Supreme Court Docket
Select Cases Pending Review by the U.S. Supreme
Court
Last updated
08/02/2007
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06-984 MEDELLIN V. TEXAS
DECISION BELOW: 2006 WL 3302639; 2006 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2236
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: AP-75207
HOLDING BELOW:
In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), I.C.J. No. 128 (judgment of Mar. 31, 2004), the International
Court of Justice determined that 51 named Mexican nationals, including
petitioner, were entitled to receive review and reconsideration
of their convictions and sentences through the judicial process
in the United States. On February 28, 2005, President George W.
Bush determined that the United States would comply with its international
obligation to give effect to the judgment by giving those 51 individuals
review and
reconsideration in the state courts. However, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the President’s determination exceeded
his powers, and it refused to give effect to the Avena judgment
or the President’s determination.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. Did the President of the United States act within his constitutional
and statutory foreign affairs authority when he determined that
the states must comply with the United States’ treaty obligation
to give effect to the Avena judgment in the cases of the 51 Mexican
nationals named in the judgment?
2. Are state courts bound by the Constitution to honor the undisputed
international obligation of the United States, under treaties duly
ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
to give effect to the Avena judgment in the cases that the judgment
addressed?
Cert. Granted 4/30/07
06-1005 UNITED STATES V. SANTOS
DECISION BELOW: 461 F.3d 886
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-4221, 05-2316
HOLDING BELOW:
The government asked the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn
its decision in United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475 (7th Cir.
2002) and interpret the pivotal term "proceeds" to mean
gross income, not net income. Scialabba indicated that the term
proceeds in 18 U.S.C.S. § 1956(a)(1) was ambiguous, in that
it was unclear if the term meant gross or net income. As a result,
Scialabba vacated those defendants' money laundering convictions.
The transactions in the present case - compensating the money collectors
and paying the winners of a gambling game - were conceptually indistinguishable
from the transactions in Scialabba which were held to be insufficient
under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Since the conduct that led to defendants'
convictions only amounted to the disposition of the gambling game's
gross income, the district court reasoned that the two were convicted
of acts that were not, nor ever had been, crimes in the instant
circuit and that the two were entitled to the benefit of Scialabba
in their 28 U.S.C.S. § 2255 proceedings. Because government
did not present a compelling reason to overturn Scialabba and in
the interest of stability in the law, the court declined to overturn
the holding.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
The principal federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1),
makes it a crime to engage in a financial transaction using the
“proceeds” of certain specified unlawful activities
with the intent to promote those activities or to conceal the proceeds.
The question presented is whether “proceeds” means the
gross receipts from the unlawful activities or only the profits,
i.e., gross receipts less expenses.
Cert. Granted 4/23/07
06-694 UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
DECISION BELOW: 444 F.3d 1286
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-15128-JJ
HOLDING BELOW:
Defendant appealed the decision entered by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida that convicted him for
promotion of child pornography under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)
on the grounds of facial unconstitutionality. Defendant was also
convicted of possession of child pornography under § 2252A(a)(5)(B),
and he appealed his sentence for that offense on the grounds that
the district court unconstitutionally enhanced his sentence under
a mandatory guidelines scheme in violation of Booker. The appellate
court noted that in the wake of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002), sexually explicit speech regarding children
that was neither obscene nor the product of sexual abuse of a real
minor retained protection of the First Amendment. The infirmities
of the PROTECT Act pandering provision reflected persistent disregard
of time-honored and constitutionally-mandated principles relating
to the Government's regulation of free speech and its obligation
to provide criminal defendants due process. Because the court found
the PROTECT Act pandering provision, 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A(a)(3)(B),
both substantially overbroad and vague, and therefore facially unconstitutional,
the court reversed defendant's conviction under that section. However,
it found no Booker error in the sentence on the other charge.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of Title 18 (Supp. IV 2004) prohibits “knowingly
* * * advertis[ing], promot[ing], present[ing], distribut[ing],
or solicit[ing] * * * any material or purported material in a manner
that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to
believe, that the material or purported material” is illegal
child pornography. The question presented is whether Section 2252A(a)(3)(B)
is overly broad and impermissibly vague, and thus facially unconstitutional.
