CADDNAR


[CITE: Spencer Coal v. DNR, Reclamation, 3 CADDNAR 64 (1986)]

 

[VOLUME 3, PAGE 64]

 

 

Cause #: 85-264R

Caption: Spencer Coal v. DNR, Reclamation
Administrative Law Judge: Lucas
Attorneys: Gray; Spicker, DAG
Date: July 29, 1986

ORDER

 

[NOTE: THE UNDERLYING NOTICES OF VIOLATION AND CESSATION ORDERS ARE THE SUBJECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CAUSE 85-257R.]

 

Spencer Coal Corporation is denied temporary relief from each of the Notices of Violation identified in finding 25 and finding 27.

 

FINDINGS OF FACT

 

1. The Department of Natural Resources (the "Department") is an "agency" as the term is defined under IC 4-22-1. The Director of the Department (the "Director") is the ultimate authority for the Department with respect to the subject matter of these administrative actions. The Natural Resources Commission ("Commission") is another entity within the Department.

 

2. The Director may delegate any or all powers and duties assigned to him under IC 13-4.1 to other employees of the Department in accordance with IC 13-4.1-2-2(c).

 

3. Stephen L. Lucas is an employee of the Hearings and Affirmative Action Section of the Department.

 

4. Spencer Coal Company ("Spencer") timely requested temporary relief under IC 13-4.1-11-8(e) from the following Notices of Violation:

 

(a) NOV #N51122-78-41 (Administrative Cause 85-264R);

(b) NOV #N51122-80-116 (Administrative Cause 85-265R);

(c)NOV #N51122-79-123 (Administrative Cause 85-266R);

(d) NOV #N51122-80-170 (Administrative Cause 95-267R);

(e) NOV #N51122-80-41 (Administrative Cause 84-268R);

(f) NOV #N51122-78-174 (Administrative Cause 85-269R);

(g) NOV #N51122-82-23 (Administrative Cause 85-270R);

(h) NOV #N51122-82-98 (Administrative Cause 85-271R);

(i) NOV #N51122-81-147 (Administrative Cause 85-272R);

(j) NOV #N62233-81-105 (Administrative Cause 85-273R);

(k) NOV #N51122-77-113 (Administrative Cause 85-274R);

(l) NOV #N51122-S-00124 (Administrative Cause 85-275R);

(m) NOV #N51122-S-00119 (Administrative Cause 85-276R);

(n) NOV #N51122-S-00127 (Administrative Cause 85-277R); and,

(o) NOV #N51122-S-00097 (Administrative Cause 85-278R).

 

The reference Notices of Violation are here collectively referred to as the "NOVs."

 

5. A hearing date was scheduled on temporary relief from the NOVs for 12/6/85 then scheduled for December 9 upon the parties' joint request. Subsequently, the parties agreed to "vacate" the 12/9 hearing.

 

6. A PHC was scheduled for 1/14/86 to consider the captioned actions for temporary relief (as well as the administrative actions, not captioned above, established to finally determine the propriety of the NOVs). By agreement, that PHC was conducted by telephone. During the pre-hearing conference, the parties agreed to a consolidated hearing for 3/5/86.

 

7. During the pre-hearing conference, the parties stipulated to the following as being the exclusive issues for consideration at hearing:

 

"(1)Whether the Department of Natural Resources has jurisdiction over interim and permanent program permits which would authorize the issuance of a Notice of Violation under IC 13-4.1; and

(2) Whether Spencer Coal Corporation can lawfully be required by the Department of Natural Resources to replace reclamation bonds posted with Guard Causality and Surety Insurance Company, and entity whose assets have been liquidated by judicial action, with those of a corporate surety licensed to do business in Indiana and in good standing with the Indiana Department of Insurance.

