Indiana Voting Systems Technical Oversight Program

Field Test Report

Voting Systems Technical Oversight Program (VSTOP)
Ball State University

Prepared by:

The VSTOP Team

On-Site Field Test - Day 1 for _____

1. **Affidavit Signed and Reviewed:**

   ☐ Complete

2. **Introduction:**

Members Present from the Inspecting Team:

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Date and Location of Test:

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Members Present from the Vendor:

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3. **Inspection of Equipment:**

Identify all hardware components and serial numbers:

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4. **Software Validation:**

Perform software validation according to the vendor steps provided with the application technical documentation. Compare the results to the vendor submitted values as required in IC 3-11-15-13.9.

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Confirm Firmware and Software versions manually by inspecting equipment.

Visually inspect and confirm direct record electronic (DRE) voting system ID numbers as required in IC 3-11-7.5-18.

5. **Ballot Creation Process:**

Creation and review of ballots through the Election Management Software (EMS) according to IC 3-11-13-7.5, IC 3-11-13-11, IC 3-11-13-11.5, IC 3-11-13-12, IC 3-11-13-13, IC 3-11-13-14, IC 3-11-13-16, IC 3-11-13-17, IC 3-11-13-18, IC 3-11-13-21, IC 3-11-14-3, IC 3-11-14-3.5, IC 3-11-14-3.7, IC 3-11-14-4, IC 3-11-14-10, IC 3-11-14-11, IC 3-11-14-12, or IC 3-11-14-14.5 as applicable to the voting system type.

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Can ballots be created that allow multiple candidates claiming affiliation with the same political party to be listed for a single member school board office?

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Can ballots be created that allow more candidates claiming affiliation with the same political party than can be elected to be listed for a multi-member school board office?

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Can ballots be created that allow a school board candidate to be listed as an “Independent”?

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Can ballots be created that do not list any party affiliation or the word “Independent” under or next to the candidate’s name for school board?

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Can ballots be created and tabulated in secondary languages according to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 Section 4?

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Loading of ballots into the voting systems to be tested.

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Additional notes related to the ballot creation process:

6. **Voting Equipment Initial Features Testing:**

Confirm system capability to perform machine diagnostics as required in IC 3-11-15-15 and IC 3-11-15-17.

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Confirm system capability to maintain a record of normal/abnormal events as required in IC 3-11-15-25.

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Confirm system capability to include built-in test, measurement, and diagnostic software, and hardware for detecting and reporting the system's status and degree of operability as required in IC 3-11-15-24.

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Confirm system capability to: (1) preserve electronic images of ballots and stored images of ballots in direct record electronic (DRE) voting machines as required in IC 3-11-15-23, IC 3-11-15-37 and IC 3-11-15-38; and (2) voiding the ballot when required under IC 3-11-14.5-5, 3-11-14.5-8, 3-11-15-26, and IC 3-11.5-8-1 .

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

7. **Security Review of the voting system being evaluated on-site for features found according to the VVSG Sections or Principles or Indiana Code as indicated.**

Confirm system security against tampering while votes are being recorded as required in IC 3-11-7.5-16.

☐ Pass ☐ Fail ☐ Incomplete

Notes:

Are keys required to open the voting system?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Commented [MK1]: VSTOP - It appears that VVSG 2.0 specifics are not being added to this revision to the protocol as I suggested in my email of 09/17/25. I did see this VVSG 2.0 reference here and we should probably be more generic here and just say VVSG Sections or Principals here to cover voting systems built on VVSG 1.0 and those built on VVSG 2.0 in the future.