Cert. Granted 3/26/07
06-571 WATSON V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 191 Fed. Appx. 326; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 18655
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-31094
HOLDING BELOW:
Defendant-Appellant appealed his guilty-plea conviction for use
of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,
a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Watson traded a quantity
of drugs to an undercover agent in exchange for a handgun. Watson
specifically reserved the right to appeal whether this factual basis
was sufficient to support his conviction for use of a firearm under
the statute. Defendant acknowledged Fifth Circuit precedent in United
States v. Zuniga, 18 F.3d 1254 (5th Cir. 1994), and United States
v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949 (5th Cir. 1996), but argued that those decisions
were distinguishable and thus not controlling. He asserted that,
in his case, government agents first proposed trading drugs for
the handgun, that he controlled the handgun for only moments before
his arrest, and that he could not have used the handgun because
it was unloaded. Fifth Circuit concluded, however, that nothing
in Zuniga or Ulloa suggested that any of these factors were material
to the determination of "use" or otherwise render those
cases distinguishable. Defendant also asked Fifth Circuit to "reconsider"
Zuniga and Ulloa in light of contrary decisions from other circuits.
"It is a firm rule of this circuit that in the absence of an
intervening contrary or superseding decision by this court sitting
en banc or by the United States Supreme Court, a panel cannot overrule
a prior panel's decision." Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany,
187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Does mere receipt of unloaded firearm as payment for drugs constitute
"use" of firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking
offense within meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and this
Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995)?
Cert. Granted 2/26/07
06-6911 LOGAN V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 453 F.3d 804
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-4722
HOLDING BELOW:
Defendant sought review of a decision of the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin, arguing that his state misdemeanor
battery convictions should not be treated as violent felonies by
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 924(e), but rather,
that they should be disregarded because of exceptions from the definition
of conviction that were made in the last sentence of 18 U.S.C.S.
§ 921(a)(20). Defendant argued that a conviction that did not
result in the loss of the civil rights should be treated the same
as a conviction following which those rights were terminated but
later restored. His argument was supported by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit's holding in U.S. v. Indelicato. However,
the federal district court had held that an offender whose civil
rights had neither been diminished nor returned was not a person
who had had civil rights restored. That conclusion was supported
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's holding in
McGrath v. U.S. Compelled to choose between the two, the Seventh
Circuit sided with the Second Circuit. The word "restore"
meant to give back something that was taken away. Moreover, when
the U.S. Congress replaced the uniform federal rule with a state
definition of conviction, it ensured that similarly situated people
would be treated differently. Section § 921(a)(20) was not
absurd and judges did not have leeway to follow their own policy
preferences. Defendant's state convictions were serious enough to
fall within the definition of violent felonies, and they required
sentencing as a recidivist under the Act.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Does "civil rights restored" provision of 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(20) apply to conviction for which defendant was not deprived
of his civil rights, thereby precluding such conviction as predicate
offense under Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)?
Cert. Granted 2/20/07
06-8120 BRENDLIN V. CALIFORNIA
DECISION BELOW: 136 P.3d 845
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: S123133
HOLDING BELOW:
Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for investigation
of expired registration tabs. The officer asked the driver for her
license. During the inquiry, the officer observed receptacles in
the car containing substances used in the production of methamphetamine.
The officer recognized defendant and, after verifying that defendant
was wanted for a parole violation, arrested him. After a hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court held that defendant
was not seized within the meaning of U.S. Const., 4th Amend., until
the officer ordered him out of the car and placed him under arrest.
The court of appeals found that the stop was unlawful and held that
the traffic stop necessarily resulted in a seizure of both the driver
and the passenger. The court stated that a proper Fourth Amendment
inquiry necessitated a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding
the encounter. Although a passenger's freedom was curtailed to some
extent during a traffic stop, the passenger was not seized in the
absence of any indication by the officer that the passenger was
the subject of the officer's investigation or show of authority.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Whether a passenger in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop is thereby
“detained” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, thus allowing the passenger to
contest the
legality of the traffic stop.
Cert. Granted 1/19/07
06-5306 BOWLES V. RUSSELL
DECISION BELOW: 432 F.3d 668
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-3262
HOLDING BELOW:
Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent was a warden.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland
denied relief. He appealed a subsequent district court order denying
his motion for a new trial. He moved to reopen the appeal period
under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Other procedural matters followed.
