FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:

JEFFREY A. MODISETT     GERALD G. ANGERMEIER
Attorney General of Indiana     JERRY E. PRALL
    Jewell, Crump & Angermeier
JAMES A. GARRARD    Columbus, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana     JULIA ANN CAUDILL
     VIRGINIA BOSWELL
    Caudill & Fischer
    Columbus, Indiana

STATE OF INDIANA, INDIANA STATE        )
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,            )
INDIANA STATE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT,         )
INDIANA STATE BUDGET AGENCY,                )
                                            )
    Appellants-Defendants,                  )
                                            )
        vs.                                 )    No. 03A01-9811-CV-414
                                            )
FELIX HENSLEY, JEFF ATWOOD,                 )
ANTHONY WILSON, and MAX JACOBUS,            )
on behalf of themselves and all others      )
similarly situated,                         )
                                            )
    Appellees-Plaintiffs.                   )

BAILEY, Judge

    Then, as stated in an earlier, interlocutory appeal of this case:

    During the 1990 legislative session, our General Assembly passed P.L. 180- 1990, an Act concerning the compensation of Indiana State Law Enforcement Officers, which read, in pertinent part, as follows:

    . . . .

        (e) The personnel department shall establish the same position classification plans and salary wage schedules (including overtime policies) for law enforcement officers of the law enforcement division of the department of natural resources that are established for law enforcement officers of the state police department.

State v. Hensley, 661 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (original had entire subsection (e) emphasized). The State failed to implement this statutory directive. Id. at 1249. The

ICOs initiated the present litigation to compel the State to adopt procedures whereby ICOs would receive compensation equivalent to their ISP counterparts. Id. at 1247. We affirmed the trial court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss. Id. at 1250.
    In its bid to comply with Pub. L. No. 180-1990, the State implemented changes affecting the compensation of ICOs which it summarized as follows:
    Pay ranges were revised to mirror the State Police pay ranges. A Financial Management Circular was issued to alter overtime pay practices to mirror State Police practices.

(R. 513, State's Answers to Interrogatories) (emphasis added). Although the new pay schedules for ICOs mirrored those of the Indiana State Police (“ISP”), the salaries of ICOs were still lower than the salaries of ISPs of comparable rank, experience, and qualifications. (R. 619).
    In the present lawsuit, the ICOs sought back pay from July 1, 1990, the effective date of Pub. L. No. 180-1990. As a component of this claim, the ICOs sought compensation equivalent to the $840 annual “emergency service allowance” received by ISPs under Pub. L. No. 357-1989. Additionally, the ICOs sought to recover prejudgment interest on the amounts allegedly underpaid.
    Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the ICOs finding in pertinent part as follows:
        5. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 180-1990, ICOs of comparable rank, experience, and qualifications to ISP officers had lower annual salaries than their ISP counterparts.

    The designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the liability issue, and that [the ICOs] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court designates the issues or claims on which it finds no genuine issue as to any material facts as follows:

    a. The clear intent of the legislature in enacting P.L. 180-1990, Section 1(e), as reflected by the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the words utilized, as well as the reasons for enactment of the statute, the existing state of affairs when the statute was enacted, the statutes' design, and the consequences that flow from the various interpretations given the statute by the parties, was to direct that ICOs and ISP officers of comparable rank, experience, and qualifications be treated the same with respect to position classifications, salaries, wages, and overtime; and

the last step in interpreting a statute is to examine the language of the statute. Indiana Bell, No. 93S02-9906-EX-350, slip op. at 6. As stated in In re the Visitation of J.P.H., 709 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999):
    When interpreting a statute, the foremost objective is to determine and effect legislative intent. Statutes must be construed to give effect to legislative intent, and courts must give deference to such intent whenever possible. Thus, courts must consider the goals of the statute and the reasons and policy underlying the statute's enactment. Courts are to examine and interpret a statute as a whole, giving words their common and ordinary meaning, and not overemphasize a strict, literal, or selective reading of individual words. Words and phrases are taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning unless a different purpose is manifested by the statute. Where possible, every word must be given effect and meaning, and no part is to be held meaningless if it can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. The meaning and intention of the legislature are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the statute but also by considering its nature, design, and the consequences which flow from the reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme.

Id. (citations omitted); see also Hensley, 661 N.E.2d at 1248. We cannot presume that the legislature intended that a statute was to be applied in an illogical manner or to contain useless provisions, the effect of which could have been easily avoided. Board of Health v. The Journal-Gazette Co., 608 N.E.2d 989, 992-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), adopted, 619 N.E.2d 273. For guidance in determining the intent of the legislature, it is appropriate for the court to examine the history surrounding the statute in question. Sangralea Boys Fund v. Board of Tax Comm'rs, 686 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1997), review denied. The court may not construe a statute in a manner that would impair the function the legislature intended it to possess. Id. at 959. Although an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to great

weight, courts rather than administrative agencies must resolve questions of statutory construction. Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Alder, No. 09S02-9806-CV-344, slip op. at 6 (Ind. July 22, 1999). Where the facts are undisputed, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law and an agency's interpretation of the statute and disposition of the case are not entitled to deference from this court. Twin States Publ'g Co, Inc. v. Indiana Unemployment Ins. Bd., 678 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.

of pay” which is lower cannot be said to “be equitably applied to” the “same position classification plan.”See footnote 5
    We hold that the trial court correctly concluded that our legislature, by enacting Pub. L. No. 180-1990 § 1(e), mandated that ICOs receive equivalent salaries and overtime pay as ISPs of comparable rank and experience. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the judgment pertaining to the hourly and overtime underpayments from July 1, 1990 through December 21, 1997 in the amount of $1,883,194.

experience. Thus, the General Assembly intended that the emergency service allowance not be considered a part of an ISP's salary, but something extra. See Jeurissen v. Amisub, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that employees' bonus which was not tied to regular work performed on a periodic basis was not a “wage” but was 'something extra'). Moreover, the emergency service allowance was not provided to all ISPs, but excluded the classifications of “communications officer, weighmaster and port security officer.” See Pub. L. No. 357-1989. We cannot conclude that the legislature could have intended that the emergency service allowance be paid to all ICOs, but only to certain ISPs.
    We hold that the trial court erred in concluding that ICOs were entitled to receive an amount equal to the emergency service allowance. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the judgment pertaining to the underpayment attributable to the annual emergency service allowance and remand with instructions that judgment be entered for the State with respect to this part of the ICOs' claim.

judgment which pertains to prejudgment interest and remand with instructions that judgment be entered in favor of the State on this part of the ICOs' claim.

(d) had not been enacted.

Pub. L. No. 206-1999. Ordinarily, we will look to the amendment of a statute as an indication of the legislature's intent at the initial enactment of the statute. See Tedlock v. State, 656 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). However, we interpret subsection (d) above as an express directive that we are not to consider the 1999 amendment in our determination of legislative intent with respect to Pub. L. No. 180-1990.

        In the present case, the intent of P.L. 180-1990 is apparent on its face. Subsection (e) plainly directed [the] State Personnel Department to establish equivalent position classifications and salary wage schedules for Conservation Officers to those that were to be established for State Police Officers.

Hensley, 661 N.E.2d at 1248 (emphasis added). In this earlier decision, it would appear that we equated the words “same” with “equivalent.” Again, we note that the language “same” . . . “salary schedules” is more reasonably interpreted as providing for “equivalent” salaries than lower salaries.

to follow the decisions of our supreme court).

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