- AWR-353-W: Using the Community Cyber Security Maturity Model
- MGT-384: Community Preparedness for Cyber Incidents
- MGT-385: Community Cyber Exercise Planning
- MGT-452: Physical & Cyber for Critical Infrastructure
- MGT-456: Integration of Cyber Personnel into the EOC for Cyber Incidents

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Homeland Defender TTX and Operational Exercise (Muscatatuck - water system cyber-attack) – August 2021
- INCyber and CISA TTX (Fort Wayne -water system attack with healthcare cascade effects) – August 2021
- Cybersecurity Workshop (county emergency managers) – March 2022
- Healthcare Cyber TTX (Southern Indiana hospital attack) – December 2022
- Healthcare Cyber TTX (Marion County hospital attack) – Feb 2023
- Cyber Ready Community TTX (Dubois/Jasper) – Summer/Fall 2023
- Cyber Ready Community TTX (Howard/Kokomo) – Summer/Fall 2023
- Cyber Ready Community TTX (Hamilton/Carmel) – Summer/Fall 2023
- Cyber Ready Community TTX (Brown/Nashville) – Summer/Fall 2023
- Cyber Ready Community TTX (Lake/Gary) – Fall/Winter 2023
- Virtual Emergency Manager Cyber Response Toolkit (State/County) – Fall/Winter 2023
- Homeland Defender TTX and/or Operational Exercise (Muscatatuck) – TBD 2025

SUPPORTING FUNDING

No grant funding currently supports cybersecurity exercises.

CONTINUITY

Target start date: 2023
Target completion date: 2028

Review, assess and validate state agency Continuity of Operation Plans (COOP) and/or the State Continuity of Government (COG) plan following an incident that requires the use of orders of succession and the ability to continue performing Essential Functions (EFs). It is uncertain at this time if the exercise will assess the devolution component of COOP/COG plans. This preparedness priority was selected in spring of 2023 following IDHS working group discussion leading up to this comprehensive IPPW.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

Planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, risk management for protection program and activities, public health, healthcare, emergency medical services,

situational assessment, operational communications, physical protective measures, access control and identity verification.

RATIONALE

As of spring 2023, the IDHS executive director's planning priorities include Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government (COOP/COG), cybersecurity and terrorism response. Since cybersecurity and terrorism events may trigger activation of plans, this plan has been added to the IPP beginning in 2023. In accordance with Indiana Executive Order 17-02:

> *Each state agency shall develop, and keep current, a continuity of operations plan to ensure that its essential functions are performed during any emergency or situation that may disrupt normal operation. This plan shall be developed and maintained consistent with the guidelines of, and in cooperation with, the IDHS, and shall be submitted to the IDHS and the Governor.* ***Each agency emergency management coordinator shall participate in plan reviews, training and exercises organized by the IDHS, and shall conduct internal training and exercises of appropriate agency employees to ensure that the plan can be implemented with little or no notice.***

Indiana must be a self-sufficient and resilient state that can continue performing essential functions following an impactful incident. From FEMA's 2022-2026 Strategic Plan, it is within one of FEMA's goals to sustain a prepared nation. Additionally, continuity is one of the IDHS eExecutive director's planning priorities in 2023. This priority will provide Indiana the opportunity to demonstrate that the needs of the community, including its responders, are to continuously be met following a disaster. Additionally, Indiana's election for governor and lieutenant governor will be on Nov. 5, 2024, providing Indiana a potential to exercise COG with a change in administration.

PLANNING FACTORS

All state agencies' continuity plans identify lines of succession and guidance to ensure that the organization can conduct its essential missions and functions under all threats and conditions. These state plans should all be updated and ready to exercise by year 2026, beginning with a seminar and/or workshop.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

The state must ensure its most important and time critical operations are performed efficiently and with minimal disruption, especially during an emergency. The IDHS executive director, or a designated successor, may initiate the Continuity Plan activation for the entire organization, based on an emergency or threat directed at the organization. All state staff are encouraged to train and prepare in advance of a continuity event, so that they are prepared to act quickly in

an emergency. Certain positions within the agency are considered necessary to conduct essential functions, and those are outlined in the COOP Plan.

State agency COOP plans seek to ensure the following 10 elements are addressed:

- Essential functions
- Orders of succession
- Delegations of authority
- Alternate locations
- Communications and information systems
- Essential records management
- Human resources
- Training and exercise
- Devolution
- Reconstitution

Equipment Factors

In the event of an incident, some equipment may not be available, and responders/emergency managers will need a backup plan to continue essential functions. Below is a list of equipment that should be considered for continuity purposes. This is not an exhaustive list.

- Technology and computers
- Outdoor event equipment
- Communications equipment
    - Phones (landline, satellite, and cellular)
    - Fax
    - Internet access
    - iPads
    - Email
    - Data lines
    - 800 MHz radios
    - Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS)/Wireless Priority Service (WPS) Cards
    - WebEOC
    - WebEx
    - Microsoft Teams
    - Zoom
- Personal protective equipment (PPE)
- Vehicles

- Buildings

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, if applicable, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

- IS-156: Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations
- IS-300: Introduction to Continuity of Operations
- IS-520: Introduction to Continuity of Operations Planning for Pandemic Influenzas
- IS-545: Reconstitution Planning Course
- IS-0551 Continuity of Operations Devolution Planning
- IS-1300 Introduction to Continuity
- E1301: Continuity Planning
- E1302: Continuity of Operations Program Management
- L0552: Continuity of Operations for Tribal Governments
- MGT 416 Introduction to Continuity of Government Planning for Rural Jurisdictions

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Seminar and/or Workshop 2026 to review applicable plans, policies and procedures.
- Discussion-based exercise 2027 to assess applicable plans, policies and procedures.
- Operations-based exercise 2028 to validate applicable plans, policies and procedures.

In 2011, there was an IDHS COOP/COG full-scale exercise named Constitutional Elm. This may be a good resource to refer to in the development of these exercises.

There are also exercise starter kits that can be found at FEMA's Continuity Resource Toolkit here: https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/continuity/toolkit.

SUPPORTING FUNDING

It is anticipated that grant funding will be requested for the exercises in 2027 and 2028.

NORTH DISTRICTS PROGRAM PRIORITIES

For the purposes of future planning, trainings and IDHS sponsored exercises, the north covers IDHS Districts 1-4.

- Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident
- Communications Failure

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT

Target start date: 2023
Target completion date: 2025

Hazardous materials can be found in every community. They can be found in almost every home, in hospitals and factories. Additionally, hazardous materials are shipped every day via land, air and water pathways and are frequently used to inspect pipelines. If released, hazardous materials can affect the whole community by causing harm to people, the environment, critical infrastructure and property.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

Environmental response/health and safety, public health, healthcare and emergency medical services, critical transportation, infrastructure systems, logistics and supply chain management, public information and warning, operational coordination, interdiction and disruption, fatality management services, situational assessment, mass care services, on-scene security, protection and law enforcement and operational communications.

RATIONALE

Hazardous materials transportation incidents were identified as a highly-rated CPRI incident on the 2016-2020 (and again in 2017-2021) HIRA averages. Additionally, hazardous material transportation incidents were the majority priority selected by emergency mangers in the north region via a survey submitted to the region that included several of the highest rated incidents as identified on the 2018-2020 north districts' HIRA report.