Are the connections and ports locked and secured?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Are security seals used on the equipment?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Are administrative privileges required to access system menus, the BIOS, or the operating system?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Does the system lock a user out after a certain number of failed login attempts?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Are passwords saved on the system in clear text?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Does the operating system log changes and does it contain any write protection features?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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Have any anti-virus software programs or other protection features been installed on the system?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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A computer or electronic device used (1) to create the layout of a ballot for an election; (2) to program a voting system, electronic voting system, or ballot card voting system; or (3) with election management software certified for use as part of a voting system may not be connected to the Internet or any network that connects to another computer or electronic device. (IC 3-11-15-61)

Does the voting system contain any built-in wireless capabilities such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Cellular, etc.?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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If yes, are wireless capabilities (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Cellular, etc.) enabled?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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Additional Security Features Noted:

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On-Site Field Test - Day 2 for _____

1. **Introduction:**

Members Present from the Inspecting Team:

Date and Location of Test:

Members Present from the Vendor:

Vendor introduction of voting system and the type of voting system as well as a brief description of components, features, and functionality:

Brief description of primary changes from the previous versions:

Hardware Changes:

Software and Firmware Changes:

2. **Confirm details on application submission.**
   - ☐ Date of completed and signed Form IEC-11 filing.
   - ☐ Confirm Vendor name and address.
   - ☐ Confirm name, address and phone number of vendor representative.
   - ☐ Identify System Name, Model number, and Type(s) which are requested.
   - ☐ Inspect evidence for filing of application fee.
   - ☐ Identify and examine independent Lab test reports.
   - ☐ Inspect compliance with VVSG as required in IC 3-11-15-13.3.

Notes:

3. **Confirmation of completion of Phase I and Phase II of the Certification Checklist.**
   - ☐ Certification checklist reviewed and completed.
   - ☐ Inspection of documentation for most recent escrow of source codes completed.

Notes:

4. **Conduct a mock election with pre-created ballots according to the IED approved test cases for straight ticket tabulation compliance, randomly marked ballots, and BMD or DRE ballots, if applicable, which are designed to test the features and capabilities of the voting system to ensure compliance with federal and state law. This includes ensuring ballot cards produced by**

a ballot marking device (BMD) comply with the standards in IC 3-11-13-7.5; the ballot label on the BMD or direct record electronic (DRE) voting system complies with IC 3-11-13-7.5 and IC 3-11-14, generally; and the DRE voting system with a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) produces a VVPAT in compliance with IC 3-11-14-2. See Appendix D & E of the Indiana Voting System Certification Protocol for more details.

Confirm the zero tape shows no vote history.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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Confirm OPSCAN system capability for dealing with stray marks and mutilation of ballots according to IC 3-12-1-3.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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Confirm OPSCAN system capability for dealing with, but not limited to, the following voting marks. By marking "Yes" below you indicate that the system was able to read this mark. By marking "No" the system was unable to read this mark.

Example 1: Small dot in the center of the bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 2: Dash across the bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 3: X inside the bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 4: X through the bubble and extending outside. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 5: Dash tangent to the bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 6: Small dot tangent of the bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 7: Partially filled bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 8: Large dot tangent of the bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Example 9: Check mark through bubble. ☐ Yes ☐ No

Notes:

Confirm OPSCAN system capability for disqualifying erasures and other stray marks that may be used to identify individual voter as required in IC 3-12-1-4(b).

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to establish voter intent as required in IC 3-12-1-1.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow voter to vote for candidate as required in IC 3-11-7.5-9.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow voter to vote for public question as required in IC 3-11-7.5-9.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow voter to vote a straight party ticket as required in IC 3-11-7-4, IC 3-11-7.5-9, IC 3-11-7.5-10, and IC 3-12-1-7.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability does not allow a straight party ticket to apply to a school board office as required in IC 3-12-1-7.1.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow voter to vote for candidates from more than 1 party as required in IC 3-11-7-4 and IC 3-11-7.5-10.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow voter to vote for or against public questions as required in IC 3-11-7.5-9, IC 3-11-7.5-10, IC 3-11-7-3, and IC 3-11-7-4.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow voter to vote for candidate nominated by petition as required in IC 3-11-7.5-10, IC 3-11-7-3, and IC 3-11-7-4.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow voter to vote for party or independent ticket electors as required in IC 3-11-7-3, IC 3-11-7-4 and IC 3-11-7.5-10.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system ability to display candidate name and designation as required in IC 3-11-15-13.1, if requested by the county election board to display a ballot number or other candidate designation uniquely associated with the candidate.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system ability to display a candidate's legal name with a universally recognized pronunciation symbol (that is, special characters), including an accent, hyphen, tilde, or umlaut on the voter's ballot, voting system screen, voting system activation card, voting system file, and voting system results report as required by IC 3-5-7-5.5. Examples of the special characters are listed below.