The matter currently before the court was whether it had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The warden argued that lack
of subject matter jurisdiction prevented the court from hearing
the merits of the appeal and that the jurisdictional scope of the
appeal should be limited to the marginal order of February 10, 2004,
reopening the time for filing an appeal. Petitioner did not argue
the jurisdictional problem presented. The court stated that Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) made it incumbent upon it to dismiss an action
when it appeared it lacked jurisdiction. Overall, the court stated
that the case was about missed deadlines. Petitioner failed to receive
timely notice of the district court's ruling that triggered his
appeal period. When he did get notice, he correctly sought relief
under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). When the district court granted his
requested relief but mistakenly offered an erroneous deadline, petitioner
chose it and failed to comply with the deadline of February 24,
2004. Earlier, the court on motion declined to dismiss his appeal.
In the instant opinion, it corrected that error and held that the
14-day period of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) was not susceptible to
extension through mistake, courtesy, or grace. The court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Whether an appellate court may sua sponte dismiss an appeal which
has been filed within the time limitations authorized by a district
court after granting a motion to reopen the appeal time under Rule
4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Cert. Granted 12/7/06 with oral argument on 3/26/07
06-6407 PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN
DECISION BELOW: 448 F.3d 815
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-70045
HOLDING BELOW:
Petitioner argued that the district court employed an erroneous
legal standard in evaluating whether he was competent to be executed.
He argued that the Eighth Amendment forbade the execution of a prisoner
who lacked a rational understanding of the state's reason for the
execution. He contended that the understanding was lacking in his
case because he believed that, although the state's purported reason
for the execution was his past crimes, the state's real motivation
was to punish him for preaching the Gospel.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Does the Eighth Amendment permit the execution of a death row inmate
who has a factual awareness of the reason for his execution but
who, because of severe mental illness, has a delusional belief as
to why the state is executing him, and thus does not appreciate
that his execution is intended to seek retribution for his capital
crime?
Cert. Granted 1/5/07
06-413 UTTECHT V. BROWN
DECISION BELOW: 451 F.3d 946
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-35998
HOLDING BELOW:
Petitioner (prisoner), on denial of his writ of habeas corpus, argued
that three prospective jurors were erroneously dismissed for cause
and that he was therefore sentenced by a tribunal organized to return
a verdict of death. Although the court found that the record adequately
supported the Washington Supreme Court's finding of substantial
impairment as to two jurors, the court held that the Washington
Supreme Court applied the wrong standard with respect to the third
juror. Because nothing whatsoever in the third juror's voir dire
supported a finding--explicit or implicit--that he would not follow
his oath, the court found structural error based on United States
Supreme Court precedent. Further, prejudice was presumed in the
erroneously exclusion of the juror.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), and Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168 (1986), this Court held that a state trial judge may,
without setting forth any explicit findings or conclusions, remove
a juror for cause when the judge determines the juror’s views
on the death penalty would substantially impair his or her ability
to follow the law and perform the duties of a juror. The Court further
held that a federal habeas court reviewing the decision to remove
the juror must defer to the trial judge’s ability to observe
the juror’s demeanor and credibility, and apply the statutory
presumption of correctness to the judge’s implicit factual
determination of
the juror’s substantial impairment. Did the Ninth Circuit
err by not deferring to the trial judge’s observations and
by not applying the statutory presumption of correctness in ruling
that the state court decision to remove a juror was contrary to
clearly established federal law?
Cert. Granted 1/12/07
06-313 ROPER V. WEAVER
DECISION BELOW: 438 F.3d 832
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 03-2880, 03-2938
HOLDING BELOW:
In a death penalty case, a prosecutor made certain statements during
both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. The inmate contended
that these arguments violated his constitutional rights. After exhausting
his state remedies, the inmate filed a petition for habeas corpus
relief. The district court granted habeas corpus relief as to the
comments made during the sentencing phase, but not the guilt phase.
Both parties then sought review. In affirming, the appellate court
determined that the claim based on statements made during the guilt
phase were procedurally defaulted. Review was therefore precluded
because the inmate failed to show either cause and prejudice or
a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Next, the appellate court
held that the case was subject to the standards of review set forth
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) because
the state supreme court's summary disposition of the issue was an
adjudication on the merits. Relief was granted under AEDPA because
the prosecutor's arguments violated clearly established federal
law. The appellate court cited several examples of statements that
infected the trial with unfairness.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Since this court has neither held a prosecutor's penalty phase closing
argument to violate due process, nor articulated, in response to
a penalty phase claim, what the standard of error and prejudice
would be, does a court of appeals exceed its authority under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) by overturning a capital sentence on the
ground that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument was
"unfairly inflammatory?"
