ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

KEVIN R. O’REILLY                 JEFFREY A. MODISETT
Lafayette, Indiana                    Attorney General of Indiana

                             SARAH E. SCHERRER
                            Deputy Attorney General
                            Indianapolis, Indiana

 DANNY FLOWERS,                )
                                        )
    Appellant-Defendant,                )
                                        )    Supreme Court Cause Number
        v.                              )    79S00-9908-CR-411
                                        )    
STATE OF INDIANA,                       )
                                        )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                 )

Gilliam v. State, 383 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Ind. 1978).
Thus, if Flowers were correct in his contention that the probable cause affidavit was deficient then his only remedy would have been release from pre-trial detention predicated upon an illegal arrest. Id.; see also Felders v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1987) (“An invalid arrest does not affect the right of the State to try a case nor does it affect the judgment of conviction.”). At this stage of the proceedings, we may address only whether the alleged illegal arrest affected the admissibility of evidence obtained through a search incident to arrest. Thomas v. State, 451 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ind. 1983); Williams v. State, 261 Ind. 385, 386-87, 304 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1973). This brings us to the next flaw in Flowers’ argument.
The record shows that the State charged Flowers with rape and burglary on April 24, 1992. It does not show when he was arrested. However, on May 13, 1992, while Flowers was in custody, the State filed a motion to obtain samples of Flowers’ blood, hair, and saliva. R. at 3. The trial court entered an order granting the motion. In this appeal Flowers asserts that his “bodily samples were taken on the strength of [the] defective affidavit of probable cause” and that “the evidence gleaned from [his] bodily samples should have been excluded.” Brief of Appellant at 11, 12.
We first observe that Flowers has failed to provide any citation to the record supporting his claim that the trial court’s order was premised on the probable cause affidavit at issue in this appeal. And our own examination of the record reveals no such support. Rather, the record merely shows the existence of the probable cause affidavit and a CCS entry where the trial court granted the State’s motion for blood, hair, and saliva samples. In any case, Flowers neither objected to the taking of the samples nor filed a motion to suppress the evidence. Further, at trial Flowers’ only objection to the admission of the blood, hair, and saliva samples was that there was an insufficient chain of custody and thus “the State has failed to lay a proper foundation.” R. at 2367. In like fashion Flowers made the same objection to the DNA evidence derived from the blood sample evidence. A party may not object on one ground at trial and then assert a different ground on appeal. Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind. 1998). To the extent Flowers now claims the evidence was inadmissible because it was the product of a search incident to an illegal arrest, the issue is waived for review. See id.
Similarly, to the extent Flowers claims that the alleged defective affidavit provided the basis for a body search warrant and thus the evidence seized thereby was inadmissible, this issue is waived also because it is a different claim than that made at trial. We note, however, that this Court has held that “[p]olice are allowed to take samples of [hair, blood, and saliva] from a defendant without a warrant provided no unreasonable intrusion is involved.” Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 959 (Ind. 1992) (rejecting defendant’s claim that a body search obtained by police violated his right to due process and to be free from illegal searches and seizures), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 976 (1993), appeal after remand, 625 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 1993); see also Heald v. State, 492 N.E.2d 671, 681 (Ind. 1986) (upholding discovery order authorizing the taking of blood samples and rejecting claim that a search warrant was required). In sum, we find no error in the trial court denying Flowers’ motion. And because Flowers makes an argument on appeal not raised before the trial court concerning the admission of evidence, this issue is waived for review.

Wethington, 560 N.E.2d at 503. Although H.B. could not quantify the exact amount of time that Flowers was present in her apartment, she did testify that he was there “a few minutes” during which time she fought and struggled with him and she “got a good look at him.” R. at 1446, 1448. H.B. also testified that after the struggle Flowers placed a blanket over her head and raped her. When the assault was over, H.B. removed the blanket, and she “saw him again” as Flowers pulled up his pants and ran out the door. R. at 1482, 1448. According to H.B., during the entire encounter, the room was illuminated with light from the television that “lit up the whole front room.” R. at 1447. Based on this evidence, we conclude a basis for H.B.’s in-court identification existed independent of any alleged unduly suggestive pre-trial procedure. The trial court did not err in admitting the in-court identification.

R. at 2753-54. Flowers objected and moved to strike the prosecutor’s comment. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to strike. After the State completed its closing argument but before the jury retired for deliberations, Flowers moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. In this appeal Flowers argues the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion insisting that that the prosecutor’s comments “shift[ed] the burden of proof to the defense . . . .” Brief of Appellant at 15.
    “To preserve an issue regarding the propriety of a closing argument for appeal, a defendant must do more than simply make a prompt objection to the argument. Defendant must also request an admonishment, and if further relief is desired, defendant must move for a mistrial.” Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 111 (Ind. 1997). Failure to request an admonishment results in waiver of the issue for appellate review. Phillips v. State, 719 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 1999). Here, although Flowers objected to the prosecutor’s remarks at trial, he failed to request an admonition. This issue is waived.
    Waiver notwithstanding, Flowers still cannot prevail. In Pettiford v. State, 506 N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. 1987), we held that the impropriety of a prosecutor’s comments during closing argument inferring that the burden of proof shifted from the State to the defendant was “de minimis” and cured by the court’s preliminary and final instructions which advised the jury that the defendant was not required to present any evidence or prove his innocence. Id. at 1089-90; see also Chubb v. State, 640 N.E.2d 44, 48 (Ind. 1994) (applying the Pettiford rationale). Here, assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecutor’s comments can be interpreted as shifting the burden of proof, the record shows that in both its preliminary and final instructions the trial court advised the jury:
Under the law of this State, a person charged with a crime is presumed to be innocent. To overcome the presumption of innocence, the State must prove the defendant guilty of each essential element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant is not required to present any evidence to prove his innocence or to prove or explain anything.

R. at 921, 1004. Thus, as in Pettiford and Chubb, the jury here was properly instructed that the defendant was not required to present any evidence or prove his innocence. Accordingly, we find that any impropriety in the prosecutor’s closing argument was de minimis and overcome by the preliminary and final instructions. The trial court did not err in denying Flowers’ motion for mistrial.