FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLEE:    CROSS-APPELLANTS:

CARMEN M. PIASECKI    ROBERT J. PALMER
Nickle & Piasecki     CHRISTOPHER R. PUTT
South Bend, Indiana    May, Oberfell & Lorber
            South Bend, Indiana
TOM WATSON
CURTIS RENNER
Watson & Renner
Washington, D.C.

INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY,                                   )
                                                                       )
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee-Defendant,                                )
                                                                       )
        vs.                                                            )    No. 50A05-9811-CV-529
                                                                       )
RAYMOND RUNGE and TINA RUNGE,                                          )
                                                                       )
    Appellees/Cross-Appellants-Plaintiffs.                             )

                                                                   

                                    

                                                                   

BROOK, Judge

in any way not inconsistent with the easement hereby granted, but no building, structure or obstruction shall be placed by the Grantor under or within 85 feet (measured horizontally) of the centerline of the electric power line." The 345-kilovolt line was constructed in 1971, has been in operation since 1973, and is suspended above the backyard of the property. On March 21, 1989, Betty M. Nemeth deeded the property to the Runges "[s]ubject to any and all easements, current taxes, assessments, restrictions and rights of way of record."
    The Runges and their two children moved into their house located on the property on March 30, 1989. In mid-April, while digging posts in the backyard, Raymond felt a sensation like "sharp grass" poking his ankles and developed a headache approximately two hours later. In late June 1989, the Runges and their friends and relatives experienced shocks while on the property. Soon thereafter, Raymond contacted IMPC about the shocking sensations, and IMPC employee William Pokorny ("Pokorny") visited the Runges in early July 1989 to measure the electrical and magnetic fields in the backyard. According to the Runges, Pokorny promised to "pass along any information, pro or con, that came across his desk regarding the effects of " EMF.
    Pokorny then contacted Ali Nourai ("Nourai") at American Electric Power about calculating EMF levels on the Runges' property, but never shared the results of Nourai's calculations with the Runges. On August 9, 1989, Pokorny again visited the Runges with IMPC employee Richard Fohrer. Pokorny confirmed that the Runges' garage encroached on the centerline right-of-way as provided in Easement 200A, but the Runges refused to sign a consent-to-encroachment form that would have released IMPC from all liability.

"concealed danger in the transmission lines"; (4) nuisance resulting from IMPC's failure to prevent EMF from "emanating outside the designated areas of their alleged easement so as to not cause harm to the plaintiffs or their property"; (5) trespass of the "unreasonably high and dangerous levels" of EMF onto the Runges' property; (6) IMPC's breach of an assumed duty to provide the Runges "with any and all information available or known" to IMPC regarding EMF; (7) IMPC's taking of the Runges' property without just compensation as a result of its easements and the effects of EMF;See footnote 4 and (8) a request for punitive damages arising from IMPC's alleged "willful and wanton misconduct, gross negligence, and reckless indifference to the consequences of its actions." IMPC filed its answer and affirmative defenses to the Runges' first amended complaint on August 26, 1991.
    On August 1, 1997, IMPC filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to exclude expert testimony; the relevant arguments advanced in these motions will be explored in greater detail below. The Runges filed their responses to IMPC's motions on September 2, 1997. On September 8, 1997, IMPC filed a motion to strike certain evidentiary designations made by the Runges pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) and filed replies in support of its previous motions. On September 10, 1997, the Runges filed a motion to strike Dillman's affidavit, to which IMPC filed an opposing memorandum on September 18, 1997; in his affidavit, Dillman opined that the Runges "took [their] property subject to all easements, which would include Easement 200 and 200A." The Runges filed a response to IMPC's motion to strike on September 18, 1997, and IMPC filed a reply to the Runges'

response on October 14, 1997. The trial court heard argument on IMPC's motion to exclude and motion for summary judgment on September 10 and 11, 1997, and heard argument on the parties' motions to strike on October 28, 1997. On March 20, 1998, the trial court entered findings and orders on all three motions.
    The trial court granted IMPC's motion to strike certain T.R. 56(C) designations in part with respect to portions of Tina's deposition, but denied its motion in all other regards. The trial court denied IMPC's motion for summary judgment in part and granted it in part as outlined above and denied IMPC's motion to exclude the Runges' expert scientific testimony. Finally, the trial court denied the Runges' motion to strike Dillman's affidavit. IMPC now appeals from several of the trial court's rulings, and the Runges raise several issues on cross- appeal.

