ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
ON APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DETERMINATIONS
LARRY J. STROBLE STEVE CARTER
JENNIFER A. DUNFEE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
BARNES & THORNBURG Indianapolis, IN
LINDA I. VILLEGAS
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
INDIANA TAX COURT
LACY DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIES, LTD., )
v. ) Cause No. 49T10-0103-TA-29
DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL )
OF THE STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS
December 5, 2003
Lacy Diversified Industries, Ltd. (LDI) appeals from the two final determinations of the
State Board of Tax Commissioners (State Board) valuing its real property as of
the March 1, 1995 and 1996 assessment dates. LDI raises three issues
for the Court to consider:
Whether the State Board erred in assigning a B grade to LDIs improvement;
Whether the State Board erred in determining that the portion of LDIs improvement
used as a parking garage is in average condition; and
Whether the State Board erred in determining that LDIs improvement was only entitled
to a 15% obsolescence adjustment. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
LDI owns a nine-story office building located at 54 Monument Circle, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Constructed in 1924, the building consists of both a parking garage and
office space on floors one through six, and office space only on floors
seven through nine. For the 1995 and 1996 assessments, the Center Township
Assessor (Assessor) assessed LDIs property at $628,900. In arriving at that value,
the Assessor assigned LDIs improvement a B grade, determined that it was in
good condition, and awarded it a 15% obsolescence adjustment.
Believing the assessments to be too high, LDI appealed them to the Marion
County Board of Review (BOR). In its appeal, LDI argued that the
assigned grade factor of B was excessive, that the buildings condition rating was
too high, and that it was entitled to an additional obsolescence adjustment.
After conducting hearings on each of the appeals, the BOR denied all requested
LDI then appealed to the State Board via two Form 131 Petitions for
Review of Assessment. After conducting a hearing on the appeals, the State
Board issued two final determinations in which it lowered LDIs condition rating on
the improvement from good to average.
All other relief was denied.
On March 21, 2001, LDI initiated an original tax appeal. In lieu
of a trial, the parties agreed to argue the case based on the
administrative record compiled before the State Board and their briefs. This Court
heard the parties oral arguments on October 19, 2002. Additional facts will
be supplied as needed.
ANALYSIS AND OPINION
Standard of Review
The Court gives great deference to the State Boards final determinations when it
acts within the scope of its authority. Clark v. State Bd. of
Tax Commrs, 742 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001), review denied.
Accordingly, this Court reverses final determinations of the State Board only when those
decisions are unsupported by substantial evidence, are arbitrary or capricious, constitute an abuse
of discretion, or exceed statutory authority. Id. The taxpayer bears the
burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the State Boards final determination. Id.
To do so, the taxpayer must present a prima facie case, i.e.,
a case in which the evidence is sufficient to establish a given fact
and which if not contradicted will remain sufficient. GTE North Inc.
v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 634 N.E.2d 882, 887 (Ind. Tax Ct.
1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
LDI contends that the State Board erroneously graded its property. More
specifically, LDI argues that the current grade of B is excessive and that
the grade should be reduced to C+1. In response, the State Board
argues that LDI did not present a prima facie case that the B
grade was improper.
Under Indianas true tax value system, improvements are assigned various grades based on
their design, workmanship, and quality of materials used in their construction; the grades
represent multipliers that are applied to the base reproduction cost of an improvement.
Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-10-3 (1996); Whitley Prods., Inc. v.
State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1116 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998),
review denied. The selection of which grade should be applied to an
improvement calls for a subjective judgment and is committed to the discretion of
the assessor. Mahan v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 622 N.E.2d 1058,
1064 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1993). Thus, in determining grade, the assessor must
distinguish significant variations [in an improvements] quality and design. Ind. Admin. Code
tit. 50, r. 2.2-10-3(a) (1996).
The State Boards regulations define the different characteristics that help assessors differentiate between
grades. For instance, B grade buildings are architecturally attractive and constructed with
good quality materials and workmanship. These buildings have a high quality interior
finish with abundant built-in features, very good lighting and plumbing fixtures, and a
custom heating and air conditioning system. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r.