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Ç	È	É	Ê	Ë	Ì	Í	Î	Ï	Ð
Ñ	Ò	Ó	Ô	Õ	Ö	Ø	Ù	Ú	Û
Ü	Ý	Þ	ß	à	á	â	ã	ä	å
æ	ç	è	é	ê	ë	ì	í	î	ï
ð	ñ	ò	ó	ô	õ	ö	ù	û	ü
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☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to demonstrate overvotes and allow voter correction (DRE and BMD) as required in IC 3-11-15-13.7 and 52 USC sec. 21081(a)(1)(A) and (B).

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm OPSCAN system tabulator/scanner capability to inform voter of overvote and provide written instructions to correct as required in IC 3-11-13-4.5. (BMD components for an opScan voting system are required to notify voter of overvote and allow for correction as noted above in IC 3-11-15-13.7)

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to accept write in votes as required and specified in IC 3-11-7-11.5, IC 3-11-7.5-10, IC 3-12-1-1.7 and IC 3-12-1-7.5.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow single party primary voting as required in IC 3-11-7.5-12 and IC 3-10-1-13.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to permit voter to vote for more than one candidate where allowed as required in IC 3-11-7-3, IC 3-11-7-4, and IC 3-11-7.5-10.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system conformity with requirements for secrecy as specified in 52 USC sec. 21081(a)(1)(C).

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to allow detection of operation after machine secured as required in IC 3-11-7.5-14.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to indicate during an election how many voters have voted by use of a counting device as required in IC 3-11-7.5-15.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to determine correct recording of each and every selection made by the voter and in the case of a partially voted ballot, deliberate undervoting by a voter must be permitted as required in IC 3-11-15-39 and confirming the system capability to provide a reconciliation of the sum of selections and undervotes as required in IC 3-11-15-40.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to display and report the status and information messages in real time to the user as required in IC 3-11-15-41.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to display and report the status and information messages depending on the critical and non-critical nature of the message as required in IC 3-11-15-42.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to produce the list of audit records that reflects all of the idiosyncrasies of a system as required in IC 3-11-15-43.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to produce in-process audit records consisting of data documenting precinct and central count system operation during diagnostic routines and the casting and tallying of ballots as required in IC 3-11-15-44.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm system capability to count a voting mark on an optical scan ballot card that touches a circle or a square as if it were on or in the circle or square as required in IC 3-12-1-9 and the system should also have the ability to remake a damaged or defective ballot card as required in IC 3-12-1-9.5 (Applies to recount).

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

Confirm that optical scan ballot cards used for absentee ballot voting has built-in security features in compliance with IC 3-11-4-14.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Commented [DS2]: Add in new requirements for auditing outlined in VVSG 2.0

Commented [MC3R2]: What are we still missing for Auditing?

Commented [DS4R2]: After further review, the VVSG 2.0 requirements would fall in line with the Indiana code.

If yes, please describe the security features below.

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5. **Examine Absentee Ballot Retraction Features and confirm unique identifiers are applied to each absentee ballot.**

Note: This section only applies to a voting system certification, recertification, or modification where the voting system vendor requests a ballot retraction feature be part of their voting system for use in Indiana. For currently certified voting systems in Indiana where ballot retraction features have not been approved for use by the Indiana Election Commission, the ballot retraction features must first be submitted as a modification and be approved by the Commission. All DRE voting systems are required to include a ballot retraction feature; opScan voting systems may include a ballot retraction feature, but it is not a requirement.

Confirm that the absentee ballot marked for retraction is not counted in the tabulation results and meets the requirements of IC 3-11-15-26.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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- Scenario 1A: Scenario for Ballot Card OpScan Voting Systems:
  John Doe submitted an absentee ballot, which was scanned by county election officials during the central county of absentee ballots that started before Election Day. John passed away after his ballot card was scanned, and this absentee ballot was rejected under state law. Now, the County Election Board must retract the image of the previously scanned absentee ballot card before the absentee ballots are tabulated.