Cert. Granted 12/7/06
06-5247 FRY V. PLILER
DECISION BELOW: 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 2694
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-16876
HOLDING BELOW:
The inmate was convicted of two counts of first degree murder. After
his convictions were affirmed by the state court, he filed a petition
for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254. The district
court denied the petition, and the inmate sought review. In affirming,
the court determined that the exclusion of the testimony of a witness
was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law. Even though the witness overheard portions of a conversation
where her cousin admitted to committing a double homicide, and her
testimony was reliable due to the fact that the conversation contained
idiosyncratic facts matching the circumstances surrounding the murders
in question, the exclusion of the evidence was harmless because
it did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury's verdict. In addition, a the exclusion
of the testimony of a second witness was harmless as well because
it was not of significant importance to the inmate's third party
culpability defense.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. If constitutional error in a state trial is not recognized by
the judiciary until the case ends up in federal court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, is the prejudicial impact of the error assessed under
the standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
or that enunciated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)?
2. Does it matter which harmless error standard is employed?
3. And, if the Brecht standard applies, does the petitioner or the
State bear the burden of persuasion on the question of prejudice?
Cert. Granted 12/7/06 with Court granting certiorari only on question
3.
05-11304 SMITH V. TEXAS
DECISION BELOW: 185 S.W.3d 455
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: AP-74228
HOLDING BELOW:
The inmate and others set out to rob a fast-food restaurant at closing
time because the inmate previously worked there. The inmate was
19 at the time, and stabbed the victim several times and beat her
in an attempt to get her to reveal the safe combination before inflicting
the lethal stab and gunshot wounds. Under the Almanza analysis,
and in determining whether the inmate suffered "egregious harm"
the court held that the nullification instruction during voir dire
did not show actual or egregious harm. The jurors agreed they could
change a "yes" to "no" on the death penalty
if instructed by the judge to do so upon finding sufficient mitigating
evidence. During trial, the prosecutor never suggested that the
inmate's mitigation evidence should be ignored. The court was unable
to conclude that the statutory special issues and nullification
instruction caused the inmate egregious harm in its effect upon
the jury's deliberation of his mitigating evidence. All of the mitigating
evidence was admitted, defense counsel did a superb job of weaving
all of that evidence into a compelling theory of the case, and the
inmate's attorneys presented a persuasive closing argument on punishment.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. In Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), this Court summarily reversed
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and found constitutional error
under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry
v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Is it consistent with
this Court’s remand in this case for the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals to deem the error in petitioner’s case harmless based
on its view that jurors were in fact able to give adequate consideration
and effect to petitioner’s mitigating evidence notwithstanding
this Court’s conclusion to the contrary?
2. Can the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, based on a procedural
determination that it declined to adopt in its original decision
that this Court then summarily reversed, impose on remand a daunting
standard of harm (“egregious harm”) to the constitutional
violation found by this Court?
Cert. Granted 10/6/06
05-11284 ABDUL-KABIR V. QUARTERMAN
05-11287 BREWER V. QUARTERMAN
DECISION BELOW: 418 F.3d 494; 442 F.3d 273
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 01-10646; 04-70034
HOLDING BELOW:
The prisoner (from Abdul-Kabir case) argued that he was entitled
to a COA on his claim that the Texas capital sentencing scheme's
special issues did not allow the jury to give full consideration
and effect to the mitigating evidence he presented at his trial's
punishment phase. The appellate court, in its original opinion,
applied the "constitutional relevance" test in determining
that the prisoner was not entitled to a COA on his Penry claim.
Because Tennard explicitly rejected this test, jurists of reason
could have debated whether the prisoner's mitigating evidence was
relevant; thus, he was granted a COA on his Penry claim. Evidence
of his family background and his organic neurological deficiency,
specifically, his lack of impulse control, constituted relevant
mitigating evidence. However, the Texas special issues were broad
enough to encompass these mitigating factors. The jury could have
considered the prisoner's family background and organic deficiency
evidence under, at the very least, the future dangerousness special
issue and found that, despite his turbulent childhood and diminished
impulse control, the prisoner could have changed and would not have
necessarily remained a danger in the future.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. Do the former Texas “special issue” capital sentencing
jury instructions — which permit jurors to register only a
“yes” or “no” answer to two questions, inquiring
whether the defendant killed “deliberately” and probably
would constitute a “continuing threat to society” —
permit constitutionally adequate consideration of mitigating evidence
about a defendant’s mental impairment and childhood mistreatment
and deprivation, in light of this Court’s emphatic statement
in Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004), that those same two questions
“had little, if anything, to do with” Smith’s
evidence of mental impairment and childhood mistreatment)?