2.2-10-3(a)(2) (1996). On the other hand, C grade buildings are moderately attractive
and constructed with average quality materials and workmanship. These buildings have minimal
to moderate architectural treatment . . . an average quality interior finish with
adequate built-ins, standard quality fixtures, and mechanical features. Ind. Admin. Code tit.
50, r. 2.2-10-3(a)(3) (1996).
When contesting a grade assigned to an improvement, a taxpayer must offer probative
evidence concerning the alleged assessment error. Whitley Prods., 704 N.E.2d at 1119.
A taxpayers conclusory statements concerning the grading of a subject improvement, however,
do not constitute probative evidence. Id. Likewise, mere references to photographs
or State Board regulations, without explanation, do not qualify as probative evidence for
purposes of grading issues. Heart City Chrysler v. State Board of Tax
Commrs, 714 N.E.2d 329, 333 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). If a taxpayer
fails to provide the State Board with probative evidence supporting its position on
a grade issue, the State Boards duty to support its final determination with
substantial evidence is not triggered. Whitley Prods., 704 N.E.2d at 1119-20.
In examining the evidence presented to the State Board at the administrative hearing,
the Court determines that LDI has not met its burden of proof.
Indeed, at the administrative hearing, LDI submitted documentation on six allegedly comparable properties
Specifically, LDI submitted photocopies of those properties record cards, as
well as photocopies of photographs of their buildings exteriors. (Cert. Admin. R.
at 139-177.) LDI also submitted the property record card and photographs of
the subject improvement. (Cert. Admin. R. at 194-97; 215-23.)
Nevertheless, LDI made
little written explanation of the record cards, photographs, or comparisons of the allegedly
comparable buildings to its improvement. In fact, the only written explanation provided
by LDI at the administrative hearing was its Memorandum In Support of
Assessment Reduction. It merely states:
[T]he construction design and materials [of the subject improvement] are in the C
range, as shown by Exhibits A through F, which are property record cards
showing comparable buildings very nearly the same age as the Building. The
architectural appearance and type of materials used in the construction of these buildings
is similar in character, design, and architecture to the Building.
(Cert. Admin. R. at 115.)
In addition to the submitted documentation, LDI also called Mr. Scott Hokanson, Director
of Operations for the buildings management company, to testify at the administrative hearing.
Mr. Hokanson testified:
Q: How do the [allegedly comparable] buildings . . . compare with
A: [Their] character, design, and architecture are similar to the Property.
Q: Given these similarities, do you think that the Property should be
graded for property tax purposes in a [similar] manner . . . ?
(Cert. Admin. R. at 126.) Later, in the administrative hearing:
Q: [How is t]he [building at] 146 East Market . . .
A: The building has been vacant, and up until a couple of
years ago has been reoccupied by some city agencies. Theyre reopening the
old Pierpont Restaurant. I have not been in the building recently, but
its still comparable. It has, if I recollect, marble floors, lobbies, and
theyve renovated some of the upper floors for tenant occupancy. * * * * *
Q: [Th]e Fletcher Trust Building [located at 108 N. Pennsylvania], which is
now the Ramada Inn. It was built in 1915. . . .
Do you have anything to add?
A: I cant really comment on this building, other than it is
a grand old building. I used to spend a lot of time
in the Fletcher Trust Building, occupying my office. I have not toured
the upper floors since the renovation of the building into a hotel.
Ive been in the lobbies and the first floor, though, and its been
changed into a hotel and offices.
(Cert. Admin. R. at 331-32.) And finally:
Q: [W]ould you feel that the quality of the materials of the
[subject] Building is average, or would you consider the quality of the materials
to be good?
A: I think its a combination of average to good. * * * * *
Q: May I ask you about the design; the architectural design.
How would you classify the architectural design: moderately attractive, or would you call
it above average or attractive architectural character?
A: I have always been told beauty was in the eyes of
the beholder. Thats a tough one! To some, its a beautiful
type of building, and to others its not. And Im going to
say its average to good. And, again, its still dependent on the
individual. I tend to like historical older buildings, some dont. * * * * *
Q: Lets move on to workmanship. Would you classify the workmanship
as good workmanship, or would you classify it as average workmanship?
