

**TO:** Clark County Clerk's Office and County Election Board

**CC:** Election Board Chairman, Andy Steele  
Election Board Member, Tony Singleton  
Election Board Secretary & County Clerk, Ryan Lynch

**DATE:** 6/24/2025

**SUBJECT:** Summary of 2025 Clark County Special Post-Election Audit

On May 21, 2025, the VSTOP team successfully completed a post-election audit in Clark County, Indiana, of its 2025 Special Election. The following memo will summarize the pre-audit process, explain the execution of the audit, and present the audit results.

### **Pre-Audit Process**

VSTOP has been authorized by the Indiana Secretary of State to conduct post-election audits. At this time, Indiana does not have mandated post-election audits, and participation is voluntary by the county, and designated by the Secretary of State. Clark County formally requested designation on April 28, 2025 via a County Election Board Resolution. Clark County was granted designation and audit prep began.

An initial audit meeting was held to review the post-election audit process, and answer any questions Clark County Election Officials had about the process. From there, the audit date, time, location and selection of audited contests, coordinated by the County Clerk and VSTOP, were finalized. The audit was scheduled for and conducted on May 21, 2025 at the Clark County Government Center in Jeffersonville, Indiana.

Using the Stark Audit Tool, VSTOP proceeded to run ballot sample size estimates on the single contest based on the initial election night reports found on the county website. While these may not have been the final vote totals (pre-certification), they work appropriately for estimating expected sample sizes and approximating how long it would take to complete the audit.

Clark County's Special Election contained a single referendum question for voters in the Silver Creek School Corporation. The final audit estimations and ballot manifests/inventories were generated using all ballot types and the county's certified reported results. VSTOP then checked the manifest for functionality in the Stark Audit Tool and confirmed it functioned properly.

It was also initially determined this audit would be completed with an intended 1 percent risk-limit/99 percent confidence level. This means there is 99 percent confidence the audit would catch an outcome error if there was one, and only a 1 percent risk the audit would not catch any outcome errors. The only way a 100 percent confidence level can be achieved is through a contest's full recount, and an audit is not a recount. For this type of post-election audit, the confidence level is dependent on the contest's margin and the random sample of ballots drawn.

While it is intended to reach a 99 percent confidence level for this audit, VSTOP established that election outcomes can be confirmed with statistical confidence using risk-limits ranging from 9 percent to 1 percent and respective confidence levels ranging 91 to 99 percent. For an audit to significantly confirm election outcomes, the sample of audited ballots **MUST** reach 91 to 99 percent confidence. Should the confidence level not be reached in the initial sample of ballots it **DOES NOT** mean there is an error in election outcomes. It just means more ballots will need to be sampled until there is, at minimum, a 91 percent confidence level reported for the sample of the audited contest.

After contest selection, risk-limit definition, and ballot inventory testing, all pre-audit prep was complete and the audit was ready to be conducted.

The information above is detailed below:

- **Audit Date:** May 21, 2025
- **Audit Time:** VSTOP Set-up/Pre-Audit Meeting 10:15 AM – Audit Begins 11:00 AM
- **Location:** County Government Complex – 501 E Court Ave Jeffersonville, IN 47130
- **Total Ballots Selected for Audit:** All Ballots Cast in Special Election – 3,998
- **Estimated Ballot Sample Sizes for Public Question Selected for Audit:**
  - Silver Creek School Corporation Referendum
    - Diluted Margin – 88.07%
    - Estimated Sample Size – 11

While only 11 ballots were estimated for inspection to achieve the 1 percent risk limit, VSTOP and County Election Officials agreed it would inspect at least three times the estimated sample size. While the statistics of the audit will not change, it bolsters public confidence in the audit by sampling more than required minimum number of ballots.

### **Execution of Post-Election Audit**

The VSTOP Audit Team, led by VSTOP's Election System Audit Specialist, Matt Housley, arrived at the Clark County Government Complex at approximately 10:15 AM and began audit set-up. As the VSTOP Team set-up, Matt had a pre-audit meeting for all County Election Officials participating in the audit. The meeting covered the post-election audit process and responsibilities, reviewed and confirmed election result totals, and completed a final review of the public post-election audit presentation that will be given just prior to the start of the audit.

By approximately 11:00 AM the pre-audit meeting was concluded and audit set-up was complete. Clark County's public, post-election audit officially began at 11:05 AM.