PLANNING FACTORS

Identify and utilize current plans, policies and procedures of hazardous materials incidents found throughout the region. Additionally, the IDHS technological hazard planning manager will advise the exercise planning team and participants on planning processes and components to consider regarding hazardous materials transportation incidents that the north districts can adopt and adapt to their needs.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

The primary responsibility for the control of hazardous materials rests with the owner, user, shipping agent, carrier or other individuals who have custody of the material. However, in the event of an incident or accident resulting in loss of control of a hazardous material by the responsible party, the local government must take action and seek assistance as necessary to limit the effects on life, property and the environment.

Activate ESF #10 personnel for such mission essential tasks as:

- The assessment of equipment, supplies and resources.
- Responding to the field for emergency operations.
- Contracting spill response and disposal services and support as necessary when responsible parties cannot be located, are unable or unwilling to respond.
- Working in an EOC during emergency conditions.
- Supporting local, district or statewide Incident Command structures.
- Activating continuity of operations plans.
- Developing and distributing maps and other pertinent oil, objectionable substances and hazardous materials response information.
- Supporting decontamination efforts as needed.
- Evaluate the ability to communicate with ESF #10 personnel and implement alternate communications if primary systems are down.
- Identify the cause of the emergency event and develop and implement activities to prevent additional oil, objectionable substances and hazardous materials response related damage during response.

Equipment Factors

- Personal protective equipment (PPE)
- Operable communications equipment
- Detection equipment
- Decontamination equipment
- Physical security enhancement equipment
- Logistical support equipment
- Incident response vehicles
- Medical supplies and limited types of pharmaceuticals
- Hazardous material reference resources

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

- AWR-111-W: Basic Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Concepts for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) Events
- AWR-160: Standardized Awareness Training
- AWR-160-W: Terrorism Awareness for Emergency First Responders
- AWR-176-W: Disaster Recovery for Information Systems
- MGT-457: On-Scene Crisis Leadership & Decision Making for HazMat Incidents
- MGT-458: Building Whole Community Engagement through LEPCs
- MGT-360: IC: Capabilities, Planning and Response Actions for All Hazards
- PER-211: Medical Management of CBRNE Events
- PER-212: Operational level Response to HazMat/WMD Incidents
- PER-261: Hazardous Materials Technologies: Monitoring, Detection, and Sampling
- PER-267: Emergency Medical Operations for CBRNE Incidents
- PER-271: Emergency Medical Response Awareness for CBRNE Incidents
- PER-322: Hazardous Materials Operations
- PER-365: Emergency Response to HazMat Incidents
- PER-902: Hospital Emergency Response Training for Mass Casualty Incidents
- PER-904: Radiological Emergency Response Operations
- PER-905: Advanced Radiological Incident Operations
- PER-290: Tank Car Specialist
- PER-291 Highway Emergency Response Specialist
- PER-292: Leadership and Management of Surface Transportation Incidents
- PER-293: HazMat/WMD Technician for Surface Transportation
- PER-326: Surface Transportation Emergency Preparedness and Security for Freight by Rail or Highway
- PER-327: Crude Oil 3 Flammable Liquid Emergencies Transported by Rail
- PER-330: Surface Transportation Emergency Preparedness and Security for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail
- PER-331: Surface Transportation Emergency Preparedness and Security for Senior Officials or Administrators
- PER-367: Tactical Hazardous Materials Operations for Surface Transportation

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident Workshop(s) 2023 Quarter 1
- Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident TTX 2024 Quarter 2
- Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident operations-based exercise 2025

SUPPORTING FUNDING

It is anticipated that the IDHS Exercise Section will be requesting EMPG or HMEP funding for this exercise series, particularly the discussions-based and operations-based exercises.

COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE

Target start date: 2026
Target completion date: 2028

Emergency communications are systems in which information is sent and received. This is of particular importance when responding to emergency. Communications is how responders gather situational awareness, send out information, alerts and warnings to the public, as well as collect and send information to and from stakeholders. Failures in this vital piece of equipment impedes response and ultimately leads to loss of life, property and the environment.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

Top capability: Community Resilience
Additional corresponding capabilities: public information and warning, operational coordination, operational communications, intelligence and information sharing, situational assessment and infrastructure systems.

RATIONALE

After extensive discussion among the region and by process of elimination of previously exercised high-ranking hazards on the HIRA, the region decided on communications failure as the prepared priority and community resilience. The region decided to practice something not practiced often. Additionally, communications failure can cover all HIRA identified core capabilities and current Improvement Plans' identified core capabilities.

PLANNING FACTORS

Identify and utilize current plans, policies and procedures of communication failure incidents found throughout the region. Furthermore, the IDHS mass care and logistics planning manager will participate as an advisor to the participants, and exercise planning team, on possible planning processes and components affected that are the result of a communications failure.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

- Although most public utilities and telecommunications infrastructure are not state-owned, the state ensures regulatory compliance via the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC), who is the lead agency for ESF-12.
- Community lifelines are interdependent and vulnerable to cascading failures. For example, communications and electric power systems rely on each other to function;

severe damage to one will disrupt the other. Most lifelines also rely on complex supply chains. Water and wastewater service depend on the resupply of a broad array of chemicals and—if power goes out—fuel for emergency generators. However, in a severe natural or human-caused incident, those supply chains themselves may be broken.

- Community lifeline stabilization relies on businesses and infrastructure owners and operators who have the expertise and primary responsibility for managing their systems in emergencies.
- Field crews and supervisors will establish 811 coordination (call before you dig) early on to avoid compounding the problem of outages.

Equipment Factors

- FirstNet Phones between first responders, EMAs and local and State EOC will be used if cell towers become overwhelmed.
- Emergency Alert System (EAS) equipment can directly monitor the National Weather Service (NWS) for local weather and other emergency alerts, which local broadcast stations, cable systems and other EAS participants can then rebroadcast, providing an almost immediate relay of local emergency messages to the public, as needed.
- If needed, deployable assets such as the mobile intel-repeater system (MIRS) and cache radios are available and managed by IDHS, IPSC, ISP and various other host agencies for day-to-day operations during large-scale incident response.
- Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) Cards

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

- IS-951: Radio Interoperability
- AWR-329: Leveraging Tools for Coordinated Disaster Communications
- IS-0242b: Effective Communication
- IS-1200: TERT Team Leader
- L0105: Public Information Basics
- IS-913a: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Achieving Results through Partnership and Collaboration
- MGT-345: Disaster Management for Electric Power Systems
- MGT-346: EOC Operations for All-Hazard Events
- E0948: Situational Awareness and Common Operating Picture
- AWR-213: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Awareness
- IS-860c: The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, An Introduction
- IS-1010: Emergency Protective Measures

- MGT-317: Disaster Management for Public Services
- MGT-414: Advanced Critical Infrastructure Protection

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Communications Failure Workshop/Seminar 2026 Quarter 1
- Communications Failure Discussion-based Exercise 2027 Quarter 2
- Communications Failure Operations-based Exercise 2028 Quarter 3

SUPPORTING FUNDING

It is anticipated that the IDHS Exercise Section will be requesting EMPG or HMEP funding for this exercise series, particularly the discussions-based and operations-based exercises.

CENTRAL DISTRICTS PROGRAM PRIORITIES

For the purposes of future planning, trainings and IDHS sponsored exercises, the central covers IDHS Districts 5-7.

