



2024 General Election Post-Election Audit Summary Report

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Introduction

The Voting System Technical Oversight Program (VSTOP) was authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State (SOS) to conduct post-election audits (PEA) on the 2024 General Election. Upon the voluntary participation of County Election Officials and recommendation of VSTOP, seven counties were granted designation as post-election audit counties by the SOS. Switzerland, Dearborn, Delaware, St. Joseph, Hendricks, Fountain, and DeKalb counties successfully completed post-election audits of their 2024 General Election. This report will summarize all General Election audit activities and the official results for each audit completed.

Two different, audit types were used throughout these post-election audits. Delaware, Hendricks, and DeKalb counties completed a Ballot Comparison Audit and Switzerland, Dearborn, St. Joseph, and Fountain completed a Ballot Polling Audit. These two types of post-election audits, use risk-limiting audit procedures, as applicable, using the Stark Audit Tool developed by Dr. Philip Stark.

A Ballot Comparison Post-Election Audit is an audit procedure for counties using DRE (Direct Recording Electronic) voting systems. MicroVote, Indiana's largest voting system vendor utilizes DREs with CVRs (Cast Vote Records) and VVPATs (Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail). This audit procedure checks machine accuracy and functionality to confidently infer correctly reported election outcomes. While this audit procedure cannot check election outcomes directly, it can provide evidence the election systems used functioned properly. If the election systems functioned properly, there can be confidence in reported election outcomes. Using a random sample of ballots, the CVR (digital voting record) is inspected alongside the VVPAT (paper voting record) to ensure every vote cast digitally matches the paper record of that vote. The audit is considered successfully completed when all sample ballots have been inspected and a 100 percent match rate is confirmed. Ballot chain of custody procedures and ballot secrecy are maintained throughout this process.

A Ballot Polling Post-Election Audit is an audit procedure for counties using OpScan (Optical Scan) voting systems. ES&S, Hart InterCivic, and Unisyn are Indiana's voting system vendors utilizing OpScan voting systems with paper ballots. This audit procedure samples ballot selections for specific contests until there is statistical evidence the outcome of the audit would validate the reported election outcome for those contests. Using a random sample of ballots, vote choices are recorded for three contests. Ballot sampling continues until the result of the audit reaches the intended statistical confidence level in the reported election outcome. Once that level is reached, the audit is considered successfully completed. Ballot chain of custody procedures and ballot secrecy are maintained throughout this process.

In both audit procedures, ballots may need to be "skipped" in the review process. For Ballot Comparison Audits, undervotes may or may not be used for inspection. Either way, the integrity and result of the audit will not be affected. VSTOP allows county officials to make the decision on whether they would like to inspect undervoted ballots. All Comparison Audit Counties decided to inspect undervoted ballots. All Ballot Polling Audit counties selected contested contests for audit. Undervoted ballots must be "skipped" and cannot be inspected because this audit procedure only considers ballots that have a vote for that contest.

Nationally, the definition, methods, processes, and procedures of post-election audits vary from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Indiana's audit procedures use risk-limiting audit methods that have been adapted to best fit the election systems used and processes established by state and local election officials. Additional resources detailing the terminology, process, use, and benefits of risk-limiting audits can be found in *Appendix A*.

Switzerland County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** November 22, 2024
- **Location:** Switzerland County Courthouse – 212 W. Main St. Vevay, IN 47043
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** Hart InterCivic / Ballot Polling
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 4,315
- **Audit Seed Number:** 77142702147140041362
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - President of the United States
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Switzerland County Commissioner - District 2
- **Results:**
 - *President of the United States*
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for the initial sample of 43 ballots. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a **greater than 99 percent confidence level**. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.
 - *Governor of Indiana*
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for the initial sample of 43 ballots. 40 ballots were able to be inspected, and 3 ballots were skipped due to undervotes on this contest. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a **greater than 99 percent confidence level**. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.

- Switzerland County Commissioner District 2
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for the initial sample of 43 ballots. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots did not achieve the desired confidence level range. An additional 21 ballots were sampled. Total, 64 ballots were sampled. 62 were able to be inspected and 2 were skipped due to undervotes on this contest. After inspecting those 62 ballots, the desired confidence level range was met. The audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.

More information detailing the Switzerland County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix B*.

Dearborn County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** November 26, 2024
- **Location:** Dearborn County Courthouse – 215 W. High St. Lawrenceburg, IN 47025
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** ES&S / Ballot Polling
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 26,845
- **Audit Seed Number:** 85677177223620503925
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - United States Senator from Indiana
 - Attorney General of Indiana
 - Indiana State Representative – District 68
- **Results:**
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for an initial sample of 27 ballots for all three contests. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range for all three contests. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence these three contests were properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**

More information detailing the Dearborn County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix C*.

Delaware County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** December 3, 2024
- **Location:** Delaware County Building – 100 W. Main St. Muncie, IN 47305
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot Comparison
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** Ballots on VVPAT – 43,192
- **Audit Seed Number:** 19892209403440753064
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - President of the United States
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Judge of the 46th Circuit Court No. 2
- **Results:**
 - A total of 170 ballots were inspected for all contests. While one contest needed to inspect only 56 ballots, and another needed 76, all three contests were audited inspecting the largest sample needed. VSTOP inspected the estimated 170 ballots, but the set risk limit and confidence level were achieved after inspecting 161 ballots. All 170 inspected ballots had a CVR and VVPAT match, **resulting in 100 percent match rate**. The audit concludes with **99 percent confidence** that the election systems functioned properly, resulting in correctly tabulated and reported election outcomes.

More information detailing the Delaware County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix D*.

St. Joseph County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** December 5, 2024
- **Location:** County-City Building – 277 W. Jefferson Blvd. South Bend, IN 46601
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** Unisyn / Ballot Polling
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 112,242
- **Audit Seed Number:** 98987571586013188055
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Indiana Supreme Court Retention Question – Lorretta H. Rush
 - Judge of the St. Joseph County Probate Court
 - St. Joseph County Coroner
- **Results:**
 - Indiana Supreme Court Retention Question – Lorretta H. Rush
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for 94 ballots. 71 were able to be inspected and recorded and 23 inspected ballots were skipped because they were undervoted. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. This initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, and the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence this contest was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**

- Judge of the St. Joseph County Probate Court
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for 989 ballots. 960 were able to be inspected and recorded and 29 inspected ballots were skipped because they were undervoted. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. This initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, and the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence this contest was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**
- St. Joseph County Coroner
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for 1,748 ballots. 1,671 were able to be inspected and recorded and 77 inspected ballots were skipped because they were undervoted. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. This initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a 99 percent confidence level. **The audit concluded with 99 percent confidence this contest was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**

More information detailing the St. Joseph County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix E*.

Hendricks County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** December 10, 2024
- **Location:** County Government Center– 355 S. Washington St. Danville, IN 46122
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot Comparison
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** Ballots on VVPAT – 77,740
- **Audit Seed Number:** 78901285231020516930
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Hendricks County Commissioner District 3
 - Hendricks County Council
- **Results:**
 - A total of 71 ballots were inspected for all contests. While one contest needed to inspect only 56 ballots, and another needed 36, all three contests were audited inspecting the largest sample needed. VSTOP inspected the estimated 71 ballots, but the set risk limit and confidence level were achieved after inspecting 67 ballots. All 71 inspected ballots had a CVR and VVPAT match, resulting in **100 percent match rate**. The audit concludes with **99 percent confidence** that the election systems functioned properly, resulting in correctly tabulated and reported election outcomes.

More information detailing the Hendricks County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix F*.

Fountain County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** December 12, 2024
- **Location:** Fountain County Courthouse – 301 Fourth St. Covington, IN 47932
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** Hart InterCivic / Ballot Polling
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** 8,053
- **Audit Seed Number:** 34025523664565879780
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - President of the United States
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Fountain County Commissioner – District 2
- **Results:**
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for an initial sample of 38 ballots for all three contests. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range for all three contests. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence these three contests were properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome for all three contests.**

More information detailing the Fountain County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix G*.