damages, it invokes the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to assert that a trial court may assume jurisdiction of the Runges' claims, should any survive the IURC's determination whether there are unsafe EMF levels on the Runge property.
    The Runges respond that their claims fall within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and we agree. In Austin Lakes Joint Venture v. Avon Utilities, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1995), our supreme court drew a fine distinction between the doctrines of "exhaustion of remedies" and "primary jurisdiction" in the context of determining a trial court's ability to settle a dispute that is ostensibly within the purview of the administrative process. The supreme court noted that "[e]ven when neither statute nor agency rule specifically mandates exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review, the general rule is that a party is not entitled to judicial relief for an alleged or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."See footnote 5 Id. at 644.
    "The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is an invention of the United States Supreme Court to deal with the problem that arises when the courts and an agency both have claims to jurisdiction of an issue in a case that has come before a court." Id. at 645 (emphasis supplied). Our supreme court viewed primary jurisdiction as an essentially "prudential" doctrine, while considering exhaustion of remedies to be "jurisdictional" in nature because a court would be powerless to decide a case in which the parties had not "exhausted the appeal process within the agency." Id. at 645. The supreme court then set out the following

guidelines for cases in which a party "alleg[es] that the issues presented are within the jurisdiction of regulatory or administrative agencies to resolve":
    First, in order to determine whether a case is properly before the trial court, the court should examine each issue presented by the case. If at least one of the issues involved in the case is within the jurisdiction of the trial court, the entire case falls within its jurisdiction, even if one or more of the issues are clearly matters for exclusive administrative or regulatory agency determination. Where at least one of the issues or claims is a matter for judicial determination or resolution, the court is not ousted of subject matter jurisdiction by the presence in the case of one or more issues which arguably are within the jurisdiction of an administrative or regulatory agency [footnote omitted]..

    Once a trial court has determined that it has subject matter jurisdiction, it must review the issues in the case claimed to be matters within the purview of an administrative or regulatory agency to determine whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should be invoked, i.e., whether the court, while retaining jurisdiction over the case, should refer an issue or some subset of issues in the case to the expert agency for its opinion or final decision..

Id. at 646 (emphasis in original).
    The supreme court then presented "three different fact patterns that can arise in these types of claims":
    1. Certainly a trial court must invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction where one (but less than all) of the issues in the case requires exhaustion of remedies before judicial review can occur.. Those issues must be referred to the agency for determination.

    2. When no issue of exhaustion of remedies or other clear requirement of referral of the issue in question to an agency is presented, the court must next decide whether the opposite fact pattern is present, i.e., whether the administrative or regulatory agency truly has any jurisdiction over an issue at all. In such situations, of course, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction cannot be invoked because there is nothing to refer to the administrative or regulatory agency because there is nothing that the agency has the legal authority to decide..

N.E.2d 977, 983-984 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("The IURC derives its power solely from the legislature and has no power to act unless such power is conferred by statute.").
    Although we have determined that our analysis of the Runges' claims does not fall under the rubric of exhaustion of remedies, we observe that the "exhaustion rule assumes that an available statutory remedy exists at the time the challenged judicial relief is sought." MHC Surgical Center Associates, Inc. v. State Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning, 699 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). We also note that "a party is excepted from the exhaustion requirement when the remedy is inadequate or would be futile, or when some equitable consideration precludes application of the rule." Smith v. State Lottery Com'n of Ind., 701 N.E.2d 926, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). "To prevail upon a claim of futility, 'one must show that the administrative agency was powerless to effect a remedy or that it would have been impossible or fruitless and of no value under the circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Indiana State Building and Construction Trades Council v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 493 N.E.2d 800, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)). "Furthermore, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies 'will be relaxed where there is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative remedy.'" Smith, 701 N.E.2d at 931 (quoting Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 164 Ind. App. 169, 195, 329 N.E.2d 66, 82 (1975)). As discussed above, IMPC has failed to demonstrate that the Runges are challenging any of the IURC's regulations or that the IURC could provide the proper relief for the monetary damages sought.

genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue is the non-moving party compelled to come forward with contrary evidence. Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1994). It is for this reason that we must review the propriety of the trial court's rulings on IMPC's summary judgment motion before we may consider the admissibility of the evidence that the Runges designated in opposition to IMPC's motion. We must determine on appeal whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court correctly applied the law, and we will reverse the trial court if we determine that it misapplied the law. Landis, 698 N.E.2d at 1220. As the party appealing the denial of its motion for summary judgment, IMPC bears the burden of persuading this Court that the trial court's ruling was improper. Id. "We will affirm the denial of summary judgment if it is sustainable on any legal theory or basis found in the evidentiary matter designated to the trial court." GEICO Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 705 N.E.2d 476, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

defendant 'acted with malice, fraud, gross negligence, or oppressiveness which was not the result of a mistake of fact or law, honest error or judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence, or other human failing.'" USA Life One Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 541 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind. 1993)). This Court has previously held that "[t]he question of punitive damages is ultimately a question of fact for the jury to decide." Whitten v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, 570 N.E.2d 1353, 1358 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied (1992); see also Ackles v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Corp., 699 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied (1999) ("Summary judgment must be denied if the resolution hinges upon state of mind, credibility of the witnesses, or the weight of the testimony."). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying IMPC's motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages.

actions and that the right interfered with is the plaintiff's right to the exclusive possession of a chattel or land." Id.
    IMPC argues that because the Runges have failed to establish either of the necessary elements of trespass, summary judgment must be granted in its favor. Under Indiana's summary judgment standard, however, merely asserting that the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence on each element of a claim is insufficient to entitle the defendant to the judgment sought. See Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 122 (promissory estoppel). Moreover, IMPC has failed to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether IMPC committed a trespass "by allowing EMF to go beyond the limits of its easement on to the Runges' property"; whether IMPC exceeded the scope of its easement by allowing allegedly excessive EMF to be emitted from the power line; and whether the Runges sustained damages as the result of the alleged trespass.See footnote 6
    Because both the legal and the scientific communities are currently divided over the precise nature of EMF and its ability to create a trespass, we may not decide this question as a matter of law and must affirm the trial court's determination that summary judgment is an inappropriate method for disposing of the Runges' trespass claim. See Getche, 701 N.E.2d at 874 ("Where material facts conflict, or undisputed facts lead to conflicting material inferences, summary judgment is inappropriate.. This is true even if the court believes the

non-moving party will not succeed at trial.. Summary judgment should not be used as an abbreviated trial[.]"See footnote 7 ).

determination that something is a nuisance per se [nuisance at law] is a question of law for the court").

forward with contrary evidence only after a defendant "demonstrate[s] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue." Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123. Rather than attempting to meet this burden, IMPC has again contented itself with merely alleging that the Runges failed to designate sufficient evidence to proceed with their claims; unless and until IMPC can comply with Indiana's summary judgment standard, a jury must determine whether the Runges have satisfied the requisite burden of proof. See Getche, 701 N.E.2d at 874 ("Summary judgment should not be used as an abbreviated trial."); see also Holding v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 400 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("Although Indiana does not adhere to the requirement that electric companies exercise utmost care in their use of high voltage electricity, our courts do hold them to a standard of care commensurate to the risks undertaken.").See footnote 12

unless it prejudices the complaining party's rights."); see also Dorsett v. R.L. Carter, Inc., 702 N.E.2d 1126, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied (1999) ("The trial court may consider only evidence that can be admitted at trial in reaching a summary judgment determination.").

[EMF] and review of published journal articles, rather than being based on any one given methodology or principle." Both parties rely heavily upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) in formulating their arguments regarding the determination of scientific reliability and the admissibility of expert testimony under Ind. Evidence Rule 702.
    With respect to the testimony of Gerald Bodman ("Bodman"), who was retained by the Runges to measure voltage and current levels on their property in October 1990, we shall address the admissibility of his testimony below in our discussion of expert scientific testimony and Evid. R. 702. As for the testimony of Drs. Bruce McLeod ("McLeod") and Abraham Liboff ("Liboff"), we note that the Runges stated their opinions were limited "to establish[ing] the reasonableness and extent of the fear and emotional distress suffered by the Runges in being exposed to the excessive electric and magnetic fields on their property." Therefore, we shall review the admissibility of their testimony below in the context of its limited application.See footnote 14
    We reiterate that the trial court's summary judgment ruling is "clothed with a presumption of validity," and we will "affirm a grant of summary judgment if it is sustainable on any theory or basis found in the record." Getche, 701 N.E.2d at 874.
    In support of its motion for summary judgment, IMPC excerpted deposition testimony from several of the Runges' witnesses to show that they failed to "present competent