A: Good to average. Some areas its good and some areas
(Cert. Admin. R. at 335-37.) CONDITION
Testimonial statements that a buildings characteristics are architecturally similar, or that another building
is comparable or a grand old building, or that the quality of a
buildings design and workmanship is good to average are nothing more than conclusions.
Conclusory statements do not qualify as probative evidence. Whitley Prods., 704
N.E.2d at 1119. Rather, specific reasons must be provided as to
why a taxpayer believes a building is comparable, or why a buildings style
is moderately attractive as opposed to architecturally attractive.
This was not done
in this case, and the State Boards duty to support its final determination
with substantial evidence is therefore not triggered. See id. at 1119-20.
Accordingly, the State Boards determination of a B grade on the subject improvement
is therefore affirmed.
Under Indianas true tax value system, improvements are also assigned physical depreciation adjustments.
The amount of the adjustment is expressed as a percentage and is
based on an improvements age, condition, and structure type. See Ind. Admin.
Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-10-7(d) (1996).
Condition represents an improvements remaining usefulness. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r.
2.2-10-7(b) (1996). To estimate an improvements condition, the assessor must observe the
amount of physical deterioration (i.e., wear and tear) relative to the age of
the improvement, as well as the degree of both maintenance and modernization to
See id. The assessor then assigns the improvement one
of nine levels of condition, ranging from excellent to no value. Ind.
Admin. Code tit. 50, 2.2-10-5(d)(8)(A)-(I) (1996). For instance, a condition rating of
average means the structure is in average condition relative to its age, or
the condition in which it would normally be expected. Ind. Admin. Code
tit. 50, 2.2-10-5(d)(8)(D) (1996). In contrast, a condition rating of poor means
the structure is in poor condition relative to its age. The degree
of deterioration is significantly worse than would normally be expected. Ind. Admin.
Code tit. 50, 2.2-10-5(d)(8)(F) (1996).
LDI contends that the State Board erred in assigning the parking garage portion
of its building a condition rating of average. To support its claim,
LDI submitted, at the administrative hearing, photocopies of photographs of the parking garage
that illustrated specific examples of the physical deterioration present in its improvement.
(Cert. Admin. R. at 208-11, 258-62.) In addition, LDI provided a summary
of the actual costs it paid to restore/repair the physical deterioration in the
(Cert. Admin. R. at 269, 341.) This evidence, LDI
argues, establishes a prima facie case that the condition rating for the garage
portion of its building should be poor. The Court disagrees.
LDIs evidence demonstrates that its improvement was suffering from physical deterioration. LDIs
evidence also demonstrates how much it spent in repairing that physical deterioration.
The evidence, however, is silent with respect to how the physical deterioration related
to the age of the improvement. Indeed, there is no explanation as
to how the specific types of physical deterioration it was suffering from were
not typical to a 70 year-old structure, nor is there an explanation as
to how the physical deterioration was significantly worse than would normally be expected.
See 50 IAC 2.2-10-5(d)(8)(D); 50 IAC 2.2-10-5(d)(8)(F). Consequently, the State Boards
final determination with respect to LDIs condition issue is affirmed.
Finally, LDI contends that the 15% obsolescence adjustment awarded by the State Board
to its improvement is in error. LDI is correct.
Obsolescence, which is a form of depreciation, is defined as a loss of
value and classified as either functional or economic. Freudenberg-NOK Gen. Pship v.
State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 715 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999),
review denied. See also Ind. Admin Code tit. 50, r. 2.2-10-7(e) (1996).
Functional obsolescence is caused by factors internal to the property and is
evidenced by conditions within the property itself. See 50 IAC 2.2-10-7(e).
Economic obsolescence is caused by factors external to the property. Id.
The State Boards regulations cite several examples of causes of obsolescence, such as
limited use or excessive material and product handling costs due to an irregular
or inefficient floor plan (functional) and the decreased market acceptability for which the
property was constructed (economic). Id.
This Court has explained that when a taxpayer seeks an obsolescence adjustment, it
must make a two-pronged showing. See Clark v. State Bd. of Tax
Commrs, 694 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). First, the taxpayer
must identify specific factors that are causing, or have caused, its improvement to
suffer a loss of value. See id. Only after this
showing does the taxpayer proceed to the second prong: quantifying the amount
of obsolescence to be applied.
