PETITIONERS, APPEARING PRO SE:    ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
FRED EARL LAWSON    KAREN M. FREEMAN-WILSON
JOHNETTE L. LAWSON    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
Indianapolis, IN    Indianapolis, IN
    
    TED J. HOLADAY
    DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Indianapolis, IN
_____________________________________________________________________

    IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT _____________________________________________________________________

FRED EARL & JOHNETTE L. LAWSON,                                                   )             
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    Petitioners,                                                                           )
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    v.                                                                                     )   Cause No. 49T10-9907-TA-169
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STATE OF INDIANA, INDIANA STATE             
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BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS,                                                                )
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    Respondent.                                                                            )    

II.     Whether the State Board erroneously refused to grant the Lawsons a negative influence factor;

III.     Whether the State Board incorrectly applied a C-1 grade to the Lawsons’ residence; and

IV.    Whether the State Board erroneously applied a neighborhood rating of Good, instead of Average, to the Lawsons’ Planned Unit Development.

Id. Also, the State Board estimated that Highway 136 is within 100 to 150 feet of the subject property. (Final Determination at 4, ¶ 12.) At trial, the State Board summed up its position by stating that the Lawsons’ contentions are merely “speculation” and that they had failed to present evidence “of any substantial reason that is a recognized reason for putting a negative influence factor on this land.” (Trial Tr. at 53, 54 & 56.)
    An influence factor “refers to a condition peculiar to the lot that dictates an adjustment to the extended value to account for variations from the norm.” Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-4-10(a)(9) (1996). See also id., r. 2.2-4-12 (“An influence factor represents the composite effect that influences the value of certain lots within the boundaries of an entire geographic area.”); id., r. 2.2-4-16 (discussing influence factors for residential acreage). The regulations list six specific conditions and one general condition that may be the basis for an adjustment. See footnote Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-4-10(a)(9) (1996). The adjustment is expressed in terms of a percentage increase or decrease in the subject land’s assessed value. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-4-10(a)(9) (1996). “The decision whether to apply an influence factor calls for subjective judgment.” Wirth v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 613 N.E.2d 874, 878 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1993). In applying an influence factor, an assessing official must first identify the deviations from the norm and then quantify the variations as a percentage. White Swan Realty v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 712 N.E.2d 555, 562 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999), review denied.     
    In the present case, the issue before the Court is whether the State Board abused its discretion by refusing to grant the Lawsons’ property a negative influence factor. See footnote The Lawsons were obligated to establish, through probative evidence, a prima facie case that the proximities of power lines and/or Highway 136 near their home or the presence of easements on their property justified application of a negative influence factor to the subject property. See Talesnick v. State Bd. of Tax Commissioners, 693 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). Two cases are instructive as to whether the Lawsons met this burden of production.
    In Talesnick v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, the taxpayers owned land and improvements on the banks of Eagle Creek Reservoir in the Eagle Ridge subdivision in Indianapolis. The taxpayers argued that their property was entitled to a negative influence factor because of a lack of infrastructure and because of the presence of a water flowage easement. The Court noted that influence factors are appropriate for making adjustments to the value of land encumbered by an easement. Id. at 660 (citing Poracky, 635 N.E.2d at 238). The taxpayers in Talesnick had submitted evidence showing that the water flowage easement encumbered and encroached upon their property to a greater extent than it did other land surrounding the reservoir. The evidence consisted of a taxpayer’s testimony, which he supported with “maps of the subdivision showing the line of the water flowage easement, the topography of the subdivision, and photographs of his home and others around the reservoir.” Id. at 661. Moreover, the taxpayers had demonstrated that their subdivision lacked the same infrastructure, i.e., city sewers, city water and city-maintained streets with access to the property, as other nearby subdivisions, even though the taxpayer’s property was valued identically to similarly situated properties in these other subdivisions. The Court concluded that the taxpayers had made a prima facie case that their property was valued incorrectly and that the State Board had failed to rebut the taxpayer’s case. Id. at 660 & 661.