- Public Utility (Telecommunications) Outage

PUBLIC UTILITY (TELECOMMUNICATIONS) FAILURE

Target start date: 2024
Target completion date: 2026

After a review of the HIRA data for the central region, it was decided that there has never been an exercise series that focuses on Public Utility Failure, specifically a telecommunications failure. It was noted that this hazard continues to be observed as a gap and area of improvement after in many types of exercises and that the need for a plan for a telecommunications failure is a top priority. The loss of this capability would have economic and social impacts as most businesses and governments depend upon reliable communications to function effectively. When communications systems fail, citizens are unable to contact emergency resources, governments cannot continue to provide services efficiently, and emergency responders are at a disadvantage when engaging in response activities. Moreover, a jurisdiction's Emergency Operations Center (EOC), whose purpose is to provide resource support to emergency responders, must have accurate information about an incident in real-time. This information allows the EOC to be able to assist in resource deployment to the incident and it cannot perform this function if there is little or delayed communication with the Incident Commander on the scene and/or disaster relief activities. This same logic can also hold true for public warning systems; without adequate and functioning telecommunications, loss of life and damage to property will most certainly occur.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

Planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, intelligence and information sharing, situational assessment, infrastructure systems and operational communications.

RATIONALE

Fostered discussion leading up to the 2021 IPPW indicated that public utility outage, specifically a telecommunications outage, is a top priority to be able to appropriately prepare, respond and recover.

PLANNING FACTORS

Identify and utilize current plans, policies and procedures of public utility failure incidents found throughout the region. Furthermore, the IDHS critical infrastructure and logistics planning

manager will create plan templates for incidents resulting in a public utilities telecommunications outage that the central districts can adopt and adapt to their needs.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

- Although most public utilities and telecommunications infrastructure are not state-owned, the state ensures regulatory compliance via the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC), who is the lead agency for ESF-12.
- Community lifelines are interdependent and vulnerable to cascading failures. For example, communications and electric power systems rely on each other to function; severe damage to one will disrupt the other. Most lifelines also rely on complex supply chains. Water and wastewater service depend on the resupply of a broad array of chemicals and—if power goes out—fuel for emergency generators. However, in a severe natural or human-caused incident, those supply chains themselves may be broken.
- Community lifeline stabilization relies on businesses and infrastructure owners and operators who have the expertise and primary responsibility for managing their systems in emergencies.
- Field crews and supervisors will establish 811 coordination (call before you dig) early on to avoid compounding the problem of outages.
- Indiana Public Safety Commission (IPSC) is an organization with a mission to facilitate statewide public safety communications. IPSC provides interoperable and reliable public safety communications systems to all Hoosier first responders and public safety professionals for use during routine, emergency and task force situations. Our goal is to strengthen community safety and security by minimizing the financial and technological barriers to interoperable communications through interagency cooperation.

Equipment Factors

- FirstNet Phones between first responders, EMAs and local and State EOC will be used if cell towers become overwhelmed.
- Emergency Alert System (EAS) equipment can directly monitor the National Weather Service (NWS) for local weather and other emergency alerts, which local broadcast stations, cable systems and other EAS participants can then rebroadcast, providing an almost immediate relay of local emergency messages to the public, as needed.

- If needed, deployable assets such as the mobile intel-repeater system (MIRS) and cache radios are available and managed by IDHS, IPSC, ISP and various other host agencies for day-to-day operations during large-scale incident response.
- Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) Cards

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

- IS-951: Radio Interoperability
- AWR-329: Leveraging Tools for Coordinated Disaster Communications
- IS-0242b: Effective Communication
- IS-1200: TERT Team Leader
- L0105: Public Information Basics
- IS-913a: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Achieving Results through Partnership and Collaboration
- MGT-345: Disaster Management for Electric Power Systems
- MGT-346: EOC Operations for All-Hazard Events
- E0948: Situational Awareness and Common Operating Picture
- AWR-213: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Awareness
- IS-860c: The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, An Introduction
- IS-1010: Emergency Protective Measures
- MGT-317: Disaster Management for Public Services
- MGT-414: Advanced Critical Infrastructure Protection

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Public Utility Failure Workshop Quarter 2 2024
- Public Utility Failure TTX Quarter 2 2025
- Public Utility Failure operations-based exercise Quarter 3 2026

SUPPORTING FUNDING

It is anticipated that the IDHS Exercise Section will request EMPG funding for this exercise series, particularly the TTX and operations-based exercise.

SOUTH DISTRICTS PROGRAM PRIORITIES

For the purposes of future planning, trainings and IDHS sponsored exercises, the south covers IDHS Districts 8-10.

- Tornado
- Communications Failure

TORNADO

Target start date: 2022
Target completion date: 2024

A tornado consists of violent whirling wind accompanied by a funnel-shaped cloud. Usually, tornadoes are associated with severe weather conditions and are very destructive. The average width of a tornado is 300 to 500 yards. The path may exceed 50 miles, and the movement of the tornado is estimated to be at speeds between 10 and 50 mph. The windspeed within tornadoes is typically between 100 and 300 mph. For this hazard, it is essential for emergency response personnel to take immediate action, as soon as conditions permit, to gather initial damage assessment information in the area that was impacted by the tornado. This information is needed to determine the severity and extent of injuries and damages. Timely and accurate information will provide much of the information that decision makers will need to implement and prioritize response activities.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

Planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, infrastructure systems, mass care services, situational assessment, mass search and rescue operations, on-scene security, protection and law enforcement, public health, healthcare and emergency management services

RATIONALE

Tornado was requested in the 2020 Multi-Year Exercise Priorities Survey with an emphasis on damage assessment. According to 2016-2020 HIRA CPRI averages, tornado falls into a severe risk category for southern counties.

PLANNING FACTORS

The IDHS critical infrastructure and logistics planning manager and technical hazards planning manager are creating a plan template for damage assessments that the southern districts can adopt and adapt to their needs. The plan template will be presented in a workshop in 2022 virtually or in person.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

- As outlined in the State EOP, the most effective way to exercise direction and control under emergency conditions is to provide a single site from which key personnel can work, which is the EOC.
- Coordination of activities ensures all tasks are accomplished with little or no duplication of effort, and with the highest probability of success.
- The EOC shall maintain the capability to communicate with all appropriate agencies, as needed, in times of emergency.
- Emergency support functions may be activated within an EOC comprised of primary agency and support agencies.
- If requested by local EMAs, IDHS can provide on-site Damage Assessment assistance.

Equipment Factors

FirstNet Phones between first responders, EMAs and local and State EOC will be used if cell towers become overwhelmed.

- Emergency Alert System (EAS) equipment can directly monitor the National Weather Service (NWS) for local weather and other emergency alerts, which local broadcast stations, cable systems and other EAS participants can then rebroadcast, providing an almost immediate relay of local emergency messages to the public, as needed.
- If needed, deployable assets such as the mobile intel-repeater system (MIRS) and cache radios are available and managed by IDHS, IPSC, ISP and various other host agencies for day-to-day operations during large-scale incident response.
- Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) Cards
- If requested, IDHS can provide drones to survey damaged area and provide real-time video links back to the county and SEOC.

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

- IS-556 Damage Assessment for Public Works
- IS-559: Local Damage Assessment
- IS-772.a: Individual Assistance Preliminary Damage Assessment Orientation
- AWR-326: Tornado Awareness
- AWR-319: Leveraging Tools for Conducting Damage Assessments

- AWR-308: Natural Disaster Awareness for Caregivers
- MGT-460: Planning for Disaster Debris Management
- E/L0102: Science of Disaster

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Tornado Seminar Quarter 4 2022
- Tornado Game(s) Quarter 2 2023
- Tornado Full Scale Exercise Quarter 3 2024

SUPPORTING FUNDING

It is anticipated that the IDHS Exercise Section will be requesting EMPG funding for this exercise series, particularly the discussions-based and operations-based exercises.

COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE

Target start date: 2025
Target completion date: 2027

The focus of IDHS Districts 8-10 in years 2025-2027 will be a communications failure. It was noted that this hazard has been observed as a gap and area of improvement in previous exercises and real-world events, resulting in the need for an emergency communications plan. The loss of communications would have economic and social impacts, as most businesses and governments depend upon reliable communications to function effectively. When communication systems fail, citizens are unable to request emergency services, governments cannot continue to provide services efficiently, and emergency responders are at a disadvantage when engaging in response activities. Moreover, a jurisdiction's EOC, whose purpose is to provide resource support to emergency responders, must have accurate information about an incident in real-time. This allows the EOC to be able to assist in resource deployment to the incident and it cannot perform this function if there is little or delayed communication with the Incident Commander on the scene and/or disaster relief activities. This same logic can also hold true for public warning systems; without adequate and functioning communications, loss of life and damage to property will most certainly occur.

CORRESPONDING CAPABILITIES

Planning, public information and warning, operational coordination, intelligence and information sharing, situational assessment, infrastructure systems and operational communications.

RATIONALE

Fostered discussion leading up to the 2022 IPPW, analyzing the available HIRA data from IDHS Districts 8-10, and a review of the 2025-2027 South Priority Focus survey results

indicated that the top priority would be communications failure to be able to appropriately prepare, respond and recover.

PLANNING FACTORS

Identify and utilize current plans, policies and procedures of communications plans throughout the region. Furthermore, the IDHS emergency services planning manager will create plan templates for incidents resulting in a communications outage that the southern districts can adopt and adapt to their needs. The purpose of planning for a communications failure is to develop a succinct document to plan for continuity of operations in the event of communication failures.

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT FACTORS

Organization Factors

- Although most public utilities and telecommunications infrastructure are not state-owned, the state ensures regulatory compliance via the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC), who is the lead agency for ESF-12.
- Community lifelines are interdependent and vulnerable to cascading failures. For example, communications and electric power systems rely on each other to function; severe damage to one will disrupt the other. Most lifelines also rely on complex supply chains. Water and wastewater service depend on the resupply of a broad array of chemicals and—if power goes out—fuel for emergency generators. However, in a severe natural or human-caused incident, those supply chains themselves may be broken.
- Community lifeline stabilization relies on businesses and infrastructure owners and operators who have the expertise and primary responsibility for managing their systems in emergencies.
- Field crews and supervisors will establish 811 coordination (call before you dig) early on to avoid compounding the problem of outages.

Equipment Factors

- FirstNet Phones between first responders, EMAs and local and State EOC will be used if cell towers become overwhelmed.
- Emergency Alert System (EAS) equipment can directly monitor the National Weather Service (NWS) for local weather and other emergency alerts, which local broadcast stations, cable systems and other EAS participants can then rebroadcast, providing an almost immediate relay of local emergency messages to the public, as needed.

- If needed, deployable assets such as the mobile intel-repeater system (MIRS) and cache radios are available and managed by IDHS, IPSC, ISP and various other host agencies for day-to-day operations during large-scale incident response.
- Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) Cards

SUPPORTING TRAINING COURSES

IDHS Training may not be actively providing these courses during this time, but the following courses are recommended for this priority:

- IS-951: Radio Interoperability
- AWR-329: Leveraging Tools for Coordinated Disaster Communications
- IS-0242b: Effective Communication
- IS-1200: TERT Team Leader
- L0105: Public Information Basics
- IS-913a: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Achieving Results through Partnership and Collaboration
- MGT-345: Disaster Management for Electric Power Systems
- MGT-346: EOC Operations for All-Hazard Events
- E0948: Situational Awareness and Common Operating Picture
- AWR-213: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Awareness
- IS-860c: The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, An Introduction
- IS-1010: Emergency Protective Measures
- MGT-317: Disaster Management for Public Services
- MGT-414: Advanced Critical Infrastructure Protection

SUPPORTING EXERCISES

- Communication Failure Workshop Quarter 2 2025
- Communication Failure TTX Quarter 2 2026
- Communication Failure operations-based exercise Quarter 3 2027

SUPPORTING FUNDING

It is anticipated that the IDHS Exercise Section will request EMPG funding for this exercise series, particularly the discussions-based and operations-based exercises.

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT PLANNING

IDHS has developed a corrective action plan to be presented at each annual IPPW. By continuously monitoring improvement actions, jurisdictions/organizations can periodically examine capabilities to ensure they are sufficient, accurate and effective to handle the threats, hazards and risks facing the jurisdiction/organization and can inform future integrated preparedness cycle activities. The continuous improvement plan should address:

- Compiling and recording areas for improvement from exercises and real-world incidents.
- Determining corrective actions for identified areas for improvement.
- Linking capabilities with identified areas for improvement and corrective actions.
- Prioritizing, assigning, tracking and reporting the progress of corrective actions.
- Measuring the effectiveness of corrective actions.
- Incorporating changes, completed corrective actions, identified best and lessons learned into future iterations of the integrated preparedness cycle and integrated preparedness plan.

INTEGRATED PREPAREDNESS SCHEDULE 2024-2026

The State Integrated Preparedness Schedule 2024-2026 can be found in Read Ahead Material Attachment 2. This excel spreadsheet is split into tabs by Information, Preparedness Priorities, Planning, Training, and Exercise (within and outside of the identified preparedness priorities). This schedule is split into POETE activities by preparedness priority. The preparedness priorities are addressed in this document, and are color coded below. These colors match with the Integrated Preparedness Schedule.

N/A	Wabash Valley	Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident
Tornado	Continuity	Cybersecurity
Human Disease Outbreak	Public Utility (Telecommunications) Failure	Communications Failure

APPENDIX A: EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

REGISTERED ORGANIZATIONS
STATE
Board of Animal Health
Department of Child Services
Indiana Department of Homeland Security
Indiana Department of Health
Indiana Department of Transportation
Indiana National Guard
Indiana Office of Technology
Integrated Public Safety Commission
Indiana State Fair Commission
LOCAL
County Emergency Management Agencies
Local Health and Fire Departments
FEDERAL
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Weather Service
United States Air Force
Veterans Affairs
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS
Catholic Charities Disaster Response/Indiana VOAD
Indiana University
Indianapolis International Airport
Ivy Tech Community College
NiSource
Rural Electric Membership Cooperative
Verizon Frontline Crisis Response Team

APPENDIX B: ADDRESSING SPR GAPS IN PREPAREDNESS PRIORITIES

SPR PROCESS

Communities use the THIRA to assess their risk and set capability targets that reflect their preparedness goals. Communities then use the SPR to answer the following questions:

- What are our current capabilities?
- What gaps exist between our targets and the capabilities we currently have?
- How can we address our capability gaps and sustain our current capabilities?

Communities identify gaps in five different areas: planning, organization, equipment, training and exercises (POETE). They also indicate whether achieving each of their capability targets is a high, medium or low priority. Communities also rate their degree of confidence in their estimates of their current capabilities using a five-point scale, with a five indicating higher confidence.

Communities can use the THIRA/SPR process to better understand how to address their most challenging risks and achieve specific preparedness goals. They can use the results to support a variety of preparedness activities, including planning, training and exercises. The THIRA/SPR also makes it easier for communities to direct resources where they will be most effective.