DeKalb County Post-Election Audit

- **Audit Date:** December 18, 2024
- **Location:** DeKalb County Office Building – 215 E. Ninth St. Auburn, IN 46706
- **Voting System Vendor / Audit Type:** MicroVote / Ballot Comparison
- **Total Ballots Eligible for Audit:** Ballots on VVPAT – 19,060
- **Audit Seed Number:** 91587860374018221501
- **Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - United States Representative from Indiana – District 3
 - Governor of Indiana
 - DeKalb County Commissioner - Central District
- **Results:**
 - A total of 61 ballots were inspected for all contests. While the first contest needed to inspect only 22 ballots, the second 25, and the third 30, all three contests were audited inspecting 61 ballots. VSTOP inspected the 61 ballots, but the set risk limit and confidence level were achieved after inspecting 28 ballots. All 61 inspected ballots had a CVR and VVPAT match, resulting in 100 percent match rate. The audit concludes with 99 percent confidence that the election systems functioned properly, resulting in correctly tabulated and reported election outcomes.

More information detailing the DeKalb County Post-Election Audit be found in *Appendix H*.

In Closing

Completion of these post-election audits present statistical confidence confirming the election systems used in the 2024 General Election by Switzerland, Dearborn, Delaware, St. Joseph, Hendricks, Fountain, and DeKalb Counties functioned with no major malfunctions, resulting in correctly reported election outcomes for audited contests in all seven counties.

The attached Post-Election Audit Information & Resources (*Appendix A*) provides additional information on post-election audits and the procedures utilized by the State of Indiana. The Post-Election Audit Reports (*Appendix B-H*) detail all activities relating to a county's respective post-election audit. Reviewing this information and these reports can assist in gaining a full-scope understanding of post-election audits in Indiana.

VSTOP would like to thank the Switzerland, Dearborn, Delaware, St. Joseph, Hendricks, Fountain, and DeKalb County Clerk's Offices for their coordination, the County Election Boards for their voluntary request for audit designation, and the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving designation of these seven counties. VSTOP is appreciative to the SOS's Office for their authorization and support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this report, contact VSTOP's Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

APPENDIX A

Post-Election Audit Information & Resources

Post-Election Audit Resources & Information

- [2024 Indiana Election Code Audit Statutes – IC 3-12-13 1-7](#)
- [A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits – Dr. Mark Lindeman and Dr. Philip Stark](#)
- [Stark Ballot Comparison Risk-Limiting Audit Tool](#)
- [Stark Ballot-Polling Risk-Limiting Audit Tool](#)
- [U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2022 Report: Election Audits Across the United States](#)
- [National Conference of State Legislatures 2022 Report: Risk-Limiting Audits](#)
- [Verified Voting – What is an RLA?](#)
- [The Carter Center Risk-Limiting Audit Guide](#)

APPENDIX B

Switzerland County Audit Report

TO: Switzerland County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Member, Will Johnson
Election Board Member, Tom Conroy
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Karin Dutkiewicz

DATE: 1/13/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2024 Switzerland County General Post-Election Audit

On November 22, 2024, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Switzerland County, Indiana, of its 2024 General Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Switzerland County formally requested designation on October 2, 2024 via a County Election Board Resolution. Switzerland County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Switzerland County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the County Clerk and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on November 22, 2024 at the Switzerland County Courthouse in Vevay, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised by VSTOP to select three contested contests for audit. All chosen contests were countywide, statewide, or federal in order for the audit to encompass all ballots cast in the election within the county. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials, determined the post-election audit will utilize all types of General Election ballots, including absentee mail-in, absentee early voting, and election day ballots. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using all ballot types and the county's certified reported results. VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly.

It was also initially determined this audit would be completed with an intended 1 percent risk-limit/99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would

catch an outcome error if there was one, and only a 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any outcome errors. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full recount, and an audit is not a recount. For this type of post-election audit, the confidence level is dependent on the contest's margin and the random sample of ballots drawn. While it is intended to reach a 99 percent confidence level for this audit, VSTOP established that election outcomes can be confirmed with statistical confidence using risk-limits ranging from 9 percent to 1 percent and respective confidence levels ranging 91 to 99 percent. For an audit to significantly confirm election outcomes, the sample of audited ballots **MUST** reach 91 to 99 percent confidence. Should the confidence level not be reached in the initial sample of ballots it **DOES NOT** mean there is an error in election outcomes. It just means that more ballots will need to be sampled until there is, at minimum, a 91 percent confidence level reported for the sample of the audited contest.

After contest selection, risk-limit definition, and ballot inventory testing, all pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** November 22, 2024
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up and Pre-Audit Meeting 12:15 PM – Audit Begins 1:00 PM
- **Location:** Switzerland County Courthouse – 212 W. Main St. Vevay, IN 47043
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:** All Ballots Cast in General Election – 4,315
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - President of the United States
 - Diluted Margin – 56.69%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 28
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Diluted Margin – 46.35%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 41
 - Switzerland County Commissioner District 2
 - Diluted Margin – 45.98%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 43

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the Switzerland County Courthouse at approximately 12:15 PM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the conducting of the audit.

By approximately 1:00 PM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and audit set-up was complete. Switzerland County's public, post-election audit officially began shortly after 1:00 PM.

The VSTOP personnel who participated in this audit included:

- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director (Research)
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Austin Bilbrey, Logistics Specialist
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist
- Gina Caravaglia, Graduate Assistant for Training and Assessment

The Switzerland County Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Karin Dutkiewicz, County Clerk
- Will Johnson, Election Board Member
- Tom Conroy, Election Board Member
- Cyndi Harris, Clerk's Office
- Cindy Haskell, Clerk's Office
- Shona Hysell, Clerk's Office

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Polling Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to hand inspect ballots and record contest choices on sampled ballots until there is statistical evidence (at minimum a 91 percent confidence level) that a full hand count would confirm the certified outcome. VSTOP and County Election Officials set an intended risk-limit to better estimate sample sizes, but because polling-audits use a random sample of ballots, achieving a set risk limit is unpredictable. The closer the contest is, the greater the likelihood additional ballots will need to be counted to reach an acceptable risk-limit/confidence level. As stated previously, the intended risk-limit of 1 percent was set for Switzerland County. However, the audit can stop and be considered successfully completed once the audit has hand sampled and counted enough ballots to achieve a risk limit ranging from 9 to 1 percent (91 to 99 percent confidence level). **VSTOP has significant practical confidence in reported election outcomes when statistical confidence levels ranging 91-99 percent are achieved.**

The audit began with an introductory presentation given by Matt Housley and Dr. Chad Kinsella to all persons in attendance. This presentation provided general information about the post-election audit process and methodology used, specific information relating to Switzerland County's audit, and allowed for a Q&A to address any questions or concerns. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this memo. After this presentation concluded, execution of the audit began. A 20-digit seed number was generated to assist the Stark Audit Tool in selecting the random sample of ballots. This number was generated live-time through 20 rolls of a 10-sided die by audit participants. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to

the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Switzerland County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
77142702147140041362

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots were generated. As a best practice for Ballot Polling Audits, a sample greater than the estimated sample size is drawn. Should the confidence level not be reached through the inspection of the estimated sample ballots, additional sampled ballots would need to be inspected. All three contests for audit were inspected using the same sample of ballots. This down ballot inspection gives additional confidence in the voting systems functionality of accurate tabulation. A total of 78 ballots were drawn for sample. The images below feature the Stark Audit Tool visualizing the information described above.

— Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots —

Seed: 77142702147140041362

Number of ballots: 4315

Current sample number: 78

Draw this many ballots: 78 draw sample reset

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 4315 Smallest margin (votes): 2,446 Diluted margin: 56.69%

Contest 1. Contest name: President of the United States

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Trump/Vance	Votes:	3319
Candidate 2 Name:	Harris/Walz	Votes:	873
Candidate 3 Name:	Oliver/Maat	Votes:	12
Candidate 4 Name:	RFK Jr./Shanahan	Votes:	53

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 28.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Presidential Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 4315 Smallest margin (votes): 2,000 Diluted margin: 46.35%

Contest 1. Contest name: Governor of Indiana

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Braun/Beckwith	Votes:	3020
Candidate 2 Name:	McCormick/Goodin	Votes:	1020
Candidate 3 Name:	Rainwater/Hudson	Votes:	135

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 41.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Gubernatorial Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 4315 Smallest margin (votes): 1,984 Diluted margin: 45.98%

Contest 1. Contest name: County Commissioner Dist. 2

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Bennett	Votes:	3071
Candidate 2 Name:	Brush	Votes:	1087

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters


Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 43.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of County Commissioner Contest Margin, Risk Limit & Sample Size

Audit Results


- President of the United States
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for the initial sample of 43 ballots. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a **greater than 99 percent confidence level**. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be

no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit/>99 percent Confidence Level was met after 43 inspected ballots


- Governor of Indiana
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for the initial sample of 43 ballots. 40 ballots were able to be inspected, and 3 ballots were skipped due to undervotes on this contest. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a **greater than 99 percent confidence level**. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit/>99 percent Confidence Level was met after 40 inspected ballots

- County Commissioner District 2
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for the initial sample of 43 ballots. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%.

The initial sample of ballots did not achieve the desired confidence level range. An additional 21 ballots were sampled. Total, 64 ballots were sampled. 62 were able to be inspected and 2 were skipped due to undervotes on this contest. After inspecting those 62 ballots, the desired confidence level range was met. The audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a 1 percent Risk Limit/99 percent Confidence Level was met after 62 inspected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP can report that all three election contest outcomes can be confirmed with significant statistical confidence through successful completion of this post-election audit. VSTOP would like to thank the Switzerland County Clerk, Karin Dutkiewicz for her coordination, the Switzerland County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Switzerland County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2024 General Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2024 General Post-Election Audit.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga



Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX C

Dearborn County Audit Report

TO: Dearborn County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Member, Frank Kramer
Election Board Member, Peggy Clapp
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Wendy Beatty

DATE: 1/27/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2024 Dearborn County General Post-Election Audit

On November 26, 2024, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Dearborn County, Indiana, of its 2024 General Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Dearborn County formally requested designation on October 10, 2024 via a County Election Board Resolution. Dearborn County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Dearborn County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the County Clerk and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on November 26, 2024 at the Dearborn County Courthouse in Lawrenceburg, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised by VSTOP to select three contested contests for audit. All chosen contests were countywide, statewide, or federal in order for the audit to encompass all ballots cast in the election within the county. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials, determined the post-election audit will utilize all types of General Election ballots, including absentee mail-in, absentee early voting, and election day ballots. The total ballots cast and counted in the General Election was 26,845, but the total in the Ballot Inventory utilized was 26,919. These additional ballots were ballot cards handed to voters that were spoiled, voided, or unvoted blank ballot cards. For integrity purposes, those ballots were still included in its respective ballot bag, but were not tabulated ballots included in the 26,845 total. Since they are included in the ballot bags, they must be included in the Ballot Inventory. If they were to be drawn for sample, they would not be inspected for audit, but the ballot inventory total

must match the “ballots cast in all contests” entered into the Stark Audit Tool for it to function properly. This had no impact on the integrity or efficacy of the audit and its purpose. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using all ballot types and the county’s certified reported results. VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly.

It was also initially determined this audit would be completed with an intended 1 percent risk-limit/99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch an outcome error if there was one, and only a 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any outcome errors. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest’s full recount, and an audit is not a recount. For this type of post-election audit, the confidence level is dependent on the contest’s margin and the random sample of ballots drawn. While it is intended to reach a 99 percent confidence level for this audit, VSTOP established that election outcomes can be confirmed with statistical confidence using risk-limits ranging from 9 percent to 1 percent and respective confidence levels ranging 91 to 99 percent. For an audit to significantly confirm election outcomes, the sample of audited ballots **MUST** reach 91 to 99 percent confidence. Should the confidence level not be reached in the initial sample of ballots it **DOES NOT** mean there is an error in election outcomes. It just means more ballots will need to be sampled until there is, at minimum, a 91 percent confidence level reported for the sample of the audited contest.

After contest selection, risk-limit definition, and ballot inventory testing, all pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** November 26, 2024
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up/Pre-Audit Meeting 10:00 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Dearborn County Courthouse – 215 W. High St. Lawrenceburg, IN 47025
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:** All Ballots Cast in General Election – 26,845
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - United States Senator from Indiana
 - Diluted Margin – 57.38%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 27
 - Attorney General of Indiana
 - Diluted Margin – 58.33%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 27
 - Indiana State Representative - District 68
 - Diluted Margin – 59.43%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 26

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the Dearborn County Courthouse at approximately 10:00 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the conducting of the audit.

By approximately 10:45 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and audit set-up was complete. Dearborn County's public, post-election audit officially began at 11:00 AM.

The VSTOP personnel who participated in this audit included:

- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director (Research)
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Austin Bilbrey, Logistics Specialist
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist
- Gina Caravaglia, Graduate Assistant for Training and Assessment

The Dearborn County Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Wendy Beatty, County Clerk
- Pamela Barbieri, Clerk's Office
- Deborah Bentle, Clerk's Office

The Secretary of State Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Dustin Renner, Election Director


VSTOP conducted a Ballot Polling Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to hand inspect ballots and record contest choices on sampled ballots until there is statistical evidence (at minimum a 91 percent confidence level) that a full hand count would confirm the certified outcome. VSTOP and County Election Officials set an intended risk-limit to better estimate sample sizes, but because polling-audits use a random sample of ballots, achieving a set risk limit is unpredictable. The closer the contest is, the greater the likelihood additional ballots will need to be counted to reach an acceptable risk-limit/confidence level. As stated previously, the intended risk-limit of 1 percent was set for Dearborn County. However, the audit can stop and be considered successfully completed once the audit has hand sampled and counted enough ballots to achieve a risk limit ranging from 9 to 1 percent (91 to 99 percent confidence level). **VSTOP has significant practical confidence in reported election outcomes when statistical confidence levels ranging 91-99 percent are achieved.**

The audit began with an introductory presentation given by Matt Housley and Dr. Chad Kinsella to all persons in attendance. This presentation provided general information about the post-election audit process and methodology used, specific information relating to Dearborn County's audit, and allowed for a Q&A to address any questions or concerns. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this memo. After this presentation concluded, execution of the audit began. A 20-digit seed number was generated to assist the Stark Audit Tool in selecting the random sample of ballots. This number was generated live-time through 20 rolls of a 10-sided die by audit participants. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Dearborn County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

85677177223620503925

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots were generated. As a best practice for Ballot Polling Audits, a sample greater than the estimated sample size is drawn. Should the confidence level not be reached through the inspection of the estimated sample ballots, additional sampled ballots would need to be inspected. All three contests for audit were inspected using the same sample of ballots. This down ballot inspection gives additional confidence in the voting systems functionality of accurate tabulation. A total of 50 ballots were drawn for sample. The images below feature the Stark Audit Tool visualizing the information described above.

A screenshot of the Stark Audit Tool interface. The title is "Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots". Below the title are four input fields: "Seed:" with the value "85677177223620503925", "Number of ballots:" with the value "26919", "Current sample number:" with the value "50", and "Draw this many ballots:" with the value "50". The "Seed:" and "Draw this many ballots:" fields are highlighted with yellow boxes. To the right of these fields are two buttons: "draw sample" and "reset".

