ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER:
TIMOTHY D. HERNLY
JAMES A. O’BRIEN
PHILIP J. FACCENDA, JR.
BARNES & THORNBURG
South Bend, IN


ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
STEVE CARTER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
Indianapolis, IN

JOEL SCHIFF
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Indianapolis, IN

BETA STEEL CORPORATION,                                                   )



COMPANY, Successor in Merger with
                                                                                                                            )

    Petitioner,                                                                )
                                                                               )
    v.                                                                         )   Cause No. 71T10-9801-TA-14
                                                                               )
DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT                                                 )

(1) cause a survey to be made of the area or areas in which the property has been destroyed; and

(2) order a reassessment of the destroyed property;

if a person petitions the department to take that action.
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-4-11(a) (1998) (emphasis added). The State Board argues that a “substantial amount” of property is not destroyed until the assessed value of the destroyed property exceeds 1% of the gross assessed value of all property in a township. Beta Steel, on the other hand, argues that Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-4-11 does not provided for a comparison of assessed property values within a township in order to determine whether a “substantial amount” of property has been destroyed.
This Court will construe terms within a statute only if they are ambiguous. Shoup Buses, Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 635 N.E.2d 1165, 1167 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1994). “Although a simple disagreement between parties does not necessarily indicate ambiguity, opposing interpretations are persuasive in suggesting that an ambiguity exists. “ Id. at 1168. In construing a statute, the Court’s goal is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Id. “To accomplish this, the [C]ourt gives statutory words and phrases their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted).
Nothing in the language of Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-4-11 indicates that the determination to afford disaster relief is made by comparing the assessed value of destroyed property to the gross assessed value of all property in a township. Indeed, nothing in the language of the statute provides for disaster relief on the basis of any comparative determinations whatsoever. Rather, the determination of disaster relief is based on a finding that: (1) a disaster has occurred, (2) the disaster partially or totally destroyed real and personal property in a township, and (3) a substantial amount of property was destroyed. I.C. § 6-1.1-4-11.
Here, the parties agree that the explosion at Beta Steel was a disaster that resulted in the partial destruction of Beta Steel’s real and personal property in Portage Township. The only issue is whether a “substantial amount” of Beta Steel’s property was destroyed. The State Board argues that the phrase “substantial amount” is synonymous with “substantial value,” See footnote but the State Board has ignored the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “amount.”
Where a word in a statute is undefined by statute or case law (as it is in this instance), the Court gives the word its plain and ordinary meaning; the Court may do so by referring to a dictionary. May Dept. Stores Co. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 749 N.E.2d 651, 661 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001). Here, the statute refers to an “amount” of property. I.C. § 6-1.1-4-11. The plain and ordinary meaning of “amount” is “quantity.” See Webster’s Third International Dictionary 72 (1981). Accordingly, the phrase “substantial amount” in Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-4-11 is synonymous with “substantial quantity,” not “substantial value.”
Because the State Board made its final determination on Beta Steel’s Form 137R based on the assessed value of Beta Steel’s property relative to that of the entire township, the State Board’s final determination was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. The Court therefore REVERSES the State Board’s final determination and REMANDS this issue to the Indiana Board to determine whether a substantial amount of Beta Steel’s real and personal property was destroyed by the disaster. If the Indiana Board determines that a substantial amount of Beta Steel’s property was destroyed, it shall order a survey and reassessment of the affected property pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1.-4-11. See footnote