 

8. The provisions and agreements set forth in findings 6 and 7 were reduced to writing in a "Report of Pre-hearing Conference and Notice of Hearing" entered by the Administrative Law Judge on January 15, 1986. That report also provided in part as follows: "Either of the parties may tender additional issues by written motion filed on or before

 

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February 14, 1986." The parties were granted until February 1, 1986 "to offer additions or corrections to this Report of Pre-hearing Conference and Notice of Hearing. If no additions or corrections are received by February 1, the matters contained in this document become an order of the Administrative Law Judge and shall govern the conduct to these administrative actions."

 

9. Neither party tendered additional issues of offered additions or corrections to the "Report of Pre-hearing Conference and Notice of Hearing" within the time periods referenced in Finding 10.

 

10. On November 4, 1985, Spencer filed a class action against "James R. [sic.] Ridenour, Individually and as Director of the Indiana Department of Natural Resources" and other employees of the Department in the United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Civil Action No. EV85-98-C (the "Federal Suit"). Among the issues raised be Spencer in the Federal Suit are jurisdictional issues which are similar to the first issue identified in Finding 7.

 

11. On February 20, 1986, the parties filed in the captioned administrative actions their "Joint Motion for Relief." The motion sought to delay indefinitely the administrative actions (and other administrative actions between Spencer and the Department) until the Court in the Federal Suite "rules upon Defendant's [Department's] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's [Spencer's] Second Complaint, or the Court makes other appropriate disposition of the jurisdictional allegations in said [Federal] case."

 

12. The "Joint Motion for Relief" was denied by the Administrative Law Judge in its "Order Denying Joint Motion for Relief" entered on February 24, 1986.

 

13. The parties then agreed to a briefing schedule for the resolution of these administrative actions. That schedule was reduced to writing in a "Memorandum of Agreement" entered on February 26, 1986, which provided in pertinent part that the parties agreed to "the final disposition of these administrative actions without hearing.

 

(1) The parties will seek to finalize stipulations of fact for each of these administrative actions within two (2) weeks of this date.

(2) The parties will file contemporaneous briefs and their stipulations of fact by March 28, 1986.

(3) The parties may file briefs, with that filing by April 15, 1986.

 

14. On March 25, the parties may filed their "Joint Motion to Change Briefing Schedule":

 

(1) Claimant will file its brief along with stipulations of fact on or before April 9, 1986;

(2) Respondent will file its brief by on or before May 12, 1986;

(3) Claimant may file a reply brief on or before May 30, 1986.

 

15. An "Entry to Modify Memorandum Agreement" was entered on March 26 by the Administrative Law Judge approving the "Joint Motion to Change Briefing Schedule."

 

16. Subsequently, the parties moved orally for a further extension on the briefing schedule. That motion was not made in writing, nor was a written entry provided in response to the motion, but the parties were informally accorded additional time to brief the issues.

 

17. On April 23, 1986, Spencer filed its written "Statement of Facts", which includes a brief and multiple attachments.

 

18. The Department filed its "Brief of Respondent" on July 1, 1986.

 

19. The 101st Indiana General Assembly enacted Public Law 101, which added a new article (IC 13-4.1) to the Indiana Code. Pursuant to SECTION 7 of that act, Public Law 101 became "effective on June 1, 1980.

 

20. Public Law 101 also provided [as currently set forth in IC 13-4.1-1-5(a)] as follows:

 

"(a) This article [IC 2-4.1] is not applicable to surface coal mining operations, unless the Director has received notice from the Office of Surface Mining of the United States Department of Interior and has published notice that the state program of surface mining control and reclamation is approved."

 

21. IC 13-4.1-1-5(a) does not require, nor does the subsection anticipate, a determination as to whether an approval by the Department of Interior complies with the requirements of Federal Law. IC 13-4.1-1-5 makes IC 13-4.1 applicable to Surface Mining under Indiana Law upon the performance of ministerial functions: the delivery and publication of a notice.

 

22. Whether the Indian State program satisfies the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Public Law 95-87) ["SMCRA"] is a question of Federal Law.[FOOTNOTE i] That issue is distinct from whether IC 13-4.1 is applicable and effective under Indiana State Law.

