MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_01CA6841.2D642060" This document is a Single File Web Page, also known as a Web Archive file. If you are seeing this message, your browser or editor doesn't support Web Archive files. Please download a browser that supports Web Archive, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer. ------=_NextPart_01CA6841.2D642060 Content-Location: file:///C:/8A7B2E50/1113092009OEA143FormerSmithFoodShop.htm Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" OFFICIAL SHORT CITATION NAME: When referring to 2009 OEA X, cite this case as

Objection to the Denial of Excess Liability Trust Fund Claim,<= /o:p>

ELTF #200609504 / FID #15307, Former Smith Food Shop=

Fort Wayne, Allen County, <= st1:State w:st=3D"on">Indiana

2009 OEA 143, (09-F-J-4201)

 

 =

[2009 OEA 1= 43, page 143 begins]

 =

OFFICIAL S= HORT CITATION NAME: When referring to 2009 OEA 143 cite this case as

   &nbs= p;        Former Smith Food Shop, 2009 OEA 143.

 

Topics:        

Excess Liability Trust Fund Claim

summary judgment

underground storage tanks

release

report

spill rule

closure report

substantial compliance

discovery

day  

 

Presiding Environmental Law Judge= : 

Catherine Gibbs

 

Party representatives: <= /o:p>

IDEM:   = ;           Julie Lang, Esq.

Petitioner:  = ;       Ginny Peterson, Esq.; Kightlinger & Gray LLP

 

Order issued: 

November 13, 2009

 

Index category: 

Land

 

Further case activity: 

[none]

 

 

[2009 OEA 1= 43, page 144 begins]

 

STATE OF INDIANA        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;  )        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;  BEFORE THE INDIANA OFFICE OF

           &n= bsp;            = ;            &n= bsp;            = ;           )        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;  ENVIRONMENTAL ADJUDICATION

COUNTY OF MARION        &= nbsp;           )<= /p>

 

IN THE MATTER OF:        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;  )

           &n= bsp;            = ;            &n= bsp;            = ;            &n= bsp;            = ;          )

OBJECTION TO THE DENIAL O= F EXCESS        &= nbsp;  )

LIABILITY TRUST FUND CLAI= M        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;      )        &= nbsp; 

ELTF #200609504 / FID #15= 307        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;           )        &= nbsp;  CAUSE NO. 08-F-J-4201

FORMER SMITH FOOD SHOP        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;           )

FOR= T WAYNE, ALLEN COUNTY, INDIANA        )

 

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER

 

This matter having come b= efore the Court on the Indiana Department of Environmental Management’s Mot= ion for Summary Judgment and Petitioner, Jacqueline Smith as Owner of Former Sm= ith Food Shop’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which pleadings are parts of= the Court’s record; and the presiding Environmental Law Judge (the ELJ), being duly advised and having read the pleadings, motions, responses, repli= es and evidence, now enters the following findings of fact, conclusions of law= and final order:

 

Findings of Fact

 

1.&n= bsp;     Jacqueline Smith (the Petitioner) is the owner and operator of underground storage tanks located at Smith’s Food and Ser= vice Plaza, a/k/a Former Smith Food Shop, 3324 Spring Street, Fort Wayne, Indiana (the Site).

 

2.&n= bsp;     On November 11, 2008, the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (the IDEM) issued a notification to the Petitioner denying her request for reimbursement from the Excess Liability Trust Fund = (the ELTF). 

 

3.&n= bsp;     The reason for the denial was that the Petitioner w= as not in substantial compliance with the regulations requiring that releases = from underground storage tanks (USTs) be reported to the IDEM.  The notification stated, “Th= ough evidence of contamination was found earlier (samples from October 19, 2005), the release was not reported to IDEM until September 8, 2006.” 

 

4.&n= bsp;     Petitioner filed her petition for review of this no= tice on November 24, 2008.

 

5.&n= bsp;     The IDEM and Petitioner both filed motions for summ= ary judgment on August 17, 2009.