    In Wirth v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, the taxpayer owned a commercially zoned platted lot located near a large water tower. The taxpayer used the building on the property as the office for his construction business and for his wife’s retail diet business. To prosecute his appeal before the State Board, Wirth engaged a contingently paid expert witness who was a property tax consultant. Before this Court, the taxpayer claimed that the State Board abused its discretion by denying the taxpayer an influence factor to account for the property’s proximity to the water tower. However, the taxpayer’s only evidence was the expert’s opinion that the water tower detracted from the property’s value. The Court denied the taxpayer’s claim, reasoning that the witness “presented no other evidence that shows the water tower was a detriment, and [that] the expert’s opinion is simply insufficient to overcome the wide latitude given the State Board and the presumption the State Board acted properly.” Wirth, 613 N.E.2d at 878.
    The Lawsons have not established a prima facie case that their property’s proximity to either power lines or Highway 136 warrants application of a negative influence factor. They have submitted no probative evidence to support this position. In their petition to this Court, the Lawsons claim that “many statistics” reveal the public’s concern regarding power lines transmissions and their effects on human beings, especially children. (Original Tax Appeal Pet. at 3.) However, the Lawsons have cited no specific studies or other authority supporting this claim. Their claim is speculative. A conclusory statement is not probative evidence. See footnote See Wirth, 613 N.E.2d at 878; CDI, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 725 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000).
    In addition, the Lawsons submitted copies of photographs of the subject property. See footnote (Stipulation 7.) According to Mr. Lawson, one picture shows that both large and small power lines are “directly behind” his residence; he further testified that there is one foot of space between the back of his home and the power lines. (Trial Tr. at 33.) In their petition, the Lawsons stated that the power company’s “low level lines [are] within 10 feet of [their] property line and the high powered ones next to them.” (Original Tax Appeal Pet. at 3.) Unfortunately, the photocopied picture submitted is dark and unclear. One cannot reasonably ascertain the distances of the power lines to the Lawsons’ home using this copy. Mr. Lawson admits this, observing at trial that the copy does not “give [the Court] much of a chance to view [the property] . . . . [The copy] does not give [a] good enough picture[] to show that it’s directly behind.” (Trial Tr. at 33-34.) Even assuming arguendo that the picture shows that the power lines are approximately one foot from the Lawsons’ home, the Court concludes that the Lawsons have shown neither that the power lines constitute a condition “peculiar” to their lot nor that the presence of the power lines is in anyway a “variation[] from the norm.” Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-4-10(a)(9) (1996). Unlike Talesnick, 693 N.E.2d at 660-61, where a taxpayer’s testimony combined with photographs and other documentary evidence established a prima facie case that the property was incorrectly valued, the Lawsons here have submitted no evidence showing the effects of power lines on the value of their residential property. See footnote
    In like manner, the Lawsons have not shown how the easements on their property negatively impact the value of their property. In Talesnick, 693 N.E.2d at 661, the Court found that the taxpayers had presented evidence showing that the easement encroached upon their land to a greater extent than it did upon the other land surrounding the reservoir. In the present case, the Lawsons do not show the extent of the easements on their property or how these easements compare with those affecting other properties in Eagle Valley. The easements may very well be an “obstacle” to remodeling or otherwise improving the Lawsons’ home and property. (Trial Tr. at 34.) However, the Lawsons cannot merely posit this without explanation or supporting evidence. Conclusory statements of this nature are not probative evidence. See CDI, 725 N.E.2d at 1020-21.
    The Lawsons also offered no evidence demonstrating how the proximity of Highway 136 negatively impacts the value of their property. They argue that there is increased traffic accompanied by noise pollution, including the noise from a nearby fire station. (Original Tax Appeal Pet. at 3.) The increased traffic, the Lawsons opine, also means that homeowners must be “very cautious” that children do not “end up” on the highway. (Trial Tr. at 35.) Again, the Lawsons have provided the Court with no evidence of probative value. Without further explanation, the Court will not assume that the presence of a highway, regardless of increased traffic flow and its accompanying noise, qualifies as a condition peculiar to the lot that affects the property’s value in a manner requiring a negative adjustment to account for variations from the norm. Similar to Wirth, 613 N.E.2d at 878, where the expert’s opinion standing alone was insufficient to support application of a negative influence factor, in the present case the testimony of Mr. Lawson (a non-expert) is “insufficient to overcome the wide latitude given the State Board and the presumption the State Board acted properly.”
    The Court holds that the State Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply a negative influence factor to the Lawsons’ land. Therefore, the State Board’s final determination on this issue is AFFIRMED.