For this scenario, your voting system's software must show it can comply with IC 3-11.5-4-6(b), so that the absentee ballot card is not tabulated by the optical scan tabulator but any scanned image of the voter's ballot and the voter's choices can be retracted. Please describe the process starting when the voter receives their ballot and a retraction ID is assigned and applied to the voter's ballot card; where the retraction ID associated to the voter is stored in any computer system and on any paper documentation such as the ballot card or ballot security envelope; how the retraction number is generated and if it includes numbers, letters, bar code, or a combination and whether it uses indirect information to create the ID or if direct voter information such as the voter's first name, residence or mailing address, telephone number, social security number, Indiana driver's license number or state ID car, the date the voter registered to vote, date of birth, or unique ID in SVRS, for example, is to be used; when the ballot card is scanned by the optical scan tabulator, what information is stored on the media device regarding the voter's choices and where the digital image of the voter's ballot is stored along with any identifying marks may be on the digital image, if applicable; and if voter is found to be disqualified, how the individual voter's ballot image is retracted from the voting system so that the voter's votes on their ballot are not tabulated or otherwise counted, including any method to confirm the retraction of the disqualified voter's ballot card was accurately performed by the system.

This description should include how the county would use your equipment to be reflective of these requirements under IC 3-11.5-4-6(b) to scan but NOT tabulate the voter's absentee ballot while maintaining voter secrecy (IC 3-11-7-3) of Mr. Doe.

Scenarios for retraction testing should include the following ballot card variations, including pre-printed ballot cards that can be hand-marked and ballot cards printed by a ballot marking device:

Notes:

- Scenario 1B: Scenario for DRE Voting Systems:
  John Doe submitted an absentee ballot during in-person early voting on the electronic voting system. On Election Day, Mr. Doe was found to not be a qualified voter under state law. Now,

the County Election Board must retract, or otherwise void and remove, the electronic absentee ballot on the DRE voting system the voter used to complete their absentee ballot.

For this scenario, your voting system's software must show it can comply with IC 3-11-10-26.2 and IC 3-11-15-26, and IC 3-11.5-8, generally, so the electronic absentee ballot can be voided and removed before the absentee ballots are tabulated on Election Day pursuant to Indiana state law. Please describe the process starting when the voter is assigned a retraction ID and it is entered into the DRE voting system unit; whether the retraction ID associated to the voter is stored in any computer system and on any paper documentation; how the retraction number is generated and if it includes numbers, letters, bar code, or a combination including if the retraction number uses any of the direct voter information not permitted under IC 3-11-15-26(c); and if voter is found to not be qualified to vote, how the electronic ballot is retracted so that the voter's votes on their ballot are not tabulated or otherwise counted, including the method to confirm the retraction of the disqualified voter's ballot was accurately performed by the system; and whether the VVPAT receipt tape includes the retraction ID number of the voter and if the ballot is retracted.

This description should include how the county would use your equipment to be reflective of these requirements under IC 3-11.5-4-6(b)(2) while maintaining voter secrecy (IC 3-11-10-26.2) of Mr. Doe.

Notes:

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- ***The following questions should be addressed by the vendor:***

1. What information is used to generate the retraction ID? For example, is the retraction ID a randomly generated series of numbers or is direct voter information, such as personal identifying information used on the voter's record, used? Is the retraction ID a series of numbers, letter, bar code, or a combination? Describe the generation of the retraction ID in detail. Does the retraction ID use any direct voter information not permitted under IC 3-11-15-26(c)?

   Notes:_____

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2A. For ballot card OpScan voting systems, where is the retraction ID printed on the ballot card? Can the retraction ID be placed on a ballot card pre-printed from a digital image on a ballot on demand printer (or by a print shop), on the ballot card printed by the ballot marking device (BMD) printer when generated after the voter makes their selections on the BMD unit, or both? Describe the application of the retraction ID on the physical ballot card in detail, including any other materials where the retraction ID would be applied for county officials to locate the ballot card.