It is important to recognize, however, that each of these prongs requires a
connection to an actual loss in property value. For example, when identifying
factors that cause obsolescence, a taxpayer must show, through the use of probative
that these factors are causing an actual loss of value to its property.
See Miller Structures, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 748 N.E.2d
943, 954 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001). Furthermore, when a taxpayer quantifies the
amount of obsolescence to which it believes it is entitled, it is required,
through the use of professional appraisal techniques, to convert that actual loss of
value (shown in the first prong) into a percentage reduction and apply it
against the improvements overall value. See Clark, 694 N.E.2d at 1238.
During the administrative hearing, LDI claimed that its improvement suffered from both functional
and economic forms of obsolescence. More specifically, LDI complains: the building
has only two elevators, as opposed to three or four (resulting in an
inconvenience for the buildings tenants); the building has an oddly-shaped floor plan (resulting
in an inefficient use of tenant space); the parking garage occupies a portion
of floors one through six (disrupting the flow and usefulness of the space
existing on the floors); the floors are not large enough for most corporate
tenants (requiring the tenants to occupy more than one floor); and the parking
garage is so small (with approximately 81 parking spaces total) as to render
it inadequate. (Cert. Admin. R. at 118-19.)
Furthermore, LDI explains that as of May 1, 1996, its building was 44%
vacant. Such a vacancy rate resulted in a  shortfall of income
from a fully-occupied building. (Cert. Admin. R. at 119.) LDI also
complains that but for its improvements inadequacies, it would be able to command
rents comparable to those charged in more modern downtown facilities. (Cert. Admin.
R. at 119.)
In turn, LDI claims that the loss of value resulting from its improvements
inadequacies translates into an obsolescence adjustment of between 39% and 48%. As
support, LDI presented two separate approaches for determining the fair market value of
the property the income capitalization approach and the cost approach.
Under the income capitalization approach, the income expected to be earned by the
subject property is estimated, allowing for reasonable expenses, vacancy, and/or collection loss, to
arrive at net operating income (NOI). The NOI is subsequently converted to
a present value by dividing it by a capitalization rate.
Inst. Of Real Estate Appraisers, the Appraisal of Real Estate, 409-17 (10th ed.
1992). The capitalization rate generally reflects the annual rate of return necessary
to attract investment capital and is influenced by such factors as apparent risk,
market attitudes toward future inflation, the prospective rates of return for alternative investments,
the rates of return earned by comparable properties in the past, the supply
of and demand for mortgage funds, and the availability of tax shelters.
Id. at 417. In the instant case, LDI determined that its improvements
annual potential gross income was $819,056. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 318.)
It subsequently allowed for a 5% vacancy loss, deducted fixed and variable
expenses, to arrive at a NOI of $353,984. (Cert. Admin. R. at
318.) Then, LDI applied a capitalization rate of 11% to its NOI,
and determined that the improvements fair market value was $3,218,036. (Cert. Admin.
R. at 318.)
Under the cost approach to market value, the cost to construct a reproduction
of the existing structure is estimated, deducting all accrued depreciation in the property.
the Appraisal of Real Estate at 321. Depreciation is the loss
of value from all sources: functional and external obsolescence, as well as
Id. at 343. In its cost approach, LDI determined
that the total cost to construct a reproduction improvement was $9,756,652. (See
Cert. Admin. R. at 282.) LDI then deducted the amount of physical
depreciation the improvement had experienced ($4,488,060). (See Cert. Admin. R. at 319.)
Thus, LDI concluded that the reproduction cost of its improvement after physical
depreciation was $5,268,592. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 319.)
LDIs next step was to quantify the effect of the sources of obsolescence
(described supra) as representing a loss of value in the property compared to
its estimated reproduction cost (after deduction for physical depreciation). To arrive at
this amount, LDI correlated the cost approach with the figures it derived under
the income capitalization method: the difference between the reproduction cost of the
property after physical depreciation and the value of the property as determined by
the income capitalization method was attributed to obsolescence. In so doing, LDI
computed the amount of obsolescence present in its improvement to be $2,050,556, or
39% of the total reproduction cost of the improvement (after physical depreciation).