 

6.&n= bsp;     There were two (2) USTs at the Site.  The USTs were removed on October 1= 8 and 19, 2005.

 

[2009 OEA 1= 43, page 145 begins]

 

7.&n= bsp;     Sampling conducted as part of the UST closure indic= ated that there had been a release from the UST system[1] at the Site.  BTEX[2] was detected in ground water above the reporting limit in the tank area.  See Petitioner Jacqueline Smith as= Owner of Former Smith Food Shop’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3, Underground Petroleum S= torage Tank Environmental Closure Assessment (the Closure Report), Appendix B, pages 14 of 17.   BTEX and TPH[3], above the reporting limits, were detected in soil in the dispenser region.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'>   See Petitioner Jacqueline Sm= ith as Owner of Former Smith Food Shop’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 3, Underground Petroleum S= torage Tank Environmental Closure Assessment (the Closure Report), Appendix B, pages 4 and 5 of 14.

=  

8.&n= bsp;     The Closure Report was signed by the Petitioner on November 22, 2005.

=  

9.&n= bsp;     The cover letter from Petitioner’s consultant= to the IDEM, attached to the Closure Report, is dated December 1, 2005.  The Closure Report was received by= the IDEM on December 14, 2005.

 

Conclusions of Law

 

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.&n= bsp;     The Office of Environmental Adjudication (“OEA”) has jurisdiction over the decisions of the Commissioner= of the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (“IDEM”) and= the parties to this controversy pursuant to I.C. § 4-21.5-7, et seq.

 

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.&n= bsp;     This is a Final Order issued pursuant to I.C. § 4-21.4-3-27.  Findings of Fact= that may be construed as Conclusions of Law and Conclusions of Law that may be construed as Findings of Fact are so deemed.

 

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.&n= bsp;     This Court must apply a de novo standard of = review to this proceeding when determining the facts at issue.  Indiana Dept. of Natural Resour= ces v. United Refuse Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. 1993), Indiana-Kentucky Electric Corporation v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Management, 820 N.E.2d 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).  Findings of fact must be based exclusively on the evidence presented= to the ELJ, I.C. § 4-21.5-3-27(d).  Deference to the agency’s initial determination is not allowed.  Id.;  De novo review” means that:

 =

      all issues = are to be determined anew, based solely upon the evidence adduced at that hearing = and independent of any previous findings.

 

      Grisell v. = Consol. City of Indianapolis, 425 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

 

[2009 OEA 1= 43, page 146 begins]

 

4.      The OEA may enter judgment for a party if it finds that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together w= ith the affidavits and testimony, if any, show that a genuine issue as to any material fact does not exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgm= ent as a matter of law.”  I.= C. § 4-21.5-3-23.  The moving party= bears the burden of establishing that summary judgment is appropriate.  All facts and inferences must be construed in favor of the non-movant.  Gibson v. Evans= ville Vanderburgh Building Commission, et al., 7= 25 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).  All evidence must be construed in = favor of the opposing party, and all doubts as to the existence of a material iss= ue must be resolved against the moving party. City of North Vernon v. Jennings Northwest Regional Utilities, 829 N.E.2d 1, (Ind. 2005), Tibbs v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, In= c., 668 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind. 1996).”

 =

5.      “The fact that both parties requested summary judgment does not alter our standa= rd of review. Instead, we must separately consider each motion to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving pa= rty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Laudig v. Marion County Bd. of Voters Registration, 585 N.E= .2d 700, (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) at 703-704.

 =

6.      “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature by giving effect to the ordinary and plain meaning of the langu= age used.”  Bourbon Mini-= Mart, Inc. v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Management, 806 N.E.2d 14, 20 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004).  The same rules that go= vern construction of statutes also govern construction of rules.  Miller Brewing Co. v. Bartholome= w County Beverage Cos= ., Inc., 674 N.E.2d 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).       