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots	
Seed:	85677177223620503925
Number of ballots:	26919
Current sample number:	50
Draw this many ballots:	50
draw sample reset	

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 26919 Smallest margin (votes): 15,445 Diluted margin: 57.38%

Contest 1. Contest name: United States Senator from Indiana

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Banks	Votes:	20654
Candidate 2 Name:	McCray	Votes:	5209
Candidate 3 Name:	Horning	Votes:	551

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 27.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of U.S. Senate Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 26919 Smallest margin (votes): 15,703 Diluted margin: 58.33%

Contest 1. Contest name: Attorney General of Indiana

Winners: 1 ▼

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Rokita	Votes:	21018
Candidate 2 Name:	Wells	Votes:	5315

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 27.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of IN Attorney General Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: Smallest margin (votes): 15,998. Diluted margin: 59.43%.

Contest 1. Contest name:

Winners:

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Bascom	Votes:	21187
Candidate 2 Name:	Barker	Votes:	5189


Audit parameters

Risk limit: Expected sample size: 26.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of State Representative Contest Margin, Risk Limit & Sample Size

Audit Results

- U.S. Senator from Indiana
- Attorney General of Indiana
- Indiana State Representative District 68
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for an initial sample of 27 ballots for all three contests. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range for all three contests. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence these three contests were properly tabulated resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit/>99 percent Confidence Level was met after 27 inspected ballots for all three audited contests

In Closing

VSTOP can report that all three election contest outcomes can be confirmed with significant statistical confidence through successful completion of this post-election audit. VSTOP would like to thank the Dearborn County Clerk, Wendy Beatty for her coordination, the Dearborn County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Dearborn County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2024 General Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2024 General Post-Election Audit.

For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX D

Delaware County Audit Report

TO: Delaware County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Member, Peter Drumm
Election Board Member, Ashley Nichols
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Rick Spangler

DATE: 1/27/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2024 Delaware County General Post-Election Audit

On December 3, 2024, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Delaware County, Indiana, for the 2024 General Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Delaware County formally requested designation on November 4, 2024 via a County Election Board Resolution. Delaware County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Delaware County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the County Clerk and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on December 3, 2024 at the Delaware County Building in Muncie, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised by VSTOP to select three contested contests for audit. All chosen contests were countywide, statewide, or federal in order for the audit to encompass all ballots cast in the election within the county. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

It was also determined this audit would be completed with a 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch a major voting system malfunction if there was one, and only 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any major system malfunctions. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full inspection of every ballot, which is a recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Delaware County's Voting System Vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast on a Direct Record Electronic (DRE) Voting System via a digital Cast Vote Record (CVR) with a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). There were 43,286 votes cast on DREs in Delaware County's General Election. For audit preparation, County Election Officials and MicroVote had to remove VVPAT rolls from each machine, totaling over 200 rolls. Those rolls were organized, matched, and labeled for each machine. During that organization, one roll was most likely mislabeled, causing a machine to be without its respective roll. When this issue was discovered, less than 24 hours before the audit, VSTOP informed MicroVote the submitted ballot inventory would not function properly if every roll is not matched to its respective machine's CVR. VSTOP made the decision to remove this machine from the ballot inventory to allow the audit tool to function properly. This had no impact on the integrity or efficacy of the audit and its purpose. While the total votes cast and counted on DREs was 43,286, the inventory used for the audit totaled 43,192 with the single machine removed. VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly. All pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** December 3, 2024
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up and Pre-Audit Meeting 9:00 AM – Audit Begins 10:00 AM
- **Location:** Delaware County Building – 100 W. Main St. Muncie, IN 47305
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:**
Absentee In-Person Early Voting & Election Day Ballots on VVPAT – 43,192
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - President of the United States
 - Diluted Margin – 18.29%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 56 Ballots
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Diluted Margin – 5.98%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 170 Ballots
 - Judge of the 46th Circuit Court No. 2
 - Diluted Margin – 13.49%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 76 Ballots

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the County Building at approximately 9:00 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the conducting of the audit. By approximately 10:00 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and the audit set-up was complete. Delaware County's public, post-election audit officially began at 10:00 AM.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director (Research)
- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Austin Bilbrey, Logistics Specialist
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist
- Duncan Klemm, IT Specialist
- Gina Caravaglia, Graduate Assistant for Training and Assessment
- Ananya Sharma, Ball State Teacher Scholar Program Student

The Delaware County Election Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Rick Spangler, County Clerk
- Mary Ann Rees, Clerk's Office
- Natalie Wiley, Clerk's Office

The Delaware County Voting System Vendor, members of MicroVote, who participated in this audit included:

- Steve Shamo, General Manager
- Mike Yaggi, Customer Service Tech
- Benji Hudson, Customer Service Tech

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Comparison Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to inspect ballots for a match between the CVR and VVPAT. Every ballot's CVR should match its VVPAT counterpart, resulting in a 100% match rate. Delaware County Election Officials alongside the VSTOP Team manually inspect the ballot's CVR to the VVPAT for the selected contests and track the match rate through the required number of ballots to sample. After the required number of ballots have been sampled, the VSTOP Team enters the match information into the Stark Audit Tool and as long as there are zero non-matches, the audit will be successfully completed.

The audit began with an introductory presentation given by Matt Housley and Dr. Jay Bagga to all persons in attendance. This presentation provided general information about the post-election audit process and methodology used, specific information relating to Delaware County's audit, and allowed for a Q&A to address any questions or concerns. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this memo. After this presentation concluded, execution of the audit began. A 20-digit seed number was generated to assist the Stark Audit Tool in selecting the random sample of ballots. This number was generated live-time through 20 rolls of a 10 sided-die by audit participants and members of the public. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Delaware County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
19892209403440753064

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots was generated. VSTOP drew an initial sample size of 180 ballots. All three contests were reviewed using ballots from this initial sample. For Ballot Comparison Audits, undervotes may or may not be used for inspection. Either way, the integrity and result of the audit will not be affected. VSTOP allows county officials to make the decision on whether they would like to inspect undervoted ballots. Delaware County Election Officials determined they would use undervotes in the ballot inspection process. This means if the contest had been undervoted by the voter, then the ballot sampled will be inspected for an undervoted CVR to VVPAT match. The contest requiring the largest sample size for audit was the Governor of Indiana at 170 ballots. Judge of the 46th Circuit Court No. 2 required 76 ballots, and President of the United States required 56 ballots.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballot Cards

Seed:	19892209403440753064
Number of ballot cards:	43192
Current sample number:	180
Draw this many ballot cards:	180

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 43192 Smallest margin (votes): 7,899 Diluted margin: 18.29%

Contest 1. Contest name: President of the United States
Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate Name	Votes
Candidate 1 Name: Trump/Vance	24836
Candidate 2 Name: Harris/Walz	16937
Candidate 3 Name: Oliver/Maat	296
Candidate 4 Name: RFK Jr./Shanahan	488

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements	1-vote	2-vote
Understatements	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001
	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 56

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Presidential Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 43192 Smallest margin (votes): 2,581 Diluted margin: 5.98%

Contest 1. Contest name: Governor of Indiana
Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate Name	Votes
Candidate 1 Name: Braun/Beckwith	20869
Candidate 2 Name: McCormick/Goodin	18288
Candidate 3 Name: Rainwater/Hudson	1903

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements	1-vote	2-vote
Understatements	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001
	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 170

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Gubernatorial Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 43192 Smallest margin (votes): 5,825 Diluted margin: 13.49%

Contest 1. Contest name: Judge of the 46th Circuit Court No. 2
Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate Name	Votes
Candidate 1 Name: Ramirez	23467
Candidate 2 Name: Dowling	17642

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements	1-vote	2-vote
Understatements	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001
	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 76

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Judicial Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all three contests on each audited ballot for the greatest number of ballots required for sample. All three contests were audited inspecting 170 ballots. Inspected by County Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team, each ballot was reviewed for the CVR to VVPAT match for each selected contest. Inspection continued until the number of ballots required for inspection were met to achieve the set 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. The inspection of the sample of ballots generated the following results.