Notes:_____
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2B. For DRE voting systems, how is the retraction ID entered into the individual voting system unit? Is the retraction ID included on the VVPAT printed receipt? Describe how the retraction ID is entered into the voting unit and what information may be included on the VVPAT, if any, that can tie the VVPAT receipt to the retraction ID, including any other materials where the retraction ID would be applied for county officials to locate the ballot card.

Notes:_____
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3. How is the retraction ID stored after it is generated? Are systems in place to prevent the unauthorized access to the retraction ID information that would directly associate the ID number to the voter who used the ballot card or DRE voting system unit? Describe in detail the controls in place to protect unlawful access to retraction IDs.

Notes:_____
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4. For opScan voting systems, when the ballot is scanned, does the image include the retraction ID or is it obfuscated when looking at the digital image? Describe in detail and provide any images of the digital image of the ballot with the unique ID.

Notes:_____
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4A. For OpScan voting systems, when the retraction ID is entered to retract a ballot, can the county users pull up or otherwise view an electronic image of the voter's ballot before it is deleted? Describe the process to retract a scanned ballot card in detail.

Notes:_____

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4B. For DRE voting systems, when the retraction ID is entered to retract a ballot, can the county user pull up or otherwise view an electronic image of the voter's ballot before it is deleted? Describe this process to retract the electronically stored "ballot label" in detail.

Notes:_____

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5. How is the ballot image retracted – on the individual unit and its media card, in the voting system's election management software, or both? Describe in detail the process to retract a ballot card or electronic submission from the vote totals.

Notes:_____

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6. If retracted, where is that retracted ballot image stored and does any person, including but not limited to county election officials or the vendor, have access to the "deleted" image? Describe in detail how the retracted ballot images are stored and what system safeguards are in place to prevent unauthorized persons from accessing the images or electronic information.

Notes:_____

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7. When a ballot card scanned by the opScan voting system tabulator, does the tabulator store the individual votes made on the voter's ballot card in the tabulator's media card or drive?

If the answer is yes:
A. If the ballot image is retracted does the retraction method also remove the voter's choices from the tabulation software without manual interference? OR
B. Would the county election board be required to manually go into the tabulator software or transfer the tabulator's memory device to the voting system EMS, look at the voter's ballot, and back out those choices by hand? If procedure B is used, how does the procedure comply with the IC 3-11.5-4-6(b) requirement that a county election board may not tabulate (as defined in IC 3-5-2.1-97.5) ballots before election day.

Notes:_____

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8. If you answered yes to either 7A or 7B , how can the county election board confirm the individual voter choices stored on the ballot card voting system tabulator for a ballot card that is retracted ballot were correctly removed? Please describe any controls or other procedures to affirm the retraction works was correctly performed.

   Notes:_____
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9. How would a county election administrator identify and pull the physical ballot card or VVPAT receipt of a voter whose absentee ballot was pre-scanned or entered into a DRE and subsequently found to not be a qualified voter to ensure the ballot card/DRE vote was not included in the final vote tally or in a recount, or used as part of a post-election audit? Describe this process in detail.

   Notes:_____
   _____

10. Do you provide instructions on the retraction ID method to your county customers? If so, please include those instructions as well as any training materials or other information that would be helpful to the understanding of your system's ability to retract absentee ballots that the county election board must reject under law.

    Notes:
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6. **Examine and tabulate results and confirm accuracy and functionality of capabilities tested in Mock Election.**

Confirm results of the mock election and that the tabulation was accurate and successful, which includes comparing the totals tapes printed from the individual voting system units against the results reports generated by the election tabulation software.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

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7. **Additional Documentation from Field Test:**

The following statements and documentation may need to be filed, if applicable to your voting system. Context for these questions can be found in the main portion of the appendix describing ballot layout.

- If applicable, please provide a statement on how an optical scan ballot card used with your optical scan voting system can be printed with the initials of the poll clerks or absentee voter board members using an ePollbook.