The VSTOP personnel who participated in this audit included:

- Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist
- Dr. Jay Bagga, VSTOP Senior Director

The Clark County Officials who participated in this audit included:

- Ryan Lynch, County Clerk
- Angela Cornett, Election Administrator
- Piper Mathis, Election Clerk
- Darla Stahl, Absentee Board

VSTOP conducted a Ballot Polling Audit using the Stark Audit Tool built for this type of post-election audit. This audit type is meant to hand inspect ballots and record contest choices on sampled ballots until there is statistical evidence (at minimum a 91 percent confidence level) that a full hand count would confirm the certified outcome. VSTOP and County Election Officials set an intended risk-limit to better estimate sample sizes, but because polling-audits use a random sample of ballots, achieving a set risk limit is unpredictable. The closer the contest is, the greater the likelihood additional ballots will need to be counted to reach an acceptable risk limit/confidence level. As stated previously, the intended risk-limit of 1 percent was set for Clark County. However, the audit can stop and be considered successfully completed once the audit has hand sampled and counted enough ballots to achieve a risk limit ranging from 9 to 1 percent (91 to 99 percent confidence level). **VSTOP has significant practical confidence in reported election outcomes when statistical confidence levels ranging 91-99 percent are achieved.**

The audit began with a public post-election audit presentation given by VSTOP Senior Director, Dr. Jay Bagga and Election Systems Audit Specialist, Matt Housley. The presentation overviewed VSTOP and explained the post-election audit process. A ballot-polling audit method was used. In a Ballot-Polling Audit, votes are hand counted until there is convincing evidence (91-99 percent confidence) that the election outcome of the audit would match the election outcome of the tabulated results. While the estimated sample for this audit was 11 ballots, VSTOP and Clark County Election Officials decided to sample at least three times the number of needed ballots for greater public confidence. The sample was drawn in live-time using a random seed number generated by 20 virtual rolls of a 10-sided die. The live-time generation of the seed number assures the sample is truly random and no-one could know what ballots were going to be selected for sample prior to the audit beginning. The seed number also becomes a control for this audit, so should the audit ever need to be replicated, it can be done so in its entirety.

The seed number for the Clark County Post-Election Audit is as follows:

**67551266111033846247**

The seed number was entered into the Stark Audit Tool and a random sample of ballots were generated. As a best practice for Ballot Polling Audits, a sample greater than the estimated sample size is drawn. Should the confidence level not be reached through the inspection of the estimated sample ballots, additional sampled ballots would need to be inspected. A total of 35 ballots were drawn for sample. The images below feature the Stark Audit Tool visualizing the information described above.

Pseudo-Random Sample of Ballots

Seed: 67551266111033846247

Number of ballots: 3998

Current sample number: 35

Draw this many ballots: 35

draw sample reset

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screen Shot of Seed Number and Initial Ballot Sample

Initial sample size

Contest information

Ballots cast in all contests: 3998 Smallest margin (votes): 3,521. Diluted margin: 88.07%.

Contest 1. Contest name: Silver Creek School Corp Referendum

Winners: 1

Reported votes:

Candidate 1 Name: YES	Votes: 238
Candidate 2 Name: NO	Votes: 3759

Add candidate to contest 1 Remove last candidate from contest 1

Add contest Remove last contest


Audit parameters

Risk limit: 1% Expected sample size: 11.

Above: Stark Audit Tool Screenshot of Referendum Margin, Risk Limit, & Sample Size

## Audit Results

- Silver Creek School Corp Referendum
  - Sampled ballots were hand counted for an initial sample of 35 ballots. The Audit Team entered the updated totals for each yes/no selection into the Stark Audit Tool to check for the desired confidence level of 91-99%. The initial sample of ballots achieved the desired confidence level range for all three contests. This sample generated a greater than 99 percent confidence level. The achieved risk limit was less than 1 percent, but the confidence level can be no greater 99.99 percent because a sample's confidence level can never equal 100 percent. **Rounded down to the nearest whole percentage, the audit concluded with 99 percent confidence that the 2025 Special Election was properly tabulated, resulting in a correctly reported election outcome.**



*Above: Stark Audit Tool showing a <1 percent Risk Limit and >99 percent Confidence Level were met after 35 inspected ballots*

## In Closing

VSTOP can report that the 2025 Special Election outcome can be confirmed with significant statistical confidence through successful completion of this post-election audit. VSTOP would like to thank the Clark County Clerk's Office: Ryan Lynch and Angela Cornett, for their coordination, the Clark County Election Board for their voluntary request for audit designation, and The Indiana Secretary of State's Office for approving Clark County's audit designation and their support of VSTOP to conduct these initiatives.

Upon completion of all 2025 Special Post-Election Audits, a full summary report of all Special Election post-election audit activities and their respective results will be prepared and submitted to the Indiana Secretary of State and all counties involved in a 2025 Special Post-Election Audit.


For any questions or concerns regarding Indiana's Post-Election Audit Procedures, or information contained in this memo, contact Matt Housley, Election Systems Audit Specialist, at [vstop@bsu.edu](mailto:vstop@bsu.edu).

**Matt Housley, MPA**



*Election Systems Audit Specialist*  
**Voting System Technical Oversight Program**

**Dr. Jay Bagga**




*Senior Director (Research)*  
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**Dustin Renner**



*Election Director*  
**Indiana Secretary of State**

**Dr. Chad Kinsella**



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