Audit Results

- President of the United States
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Judge of the 46th Circuit Court No. 2
- A total of 170 ballots were inspected for all contests. While one contest needed to inspect only 56 ballots, and another needed 76, all three contests were audited inspecting the largest sample needed. VSTOP inspected the estimated 170 ballots, but the set risk limit and confidence level were achieved after inspecting 161 ballots. All 170 inspected ballots had a CVR and VVPAT match, resulting in **100 percent match rate**. The audit concludes with **99 percent confidence** that the election systems functioned properly, resulting in correctly tabulated and reported election outcomes.

Should more ballot cards be audited?

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 170

1-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0

2-vote overstatements: 0 Rate: 0

1-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0

2-vote understatements: 0 Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Calculate **Audit complete**

If no more differences are observed: 161.

If differences continue at the same rates: 161.

Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing Risk Limit and Confidence Level were met after 161 inspected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank the Delaware County Clerk's Office, Rick Spangler and Mary Ann Rees for their coordination, the Delaware County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Delaware County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2024 General Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2024 General Post-Election Audit.

For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga




Co-Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Co-Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX E

St. Joseph County Audit Report

TO: St. Joseph County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Member, Marcellus Lebbin
Election Board Member, Chuck Leone
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Amy Rolfes

DATE: 2/4/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2024 St. Joseph County General Post-Election Audit

On December 5, 2024, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in St. Joseph County, Indiana, of its 2024 General Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. St. Joseph County formally requested designation on October 4, 2024 via a County Election Board Resolution. St. Joseph County was granted designation and audit prep began.

Initial audit meetings were held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions St. Joseph County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the County Clerk and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for December 5, and if needed, December 6. It was conducted and completed on December 5, 2024 at the County-City Building in South Bend, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised by VSTOP to select three contested contests for audit. All chosen contests must be countywide, statewide, or federal so the audit encompasses all ballots cast in the election within the county. Based on St. Joseph County's extremely close margins in federal and state contests, sample size estimates were exorbitant and not feasible for audit. Due to this, VSTOP directed County Election Officials to select only countywide contests for audit. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit will utilize all types of General Election ballots, including absentee mail-in, absentee early voting, and election day ballots. The total ballots cast and counted in the General Election was 112,329, but the total in the Ballot Inventory utilized was 112,242.

Provisional ballots require additional action post-election, so they were not able to be sorted into their respective vote centers which they may have originated from. While they were cast and counted, they were not included in the inventory for the audit, which accounts for the 87-ballot difference between the certified results and the “total ballots cast” used in the audit tool. This had no impact on the integrity or efficacy of the audit and its purpose. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using all ballot types and the county’s certified reported results. VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly.

It was also initially determined this audit would be completed with a flexible risk-limit/confidence level. Based on the contests selected for audit, the intended risk-limit would range anywhere from 9 to 1 percent/ 91 to 99 percent confidence. This means there is 91 to 99 percent confidence the audit would catch an outcome error if there was one, and only a 9 to 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any outcome errors. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest’s full recount, and an audit is not a recount. For this type of post-election audit, the confidence level is variable depending on the contest’s margin and the random sample of ballots drawn. For an audit to significantly confirm election outcomes, the sample of audited ballots **MUST** reach 91 to 99 percent confidence. Should the confidence level not be reached in the initial sample of ballots it **DOES NOT** mean there is an error in election outcomes. It just means more ballots will need to be sampled until there is, at minimum, a 91 percent confidence level reported for the sample of the audited contest.

After contest selection, risk-limit definition, and ballot inventory testing, all pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** December 5, 2024
- **Audit Time:**
 - VSTOP Set-up/Pre-Audit Meeting – Wednesday December 4 at 3:00 PM
 - Audit Begins - December 5 at 8:30 AM
- **Location:** County-City Building – 277 W. Jefferson Blvd. South Bend, IN 46601
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:**
 - Ballots Cast in General Election (Provisional Ballots Excluded) – 112,242
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Indiana Supreme Court Retention Question – Lorretta H. Rush
 - Diluted Margin – 36.8%
 - Intended Risk Limit – 1%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 55

- Judge of the St. Joseph County Probate Court
 - Diluted Margin – 7.8%
 - Intended Risk Limit – 5%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 960
- St. Joseph County Coroner
 - Diluted Margin – 5.3%
 - Intended Risk Limit – 9%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 1,666

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP’s Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the County-City Building at approximately 3:00 PM on December 4 and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the conducting of the audit. By approximately 4:30 PM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and audit set-up was complete. St. Joseph County’s public, post-election audit officially began at 8:30 AM on December 5.

The VSTOP personnel who participated in this audit included:

- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Austin Bilbrey, Logistics Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist
- Gina Caravaglia, Graduate Assistant for Training and Assessment

The St. Joseph County Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Amy Rolfes, County Clerk
- Trisha Carrico, Chief Deputy Clerk
- Kim Riskovitch, Election Clerk
- Chris Lyle, Lead Machine Technician
- June Lawton, Clerk Supervisor
- Elizabeth Leeper, Clerk Supervisor
- Angie Pluta, Clerk Supervisor
- Darlene Sienkowski, Clerk Supervisor
- Eric Clark, Voter Registration Clerk
- Marissa Davis, Voter Registration Clerk
- Gino Catanzarite, Voter Registration Clerk
- Jennifer Wiland, Voter Registration Clerk
- Karen Beelaert, Clerk

- Johnathan Maloney, Clerk
- Jennifer Newgent, Clerk
- Renee Richardson, Clerk
- Barbara Vollmer, Clerk
- Carole Waterhouse, Clerk

The St. Joseph County Voting System Vendor (RBM Voting) personnel who participated in this audit included:

- Nick Abernathy, Project Manager

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Polling Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to hand inspect ballots and record contest choices on sampled ballots until there is statistical evidence (at minimum a 91 percent confidence level) a full hand count would confirm the certified outcome. VSTOP and County Election Officials set an intended risk-limit to better estimate sample sizes, but because polling-audits use a random sample of ballots, achieving a set risk limit is unpredictable. The closer the contest is, the greater the likelihood additional ballots will need to be counted to reach an acceptable risk-limit/confidence level. As stated previously, the intended risk-limit of 1, 5 and 9 percent were set for each respective contest audited. However, the audit can stop and be considered successfully completed once the audit has sampled and hand counted enough ballots to achieve a risk limit ranging from 9 to 1 percent (91 to 99 percent confidence level). **VSTOP has significant practical confidence in reported election outcomes when statistical confidence levels ranging 91-99 percent are achieved.**

The audit began with an introductory presentation given by Matt Housley and Dr. Chad Kinsella to all persons in attendance. This presentation provided general information about the post-election audit process and methodology used, specific information relating to St. Joseph County's audit, and allowed for a Q&A to address any questions or concerns. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this memo. After this presentation concluded, execution of the audit began. A 20-digit seed number was generated to assist the Stark Audit Tool in selecting the random sample of ballots. This number was generated live-time through 20 rolls of a 10-sided die by audit participants. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the St. Joseph County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

98987571586013188055

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots were generated. As a best practice for Ballot Polling Audits, a sample greater than the estimated sample size is drawn. Should the confidence level not be reached through the inspection of the estimated sample ballots, additional sampled ballots would need to be inspected. All three contests for audit were inspected using the same sample of ballots. This down ballot inspection gives additional confidence in the voting systems functionality of accurate tabulation. A total of

4,000 ballots were drawn for sample. The images below feature the Stark Audit Tool visualizing the information described above.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots

Seed: 98987571586013188055

Number of ballots: 112242

Current sample number: 0

Draw this many ballots: 4000 draw sample reset

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 112242 Smallest margin (votes): 41,334 Diluted margin: 36.83%

Contest 1. Contest name: IN Supreme Court Judge Retention - Loretta H. Rush

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	YES	Votes:	65394
Candidate 2 Name:	NO	Votes:	24060

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 55.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Retention Question Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 112242 Smallest margin (votes): 8,767 Diluted margin: 7.81%

Contest 1. Contest name: Judge of the Probate Court

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Cichowicz	Votes:	49793
Candidate 2 Name:	Zappia	Votes:	58560

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 5% Expected sample size: 960.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Judge of the Probate Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 112242 Smallest margin (votes): 5,954 Diluted margin: 5.3%.