evidence" that IMPC's conduct "was both the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause" of the Runges' alleged injuries. As this Court stated in Roberson v. Hicks, 694 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, "[a]n essential element in a cause of action for negligence is the requirement of a reasonable connection between a defendant's conduct and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered." At a minimum, this element requires causation in fact -- "that is, that the harm would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's conduct." Id. The plaintiff may not carry his burden with "evidence based merely upon supposition or speculation." Id. "When the issue of cause is not within the understanding of a lay person, expert witness testimony on the issue is necessary." Id. Although "summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence actions . a defendant is entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law when undisputed material facts negate at least one element of plaintiff's claim." Colen v. Pride Vending Service, 654 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied (1996). More specifically, "[t]he defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff cannot establish that her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's conduct." Hottinger v. Trugreen Corp., 665 N.E.2d 593, 595-596 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
    IMPC designated testimony from the Runges' internists, obstetrician/gynecologist, dermatologist, dentist, and neurosurgeons, all of whom stated that they did not diagnose EMF as the cause of the Runges' various medical complaints, which included rashes, headaches, tooth decay, and Tina's miscarriage. IMPC also presented testimony from Dahlberg, McLeod, Liboff, and Smith, none of whom is a medical doctor, and none of whom has

examined the Runges or their medical records or interviewed their treating physicians. In the extracts selected from their depositions, IMPC attempted to show that none of these experts could offer an opinion that EMF actually caused the injuries claimed by the Runges. In its ruling on IMPC's motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated, "That there is no genuine issue of material fact, and there is no showing of proximate cause related to the claimed negligence of the Defendant and [injuries claimed by the Runges] or any other medical related condition, and Summary Judgment on those claims shall be GRANTED."
    The Runges seem to suggest that because the trial court "found a genuine issue of material fact with respect to every other facet of [their] negligence claim," it therefore erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of causation of their medically related conditions. Citing Jarboe, the Runges assert that the "[t]he trial court failed to recognize that [they] had no obligation to come forward with any evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of the injuries or the causation until the moving party demonstrated the absence of a material fact"; they further claim that the evidence designated by IMPC "was insufficient to carry this burden." We disagree.
    Without exception, the Runges' treating physicians stated that they did not diagnose EMF as the cause of any of the adverse health effects of which the Runges complained. The most equivocal opinion was offered by Dr. Claude Hartman, Tina's OB/GYN, who answered that he "[did not] know" whether exposure to EMF had caused Tina's miscarriage, and that he had not previously diagnosed EMF as a cause of anyone else's miscarriage. In their memorandum in opposition to IMPC's motion to exclude expert testimony, the Runges stated

that "the opinions of Dr. Liboff and Dr. McLeod are not being used to establish causation, but to establish the reasonableness and extent of the fear and emotional distress suffered by the Runges in being exposed to the excessive electric and magnetic fields on their property." Having admitted to the limited purpose of Liboff's and McLeod's testimony, the Runges relied on the opinions of Smith, who has a Ph.D. in anatomy but does not have a medical degree.
    In support of their motion for summary judgment, IMPC cited portions of Smith's deposition to cast doubt on the admissibility of his opinions:See footnote 15
            Q    Do you feel that you're in a position to identify all of the risk factors that have been associated with miscarriage?

            A    Oh, certainly not. Not every one. New ones appear weekly.

            Q    Have you made any investigation of whether any of these risk factors were present in the Runges' environment?

            A    No, except electrical and magnetic fields. That's information that's been supplied to me.

            Q    So to your knowledge there may well have been other risk factors that Mrs. and/or Mr. Runge were exposed to?

    A    I have no knowledge of other factors.

    Q    Either way?

    A    Either way..

            Q    Now, are you aware of any research that identifies the operative windows of magnetic field exposure for a miscarriage?