(Final Determination at 13-14, ¶ 35.) At trial the State Board essentially argued that grade assignment involves the weighing of numerous factors, many of which are subjective in nature, and that in the present case the State Board did consider all of the relevant features of the Lawsons’ home in arriving at a grade of C-1. (Trial Tr. at 57-58.) The State Board asserted that the Lawsons had failed to prove specific facts demonstrating that a C-1 grade is “clearly wrong.” (Trial Tr. at 58.)
    “Grade” means the “classification of an improvement based on certain construction specifications and quality of materials and workmanship.” Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-1-30 (1996). C grade dwellings are described in part as being “moderately attractive and constructed with average quality materials and workmanship. They have minimal to moderate architectural treatment. The design has universal appeal and optimal utility.” Id., r. 2.2-7-6(d)(3). D grade dwellings are described in part as being “constructed with economy materials and fair workmanship. They are void of any architectural detail.” Id., r. 2.2-7-6(d)(4).
    Each grade has a corresponding multiplier that applies to the base value of a residence. Id., r. 2.2-7-8.1(g). See footnote A C grade dwelling has a corresponding multiplier of one hundred percent. Id., r. 2.2-7-6(e)(3). A D grade dwelling has a corresponding multiplier of eighty percent. Id., r. 2.2-7-6(e)(4). An intermediate grade of C-1 indicates that the grade is slightly below the C grade classification. Id., r. 2.2-7-6(g)(2). A C-1 grade has a multiplier of ninety-five percent. Id., r. 2.2-7-11 (Schedule F).
    “The selection of which grade should be applied to an improvement calls for a subjective judgment and is committed to the discretion of the assessor.” Garcia v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). Accord King Indus., 699 N.E.2d at 341 n.7. See also Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-7-6(c) (1996) (“The selection of the proper grade relies on the judgment of the assessor.”) “This Court affords subjective determinations made by the State Board a great deal of deference, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the State Board.” Clark, 694 N.E.2d at 1236. To assign the correct grade, the regulations provide that the “assessor must weigh the components of each represented major grade classification and determine an overall composite grade. This is accomplished by first determining the major grade classification that best represents the structure [and second] . . . weigh[ing] the various components against the determined classification.” Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-7-6(f) (1996). According to the regulations, the “quality of materials and design are the most significant factors” to consider in establishing a dwelling’s grade. Id., r. 2.2-7-6(c). The grade specification table “offers some guidance for assessors in selecting the basic grade classification.” Garcia, 694 N.E.2d at 797. But cf. Kemp v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 726 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000) (concluding that marking a copy of the grade specification table, without further explanation, is conclusory and thus not probative as to grade). It “provides the assessor with an indicator for establishing the differences between the subject dwelling and the model.” See footnote Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-7-6(b) (1996). Assessors “must carefully review the grade specification table for the changes in material used to construct the different grade dwellings.” Id., r. 2.2-7-6(b).
    To prove that the State Board abused its discretion in assigning a C-1 grade, the Lawsons, who argue that a D grade should be applied, were obligated to submit probative evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case that a D grade was the proper grade. See Whitley Prods., Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998); Clark, 694 N.E.2d at 1236 (finding that taxpayer had presented prima facie case that State Board erred as to grade). The Lawsons have shown that a D grade would be appropriate. They list several items from the D grade column of the grade selection table that match the design and construction of their home. See footnote
    However, this does not mean that the State Board has abused its discretion. The State Board’s final determination noted that the hearing officer who inspected the Lawsons’ home observed fourteen different characteristics of the home that were relevant to the building’s grade determination.See footnote (Final Determination at 5, ¶ 15.) Some of these characteristics are found in the C grade description, including average quality doors, plumbing fixtures, and kitchen cabinets, and the 1/2” plywood on 2” x 8” joists for the floor and normal roof overhangs.See footnote See Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-7-6(d)(3) (1996). Two of these characteristics, the 2” x 8” wood joists and the normal roof overhangs (cited by Mr. Lawson as well), are also found in the D grade description, per Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-7-6(b) (1996). See footnote
    The Court finds that the State Board has rebutted the Lawsons’ prima facie case with substantial evidence. The Lawsons’ home had some C grade features. Thus, the home’s “major grade classification” appropriately could be deemed as best represented by C, see Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-7-6(f) (1996). Having determined that many of the home’s features are “consistent with that of a C grade,” the State Board then weighed the building’s features against the C grade classification. (Final Determination at 13-14, ¶ 35.) Compare with (Stipulation 15 at 5) (listing as either C or D grade quality the home’s roof, interior finish and electric and listing its heating as C grade.) Upon doing so, the State Board determined that the home had both features typical of higher and lower quality homes. (Final Determination at 13-14, ¶ 35.) It found that the building’s overall quality was slightly below a C grade. (Final Determination at 13-14, ¶ 35.) Having examined the evidence, the Court cannot state that the State Board abused its discretion in assigning a grade of C-1. Therefore, the State Board’s final determination on this issue is AFFIRMED.