Contest 1. Contest name: St. Joseph County Coroner

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name: McGann	Votes: 51052
Candidate 2 Name: Jordan	Votes: 57006

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 9% Expected sample size: 1,666.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of County Coroner Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Audit Results

- Indiana Supreme Court Retention Question – Lorretta H. Rush
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for 94 ballots. 71 were able to be inspected and recorded and 23 inspected ballots were skipped because they were undervoted. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. This initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a **greater than 99 percent confidence level**. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, and the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.

Audit progress


Audited votes for IN Supreme Court Judge Retention - Loretta H. Rush: 71

YES	52
NO	19

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit/>99 percent Confidence Level was met after 71 inspected ballots

- Judge of the St. Joseph County Probate Court
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for 989 ballots. 960 were able to be inspected and recorded and 29 inspected ballots were skipped because they were undervoted. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. This initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a **greater than 99 percent confidence level**. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, and the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.


Audit progress



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit/>99 percent Confidence Level was met after 960 inspected ballots

- St. Joseph County Coroner
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for 1,748 ballots. 1,671 were able to be inspected and recorded and 77 inspected ballots were skipped because they were undervoted. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. This initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range. This sample generated a **99 percent confidence level**. The audit concluded **with 99 percent confidence** this contest was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.

Audit progress



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a 1 percent Risk Limit/99 percent Confidence Level was met after 1,671 inspected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP can report that all three election contest outcomes can be confirmed with significant statistical confidence through successful completion of this post-election audit. VSTOP would like to thank the St. Joseph County Clerk's Team: Amy, Trisha, Kim, and Chris for their coordination, and the St. Joseph County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation. Thank you to the Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving St. Joseph County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2024 General Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2024 General Post-Election Audit.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX F

Hendricks County Audit Report

TO: Hendricks County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Member, Don Hodson
Election Board Member, Tracy Berens-Funk
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Marjorie Pike

DATE: 2/14/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2024 Hendricks County General Post-Election Audit

On December 10, 2024, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Hendricks County, Indiana, for the 2024 General Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Hendricks County formally requested designation on October 4, 2024 via a County Election Board Resolution. Hendricks County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Hendricks County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the Chief Deputy Clerk of Elections, Debbie (DJ) Hoskins, and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on December 10, 2024 at the Hendricks County Government Center in Danville, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised by VSTOP to select three contested contests for audit. All chosen contests were countywide, statewide, or federal in order for the audit to encompass all ballots cast in the election within the county. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

It was also determined this audit would be completed with a 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch a

major voting system malfunction if there was one, and only 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any major system malfunctions. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full inspection of every ballot, which is a recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by Hedricks County's Voting System Vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT). VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly. All pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** December 10, 2024
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up and Pre-Audit Meeting 9:15 AM – Audit Begins 10:00 AM
- **Location:** Government Center– 355 S. Washington St. Danville, IN 46122
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:**
Absentee In-Person Early Voting & Election Day Ballots on VVPAT – 77,740
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Diluted Margin – 18.12%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 56 Ballots
 - Hendricks County Commissioner District 3
 - Diluted Margin – 28.14%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 36 Ballots
 - Hendricks County Council
 - Diluted Margin – 14.38%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 71 Ballots

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the County Building at approximately 9:15 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the conducting of the audit. By approximately 10:00 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and the audit set-up was complete. Hendricks County's public, post-election audit officially began at 10:00 AM.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist
- Gina Caravaglia, Graduate Assistant for Training and Assessment

The Hendricks County Election Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Marjorie Pike, County Clerk
- Don Hodson, Election Board
- Tracy Berens-Funk, Election Board
- Debbie (DJ) Hoskins, Chief Deputy Clerk of Elections
- Anita Pearman, Clerk's Office
- Tina Woodrum, Clerk's Office

The Hendricks County Voting System Vendor, members of MicroVote, who participated in this audit included:

- Steve Shamo, General Manager
- Jared Turner, MicroVote Quality Manager
- Mike Yaggi, Customer Service Tech
- Benji Hudson, Customer Service Tech

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Comparison Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to inspect ballots for a match between the CVR and VVPAT. Every ballot's CVR should match its VVPAT counterpart, resulting in a 100% match rate. Hendricks County Election Officials alongside the VSTOP Team manually inspect the ballot's CVR to the VVPAT for the selected contests and track the match rate through the required number of ballots to sample. After the required number of ballots have been sampled, the VSTOP Team enters the match information into the Stark Audit Tool and as long as there are zero non-matches, the audit will be successfully completed.

The audit began with an introductory presentation given by Matt Housley and Dr. Chad Kinsella to all persons in attendance. This presentation provided general information about the post- election audit process and methodology used, specific information relating to Hendricks County's audit, and allowed for a Q&A to address any questions or concerns. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this memo. After this presentation concluded, execution of the audit began. A 20-digit seed number was generated to assist the Stark Audit Tool in selecting the random sample of ballots. This number was generated live-time through 20 rolls of a 10 sided- die by audit participants and members of the public. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Hendricks County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

78901285231020516930

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots was generated. VSTOP drew an initial sample size of 80 ballots. All three contests were reviewed using ballots from this initial sample. For Ballot Comparison Audits, undervotes may or may not be used for inspection. Either way, the integrity and result of the audit will not be affected. VSTOP allows county officials to make the decision on whether they would like to inspect undervoted ballots. Hendricks County Election Officials determined they would use undervotes in the ballot inspection process. This means if the contest had been undervoted by the voter, then the ballot sampled will be inspected for an undervoted CVR to VVPAT match. The contest requiring the largest sample size for audit was the County Council contest at 71 ballots. Governor of Indiana required 56 ballots, and County Commissioner District 3 required 36 ballots.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballot Cards

Seed:	78901285231020516930
Number of ballot cards:	77740
Current sample number:	80
Draw this many ballot cards:	80

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 77740 Smallest margin (votes): 14,084 Diluted margin: 18.12%

Contest 1. Contest name: Governor of Indiana
Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Braun/Beckwith	Votes:	42105
Candidate 2 Name:	McCormick/Goodin	Votes:	28021
Candidate 3 Name:	Rainwater/Hudson	Votes:	3917

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size: 56

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Gubernatorial Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 77740 Smallest margin (votes): 21,874 Diluted margin: 28.14%

Contest 1. Contest name: Hendricks County Commissioner Dist. 3
Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Whicker	Votes:	46953
Candidate 2 Name:	Berry-Tayman	Votes:	25079

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size: 36

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of County Commissioner Contest Margin, Risk Limit & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 77740 Smallest margin (votes): 11,179 Diluted margin: 14.38%

Contest 1. Contest name: Hendricks County Council
Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 3

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Hesson	Votes:	37297
Candidate 2 Name:	Marsh	Votes:	34202
Candidate 3 Name:	Wyeth	Votes:	32432
Candidate 4 Name:	Davia	Votes:	16798
Candidate 5 Name:	Walsh	Votes:	21253
Candidate 6 Name:	White	Votes:	19814

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001
Understatements. 1-vote:	0.001	2-vote:	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size: 71

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of County Council Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all three contests on each audited ballot for the greatest number of ballots required for sample. All three contests were audited inspecting 71 ballots. Inspected by County Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team, each ballot was reviewed for the CVR to VVPAT match for each selected contest. Inspection continued until the number of ballots required for inspection were met to achieve the set 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. The inspection of the sample of ballots generated the following results.

Audit Results

- Governor of Indiana
 - Hendricks County Commissioner District 3
 - Hendricks County Council
- A total of 71 ballots were inspected for all contests. While one contest needed to inspect only 56 ballots, and another needed 36, all three contests were audited inspecting the largest sample needed. VSTOP inspected the estimated 71 ballots, but the set risk limit and confidence level were achieved after inspecting 67 ballots. All 71 inspected ballots had a CVR and VVPAT match, resulting in **100 percent match rate**. The audit concludes with **99 percent confidence** that the election systems functioned properly, resulting in correctly tabulated and reported election outcomes.