 =

7.      An owner or operator who w= ishes to receive reimbursement from the ELTF must be in substantial compliance wi= th “this article” (I.C. § 13-23-8-4(a)(1)(A)) and “rules adopted u= nder this article” (I.C. § 13-23-8-4(a)(1)(B)).  The reference to “this article” clearly means Chapter 13, Article 23 of the Indiana Code.  Therefore, an owner or operator mu= st be in substantial compliance with any rule adopted under I.C. § 13-23 in order to be eligible for ELTF reimbursement. 

 =

8.      329 IAC 9 was promulgated by the Solid Waste Management Board under the authori= ty of Chapter 13, Article 23 of the Indiana Code.  All owners and operators of USTs m= ust comply with the requirements promulgated in 329 IAC 9 (329 IAC 9-1-1(a)), regardless of whether they are eligible for reimbursement from the ELTF.  Various provisions of 329 IAC 9 re= quire that the owner or operator of USTs report releases within twenty-four (24) hours of discovery.  Which spe= cific reporting provision applies depends on the circumstances under which the release was discovered.

 =

[2009 OEA 1= 43, page 147 begins]

 

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>9.&n= bsp;     328 IAC 1-1-9[4], in effect in during the time in question in this case, defines “substantial compliance” as follows:

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(a)&= nbsp;   "Substantial compliance" means that, at the time a release was first discovered or confirmed:

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(1)&= nbsp;  the owner or operator has met the requirements of I.C. § 13-23-8-4(a), with the exception of mi= nor violations of:

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(A)&= nbsp;       statutory deadlines;

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(B)&= nbsp;   &= nbsp;    regulatory deadlines; or

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(C)&= nbsp;       regulatory = requirements; that do not cause harm or threaten to harm human health or the environment;= and

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(2)&= nbsp;  registration fees have been paid as required under I.C. § 13-23-12 and 328 IAC 1-3-3.=

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(b)&= nbsp;  An owner or operator is not in substant= ial compliance if the release:

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(1)&= nbsp;  Has not been reported within seven (7) days = of the date the release was required to be reported under the spill reporting = rule in effect at the time of the release.

<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>(2)&= nbsp;  Harms public health or the environment and w= as not timely reported under the spill reporting rule applicable at the time of the release.

 =

10.  In or= der to be eligible for ELTF reimbursement, an owner or operator of a UST must be in substantial compliance with the rules.&nbs= p; The Underground Storage Tank Financial Assurance Board has defined “substantial compliance” with regard to the reporting requireme= nts contained in 329 IAC 9.  In or= der to be in substantial compliance with the reporting requirements, an owner or operator must report the release within seven (7) days. 

 =

11.  It is= clear from the rule that the critical fact in determining whether the owner or operator had substantially complied with release reporting is when the repo= rt was made.  Whether the violati= on was minor or did not cause harm to human health or the environment is applicabl= e in determining whether the owner or operator was in substantial compliance with rules other than those mandating sp= ill reporting.  The Petitioner’s argument that the rule is too vague is unpersuasive. 

 =

12.  All o= f the rules governing reporting require that the owner or operator report a relea= se within 24 hours of discovery.  Therefore, it is irrelevant = which particular rule applies in this matter as the critical fact is whether the release in this matter was reported within the appropriate time frame.

 

[2009 OEA 1= 43, page 148 begins]

 

13.  In accordance with 329 IAC 1-1-9(b)(1), the appropriate time frame for purpose= s of determining ELTF eligibility is seven (7) days.  Giving the term “day” = its ordinary meaning, the release had to be reported within seven (7) calendar days.

 

14.  Neith= er the IDEM nor the Petitioner have provided any information about whether the Petitioner knew that a release had been discovered prior to her signature on the Closure Report.  However, = it is known that she signed the notification that the USTs had been permanently closed on November 22, 2005.  = The Closure Report, containing the sampling results showing that a release had occurred, was attached to this notification.  Therefore, this is the date on whi= ch the Petitioner discovered the release.   