(Original Tax Appeal Pet. at 3.) At trial Mr. Lawson repeated these contentions, adding that the wooded areas and trees in the neighborhood have become a problem for septic systems. (Trial Tr. at 42-43.) Many of the septic systems, he indicated, need to be removed. (Trial Tr. at 43.) According to Mr. Lawson, the only sidewalks in the neighborhood are on one-half of the main thoroughfare; none are located on side streets. (Trial Tr. at 44-45.) He admitted that the both a country club and racing facility were located somewhat near Eagle Valley. (Trial Tr. at 45-46.) Moreover, he reported that the landscape in Eagle Valley is “maintained.” (Stipulation 23, Tape of Administrative Hearing.) Accord (Stipulation 15 at 2.)
    The State Board’s final determination upheld the application of a Good rating to Eagle Valley. (Final Determination at 15, ¶ 40.) The State Board concluded that “[w]hile the lack of many street lights and sidewalks detract slightly from this neighborhood, it has many characteristics of a desirable neighborhood. It is close to shopping and major roads, and an acceptable distance to schools. It is in close proximity to a country club and a major motor speedway.” (Final Determination at 15, ¶ 40.) Moreover, the State Board stated that new construction in the area was evidence that the neighborhood was above average. See footnote (Final Determination at 15, ¶ 40.)
    A dwelling’s neighborhood desirability rating is important for purposes of calculating its physical depreciation. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-7-9(c) (1996). “The neighborhood desirability rating is a judgment of overall desirability, which includes the consideration of all neighborhood characteristics that are benefits or liabilities to the dwelling.” Id., r. 2.2-7-7.1(g)(20). The rating is a “composite judgment of the overall desirability based on the condition of agreeable living and the extent of residential benefits arising from the location of the dwelling.” Id., r. 2.2-7-7.1(f)(7). The regulations list seven categories, including “G[ood]” and “Av[erage].” Id., r. 2.2-7-7.1(f)(7)(C) & (D); see also infra n.28. These categories have limited definitions in the regulations. Good “indicate[s an] attractive and desirable area”; Average “indicate[s] an average area.” Id. However, the Marion County Land Order further fleshes out the meaning of these two terms with respect to Apartment Land and PUDs in the following manner:
GOOD: Attractive and desirable with good landscaping, level to rolling partially wooded terrain and could possibly include a man-made lake. Has many of the same features as the very good classification. Features include: 2 parking spaces per unit, some carport areas, asphalt or concrete roads, sidewalks to units, lighted streets, clubhouse and office. Recreational areas may include a swimming pool and tennis courts.

AVERAGE: A typical area with level terrain, adequate drainage, and landscaping. May have a man-made lake, near commercial and residential areas with acceptable distances to roads, schools and shopping areas and is neither particularly attractive nor unattractive having characteristics of both good and fair areas. Features include: one and one-half parking spaces per unit, may have carports available, sidewalks, hard surface roads, small clubhouse and office.