Stopping sample size and escalation

Ballots audited so far: 71

1-vote overstatements: Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements: Rate: 0
1-vote understatements: Rate: 0
2-vote understatements: Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Audit complete
If no more differences are observed: 67.
If differences continue at the same rates: 67.
Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing Risk Limit and Confidence Level were met after 67 inspected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank the Hendricks County Clerk's Office, Marjorie Pike and Debbie (DJ) Hoskins for their coordination, the Hendricks County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Hendricks County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2024 General Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2024 General Post-Election Audit.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga




Co-Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Co-Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX G

Fountain County Audit Report

TO: Fountain County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Member, Lisa Cruea
Election Board Member, Sherri VanHook
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Patty Smith

DATE: 2/17/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2024 Fountain County General Post-Election Audit

On December 12, 2024, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Fountain County, Indiana, of its 2024 General Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Fountain County formally requested designation on October 25, 2024 via a County Election Board Resolution. Fountain County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Fountain County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the County Clerk and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on December 12, 2024 at the Fountain County Courthouse in Covington, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised by VSTOP to select three contested contests for audit. All chosen contests were countywide, statewide, or federal in order for the audit to encompass all ballots cast in the election within the county. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials, determined the post-election audit will utilize all types of General Election ballots, including absentee mail-in, absentee early voting, and election day ballots. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using all ballot types and the county's certified reported results. VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly.

It was also initially determined this audit would be completed with an intended 1 percent risk-limit/99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch an outcome error if there was one, and only a 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any outcome errors. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full recount, and an audit is not a recount. For this type of post-election audit, the confidence level is dependent on the contest's margin and the random sample of ballots drawn. While it is intended to reach a 99 percent confidence level for this audit, VSTOP established that election outcomes can be confirmed with statistical confidence using risk-limits ranging from 9 percent to 1 percent and respective confidence levels ranging 91 to 99 percent. For an audit to significantly confirm election outcomes, the sample of audited ballots **MUST** reach 91 to 99 percent confidence. Should the confidence level not be reached in the initial sample of ballots it **DOES NOT** mean there is an error in election outcomes. It just means more ballots will need to be sampled until there is, at minimum, a 91 percent confidence level reported for the sample of the audited contest.

After contest selection, risk-limit definition, and ballot inventory testing, all pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** December 12, 2024
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up/Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** Fountain County Courthouse – 301 Fourth St. Covington, IN 47932
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:** All Ballots Cast in General Election – 8,053
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - President of the United States
 - Diluted Margin – 59.42%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 25
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Diluted Margin – 49.17%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 35
 - County Commissioner District 2
 - Diluted Margin – 53.58%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 31

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the Fountain County Courthouse at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the start of the audit.

By approximately 10:45 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and audit set-up was complete. Fountain County's public, post-election audit officially began at 11:00 AM.

The VSTOP personnel who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Austin Bilbrey, Logistics Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist

The Fountain County Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Patty Smith, County Clerk
- Becky Dinsmore, Voter Registration Clerk
- Wanda Taylor, Election Board Designee
- Sherri VanHook, Election Board Member


VSTOP conducted a Ballot Polling Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to hand inspect ballots and record contest choices on sampled ballots until there is statistical evidence (at minimum a 91 percent confidence level) that a full hand count would confirm the certified outcome. VSTOP and County Election Officials set an intended risk-limit to better estimate sample sizes, but because polling-audits use a random sample of ballots, achieving a set risk limit is unpredictable. The closer the contest is, the greater the likelihood additional ballots will need to be counted to reach an acceptable risk limit/confidence level. As stated previously, the intended risk-limit of 1 percent was set for Fountain County. However, the audit can stop and be considered successfully completed once the audit has hand sampled and counted enough ballots to achieve a risk limit ranging from 9 to 1 percent (91 to 99 percent confidence level). **VSTOP has significant practical confidence in reported election outcomes when statistical confidence levels ranging 91-99 percent are achieved.**

The audit began with an introductory presentation given by Matt Housley to all persons in attendance. This presentation provided general information about the post-election audit process and methodology used, specific information relating to Fountain County's audit, and allowed for a Q&A to address any questions or concerns. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this memo. After this presentation concluded, execution of the audit began. A 20-digit seed number was generated to assist the Stark Audit Tool in selecting the random sample of ballots. This number was generated live-time through 20 rolls of a 10-sided die by audit participants. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Fountain County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

34025523664565879780

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots were generated. As a best practice for Ballot Polling Audits, a sample greater than the estimated sample size is drawn. Should the confidence level not be reached through the inspection of the estimated sample ballots, additional sampled ballots would need to be inspected. All three contests for audit were inspected using the same sample of ballots. This down ballot inspection gives additional confidence in the voting systems functionality of accurate tabulation. A total of 60 ballots were drawn for sample. The images below feature the Stark Audit Tool visualizing the information described above.

The screenshot shows the 'Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots' interface of the Stark Audit Tool. It features four input fields with yellow highlights: 'Seed:' with the value '34025523664565879780', 'Number of ballots:' with '8053', 'Current sample number:' with '60', and 'Draw this many ballots:' with '60'. To the right of these fields are two buttons labeled 'draw sample' and 'reset'.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots	
Seed:	34025523664565879780
Number of ballots:	8053
Current sample number:	60
Draw this many ballots:	60
draw sample reset	

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 8053 Smallest margin (votes): 4,785 Diluted margin: 59.42%

Contest 1. Contest name: President of the United States
Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Trump/Vance	Votes:	6311
Candidate 2 Name:	Karris/Walz	Votes:	1526
Candidate 3 Name:	Oliver/Maat	Votes:	56
Candidate 4 Name:	RFK Jr./Shanahan	Votes:	88

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 25.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Presidential Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 8053 Smallest margin (votes): 3,960 Diluted margin: 49.17%

Contest 1. Contest name: Governor of Indiana
Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Braun/Beckwith	Votes:	5664
Candidate 2 Name:	McCormick/Goodin	Votes:	1704
Candidate 3 Name:	Rainwater/Hudson	Votes:	570

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 35.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Gubernatorial Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 8053 Smallest margin (votes): 4,315 Diluted margin: 53.58%

Contest 1. Contest name: County Commissioner District 2
Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name:	Rice	Votes:	6078
Candidate 2 Name:	Haddock	Votes:	1763

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest


Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 31.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of County Commissioner Contest Margin, Risk Limit & Sample Size

Audit Results

- President of the United States
- Governor of Indiana
- Fountain County Commissioner District 2
 - Sampled ballots were hand counted for an initial sample of 38 ballots for all three contests. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each candidate into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range for all three contests. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence these three contests were properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome for all three contests.**



Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit/>99 percent Confidence Level was met after 38 inspected ballots for all three audited contests

In Closing

VSTOP can report that all three election contest outcomes can be confirmed with significant statistical confidence through successful completion of this post-election audit. VSTOP would like to thank the Fountain County Clerk, Patty Smith, for her coordination, the Fountain County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Fountain County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2024 General Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2024 General Post-Election Audit.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga




Senior Director (Research)
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dustin Renner



Election Director
Indiana Secretary of State

Dr. Chad Kinsella



Executive Director
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

APPENDIX H

DeKalb County Audit Report

TO: DeKalb County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

CC: Election Board Member, Tara Lilly
Election Board Member, Suzanne Drerup-Davis
Current Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Dana Hendrick
Outgoing Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Holly Albright

DATE: 2/17/2025

SUBJECT: Summary of 2024 DeKalb County General Post-Election Audit

On December 18, 2024, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in DeKalb County, Indiana, for the 2024 General Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

Pre-Audit Process

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. DeKalb County formally requested designation on October 2, 2024 via a County Election Board Resolution. DeKalb County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions DeKalb County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by County Clerk, Holly Albright, and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on December 18, 2024 at the DeKalb County Office Building in Auburn, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the selected contests based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

County Election Officials were advised by VSTOP to select three contested contests for audit. All chosen contests were countywide, statewide, or federal in order for the audit to encompass all ballots cast in the election within the county. In consultation with VSTOP, Election Officials determined the post-election audit would utilize all absentee in-person early voting and election day ballots. These ballots were selected because they were cast on the voting system in which the audit is built to inspect. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using those ballot types and the county's certified reported results.