Relying heavily on the comprehensive preparedness picture of the THIRA and SPR, IDHS Exercise will focus in on the SPR data submitted annually by local jurisdictions when planning exercises. Use of the specific and quantitative data found the SPR will allow exercises to be more tailored to support the jurisdictional needs, specifically by addressing the capabilities gaps in POETE. This data will drive training and exercise planning to target these known capability gaps. The result of which is to validate the THIRA/SPR data to support emergency management efforts and draw a link between gaps and investment justifications.

GAP TYPE DEFINITIONS

Below is a description of the types of gaps described and potential applications communities can use to understand the critical unmet requirements across various operational lines of effort.

GAP TYPE DESCRIPTIONS AND APPLICATIONS		
Gap Type	**Gap Description**	**Potential Applications**
Target Gap	The difference between the community's capability target and their current capability. This gap represents the capability that the community intends to build, in addition to what it currently has, to achieve its preparedness goals.	• Understanding immediate unmet requirements that are identified and managed by the community. • Deliberate planning, outlining an expected community-managed responsibility. • Helping communities build and sustain preparedness.
Durable Gap	The difference between the community's largest standardized impact entry and their capability target. This represents potential capability requirement beyond what the community is planning to build to. This is displayed as a percentage; the higher the value, the larger this gap.	• Understanding long-term unmet requirements that may require outside support. • Deliberate planning, outlining an expected permanent federal or other responsibility.
Catastrophic Gap	The difference between the community's largest standardized impact entry and their current capability. This is displayed as a percentage; the higher the value, the larger this gap.	• Understanding immediate unmet requirements that may require outside support during a catastrophic event. • Crisis action planning, outlining a potential federal or other responsibility reported at a specific point in time.

POETE Area Gap	This indicates in which of the five POETE (planning, organization, equipment, training and exercises) areas the community has capability gaps. Each POETE area gap has an associated free-text description.	• Providing additional context into the specifics of existing capability gaps, allowing for better-targeted assistance in capability-building efforts.

See below for a depiction of the durable gap and catastrophic gap and how they relate to the current capability, capability target and largest impact.

SPR CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT LEGEND

PERCENTAGE OF GAP

This figure indicates how much capability the community currently has compared to their capability target. Percentages are shaded according to the range below.



PRIORITY RATING

This rating reflects how important it is for the community to achieve the capability target, or to sustain current capability if the community has already met the target. The rating is a selection between high, medium and low priority.

CONFIDENCE RATING

This rating reflects how confident the community is in the accuracy of their reported current capability. The rating ranges from 1 to 5, where a 1 indicates a lower confidence in the estimate and a 5 indicates a higher confidence.

Planning

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Evaluating and updating plans, operational planning, whole community involvement and coordination

Within every 24 month(s), update all emergency operations plans that define the roles and responsibilities of 15 partner organizations involved in incident management across three (3) jurisdictions affected, and the sequence and scope of tasks needed to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to and recover from events.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) jurisdictions affected	1	3	26	67%	88%	96%
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	5	15	15	67%	0%	67%
Priority	High Priority		**Confidence Rating (1-5)**		5	

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Lack of proper and updated emergency response plans, standard operating procedures and checklists. Additional usage of the incident command system methodology within individual agencies, including a lack of viable communication plans allow for repeated errors that can have devastating effects on real-world situations.
O	X	Keeping partner organizations involved and interested in the continuous planning process and how participation can increase our organizational capability.
Eq	X	Aging and deteriorating equipment.
T	X	Most in-person training was cancelled this year due to COVID-19 concerns. There were limited courses conducted with social distancing and PPE worn, but attendance was minimal due to concern over spread of virus.
Ex	X	All in-person exercises were cancelled due to COVID-19. The state and counties were able to conduct several seminars later in the year via Microsoft Team and Zoom.

Public Information and Warning

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Delivering actionable guidance, alerts, and warnings, culturally and linguistically appropriate messaging, inclusiveness of the entire public

Within 15-minute(s) notice of an incident, deliver reliable and actionable information to 21,590 people affected, including 1,320 people with access and functional needs (affected) and 239 people with limited English proficiency affected.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people affected*	11590	21590	23269	48%	7%	52%
(#) people with access and functional needs (affected)	310	1320	1500	77%	12%	79%
(#) people with limited English proficiency affected	88	239	344	63%	31%	74%

Priority	High Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	5

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Pre-scripted messages both in English and other non-English languages. Need policy for social media use for local authorities. New mass notification system processes have not been added to several plans. Research and planning of alternative methods of mass communication for people with access and functional needs. Lost planning capability due to and attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to COVID-19.
O	X	Organization gap due to organizational re-structuring and loss of leadership within partner organization. Need more personnel trained in sending out “Code Red” alerts. Loss of organizational capability due to personnel due to COVID-19 illness.
Eq	X	Some counties used Everbridge Mass Communications to send out alerts on COVID-19 testing sites. Need for more digital warning systems available to public without a subscription. Lack or update of outdoor warning systems. Better VHF communication systems. Need for additional repeater systems. Purchase of additional radios. Rural counties with limited internet or cell phone capability have difficulty with adequate mass notification systems.
T	X	Need to train 911 personnel in administration duties with the Mass Notification System. Lack of JIC and IPAWS training. Training cancelled due to COVID-19 response.

Ex	X	Additional PIO training needed. Public info warning not included in all exercises. Exercise gap due to needing updated plans and updated training. In-person exercises cancelled due to COVID-19 response.

Operational Coordination

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Command, control and coordination, National Incident Management System/Incident Command System compliance, stakeholder

Within 1 hour(s) of a potential or actual incident, establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process across 5 jurisdictions affected and with 8 partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for two (2) week(s).

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) jurisdictions affected*	2	5	26	60%	81%	92%
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management*	2	8	15	75%	47%	87%

Priority	High Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	5

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Conduct a tornado exercise and a Commodities-Points Of Distribution (C-POD) exercise by Dec. 2023. Need to update Hazard Mitigation Plan. Several local Emergency Operations Plans require updates. Not all EOC partners participate or desire to collaborate with the planning process.
O	X	Work with jurisdictions to better coordinate. Operational planning needs to be updated with all Jurisdictions in the county based on the EOP beginning 1-2022. Several partner organizations refuse to conduct collaboration efforts out of the EOC during disasters.
Eq	X	Several pieces of IMT equipment have been purchased but equipment is in need of maintenance or replacement. Several local EOCs and officials may require specific incident management equipment.

T	X	There were limited courses conducted with social distancing and PPE worn, but attendance was minimal due to concern over spread of virus. Need to train newly elected officials and schedule meetings in near future. Agencies have a lack of manpower and funding to send personnel to train.
Ex	X	The state and counties were able to conduct several seminars later in the year via Teams. Getting everyone working and training together. Not all local ESF partners participate in exercises.

Critical Transportation

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Evacuation

Within 18-hour(s) notice of an incident, complete the evacuation of 301 people requiring evacuation, including eight (8) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation).

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people requiring evacuation*	140	301	301	53%	0%	53%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring evacuation) *	2	8	8	75%	0%	75%

Priority	High Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	4

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Additional plans and mutual aid agreements are needed. Due to multiple construction projects across the state, pre-identified routes have been drastically affected thus drastically reducing our capability to evacuate effectively, including those with access and functional needs. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been planning loss thus effecting our coordination ability to adequately update our plans.
O	X	Loss of organizational capability due to personnel due to COVID-19 illness and attrition.