2. Do this Court’s recent opinions in Penry v. Johnson, 532
U.S. 782 (2001) (“Penry II”) and Smith, both of which
require instructions that permit jurors to give “full consideration
and full effect” to a defendant’s mitigating evidence
in choosing the appropriate sentence, preclude the Fifth Circuit
from adhering to its prior decisions — antedating Penry II
and Smith — that reject Penry error whenever the former special
issues might have afforded some indirect consideration of the defendant’s
mitigating evidence?
3. Has the Fifth Circuit, in insisting that a defendant show as
a predicate to relief under Penry that he suffers from a mental
disorder that is severe, permanent or untreatable, simply resurrected
the threshold test for “constitutional relevance” that
this Court emphatically rejected in Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274 (2004)?
4. Where the prosecution, as it did here, repeatedly implores jurors
to “follow the law” and “do their duty”
by answering the former Texas special issues on their own terms
and abjuring any attempt to use their answers to effect an appropriate
sentence, is it reasonably likely that jurors applied their instructions
in a way that prevented them from fully considering and giving effect
to the defendant’s mitigating evidence?
Cert. Granted 10/13/06 with appeals consolidated for one hour oral
argument.
05-1631 SCOTT V. HARRIS
DECISION BELOW: 433 F.3d 807
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 03-15094
HOLDING BELOW:
The suspect's vehicle was clocked at 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour
zone. The suspect was not wanted for any other offense. The deputy
was pursuing the car when he was given permission by the sergeant
to perform a "precision intervention technique" (PIT)
to halt the suspect's vehicle. The deputy was unable to perform
the PIT maneuver at the high speed, and instead rammed the suspect's
vehicle. The suspect alleged that he was rendered a quadriplegic
as the result of the use of excessive and deadly force in his seizure
by the deputy. The appellate court first concluded that whether
the suspect's driving was sufficiently reckless to give probable
cause of imminent physical harm to motorists and pedestrians was
an issue for the jury. If not found to be reasonable, such actions
would violate the suspect's right to be free from excessive force
during a seizure. The appellate court agreed that the deputy was
not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The
chase only concerned a traffic violation, not a crime involving
a threat of serious physical harm, and, under Tennessee v. Garner,
the use of deadly force was clearly excessive.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
1. Whether a law enforcement officer’s conduct is “objectively
reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment when the officer makes
a split-second decision to terminate a high-speed pursuit by bumping
the fleeing suspect’s vehicle with his push bumper, because
the suspect had demonstrated that he would continue to drive in
a reckless and dangerous manner that put the lives of innocent persons
at serious risk of death.
2. Whether, at the time of the incident, the law was “clearly
established” when neither this Court nor any circuit court,
including the Eleventh Circuit, had ruled the Fourth Amendment is
violated when a law enforcement officer uses deadly force to protect
the lives of innocent persons from the risk of dangerous and reckless
vehicular flight.
Cert. Granted 10/27/06
06-5618 CLAIBORNE V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 439 F.3d 479
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-2198
HOLDING BELOW:
Defendant was arrested for attempting to sell 0.23 grams of cocaine
base to a police officer. Six months later, police approached defendant
engaged in a drug deal. He fled through the house next door, throwing
down a plastic baggie containing 5.03 grams of cocaine base. The
district court determined that defendant's advisory guidelines sentencing
range was 37 to 46 months. The court concluded that the sixty percent
reduction was an extraordinary variance that was not supported by
extraordinary circumstances, and thus was unreasonable under 18
U.S.C.S. § 3553(a). Defendant's lack of criminal history was
taken into account when the safety valve eliminated the mandatory
minimum sentence. The small amount of crack cocaine seized was taken
into account in determining his guidelines range. Substantially
reducing the guidelines sentence based upon drug quantity was unreasonable
because it was a fair inference that defendant distributed additional
quantities of cocaine during the six months between the two incidents.
The fact that he committed a second drug offense six months after
his first arrest demonstrated that defendant had not earned an extraordinary
downward variance.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), this Court ruled
that the mandatory use of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on any fact required
to enhance a criminal sentence. The Court remedied the error by
making the Guidelines “effectively advisory” and, therefore,
just one of many factors a court considers in choosing a sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court also prescribed appellate
review of sentences for “reasonableness” in light of
all the section 3553(a) factors and the reasons for the sentence
as stated by the sentencing judge. The model of review on which
Booker based this “reasonableness” standard paid “substantial
deference” to a sentencing judge’s discretionary choices
in departing from the guidelines range, as held in Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81(1996).