 

23. On July 26, 1982, the Office of Surface Mining, acting through the Secretary of the United States Department of Interior, published in the Federal Register in Volume 47, Number 143, page 32071, its approval under SMCRA of the Indiana permanent regulatory

 

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program. The effective date of the approval was established for July 29, 1982.

 

24. Public Law 101 (and IC 13-4.1 as established by Public Law 101) became effective for the purposes of Indiana State Law on June 1, 1980. Those provisions became applicable to Surface Coal Mining Operations on July 29, 1982.

 

25. The following NOVs were issued against permits issued after July 29, 1982:

 

NOV #N51122-S-00124 (Cause 85-275R),

NOV #N51122-S-00119 (Cause 85-276R),

NOV #N51122-S-00127 (Cause 85-277R),

NOV #N51122-S-00097 (Cause 85-278R).

 

The permits affected by these NOVs are here collectively referred to as the "Permanent Program Permits."

 

26. The Department has at all times had jurisdiction over the Permanent Program Permits. That jurisdiction authorized the issuance of a Notice of Violation under IC 13-4.1-11-4.

 

27. The following NOVs were issued against permits issued after August 3, 1977 and before July 29, 1982:

 

NOV #N51122-78-41 (Cause 85-264R),

NOV #N51122-80-116 (Cause 85-265R),

NOV #N51122-79-123 (Cause 85-266R),

NOV #N51122-80-170 (Cause 85-267R),

NOV #N51122-80-41 (Cause 85 -268R),

NOV #N51122-78-174 (Cause 85-269R),

NOV #N51122-82-23 (Cause 85-270R),

NOV #N51122-82-98 (Cause 85-271R),

NOV #N51122-81-147 (Cause 85-272R),

NOV #N51122-81-105 (Cause 85-273R),

NOV #N51122-77-113 (Cause 85-274R).

 

The permits affected by these NOVs are here collectively referred to as the "Interim Program Permits."

 

28. During the period from August 3, 1977 to July 28, 1982, the State Surface Mining Law in Indiana consisted of IC 13-4-6 and the following non-code provisions: Acts of 1978, P.L. 159; Acts of 1979, P.L. 314; Acts of 1980, P.L. 101, SECTION 5; and Acts of 1981, P.L. 331.

 

29. Acts of 1978, P.L. 159 provides in pertinent part: SECTION 1. Beginning May 4, 1978, the Department of Natural Resources shall enforce section 502 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (Pub. L. 95-87) . . . "SECTION 6. This act expires on June 4, 1979. . .

 

30. Acts of 1979. P.L. 314 provides in pertinent part" ". . . (7) Acts of 1978, Public Law 159 should be extended for an additional year. . . ."

 

31. Acts of 1980, P.L. 101, SECTION 5, provides as follows: "A valid coal mining permit issued under IC 13-4 shall continue in effect until its expiration date or until such time as the Department has reviewed his application for a new permit, whichever is later. A permittee holding a permit issued under IC 13-4 which expires on or after June 1, 1980, or the date the State coal mining program is approved by the Office of Surface Coal Mining of the United States Department of Interior or until such time as the Department has reviewed his application for a new permit, whichever is later, must comply with all the provisions of IC 13-4.1. However, those permittees who expect to continue that coal mining operations on or after February 1, 1981, or eight (8) months after the date the state coal mining program is approved by the Office of Surface Mining of the United States Department of Interior, whichever is later, shall apply for a permit under IC 13-4.1 not later than August 1, 1980, or two (2) months after the state coal mining program is approved by the Office of Surface Mining of the United States Department of Interior, whichever is later. The Commission shall make a decision on that application by February 1, 1981, or eight (8) months after the state coal mining program is approved by the Office of Surface Mining of the United States Department of Interior, whichever is later."

 

32. Acts of 1981, P.L. 331, provides in pertinent part: "SECTION 2. The Department of Natural Resources shall enforce SECTION 6 (a) This act . . .[is] inapplicable at such time as IC 13-4.1 becomes applicable [July 29, 1982]. . ."