- If an absentee or provisional optical scan ballot card, including those used with a ballot marking device, cannot be printed with the clerk's seal and signature, then please provide to VSTOP a statement or training materials that recommend to the clerk that the seal and signature be otherwise affixed to the ballot card used for all absentee voting methods, including the vendor's preferred location for the seal and signature to be placed.

- If a ballot on demand printer is included on the list of hardware on the voting system's IEC-11 application, please describe if the county user can use any Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) printer or if a specific printer model must be used.

- Scenario 1: For the Tulip County Circuit Court Clerk election, candidate Hannah Freeman died two days before the election, and the county election board did not reprint the ballot due to the timing of her death. Despite the Democratic Party filling the ballot vacancy with another candidate on the day before the election, state law only permits the straight party choices for the Democratic Party (that is, the party of the deceased and replacement candidate) to be counted for the replacement candidate as her name (or the phrase "candidate deceased") was not printed on the ballot. IC 3-12-1-14 and IC 3-12-1-15 are the statutes being tested here. If it is not possible for individual selections for Hannah Freeman to be automatically removed from the vote total of the individual voting unit or the main tabulation software, please describe the manual process by which the county would follow to be reflective of these requirements in state law.

- Scenario 2: For the Dogwood Township Trustee election, Jonathan Wilson, Sr., the Republican candidate, died 30-days before the election. The county election board reprinted the ballot with the phrase “Candidate Deceased”. Absentee-by-mail ballots were mailed 45-days before the election, and not every voter asked for a replacement ballot so there is a mix of absentee ballots with “Jonathan Wilson, Sr” and “Candidate Deceased” listed in the township trustee race. For purposes of this exercise, the Republican Party filled the ballot vacancy the day before the election, but the county opted not to re-print the ballot with the new candidate’s name due to the timing. For this scenario, your voting system tabulation software must show it can comply with IC 3-12-1-16, where any straight ticket vote for the Republican Party (that is, the party the replacement candidate) and any individual vote for the phrase “Deceased Candidate” in the trustee election is considered a vote for the successor candidate. In other words, any individual selections for “Jonathan Wilson, Sr.” cannot be applied to the vote totals for the deceased candidate. If it is not possible for individual selections for Jonathan Wilson, Sr. to be automatically removed from the vote total of the individual voting unit or the main tabulation software, please describe the manual process by which the county would follow to be reflective of these requirements in state law.

8. **Voting System Accessibility Testing:**

The accessibility testing can occur either before or after the mock election. The results of the disability testing can be found on the disability testing report.

Name of ADA Contractor Present:

_____

Date and Place of Disability Testing:

_____

Notes:

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9. **Miscellaneous Notes:**

Ballot management software can produce a ballot card or ballot label file that can print or display on the ballot card, ballot label, and voting system results report any universally recognized pronunciation symbols that is part of a candidate's legal name, including an accent, hyphen, tilde, or umlaut and comply with IC 3-5-7-5.5

Note: The requirements of IC 3-5-7-5.5 regarding the display or printing of universally recognized punctuation symbols, including an accent, hyphen, tilde, or umlaut, are not required to be complied with by a voting system that was initially approved by the Indiana Election Commission for marketing and use in an Indiana election before January 1, 2022. While VSTOP may review if a voting system can meet this requirement, for these voting systems it will not affect the voting system from being recertified as part of the 2025 recertification established pursuant to IC 3-11-15-13.3.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

_____
_____
_____

A vendor may include as part of their voting system for use in Indiana features to permit the use of electronic adjudication of ballots to review voter intent. If applicable, does the electronic adjudication feature allow for a county user to adjudicate ballots in compliance with Indiana ballot counting laws; IC 3-11-15-13.8, IC 3-12 et. seq.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

_____
_____
_____

A vendor may include as part of their voting system for use in Indiana features to permit the use of electronic adjudication of ballots to review voter intent (IC 3-11-15-13.8). If applicable, is the electronic adjudication feature part of the election management system (EMS) software of the voting system to be certified by the Indiana Election Commission.

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ N/A

Notes:

The following sections are for any other notes which are not applicable to the above sections or items of which to follow-up with after the field test.

Notes:

Open/Unresolved Items from the Field Test (If Applicable):