Eq	X	Need to securing equipment and personnel to sustain this core capability. Lack of equipment to provide rescue within certain counties were dependent on DNR and adjacent counties to provide rescue. Aging equipment and operational life of equipment and emerging technologies will require us to update in order to be effective in our mitigation, prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery efforts.
T	X	Lack of joint training due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Some counties lack a completed and exercised evacuation plan to prepare for the evacuation. Lack of realistic evacuation exercises due to needing an updated plan and updated training and training and exercises being cancelled due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Critical Transportation

Capability Target #2
Functional Areas: Debris removal, establishing access

Within 12 hour(s) of an incident, clear 178 miles of affected road to enable access for public, private and non-profit emergency responders.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) miles of road affected*	40	178	122	78%	0%	67%

Priority	High Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	2

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Due to multiple construction projects across the state, pre-identified routes have been drastically affected thus reducing our capability drastically. Due to COVID-19 and illnesses, there has been planning loss thus effecting our coordination ability to adequately update our plans.
O	X	Loss of organizational capability due to personnel due to COVID-19 illness.
Eq	X	Aging equipment and operational life of equipment and emerging technologies will require us to update in order to be effective in our mitigation, prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery efforts.

T	X	Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being limited due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Hazardous material clean-up						
Within three (3) hour(s) of an incident, assess, contain and begin cleaning up hazardous material releases from two (2) hazmat release sites.						
Impact	**Current Capability**	**Capability Target**	**Largest Impact**	**Target Gap**	**Durable Gap**	**Catastrophic Gap**
(#) hazmat release sites*	1	2	2	50%	0%	50%
Priority	Medium Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	4			

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Lack of community partners in the planning process. Lost planning capability due to retirements, and attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of COVID-19.
O	X	Not enough full-time, trained HazMat personnel to fully fulfill capability. Not all agencies and facilities come to meetings, trainings and exercises. Loss of organizational capability due to personnel due to COVID-19 illness. Not all agencies and facilities show initiative to participate.
Eq	X	Hazmat equipment and communications across the state needs upgraded/replaced.
T	X	Lack of statewide training and availability of personnel to train due to many fire departments having volunteer personnel. Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Due to lack of planning, organization and training, exercises are limited in scope and trained personnel. Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being limited due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Capability Target #2 Functional Areas: Decontamination
Within four (4) hour(s) of a hazmat incident, complete decontamination procedures for 72 exposed individuals (hazmat-related incidents).

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) exposed individuals (hazmat-related incidents) *	20	72	72	72%	0%	72%

Priority	Medium Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	4

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements, and attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of the COVID-19 pandemic.
O	X	Not enough full-time, trained HazMat personnel to fulfill capability. Loss of organizational capability due to personnel due to COVID-19 illness. Not all agencies and facilities show initiative to participate.
Eq	X	Lack the funding and manpower to continuously monitor these sites. Aging and lack of HazMat equipment across the state.
T	X	Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being cancelled due to the COVID-19 restrictions.

Fatality Management Services

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Body recovery, mortuary services, victim identification

Within six (6) day(s) of an incident, complete the recovery, identification and mortuary services, including temporary storage services, for 32 fatalities.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) fatalities*	10	32	32	66%	0%	69%

Additional Context			
Priority	Medium Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	5

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Update the Mass Fatality Plan. Lost planning capability due to retirements, and attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of the COVID-19 pandemic.
O	X	Some communities have no hospital or full-time paid ambulance service resulting in local EMS having slower response times and/or having to rely on mutual aid from neighboring counties.
Eq	X	Some county morgues do not have enough space for mass casualties. Aging equipment in most counties and some counties have only one refrigerated container to store remains.
T	X	Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being limited due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Fire Management and Suppression

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Structural Firefighting						
Within 6 hour(s) of an incident, conduct firefighting operations to suppress and extinguish three (3) structure fires.						
Impact	**Current Capability**	**Capability Target**	**Largest Impact**	**Target Gap**	**Durable Gap**	**Catastrophic Gap**
(#) structure fires*	1	3	3	67%	0%	67%

Additional Context			
Priority	Medium Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	3

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Due to the COVID-19 pandemic variant response and limitations, there was a reduced participation in planning with full-time and volunteer-based departments.
O	X	Several volunteer fire departments across the state hinder full-time collaboration and training with paid fire departments.
Eq	X	Volunteer fire stations operating with antiquated apparatus.
T	X	Lack of standardized training for all firefighters across the state. Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Continuing ongoing training, maintaining our existing equipment and conducting exercises are important to sustaining our core capability. Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being limited due to COVID-19, restrictions.

Logistics and Supply Chain Management

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Resource Management, Resource Delivery
Within 12 hour(s) of an incident, identify and mobilize life-sustaining commodities, resources and services to 722 people requiring shelter and 1350 people requiring food and water. Maintain distribution system for three (3) day(s).

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people requiring shelter*	201	722	725	72%	0%	72%
(#) people requiring food and water *	582	1350	1350	57%	0%	57%

Additional Contex			
Priority	High Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	3

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements, and attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of the COVID-19 pandemic.
O	X	Loss of organizational capability due to personnel due to COVID-19 illness.
Eq	X	In some counties, gaps were identified in C-Pods and LSA. Competing for resources from neighboring counties. Due to COVID-19, county capabilities will be stressed with providing more shelters based on social distancing requirements and commodities based on lack of storage availability due to competing space needed.
T	X	Lack of in-state training for this capability to due COVID-19 response efforts and restrictions.
Ex	X	Lack of exercising capability at state or local level exercises due to COVID-19 response efforts and restrictions from the Delta and Omicron variants.

Mass Care Services

Capability Target #1

Functional Areas: Sheltering, Ensuring Access, Feeding, Hydration, Pets, Resource Distribution

Within nine (9) hour(s) of an incident, provide emergency sheltering, food and water for 725 people requiring shelter and 1350 people requiring food and water, including 200 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible shelter) and 450 people with access and functional needs (requiring food and water), and 76 animals requiring shelter, food and water. Maintain for four (4) day(s).

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people requiring shelter*	300	725	725	59%	0%	59%
(#) people requiring food and water*	600	1350	1350	56%	0%	56%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring	70	200	200	65%	0%	65%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring food	100	450	450	78%	0%	78%
(#) animals requiring shelter, food, and water*	20	76	76	74%	0%	6742%

Additional Context

Priority	High Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	3

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Planning for large-scale disaster response regarding persons with access and functional needs, animal sheltering and homeless sheltering needs regardless of a pandemic or not.
O	X	Assisting agencies do not have a dedicated staff to operate shelters for an extended period. Lack of identified organizational structure regarding specialized care and impact of animals
Eq	X	Lack of specialized equipment for persons with access and functional needs and animal sheltering equipment is needed across the state.
T	X	Training in access and functional needs and animal sheltering is needed across the state.
Ex	X	Lack of exercises that includes persons with disabilities and animal sheltering.

Mass Care Services

Capability Target #2 Functional Areas: Relocation Assistance
Within 72 hour(s) of an incident, move 81 people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing, including 40 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing), from congregate care to temporary housing.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people requiring temporary, non-congregate housing*	34	81	81	58%	0%	852%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible, temporary, non-congregate housing) *	10	40	40	75%	0%	75%

Additional Context			
Priority	High Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	3

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	COVID-19 illness and Red Cross and Salvation Army staff turnover affects planning and organizational capabilities. Lack of access and functional needs inclusion in current plans.
O	X	Lack of organization including access and functional needs expertise and anticipated expectations.
Eq	X	Lack of accessible housing options.
T	X	Lack of access and functional needs expertise and anticipated expectations.
Ex	X	More exercises that include persons with access and functional needs.