(Land Order at 1-2.)
    Before considering whether the Lawsons’ home was assigned a proper neighborhood rating pursuant to the above descriptions, the Court first observes that the State Board applied the incorrect description in the first place. This fact is reflected in both the State Board’s final determination and by its arguments at trial. The final determination states that the neighborhood classification was left unchanged as Good “[a]fter inspection of the property and in consideration of 50 IAC 2.2-4-13.” (Final Determination at 15, ¶ 40.) The final determination quotes the relevant language from Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-4-13(c) (1996), which lists seven categories, See footnote including those for Good and Average. (Final Determination at 15, ¶ 39.) However, under the regulation, these categories are to be applied to “agricultural homesites and rural residential parcels.” Id. The regulation specifically requires local land valuation commissions to establish value ranges for each of the seven categories. Id. Under this regulation, Good indicates that the location is “pleasant,” is an “improving area with good access to shopping, schools, and major roads,” and “may be in close proximity to recreational facilities.” Id., r. 2.2-4-13(c)(3). Average, in comparison, indicates that the “location is typical,” is generally in a “static area with little or no evidence of new development,” has acceptable distances to shopping, school and major roads, and is “neither particularly attractive nor unattractive.” Id., r. 2.2-4-13(c)(4). The Land Order adopts this language verbatim, stating that the “category definitions apply to Rural Residential and Agricultural Homesites [Rural Sites].” At trial, the State Board’s counsel admitted that the final determination quoted the wrong description. (Trial Tr. at 60 & 61.)
    Although the wrong description was used as the standard, the State Board insists that its analysis is consistent with the Good standard applicable to a PUD. (Trial Tr. at 61.) In other words, the State Board argues that paragraph forty of its final determination “makes it clear that [the State Board is] analyzing [the Lawsons’ property] under the correct criteria for . . . good PUD neighborhood land.” (Trial Tr. at 61.) If this is the case, the State Board’s rating is proper.
    Unfortunately, a comparison of the State Board’s findings and conclusions with the proper standard indicates that the State Board may have improperly considered and applied some factors while neglecting to consider and apply others. First, the State Board pointed out that there was new construction in the area, i.e., it was not a “static neighborhood.” See footnote The proper standard for a PUD does not include such a consideration, while the presence of new development plays a prominent role in the description for Rural Sites. Second, the State Board noted that the neighborhood lacks “many street lights and sidewalks.” (Final Determination at 15, ¶ 40.) An Average PUD typically features sidewalks. An Average PUD may have characteristics of both Good and Fair areas, and Fair areas feature sidewalks and “scant lighting throughout the area.” (Land Order at 2.) In sharp contrast, a Good PUD features “sidewalks to units” and “lighted streets.” (Land Order at 1.) The Good and Average descriptions for Rural Sites mention neither sidewalks nor street lighting. (Land Order at 1.) Third, The only overlapping category that plays into the State Board’s final determination is the neighborhood’s access to shopping, schools and major roads. In the Rural Sites category, Good involves “good access” to these places, including the possibility that it “may be in close proximity to recreational facilities.” (Land Order at 1.) Similarly, Good PUDs have many features of the Very Good Classification, which includes “easy access to major roads, schools and shopping areas.” (Land Order at 1.) Average Rural Sites properties merely have “acceptable” distances to shopping, schools and major roads. (Land Order at 1.) In like manner, Average PUDs have “acceptable” distances to roads, schools, and shopping areas. (Land Order at 2.) The State Board’s final determination states that the Lawsons’ neighborhood is in “close” proximity to shopping and major roads and is an “acceptable” distance to schools. Thus, the area apparently shares features of both Good and Average PUDs, with respect to access to shopping, major roads and schools. The Court notes, though, that the State Board also considered the area’s proximity to a country club and a racing facility; these are important with respect to the Good category for Rural Sites, but recreational facilities are not part of the PUD category descriptions. The State Board thus appears to have improperly weighed this factor.
    The Court disagrees with the State Board’s contention that it analyzed the Lawsons’ neighborhood using the factors associated with the Good and Average PUD categories. It is obvious that that the State Board applied the incorrect descriptions. However, it is not so obvious as to whether, in considering and applying the incorrect descriptions, the State Board also applied the incorrect neighborhood rating. The Lawsons, while providing some probative evidence concerning certain pertinent features in the neighborhood, have not established a prima facie case as to the appropriate neighborhood rating. In this case, where the State Board mistakenly applied the incorrect standard, the Court finds that the State Board should consider this issue under the correct standard for the first time on remand. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the State Board abused its discretion when it applied the Good neighborhood rating pursuant to the incorrect rating descriptions. Therefore, the Court REVERSES the State Board’s final determination on this issue and REMANDS this issue to the State Board for further consideration in a manner consistent with this opinion.