=  

15.  The r= elease should have been reported within seven (7) calendar days or no later than November 29, 2005.

=  

16.  The C= losure Report was sent to the IDEM on December 1, 2005 and received on December 14, 2005.  If the presiding ELJ as= sumes that the Closure Report could serve as notice to the IDEM that a release had occurred[5], the Closure Report was not filed with IDEM on or before November 29, 2005.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> 

 =

17.  The Petitioner has presented no evidence that the release was reported on or be= fore November 29, 2005.  

 =

18.  There= is no genuine issue of material fact.  The Petitioner failed to substantially comply with the requirement to timely re= port a release at the Site.  The IDEM’s determination that she is not eligible for reimbursement is proper. 

 =

19.  This analysis is dispositive of the issues in this cause.  The parties’ arguments about whether (1) the release date assigned by IDEM is proper; (2) the Petitioner= has waived any arguments; (3) 327 IAC 2-6-1 is applicable; or (4) the submissio= n of the Closure Report can be considered a “release report” are irrelevant and will not be addressed.  

 

Final Order

=  

AND THE COURT, being duly advised, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDG= ES AND DECREES that the Indiana Department of Environmental ManagementR= 17;s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.  Petitioner, Jac= queline Smith as Owner of Former Smith Food Shop’s Motion for Summary Judgmen= t is DENIED.  The Petition for Administrative Review is DISMISSED. 

  &nbs= p;

You are hereby further notified that pursuant to provisions of I.C. § 4-21.5-7.5, the Office of Environmental Adjudication serves as the Ultimate Authority in the administrative review of decisions of the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Environmental Management.  This is a Final Order subject to Judicial Review consistent with applicable provisions of IC 4-21.5.  Pursuant to I.C. § 4-21.5-5-5= , a Petition for Judicial Review of this Final Order is timely only if it is fi= led with a civil court of competent jurisdiction within thirty (30) days after = the date this notice is served.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED th= is 13th day of November, 2009 in = Indianapolis, IN.

Hon. Catherine Gibbs

Environmental Law Judg= e

 

[2009 OEA 143: end of decision]

=  

 

2009 OEA 143 in .doc format

2009 OEA 143 in .pdf format

 

 

           &nb= sp;            =             &nb= sp;            =             &nb= sp;            =       

 

 



[1] 329 IAC 9-1-49 defines UST system as including underground piping and underground ancillary equipment.  The release was discovered under the dispenser.  The piping leading to the dispense= r is part of the UST system.  

[3] Total petroleum hydrocarbons.

<= ![if !supportFootnotes]>[4] Underground Storage Tank Financial Assurance Bo= ard; 328 IAC 1-1-9; filed Dec 4, 1992, 11:00 a.m.: 16 IR 1052; filed Nov 1,1995, 8:30 a.m.: 19 IR 343; readopted filed Jan 10, 2001, 3:21 p.m.: 24 IR 1534; filed Oct 17, 2001, 4:30 p.m.: 25 IR 789; filed Aug 30, 2004, 9:40 a.m.: 28= IR 125; readopted filed May 14, 2007, 1:52 p.m.: 20070523-IR-328070137BFA=

[5] The = ELJ declines to decide this issue as it is not necessary to do so. 

------=_NextPart_01CA6841.2D642060 Content-Location: file:///C:/8A7B2E50/1113092009OEA143FormerSmithFoodShop_files/header.htm Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"





Objection to the Denial of Excess Liability Trust Fund Claim,<= /o:p>

ELTF #200609504 / FID #15307, Former Smith Food Shop=

Fort Wayne, Allen County, <= st1:State w:st=3D"on">Indiana

2009 OEA 143, (09-F-J-4201)

 

2009 OEA 14= 3, page 149

------=_NextPart_01CA6841.2D642060 Content-Location: file:///C:/8A7B2E50/1113092009OEA143FormerSmithFoodShop_files/filelist.xml Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/xml; charset="utf-8" ------=_NextPart_01CA6841.2D642060--