Mass Search and Rescue Operations

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Rescue Operations, Search Operations, Community-Based Search and Rescue Support

Within seven (7) hour(s) of an incident, conduct search and rescue operations for 70 people requiring rescue.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people requiring rescue*	51	70	70	27%	0%	27%

Additional Context

Priority	Low Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	5

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements, and attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of the COVID-19 pandemic.
O	X	Large scale search and rescue would require MAA with other agencies. Lack of trained personnel to conduct large scale operations.
Eq	X	There is a large gap in the firefighting capabilities in some counties. Several counties need to update or purchase SAR equipment.
T	X	Standardized and specialized training needs to be conducted across the state. Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Maintain our existing plans and mutual aid agreements, equipment and continue ongoing training. Exercises lack quality SAR scenarios. Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being limited due to COVID-19 restrictions

On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Law Enforcement, Protecting Response Personnel, Securing Disaster Areas

Within 20 minute(s) of an incident, provide security and law enforcement services to protect emergency responders and 252 people affected.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people affected*	169	252	23269	33%	99%	99%

Additional Context			
Priority	Low Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	4

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements, attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of COVID-19 pandemic.
O	X	Lack of personnel Local LE departments. Lost organizational capability due to retirements, attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of COVID-19.
Eq	X	Need equipment to assist in visual and audible capabilities of schools, government offices and larger private sector facilities.
T	X	Lost joint training with law enforcement and non-law enforcement first responders due to COVID-19 response and restrictions.
Ex	X	Lack of law enforcement scenarios during joint exercises. Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being cancelled due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Operational Communications

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Interoperable Communications Between Responders
Within 57 minute(s) of an incident, establish interoperable communications across five (5) jurisdictions affected and with eight (8) partner organizations involved in incident management. Maintain for two (2) day(s).

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) jurisdictions affected*	1	5	26	80%	81%	96%
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management*	1	8	15	88%	47%	93%

Additional Context			
Priority	High Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	5

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Not all partners participate in planning efforts or initiative due to staff turnover and lack of desired involvement and/or COVID-19 illness or COVID-19 response restrictions.
O	X	Lack of partners effects overall organization, structure and capability.
Eq	X	Funding needed to update communication equipment. Lack of Incident Management Training and a physical space for an EOC,
T	X	Lack of Incident Management Training and a physical space for an EOC, Turnover of staff creates a significant response training challenge with new staff. Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being cancelled due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services

Capability Target #1
Functional Areas: Triage and Initial Stabilization, Emergency Medical Services, Definitive Care

Within 20 minute(s) of an incident, complete triage, begin definitive medical treatment and transfer to an appropriate facility 82 people requiring medical care.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people requiring medical care*	34	82	82	59%	0%	59%

Additional Context

Priority	High Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	4

POETE Area Gaps

P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements, attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges due to response of COVID-19.
O	X	Lack of paramedics and EMTs across the state due to low compensation. New state requirement is to obtain National Accreditation for new paramedics and EMTs making recruiting more challenging.
Eq	X	Lack of EMS equipment, PPE and mass casualty equipment among small counties within the state.
T	X	Lack of statewide mass casualty training opportunities for first responders in rural counties.
Ex	X	Lack of mass casualty exercise opportunities for first responders in rural counties due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Situational Assessment

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Delivering Situation Reports, Stakeholder Engagement
Within 30-minute(s) of incident, and on a two-hour(s) cycle, thereafter, provide notification to leadership and eight (8) partner organizations involved in incident management of the current and projected situation. Maintain for two (2) week(s).

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) partner organizations involved in incident	6	8	15	25%	47%	60%

Additional Context			
Priority	Low Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	4

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements, attrition of personnel and real-world challenges due to illness and response of COVID-19.
O	X	Difficulty in maintaining the interest of all partner agencies involvement in the organizational process.
Eq		
T	X	Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex	X	Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and exercises being cancelled due to COVID-19 restrictions.

Economic Recovery

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Reopening Businesses						
Within 15 day(s) of an incident, reopen 16 businesses closed due to the incident.						
Impact	**Current Capability**	**Capability Target**	**Largest Impact**	**Target Gap**	**Durable Gap**	**Catastrophic Gap**
(#) businesses closed due to the incident*	(#) businesses closed due to the incident	6	16	300	62%	95%

Additional Context			
Priority	High Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	4

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Indiana businesses have been critically impacted because of businesses closing, employee illness and/or turnover, lack of available capital to keep businesses open, etc. This caused a drastic cascading effect and reduction in planning capabilities across the state. Many businesses lacked continuity plans, thus making their recovery more difficult and less likelv to successfullv recover.
O	X	Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Indiana businesses have been critically impacted because of businesses closing, causing a drastic cascading effect and reduction in organizational capabilities across the state.
Eq	X	Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Indiana businesses have been critically impacted because of businesses closing, causing a drastic cascading effect and reduction in equipment capabilities across the state.
T	X	Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Indiana businesses have been critically impacted because of businesses closing, causing a drastic cascading effect and reduction in training capabilities across the state.
Ex	X	Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Indiana businesses have been critically impacted because of businesses closing, causing a drastic cascading effect and reduction in exercise capabilities across the state.

Health and Social Services

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Healthcare Facilities and Coalitions, Social Services
Within 48 hour(s) of an incident, restore functions at six (6) affected healthcare facilities and social service organizations.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) affected healthcare facilities and social service	2	6	14	67%	57%	86%

Additional Context			
Priority	High Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	4

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements and real-world challenges due to response to COVID-19. Many facilities across the state are not at an acceptable level of continuity planning. Most county-level social service organizations are included in this capability gap. Social service organizations at the state level are slightly better prepared but most still lack a quality plan. Limited staffing and lack of training and exercise is the primary indicator of this reduced capability.
O	X	Lost organizational capability due to retirements and real-world challenges due to response to COVID-19. Many facilities across the state are not at an acceptable level of organization staffing needs. Most county-level social service organizations are included in this capability gap. Social service organizations at the state level are slightly better prepared but most still lack quality organization.
Eq	X	Lost equipment capability due to lack of equipment, aging and overuse of equipment due to COVID-19 needs.
T	X	Lost training and capability due to retirements, attrition of personnel and real-world challenges due to restrictions and response of COVID-19.
Ex	X	Lost exercise capability due to retirements, and attrition of personnel and real-world challenges due to restrictions and response of COVID-19.

Housing

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Transition from Interim to Permanent/Long-Term Housing, Addressing Housing Shortages, Housing Accessibility
Within seven (7) day(s) of an incident, 275 people require long-term housing, including 31 people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing), find and secure long-term housing.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) people requiring long-term housing*	160	275	204	42%	0%	22%
(#) people with access and functional needs (requiring accessible long-term housing) *	10	31	32	68%	3%	69%

Additional Context			
Priority	High Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	3

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Due to COVID-19, illness and attrition of personnel, local housing organizations have lost planning capabilities across the state.
O	X	Lack of universal design and/or specialized accessible housing across Indiana. Due to COVID-19, illness and attrition of personnel, local housing organizations have lost organizational capabilities across the state.
Eq	X	Lack of affordable housing for low-income individuals or those affected by COVID-19 employment furloughs or loss of jobs.
T		
Ex		

Natural and Cultural Resources

Capability Target #1 Functional Areas: Environmental Preservation and Restoration, Historic Preservation, Damage Assessment
Within 48 hour(s) of an incident, restore two (2) damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction.