 

33. After July 28, 1982, the non-code provisions set forth in findings 29, 30, 31 and 32 lapsed.[FOOTNOTE ii]

 

34. The Indiana General Assembly enacted P.L. 148-1985, Section 2, effective April 9, 1985, which established IC 13-4-6-1.6 as follows: "All surface mining operations that operate or have operated under a permit issued under this chapter [IC 13-4-6] subject to Acts 1978,

 

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P.L. 159, Acts 1979, P.L. 314, Acts 1980, P.L. 101, SECTION 5, or Acts 1981, P.L. 331 are subject to IC 13-4.1-11, IC 13-4.1-12, IC 13-4.1-13, 30 U.S.C. 1252, 30 U.S.C. 1260(d), 30 U.S.C. 1272 (3), and 30 C.F.R. 710 through 716."

 

35. IC 13-4-6-1.6 results in the re-implementation on April 9, 1985 of the non-code provisions set forth in findings 29, 30, 31 and 32.[FOOTNOTE iii]

 

36. Since April 9, 1985, the Department has had jurisdiction to issue a Notice of Violation against an interim program permit. Each of the NOVs identified in findings 27 were issued after April 9, 1985. The Department had jurisdiction to issue the NOVs identified in finding 27.

 

37. The Department has jurisdiction over interim and permanent program permits which authorizes the issuance of the NOVs under IC 13-4.1.

 

38. The Indiana General Assembly established with the Acts of 1967, chapter 344, a statutory scheme to require the permitting and reclamation of strip mining, including the surface mining of coal. That enactment, with subsequent statutory amendments, is found in IC 13-4-6.

 

39. The purposes of the Acts of 1967, chapter 334, (IC 13-4-6) are set forth in IC 13-4-6-1, which states in pertinent part as follows: "This act [IC 13-4-6] shall provide for the proper reclamation of areas of lands subjected to surface mining of minerals in accordance with modern standards to provide improved land-use practice of these areas. To prevent or minimize injurious effects to the people and the natural resources of the State of Indiana including the need to protect our lakes and streams from pollution, to decrease soil erosion, to decrease the hazards of fire, to improve the aesthetic value of the landscape, to enhance the development of wildlife resources, and to increase the economic contributions of the affected areas to the welfare of the people of the state of Indiana. . . ."

 

40. IC 13-4-6-5 provides in pertinent part:

 

"(a) No person shall engage in surface mining unless such person possesses a valid permit obtained from the [C]ommission designating the area of land affected by the operation. . . ." (F) Contemporaneously with and as condition precedent to the issuance of the permit there shall be filed by the operator with the [D]irector, a bond payable to the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Indiana, conditioned that the operator shall faithfully perform all requirements of the [C]ommission in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. . . .Any operator may execute the bond without surety if he shall deposit with the [D]irector cash or securities that meet the approval of the [C]ommission in an amount equal to the surety bond as prescribed in this division of this section. The number of acres for which [a] permit is issued may be increased by the [C]ommission after a permit is issued on receipt of the prescribed fee and additional bond for such additional number of acres."

 

41. With respect to the Interim Program Permits, Spencer must maintain a bond under IC 13-4-6. Failure to maintain the bond is subject to the issuance of a Notice of Violation under IC 13-4.1-11-4 and pursuant to IC 13-4-6-1.6.[FOOTNOTE iv]

 

42. IC 13-4.1 provides in Chapter 6 for bonding or other security. IC 13-4.1-6-1 states: "After a surface coal mining and reclamation permit application is approved but before that permit is issued, the applicant shall file with the [D]irector, on a form prescribed and furnished by the [D]irector, a bond for performance of all the requirements of this article [IC 13-4.1] and of the permit. The bond shall cover that area of land within the permit area upon which the operator will initiate and conduct surface coal mining and reclamation operations within the initial term of the permit. As succeeding increments of surface coal mining reclamation operations are initiated and conducted within the permit area, the permittee shall file with the [D]irector an additional bond or bonds to cover those increments in accordance with this chapter."