(Cert. Admin. R. at 314.) Accordingly, LDI contends that it is appropriate
to apply, at a minimum, a 39% obsolescence reduction against its true tax
See footnote As this Court has previously held, this is a valid methodology
for estimating obsolescence.
Canal Square Ltd. Pship v. State Bd. of Tax
Commrs, 694 N.E.2d 801, 807 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998). See also Thorntown
Tel. Co., Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 588 N.E.2d 613, 619
(Ind. Tax Ct. 1992) (stating that one technique to quantify obsolescence is to
compare the replacement cost new, less physical deterioration, of an improvement with the
value of the property estimated under the income approach.)
Nevertheless, the State Board denied LDIs request for additional obsolescence on the basis
that it was confused by LDIs calculations. More specifically, the State Board
became confused when LDIs submitted the second income capitalization approach because it utilized
a different rental income per square foot. (See Cert. Admin. R. at
82.) See also footnote 13, supra. As a result, the State
Board determined that LDI manipulated the data to such a degree that [its]
argument must be determined to be unsubstantiated. (Cert. Admin. R. at 83.)
The Court disagrees.
LDIs methodology for estimating its entitlement to an additional obsolescence adjustment is valid.
See Canal Square, 694 N.E.2d at 807. These calculations indicate that
LDI should receive an obsolescence adjustment of at least 39%. Consequently, it
was up to the State Board to rebut LDIs prima facie case and
deal with LDIs evidence in a meaningful manner. See Clark, 694 N.E.2d
at 1235. Instead, it rejected the evidence because it was confused and,
because it was confused, the evidence must have been manipulated. This Court
will not uphold a State Board decision rejecting a taxpayers evidence when the
State Board fails to make any findings that the evidence is inaccurate or
unreliable. See Canal Square, 694 N.E.2d at 807 (citations omitted).
For the aforementioned reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the State Boards final determination on
Issues I and II. The Court, however, REVERSES the final determination with
respect to Issue III. Consequently, Issue III is REMANDED to the Indiana
Board of Tax Review
See footnote in order to instruct the local assessing officials to
award LDIs improvement with a 39% obsolescence adjustment.
The State Board of Tax Commissioners (State Board) was originally the
Respondent in this appeal. However, the Legislature abolished the State Board as of
December 31, 2001. 2001 Ind. Acts 198 § 119(b)(2). Effective January
1, 2002, the Legislature created the Department of Local Government Finance (DLGF) and
the Indiana Board of Tax Review (Indiana Board).
Ind. Code §§ 6-1.1-30-1.1
(West Supp. 2003)(eff.1-1-02); 6-1.5-1-3 (West. Supp. 2003)(eff. 1-1-02); 2001 Ind. Acts 198 §§
66, 95. Pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.5-5-8, the DLGF is substituted
for the State Board in appeals from final determinations of the State Board
that were issued before January 1, 2002. Ind. Code § 6-1.5-5-8 (West
Supp. 2003)(eff. 1-1-02); 2001 Ind. Acts 198 § 95. Moreover, the law
in effect prior to January 1, 2002 applies to these appeals. I.C.
§ 6-1.5-5-8. See also 2001 Ind. Acts 198 § 117. Although
the DLGF has been substituted as the Respondent, this Court will still reference
the State Board throughout this opinion.
The change in condition rating reduced LDIs assessment from $628,900 to
Footnote: Because structures sometimes fall between major classifications . . . a method
of interpolation is built into the system.
Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50,
r. 2.2-10-3(c) (1996). Therefore:
Plus or minus two (+/- 2) indicates that the grade falls halfway between
the assigned grade classification and the grade immediately above or below it.
For example, a grade of C+2 indicates that the quality and design grade
classification is estimated to fall halfway between C and B or average to
good construction. . . .
Plus or minus one (+/- 1) indicates that the grade falls slightly above
or below the assigned grade classification, or at a point approximately twenty-five percent
(25%) of the interval between the assigned grade classification and the grade immediately
above or below it. For example, a grade of C+1 indicates that
the quality and design grade classification is estimated to be slightly better than
average or approximately halfway between a C grade and a C+2 grade.