Impact	Current Capability	Capability Target	Largest Impact	Target Gap	Durable Gap	Catastrophic Gap
(#) damaged natural and cultural resources and historic properties registered in the jurisdiction*	1	2	32	50%	94%	97%

Additional Context			
Priority	Low Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	3

POETE Area Gaps		
P	X	Lost planning capability due to retirements, attrition of personnel and real-world challenges and restrictions due to response of COVID-19.
O		
Eq		
T	X	Need additional trained damage assessment specialists across the state. Due to COVID-19, in-person training needed to be cancelled due to state and local restrictions.
Ex		

RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PROTECTION PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities Target # 1 Functional Area(s) – Data Collection; Risk Assessment				
Every **year(s)**, appropriate authorities conduct a review of relevant physical and cyber threats and hazards, vulnerabilities and strategies for risk management covering four (**4**) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities.				
Impact Category	**Capability Target**	**Current Capability**	**Capability Gap**	**Percentage of Target Achieved**
(#) publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities	4	2	2	50%

Additional Functional Area Capability Gaps						
Functional Area	Planning	Organization	Equipment	Training	Exercises	No Gaps
Analysis Tools	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Incorporating Risk Assessments in Exercise Design	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Risk Communication	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Risk Management Planning	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Additional Context			
Priority	Medium Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	4

POETE Area Gaps
- Need for increased risk management planning, training and exercise efforts among EMAs and organizations responsible for both physical and cybersecurity protection. - Development of integrated risk management strategies that lead to enhanced capabilities for the protection of our critical infrastructure. - Identify risk management physical and cybersecurity concerns impacting overall infrastructure security posture and examine integrated physical and cybersecurity incidents and the evolving risks and impacts they pose to critical infrastructure. - Explore resources that can be applied to improve risk management security within an organization, business or government entity. - Lack of trained personnel to appropriately conduct planning, training and assessments. - Counties need to review critical infrastructure plans to determine need for hardening structures, installing cameras and security risks associated with the use of automatic doors. - Counties need to perform hazard assessments and determine if policies and procedures have been updated regarding gaps found in critical infrastructure facilities. - Several counties need to purchase and develop a comprehensive GIS program for increased planning, training and response capabilities.

Physical Protective Measures

Physical Protective Measures Target # 1 Functional Area(s) – Physical Security Measures; Site-Specific and Process-Specific Risk Assessments
Within **one (1) year(s)** of completing a risk and vulnerability assessment, appropriate authorities review and update physical security plans covering **32** publicly managed and/or regulated critical infrastructure facilities to incorporate new information from the assessment.

Impact Category	Capability Target	Current Capability	Capability Gap	Percentage of Target Achieved
(#) publicly managed or regulated critical infrastructure facilities	32	4	28	13%

Additional Functional Area Capability Gaps

Functional Area	Planning	Organization	Equipment	Training	Exercises	No Gaps
Biosecurity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Border Protection	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Identifying and Prioritizing Assets to Protect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Additional Context

Priority	High Priority	Confidence Rating (1-5)	4

POETE Area Gaps

- Need for increased planning, training and exercise efforts among EMAs and organizations responsible for both physical and cybersecurity protection.
- Development of integrated risk management strategies that lead to enhanced capabilities for the protection of our critical infrastructure.
- Identify physical and cybersecurity concerns impacting overall infrastructure security posture and examine integrated physical and cybersecurity incidents and the evolving risks and impacts they pose to critical infrastructure.
- Explore resources that can be applied to improve security within an organization, business or government entity
-- Loss of organizational capability due to personnel illness.
- Additionally, planning and exercising would identify additional gaps in critical infrastructure. Hardening of county government sites, with auto doors and cameras, is needed.
- Purchase needed equipment and assist in additional training. Develop plans, policies and procedures.
- Additional training of personnel beyond IT is identified as a gap and necessary.
- Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training.

Access Control and Identity Verification

Access Control and Identity Verification Target # 1 Functional Area(s) – Verifying Identity				
Within **10 minute(s)** of an event, be prepared to accept credentials from **15** partner organizations involved in incident management.				
Impact Category	**Capability Target**	**Current Capability**	**Capability Gap**	**Percentage of Target Achieved**
(#) partner organizations involved in incident management	15	8	7	53%

Additional Functional Area Capability Gaps

Functional Area	Planning	Organization	Equipment	Training	Exercises	No Gaps
Controlling Cyber Access	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Controlling Physical Access	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Additional Context

Priority	Medium Priority	**Confidence Rating (1-5)**	3

POETE Area Gaps

- Many counties do not have a cyber response plan. Many county EMAs completely rely on contractors or IT staff to manage the threat and do not see their role in cybersecurity.
- Cybersecurity training for county employees is not required for all counties, thus making a cyber breach a serious threat for those small and mid-size counties and their critical infrastructure.
- Many county EOCs and other facilities needing access control do not have equipment or equipment is in need of replacement and competing funding priorities limit the possibility of reducing this gap in the smaller and mid-size counties.
- Lost planning capability due to retirements, attrition of personnel and real-world timeline challenges.
- Loss of organizational capability.
- Lost equipment capability due to critical equipment needing replacement.
- Additional training, purchase needed equipment and develop plan.
- More in-person training needed to be limited due to state and local restrictions.
- Lost exercise capability due to needing an updated plan and updated training and training being cancelled.

APPENDIX C: ACRONYMS

ACRONYM	TERM
AAC	After Action Conference
AAR/IP	After Action Report/Improvement Plan
ANSI	American National Standard Institute
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive
CCTA	Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
C&E	Controllers and Evaluators
C&O	Concept and Objectives
C-POD	Commodity Points of Distribution
CPRI	Calculated Priority Risk Index
CUSEC	Central United States Earthquake Consortium
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
EMAP	Emergency Management Accreditation Program
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
FE or FX	Functional Exercise
FPM	Final Planning Meeting
FSE	Full Scale Exercise
GETS	Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
HIRA	Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
HSEEP	Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
ICS	Incident Command System
IDHS	Indiana Department of Homeland Security
IECC	Indiana Executive Council on Cybersecurity
IPM	Initial Planning Meeting
IPP	Integrated Preparedness Plan
IPPW	Integrated Preparedness Plan Workshop
JIT	Just-In-Time
JOC	Joint Operations Center

ACRONYM	TERM
JTF	Joint Task Force
MIRS	Mobile Intel-Repeater System
MPM	Midterm Planning Meeting
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
MUTC	Muscatatuck Urban Training Center
LSA	Logistical Staging Area
PASP	Project Aviation Safety Plan
POETE	Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercise
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
SEAR	Special Event Assessment Rating
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SEOP	State Emergency Operations Plan
SLE	State Level Exercise
SPR	Stakeholder Preparedness Review
TEP	Training and Exercise Plan
TEPW	Training and Exercise Planning Workshop
TFR	Temporary Flight Restrictions
THIRA	Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
TTX	Tabletop Exercise
UC	Unified Command
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
WEBEOC	Web-based Emergency Operations Center
WS	Workshop

APPENDIX D: READ AHEAD MATERIAL ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1: IPPW PowerPoint Presentation

Attachment 2: 2024-2026 Integrated Preparedness Schedule

Attachment 3: District-wide IPPs/IPSs or MYTEPs if submitted