 

43. 310 IAC 12-4-10(e)(2) mandates that the Department issue a Notice of Violation where the institution which provides or holds the bond becomes incapacitated. "Upon the incapacity of a bank or surety company by reason of bankruptcy, insolvency or suspension, or revocation of its charter or license, the permittee shall be deemed to be without bond coverage. The [D]epartment shall issue a Notice of Violation to any operator who is without bond coverage and shall issue a Notice of Violation to any operator which is without bond coverage and shall specify a reasonable period to replace bond coverage not to exceed 90 days." [Emphasis supplied].

 

44. With respect to the Permanent Program Permits, Spencer must maintain a bond under IC 13-4.1. Failure to maintain the bond or other security is subject to the issuance of a Notice of Violation under IC 13-4.1. A Notice of Violation must be issued pursuant to 310 IAC 12-4-10(e)(2) where the bank or surety company which provides or holds the bond becomes

 

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incapacitated.

 

45. Surety bonds were provided by Spencer for each of the interim program permits and each of the permanent program permits through Guard Casualty and Surety Insurance Company.[FOOTNOTE v]

 

46. Prior to the issuances of the NOVs, Guard Casualty and Surety Insurance Company was ordered to be liquidated by the Marion Circuit Court in a civil action entitled Harry E. Easkin, as the Insurance Commissioner of the Department of Insurance of the State of Indiana v. Guard Casualty and Surety Insurance Company, Cause Number C 85-1374.

 

47. Guard Casualty and Surety Insurance Company is insolvent.

 

48. The surety bonds issued by Guard Casualty and Surety Insurance Company to Spencer with respect to the permits at issue in these administrative actions are without force and effect.

 

49. The NOVs were issued by the Department to Spencer as a consequence of the insolvency of Guard Casualty and Surety Insurance Company and that its bonds are without force and effect.

 

50. Issuance of the NOVs with respect to the Interim Program Permits is supported by the law and the facts.

 

51. Issuance of the NOVs with respect to the Permanent Program Permits is mandated by the law and the facts.

 

52. Under IC 13-4-5(f), an operator may seek suitable security other than a surety bond. [The pertinent text of the subsection 5(f) is contained in the final paragraph of finding 40.]

 

53. Under IC 13-4.1-6-5, an operator may seed suitable security other than a surety bond. "In lieu of a bond, the operator may elect to deposit cash, negotiable bonds of the United States Government or of Indiana, or negotiable certificates of deposit or letters of credit of any bank organized or transacting business in the United States in an amount or which has a market value of equal to or greater than the amount of the bond required for the bonded area under the same terms and conditions upon which surety bonds are deposited."

 

54. The form of security is selected by an operator permitted under IC 13-4-6 or under IC 13-4.1 within the parameters of those statutory provisions. Whether to choose a surety bond, a cash bond, a negotiable certificate of deposit or a letter of credit is a decision made by the operator. An operator also chooses the particular institution with which dealings are to be made. These selections are business choices which carry with them differing benefits and risks.

 

55. Nothing in the evidence supports the proposition that the Department, or the State of Indiana, generally, serves as guarantor to Spencer for the continued economic viability or Guard Casualty and Surety Insurance Company.

 

56. Spencer received whatever benefits Guard Casual and Surety Insurance Company provided over other surety companies; and Spencer received whatever benefits a surety company supplied over security other than a surety. In accepting the benefits, Spencer also assumes the risks.

 

57. Spencer can lawfully be required by the Department to replace reclamation bonds posted with Guard Casual and Surety Insurance Company, an entity whose assets have been liquidated by judicial action, with another surety bond, a cash bond, a negotiable certificate of deposit or a letter of credit which comports with the applicable provision of IC 13-4-6.[FOOTNOTE vi]

 

58. Spencer has not shown there is a substantial likelihood that the findings of the Director will be favorable on the NOVs.