In light of the foregoing, these issues are presented:
1. Does an appellate court make the Sentencing Guidelines effectively
mandatoryby granting a presumption of reasonableness to the Guidelines
range in reviewing a sentence outside that range, rather than granting
deference to the sentencing judge’s decision in light of all
the 3553(a) factors?
2. Does granting a presumption of reasonableness to the guidelines
range deny the substantial deference granted a district court’s
discretionary sentencing decision under the “reasonableness”
standard chosen in Booker?
Cert. Granted 11/3/06
06-5754 RITA V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 2006 WL 1144508; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10850
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-4674
HOLDING BELOW:
The appellate court found that the district court properly calculated
the guideline range and appropriately treated the guidelines as
advisory. The district court sentenced defendant only after considering
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a). Based on these
factors, and because the district court sentenced defendant within
the applicable guideline range and the statutory maximum, the appellate
court found that defendant's sentence of thirty-three months' imprisonment
was reasonable.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
Whether the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals appellate review for
“unreasonableness” has preserved de facto mandatory
Guidelines, contrary this Court’s ruling in United States
v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), by discouraging district courts
from sentencing outside of the recommended guidelines ranges?
SUPREME COURT LIMITED TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
1. Was the District Court’s choice of within-guidelines sentence
reasonable?
2. In making that determination, is it consistent with United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), to accord a presumption of reasonableness
to within-guidelines sentences?
3. If so, can that presumption justify a sentence imposed without
an explicit analysis by the District Court of the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors and any other factors that might justify a lesser
sentence?
Cert. Granted 11/3/06
05-1629 GONZALES, ATT’Y GEN. V. DUENAS-ALVAREZ
DECISION BELOW: 176 Fed. Appx. 820 (9th Cir. unpublished decision
filed April 18, 2006)
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-74471
HOLDING BELOW
An immigration judge found that Duenas-Alvarez's conviction for
taking a vehicle without consent in violation of California Vehicle
Code § 10851 (a) categorically met the definition of a theft
offense and, as such, qualified as an aggravated felony under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). As government noted, Court recognized
that it recently held that a violation of section 10851 (a) does
not categorically qualify as a theft offense because that section
is broader than the generic definition of a theft offense under
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)(G). See Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 435 F.3d
961 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we remand this petition to the
Board for further proceedings in light of Penuliar.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a “theft offense,” which is an “aggravated
felony” under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(43)(G), includes aiding and
abetting.
Cert. Granted 9/26/06 with oral argument set for 12/5/06.
05-1575 SCHRIRO V. LANDRIGAN
DECISION BELOW: 441 F.3d 638
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-74471
HOLDING BELOW
Petitioner asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
in the penalty phase of his capital murder trial. Petitioner alleged
that with some minimal investigation counsel could have uncovered
petitioner's tortured family history, including petitioner's genetic
makeup, in utero exposure to teratogenic substances, early maternal
rejection, and troubled interactions with his adoptive family. On
the record, the court found that counsel did little to prepare for
the sentencing phase of the case and that he failed to develop potential
mitigating evidence. Further, the state courts unreasonably determined
that petitioner instructed his counsel not to present mitigating
evidence. Additionally, prevailing standards suggested that counsel's
duty to investigate was virtually absolute regardless of petitioner's
expressed wishes. The court found no knowing waiver of petitioner's
right to present mitigating evidence. The court also found a reasonable
probability that the sentencing judge would reach a different conclusion
if petitioner proved his allegations. Because petitioner presented
a colorable claim of ineffective assistance, he was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Respondent Jeffrey Landrigan actively thwarted his attorney’s
efforts to develop and present mitigation evidence in his capital
sentencing proceeding. Landrigan told the trial judge that he did
not want his attorney to present any mitigation evidence, including
proposed testimony from witnesses whom his attorney had subpoenaed
to testify. On post-conviction review, the state court rejected
as frivolous an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in which
Landrigan asserted that if counsel had raised the issue of Landrigan’s
alleged genetic predisposition to violence, he would have cooperated
in presenting that type of mitigating evidence.
1. In light of the highly deferential standard of review required
in this case pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), did the Ninth Circuit
err by holding that the state court unreasonably determined the
facts when it found that Landrigan “instructed his attorney
not to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing”?
2. Did the Ninth Circuit err by finding that the state court’s
analysis of Landrigan’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim was objectively unreasonable under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), notwithstanding the absence of any contrary
authority from this Court in cases in which (a) the defendant waives
presentation of mitigation and impedes counsels attempts to do so,
or (b) the evidence the defendant subsequently claims should have
been presented is not mitigating?
Cert. Granted 9/26/06
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