'possible' or 'could have been' is insufficient by itself to support a material factual question." Id.See footnote 16
    In the context of Evid. R. 401 and 402, we cannot conclude that Smith's testimony regarding the possible effects of EMF on the Runges' health is relevant to the determination of causation, in that his failure both to examine the medical conditions and histories of the Runges and to rule out other contributing factors cannot ultimately help the Runges prove that their adverse health effects were more or less probably caused by IMPC's alleged negligence. See Tucker v. Nike, 919 F.Supp. 1192, 1196-1997 (N.D. Ind. 1995):
    The most troubling aspect of [plaintiff's expert's] testimony [on causation] is his failure to consider other causes of the accident in forming his opinion.. [Plaintiff's expert's] testimony provides no scientific basis for excluding these other factors as potential causes for the Plaintiff's injury. Had [the expert] even considered these other factors, he could have conducted tests or at least arrived at a scientific explanation for why these other factors were not the cause of the injury in this case. The Court finds that [the expert's] opinion as

to the cause of the Plaintiff's accident is nothing more than "subjective belief" and "unsupported speculation" which is not the proper subject of expert testimony under Daubert[.]

    The expert's opinion on causation also implicates Daubert's second requirement of "fit." Under that requirement, the expert's opinion must have a "scientific connection" to the facts of the case. In addition to [the expert's] speculation as to the cause of the accident in this case, the Court finds that his opinion does not "fit" the facts of this case.

The question of "fit" is especially apposite with respect to the causation of Raymond's headaches, where Smith opined that the strength of a magnetic field would have to be "in the neighborhood of 150 or so milligauss"; as IMPC observes, this level of magnetic field intensity is many times higher than the highest reading that had been measured on the Runges' property.
    With respect to the admissibility of expert scientific testimony, we first refer to Ind. Evid. Rule 702:
    Rule 702. Testimony by Experts

         (a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

         (b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony rests are reliable.

The federal rules of evidence do not have a counterpart to Evid. R. 702(b), which was adopted before the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, which in turn addressed the trial court's "'gatekeeping function' of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." Hottinger, 665 N.E.2d at 596 (citing

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2798, 2799, 125 L.Ed.2d at 485). Our supreme court has held that "the federal evidence law of [Daubert] and its progeny are helpful in applying Indiana's Evid. R. 702." Hottinger, 665 N.E.2d at 596 (citing Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995)). "The trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of expert testimony under Evid. R. 702 is a matter within its broad discretion which will not be disturbed unless the trial court's application of the Daubert framework is clearly erroneous." Hottinger, 665 N.E.2d at 596.
    "When faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, the court must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue." Id. In the instant case, the trial court held separate hearings on IMPC's motion for summary judgment and motion to exclude expert testimony, the latter of which contained numerous references to the various reliability factors enumerated in Daubert, such as whether a theory or technique can be empirically tested; whether the theory or technique "has been subjected to peer review and publication"; and whether the theory or technique has gained "widespread acceptance." Id.
    As we concluded in our discussion of relevancy under Evid. R. 401 and 402, we fail to see how Smith's testimony could "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" with respect to the issue of causation under Evid. R. 702(a). Relevancy considerations aside, the Runges defend the testimony of Smith and their other witnesses as "based upon years of experience in investigating the effects of electric and

magnetic fields and review of published journal articles, rather than being based on any one given methodology or principle." Although we agree with the Runges that no specific "test" or set of "prongs" must be considered to determine the reliability of scientific testimony, we also agree with IMPC that allowing a self-professed expert to base his opinions merely upon his "years of experience" would be "inconsistent with the clear intent of [Evid. R. 702] that scientific experts demonstrate their testimony is based on reliable scientific principles." See Lytle v. Ford Motor Co., 696 N.E.2d 465, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied (1999) (flexibility of Evid. R. 702 analysis).See footnote 17
    In Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1335 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (Porter I), aff'd 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (Porter II), Judge Tinder cautioned against the inherent dangers of permitting a jury to rely on the bald assertions of an expert:
    Merely because an opinion of scientific causation comes from a person learned in medical science does not provide that opinion with a sufficient scientific basis. An expert cannot rely solely on his or her own stature, intellect or intuition to support an opinion admissible to aid the trier of fact. The basis -- the "reasoning" and "facts and data" -- of an opinion is distinct from the expert's qualifications as an expert in the field. An expert's qualifications reflect the expert's knowledge of relevant scientific facts and skill in making comparative judgments. The factual basis of a particular medical conclusion

is composed of an application of particular scientific facts to particular data about the instant case. Admissible opinions relate instant facts to known relationships; an opinion relating instant facts to an unknown relationship (a hypothesis) does not further the trier of fact's ability to determine a fact dependent upon that hypothetical relationship. Although experts may provide opinions in the form of a hypothetical fact situation, the scientific foundation or reasoning process may not be based on merely hypothetical causal relationships. Unsupported subjective opinion is unhelpful speculation and not admissible under Rule 702..