 

59. Spencer has not shown that granting Temporary Relief will not adversely affect the health or safety of the public or cause significant imminent environmental harm to land air, or water resources.[FOOTNOTE vii]

FOOTNOTES

i. The mechanism for seeking judicial review from a determination by the Secretary of the Interior to approve or disapprove a state program is provided under SMCRA within 30 U.S.C. 1276 (a) (1): "Any action of the Secretary to approve of disapprove a State program. . .shall be subject to judicial review by the United States District Court for the District which includes the Capital of the State whose program is at issue. . .A petition for review of any action subject to judicial review under this subsection shall be filed in the appropriate Court within sixty days from the date of such action, or after such date if the petition is based solely on grounds arising after the sixteenth day. Any such petition may be made by any person who participated in the administrative proceedings and who is aggravated by the action of the Secretary." The Department urges on page 5 of its "Brief of Respondent" that "the conditional approval of the Indiana program has never been struck down, and if this complaint [in the Federal Suit] constitutes an attempt to challenge that approval, it is an untimely challenge. See U.S.C. 1276, which provides for the judicial review of challenges to the approval or disapproval of state

 

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programs by filing in the appropriate court within sixty days' (emphasis supplied [by the Department]) from the date of approval or disapproval. Spencer would have had to have attempted its challenge by September 29, 1982; it is almost four years [emphasis supplied by the Department] too late." The argument by the Department is well-taken, but unnecessary to a resolution of these administrative actions. If Spencer desires to attack the approval of the Indiana State program by the Secretary of the Interior, that attack must be made under Federal Law in a Federal Court (and must, presumably, include the Interior Department as a necessary party.) Whether the Secretary's approval was properly entered (and whether the attack by Spencer of that approval was timely) are questions which are not dispositive of whether IC 13-4.1 is effective and applicable to surface mining in Indiana. That question is essentially a one of Indiana State Law, limited by the ability of the Office of Surface Mining to institute an action to preempt. Stated in the alternative: An Indiana statute pertaining to surface coal mining and reclamation is not invalidated by virtue of its being determined to be outside of the approved state program under SMCRA. See 30 C.F.R. 730.11(a), a regulation under SMCRA, which provides: "No state law. . .shall be superseded by any provision of. . .[SMCRA],, except to the extent that the State Law. . .is inconsistent with, or precludes implementation of, requirements of SMCRA" or a regulation promulgated under SMCRA. The Director of the Office of Surface Mining "shall publish a notice of the proposed action in the Federal Register setting forth the text or a summary of any State Law. . .initially determined by him to be inconsistent with SMCRA" or a regulation promulgated under SMCRA. "Following the close of the public comment period, the Director [of the Office of Surface Mining] shall make a final determination which shall be published in the Federal Register." This regulatory section is consistent with the statutory design set forth in SMCRA, particularly 30 U.S.C. 1254 (g). The regulation of the surface mining of coal is not an area where the United States Congress has sought generally to preempt state law. Where the Federal and State Governments exercise concurrent power, the Supremacy Clause, United States Constitution, Article VI, Section 2, acts to preempt state laws only where it is clear that Congress so intended. Statutes are construed to avoid preemption, absent an unmistakable intention to the contrary. Where it is not clearly stated that state law is preempted, the state law is preserved unless it conflicts with Federal Law or would frustrate the federal scheme. [See by way of illustration Tennessee v. Champion International Corp. (1985), 22 ERC 1338, Tenn. App., which construed the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq.) See also Fossil Fuels Mining, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, Division of Reclamation, Administrative Cause Number 85-102R, 85-103R, 85-147R and 85-150R as decided by the Director on March 21, 1985. Assuming for the sake of argument that Spencer establishes, in proper forum, the approval of the Indiana state program by the Secretary of the Interior was (or is) invalid, the result is that two separate regulatory schemes are applicable; SMCRA and IC 13-4.1. In the absence of an action by the Director of the Office of Surface Mining Under 30 C.F.R. 730.11 (a) to preempt state law, or of a repeal of IC 13-4.1 by the Indiana General Assembly, the provisions of IC 13-4.1 are effective and applicable for the purposes of state law.