LDI alleges the following properties are comparable:
146 East Market Street: constructed in 1922; assigned a grade of C.
155 East Market Street: constructed in 1926; assigned a grade of C+2.
107 North Pennsylvania: constructed in 1922; assigned a grade of C.
108 North Pennsylvania: constructed in 1915; assigned a grade of C.
5 East Market Street: constructed in 1929; assigned a grade of B-1.
17 West Market Street: constructed in 1929; assigned a grade of B-2.
See Cert. Admin. R. at 115-16.)
This Court has previously held that, in many ways, the State
Boards regulations regarding grade are so subjective as to be unclear.
of St. John v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 690 N.E.2d 370, 386
(Ind. Tax Ct. 1997), revd in part on other grounds by 702 N.E.2d
1034 (Ind. 1998). Nevertheless, it expects taxpayers who are appealing a grade
issue to do more than merely regurgitate the language found in the regulations
when presenting their case. Rather, taxpayers are expected to present specific reasons
as to why they think, for instance, a buildings style is moderately attractive
as opposed to architecturally attractive. Those reasons may be based on the
taxpayers subjective judgment.
Maintenance is the general upkeep of existing characteristics. Modernization refers
to corrective measures that are taken to bring the building in conformity with
change in style or technology. It requires replacing parts of the building
with modern replacements of the same kind
. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50,
r. 2.2-10-7(b) (1996).
The photographs reveal deterioration to the parking garages floor and wall
concrete, as well as indicate separations in the concrete beams. (
Admin. R. at 208-11; 258-62.)
LDI spent $746,000 to cure the physical deterioration in its building.
LDI explains that the difference in depreciation between the poor and average
condition ratings is 15% of the improvements total reproduction cost, which, in this
case, is $212,579. LDI asserts that because the $746,000 greatly exceeds the
$212,579, it established a prima facie case that the condition rating should be
reduced to poor. (
See Oral Argument Tr. at 12-13.)
Indeed, [w]here there is no cause of obsolescence, there is no
obsolescence to quantify.
Lake County Trust v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs,
694 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998), review denied.
In the commercial context, this loss of value usually means a
decrease in the propertys income generating ability. See Miller Structures, Inc. v.
State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 748 N.E.2d 943, 953 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001).
In 1995 and 1996, Indiana did not assess property on the
basis of its fair market value. Nonetheless, [the determination of] obsolescence [under
Indianas true tax value system] obviously incorporates market value concepts. Therefore, a
market value estimate is appropriate in the context of obsolescence. There is
really no choice in this matter: the Court (and taxpayers) must accept
quantifications . . . [that] use market concepts.
Canal Square Ltd. Pship
v. State Bd. of Tax Commrs, 694 N.E.2d 801, 806 n. 8 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 1998).
Indianas property assessment regulations also require the recognition of obsolescence and
ties the definition of obsolescence directly to that applied by professional appraisers under
the cost approach.
See id. at 806-07; Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50,
r. 2.2-10-7 (1996); Am. Inst. Of Real Estate Appraisers, the Appraisal of Real
Estate, 343-65 (10th ed. 1992).
LDI also submitted an alternate income capitalization approach one in
which it used a lower rent per square foot, which resulted in a
lower NOI. (
See Cert. Admin. R. at 314, 320.) The resulting
analysis indicates an obsolescence adjustment of 48%. (See Cert. Admin. R. at
314, 321.) In contrast to its explanation for the rental rate in
the first calculation (see Cert. Admin. R. at 346), however, LDIs explanation supporting
the use of the lower rent per square foot in this second calculation
is inadequate. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 346.)
All cases that would have been remanded to the State Board
are now remanded to the Indiana Board of Tax Review (Indiana Board).
Ind. Code § 6-1.1-15-8 (West Supp. 2003). Final determinations made by the
Indiana Board are subject to review by this Court pursuant to Ind. Code
§ 6-1.1-15. Ind. Code §§ 6-1.5-5-7 (West Supp. 2003); 3-33-5-2.