    In a highly technical case like this, where a lay trier of fact cannot possibly determine the precise etiology of the injury without guidance from expert opinions, there is a risk that the jury would make an irrational finding of causation based upon the siren-like allure of opinions stated by highly qualified experts. Thus, an expert's opinion must have some basis other than hypothesis before the opinion may have the privilege of being assailed by cross-examination.

Id. at 1345 (emphases supplied). Unlike the Runges' treating physicians, all of whom stated that they did not diagnose EMF as the cause of the Runges' alleged injuries, Smith lacks both a medical degree and detailed knowledge of their current medical conditions and past medical histories, which would form the critical factual basis for his expert opinions. As we stated in Hottinger, "[e]xpert testimony requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." 665 N.E.2d at 596. IMPC successfully demonstrated that Smith's testimony (and therefore the Runges' claim) fails to meet this standard with respect to causation, and the trial court correctly determined that IMPC thereby demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
    In their response to IMPC's summary judgment motion, the Runges designated abundant supporting evidence, including the following excerpts from Smith's deposition on June 13, 1997:

causation is inadmissible, we must reverse the trial court's ruling on IMPC's motion to exclude it.
    As for the testimony of McLeod, an electrical engineer, and Liboff, a physicist, we note that IMPC's appellate arguments focus on its admissibility on the issue of medical causation and not with respect to its limited purpose of "establish[ing] the reasonableness and extent of the fear and emotional distress suffered by the Runges in being exposed" to "excessive" EMF on their property. Nevertheless, McLeod admitted in his deposition that "[w]e can neither prove [] [n]or disprove" that "power frequency fields" cause health problems in humans, and Liboff confirmed that he was not "offering an opinion that [EMF from the power line] actually contributed to any injury or illness claimed by the Runges." Moreover, neither McLeod nor Liboff has ever reviewed the Runges' medical records or spoken with their treating physicians. Because IMPC failed to argue that their testimony was inadmissible on the issue of emotional distress relating to the Runges' negligence claim, we may not determine its admissibility for this limited purpose. Finally, because we cannot predict how McLeod's and Liboff's testimony will be used by the Runges to support their negligence claim, we can do nothing more than remind the trial court of its "gatekeeping" responsibility and the relevancy and reliability considerations addressed in the evidence rules and case law cited above.
    Finally, with respect to Bodman's testimony regarding his measurement of electric current on the Runges' property, neither party sufficiently informs us of the intended purpose for the challenged testimony, and IMPC has failed to demonstrate how it was prejudiced by

the trial court's admission thereof at the summary judgment stage. Consequently, we decline IMPC's invitation to second-guess the trial court's determination of its admissibility.
    In summary, the trial court did not err in granting IMPC's motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation of the Runges' adverse health effects; however, we reverse the trial court's denial of IMPC's motion to exclude the expert scientific testimony of Smith and Dahlberg.

appeal."). Moreover, the trial court also ruled that "the shocking sensation itself is an injury for which damages may be recoverable," thereby preserving both the injury element and the entire claim for jury consideration. Finally, we must distinguish between the duty of a public utility to warn its customers of reasonably foreseeable injuries that may occur as a result of the utility's conduct (as discussed in Ingram, supra, and as implicated in the instant case) and a manufacturer's duty to warn the users of its product of a concealed danger of which the manufacturer knew or had reason to know. See, e.g., Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied (1990). The Runges originally framed their failure-to-warn claim in terms of a strict product-liability theory of failure to warn of a concealed danger. In its motion for summary judgment, IMPC argued that the Runges' failure-to-warn claim could not succeed because the trial court had dismissed their strict liability claim; citing Ingram, the Runges responded that "a duty to warn may be based on either strict liability or negligence."

    Such a blunt inference cannot provide a reasonably reliable explanation for complex, unseen physiological processes. While a temporal congruity may be some evidence of causation, it is insufficient evidence to move the merely possible to the reasonably probable. Any finding of the fact of causation based solely on the facts within the understanding of lay jurors would be bald speculation.

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