 

ii. This statutory lapse resulted in temporary relief being granted on February 27, 1985 to the permittee in Spencer Coal Corporation v. Department of Natural Resources, Division of Reclamation, Administrative Cause Number 85-040R (TR #C50206-80-41.) In that action, a Notice of Violation and Cessation Order were issued by the Department to Spencer with respect to an interim program permit for a failure by Spencer to establish on the regraded areas, and all other lands affected, a diverse, effective and permanent cover. The notice and violation and Cessation Order were found to be supported by the facts, but temporary relief was granted on the basis that there was no procedural mechanism available to the Department to enforce the apparent substantive violation. Spencer had not mined under the permit in question since July 29, 1982, and the non-code provisions (which implemented the interim program) had lapsed prior to issuance

 

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of the Notice of Violation and Cessation Order.

iii. As a consequence, the rationale set forth in Spencer v. Department of Natural Resources, Division of Reclamation, Administrative Cause Number 85-040R, as outlined in footnote ii, has no application to a Notice of Violation or Cessation Order issued after April 8, 1985. Whether IC 13-4-6-1.6 provides new vitality to a Notice of Violation or permit between July 29, 1982 and April 9, 1985 (and against which an affected person made a timely request for administrative review under IC 4-22-1) need not b e addressed here. All of the NOVs identified in Findings 27 were issued after April 8, 1985.

iv. The Department urges on page 4 of its brief: ". . .[C]ommon sense dictates that if bond is required to be posted as a condition precedent to the issuing of a permit and cannot be released until successful reclamation has been attained, such coverage must be maintained over the life of the permit. . .Under IC 13-4-6 one could not lawfully conduct surface mining operations in Indiana without a permit issued by the Natural Resources Commission (IC 13-4-6-3 and IC 13-4-6-5), and one could not secure a permit without first posting the required bond. Clearly,, not to be covered by bond constitutes a failure to comply with IC 13-4-6, as well as IC 13-4.1, for which an NOV must be written directing the operator to secure replacement bond; IC 13-4-6-7(f) states, in pertinent part: "If the Director finds that any of the requirements of this chapter. . .or of any order of the [D]irector or [C]ommission have not been complied with. . .the [D]irector shall cause a notice of non-compliance to be served upon the Director" An NOV is the functional equivalent of a Notice of Non-Compliance and is the enforcement mechanism provided. . ." in IC 13-4.1. In these regards, the Department presents a compelling argument.


v. While nothing in the record clearly dictates this finding, the result is seemingly implicit to the arguments of both counsel.


vi. Spencer also urges in its brief that the Director cannot render a determination in these administrative actions because to do so would violate the "strict test of impartiality" set forth in City of Mishawaka v. Stewart, 310 N.E. 2d 65. The issue is not timely raised and is not properly presented for consideration. See particularly Finding 7, Finding 8 and Finding 9. In any event,
the argument by Spencer is unpersuasive, The Department responds appropriately at page 3 of its brief: "The allegation that the Administrative Law Judge cannot render an impartial judgment because he is the delegate of the Director, a defendant in a law suit brought by Spencer in Federal Court, is simply that-- a bald allegation with no facts to substantiate it. If this argument is allowed to prevail, any person wishing to avoid an administrative decision pursuant to IC 13-41 and IC 4-22-1. . .could simply file a complaint in another form [forum] and claim prejudice. While abstention may be appropriate in some instances this is not always the case, and a claimant who himself initiated [IC] 4-22-1 administrative review should not prevail unless he can demonstrate prejudice."

vii. Spencer may no longer wish to pursue temporary relief in these administrative actions. The company has formally requested temporary relief, however, and has not articulated a motion to dismiss or withdraw that request.