It was also determined this audit would be completed with a 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch a major voting system malfunction if there was one, and only 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any major system malfunctions. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full inspection of every ballot, which is a recount, not an audit.

The ballot manifest/inventory was generated by DeKalb County's Voting System Vendor, MicroVote, and included all votes cast during absentee in-person voting and on Election Day that were recorded via Cast Vote Record (CVR) with Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT). VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly. All pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** December 18, 2024
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up and Pre-Audit Meeting 9:15 AM – Audit Begins 10:00 AM
- **Location:** DeKalb County Office Building, 215 E. Ninth St. Auburn, IN 46706
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:**
Absentee In-Person Early Voting & Election Day Ballots on VVPAT – 19,060
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Contests Selected for Audit:**
 - U.S. House of Representatives – Indiana District 3
 - Diluted Margin – 47.67%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 22 Ballots
 - Governor of Indiana
 - Diluted Margin – 40.97%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 25 Ballots
 - DeKalb County Commissioner – Central District
 - Diluted Margin – 34.22%
 - Estimated Sample Size – 30 Ballots

VSTOP and DeKalb County Election Officials made the decision double the needed sample size of 30 ballots to increase public trust in the audit process. It was determined all three contests would be audited by inspecting 60 ballots.

Execution of Post-Election Audit

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the County Office Building at approximately 9:15 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed contest selection and election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the conducting of the audit. By approximately 10:00 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and the audit set-up was complete. DeKalb County's public, post-election audit officially began just after 10:00 AM.

The VSTOP team members who participated in this audit included:

- Dr. Chad Kinsella, VSTOP Executive Director
- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Marc Chatot, VSTOP Manager
- Spencer Drumm, Election Systems Certification Specialist
- Alisa Gray, Election Training and Assessment Specialist
- Austin Bilbrey, Logistics Specialist
- Gina Caravaglia, Graduate Assistant for Training and Assessment

The DeKalb County Election Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Holly Albright, Outgoing County Clerk
- Dana Hendrick, Incoming County Clerk
- Tara Lilly, Election Board
- Suzanne Drerup-Davis, Election Board
- Karen Bishop, Voter Registration/Election Deputy

The DeKalb County Voting System Vendor, members of MicroVote, who participated in this audit included:

- Steve Shamo, General Manager
- Jack Georgopoulos, Customer Service Tech
- Sam Miller, Customer Service Tech
- Benji Hudson, Customer Service Tech

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Comparison Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to inspect ballots for a match between the CVR and VVPAT. Every ballot's CVR should match its VVPAT counterpart, resulting in a 100% match rate. DeKalb County Election Officials alongside the VSTOP Team manually inspect the ballot's CVR to the VVPAT for the selected contests and track the match rate through the required number of ballots to sample. After the required number of ballots have been sampled, the VSTOP Team enters the match information into the Stark Audit Tool and as long as there are zero non-matches, the audit will be successfully completed.

The audit began with an introductory presentation given by Matt Housley and Dr. Chad Kinsella to all persons in attendance. This presentation provided general information about the post-election audit process and methodology used, specific information relating to DeKalb County's audit, and allowed for a Q&A to address any questions or concerns. This presentation has been attached as *Appendix A* to this memo. After this presentation concluded, execution of the audit began. A 20-digit seed number was generated to assist the Stark Audit Tool in selecting the random sample of ballots. This number was generated live-time through 20 rolls of a 10 sided- die by audit participants and members of the public. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the DeKalb County Post-Election Audit is as follows:
91587860374018221501

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots was generated. VSTOP drew an initial sample size of 65 ballots. All three contests were reviewed using ballots from this initial sample. For Ballot Comparison Audits, undervotes may or may not be used for inspection. Either way, the integrity and result of the audit will not be affected. VSTOP allows county officials to make the decision on whether they would like to inspect undervoted ballots. DeKalb County Election Officials determined they would use undervotes in the ballot inspection process. This means if the contest had been undervoted by the voter, then the ballot sampled will be inspected for an undervoted CVR to VVPAT match.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballot Cards

Seed:	91587860374018221501
Number of ballot cards:	19060
Current sample number:	65
Draw this many ballot cards:	65

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 19060 Smallest margin (votes): 9,085 Diluted margin: 47.67%

Contest 1. Contest name: U.S. Representative District 3

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate Name	Votes
Candidate 1 Name: Stutzman	13254
Candidate 2 Name: Adolph	4169
Candidate 3 Name: Lancaster	684

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements	1-vote	2-vote
Understatements	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001
	0.001	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 22

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of U.S. House Contest Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 19060 Smallest margin (votes): 7,808 Diluted margin: 40.97%

Contest 1. Contest name: Governor of Indiana

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate Name	Votes
Candidate 1 Name: Braun/Beckwith	12635
Candidate 2 Name: McCormick/Goodin	4827
Candidate 3 Name: Rainwater/Hudson	1140

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements	1-vote	2-vote
Understatements	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001
	0.001	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 25

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Gubernatorial Contest Margin, Risk Limit & Sample Size

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballot cards cast in all contests: 19060 Smallest margin (votes): 6,523 Diluted margin: 34.22%

Contest 1. Contest name: County Commissioner Central District

Contest type: ☒ plurality ☐ super-majority

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate Name	Votes
Candidate 1 Name: Dooley	11834
Candidate 2 Name: Winebrenner	5311

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest

Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1%

Expected rates or differences (as decimal numbers):

Overstatements	1-vote	2-vote
Understatements	1-vote: 0.001	2-vote: 0.0001
	0.001	0.0001

Starting size

☒ Round up 1-vote differences. ☐ Round up 2-vote differences Calculate size 30

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of County Commissioner Contest Margin, Risk Limit & Sample Size

VSTOP's practice is to inspect all three contests on each audited ballot for the greatest number of ballots required for sample. As previously mentioned, VSTOP inspected double the needed sample size. All three contests were audited inspecting 61 ballots. Inspected by County Election Officials and members of the VSTOP Audit Team, each ballot was reviewed for the CVR to VVPAT match for each selected contest. This sample achieved the set 1 percent risk limit and 99 percent confidence level. The inspection of the sample of ballots generated the following results.

Audit Results

- U.S. House of Representatives – District 3
- Governor of Indiana
- DeKalb County Commissioner – Central District
 - A total of 61 ballots were inspected for all contests. While the first contest needed to inspect only 22 ballots, the second 25, and the third 30, all three contests were audited inspecting 61 ballots. VSTOP inspected the 61 ballots, but the set risk limit and confidence level were achieved after inspecting 28 ballots. All 61 inspected ballots had a CVR and VVPAT match, resulting in **100 percent match rate**. The audit concludes with **99 percent confidence** that the election systems functioned properly, resulting in correctly tabulated and reported election outcomes.

— Stopping sample size and escalation —

Ballots audited so far: 61

1-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote overstatements:	0	Rate: 0
1-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0
2-vote understatements:	0	Rate: 0

Estimated stopping size

Audit complete

If no more differences are observed: 28.

If differences continue at the same rates: 28.

Estimated additional ballots if difference rates stay the same: 0.

Above: Stark Audit Tool showing Risk Limit and Confidence Level were met after 28 inspected ballots

In Closing

VSTOP would like to thank the DeKalb County Clerk's Office, Holly Albright and Dana Hendrick, for their coordination, the DeKalb County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving DeKalb County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2024 General Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2024 General Post-Election Audit.

For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at vstop@bsu.edu.

Matt Housley, MPA



Election Systems Audit Specialist
Voting System Technical Oversight Program

Dr. Jay Bagga




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