FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MICHAEL C. BORSCHEL STEVE CARTER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
GRANT CARLTON
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TED L. VERTNER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-0203-CR-215
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable William Schabler, Judge Pro-Tem
Cause No. 49F15-0009-DF-166630
August 20, 2003
OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Ted Vertner appeals his convictions after a jury trial of (1) resisting law
enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle, a Class D felony;
See footnote (2) resisting law
enforcement by fleeing, a Class A misdemeanor;See footnote and (3) reckless possession of paraphernalia,
a Class A misdemeanor.See footnote Vertner raises three issues on appeal, which we
restate as:
Whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to admit, as course
of police work testimony, hearsay statements from an anonymous victim/informant regarding an alleged
robbery;
Whether the trial court erred by failing to rule on Vertners objection to
improper statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument; and
Whether the trial court erred by failing to give a requested instruction regarding
possession of paraphernalia as a Class A infraction.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
See footnote
FACTS
Two Indianapolis Police Department officers were on an early morning training patrol in
a marked patrol car when they encountered a car in the middle of
a street. A male pedestrian stood next to the passenger side of
the car, which was occupied by three men. As the patrol car
approached, the vehicle took off at high speed. The pedestrian flagged down
the police car and reported that he had just been robbed.
One of the officers told the pedestrian to remain at that location, and
the officers left with full lights and siren engaged in pursuit of the
fleeing vehicle. The patrol car was able to follow the subject car
closely until it stopped suddenly. Vertner and the other two occupants exited
the car and fled on foot. The police chased Vertner and apprehended
him. The officers discovered a crack pipe in Vertners pocket when they
searched him. Vertner admitted at trial that the pipe was his, that
he had used it that evening to smoke crack cocaine, and that he
intended to use it in the future to smoke crack cocaine.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
1. Hearsay statements as course of police work testimony
Vertner asserts the trial court committed reversible error by denying his pre-trial Motion
in Limine to preclude the State from offering as course of police work
testimony hearsay statements from an anonymous informant/victim regarding an alleged robbery.
The trial courts discretion to admit or exclude evidence is broad,
Hardiman v.
State, 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (Ind. 2000), and it will not be reversed
absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. A trial court abuses
its discretion when its evidentiary ruling is clearly against the logic, facts and
circumstances presented. Id.
Hearsay is evidence of a statement made out of court that is offered
in a judicial proceeding to prove the truth of a matter asserted in
the statement. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). We note initially that the
statement Vertner challenges is not properly characterized as hearsay. The testimony to
which Vertner objected was the following statement by one of the police officers:
The vehicle then turned on its lights and took off at a
high rate of speed. The subject that was standing outside flagged me
down and I approached him. After talking with him very briefly, I
then took off after the vehicle in order to investigate an alleged robbery.
(Tr. at 131.) While the officers statement strongly suggests the allegation
of a robbery was made by the person to whom the officer was
speaking, the testimony does not explicitly contain a statement made by anyone other
than the officer who was testifying. It therefore was not hearsay.
Because Vertners objection was based solely on hearsay grounds, we need not address
the merits of Vertners argument on appeal.
Even if the statement may be characterized as hearsay, its admission was harmless
error. When the admissibility of an out-of-court statement received by a police
officer during the course of an investigation is challenged as hearsay, we first
determine whether the testimony describes an out-of-court statement that asserts a fact susceptible
of being true or false.
Hernandez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 294, 298
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied (citing Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207,
211 (Ind. 1994)). If the statement contains no such assertion, it cannot
be hearsay and the objection should accordingly be overruled. Id.
If the statement does contain an assertion of fact, we consider the evidentiary
purpose of the proffered statement. If it is to prove the fact
asserted, is not from a witness or a party, and there are no
applicable hearsay exceptions, the statement is inadmissible as hearsay.
Id. If
the statement is offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth
of the matter asserted, we consider whether the fact to be proved is
relevant to some issue in the case and whether the danger of unfair
prejudice that may result from its admission outweighs its probative value. Id.
Relevance is the tendency to make a fact of consequence to the determination
of the action more or less probable.
Id. If the fact
sought to be proved under the suggested non-hearsay purpose is not relevant, or
if it is relevant but its danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value, the hearsay objection should be sustained. Id. at 298-99.
This rationale is applicable in analyzing the admissibility of evidence the State argues
is admissible because it merely describes the course of police investigation. Id.
at 299.
Officer Hessongs statement that the police chase was initiated by the pedestrians report
that a robbery had occurred is a fact susceptible of being true or
false. The second part of the test requires consideration of the evidentiary
purpose of the statement. The State contends the evidentiary purpose of the
statement was not to prove that a robbery had in fact occurred but
to explain the subsequent conduct of the police officers. In
Maxey v.
State, 730 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 2000), Maxey argued course of police work testimony
that he was apprehended out of state was improperly admitted evidence. Because,
as here, the State asserted that the evidentiary purpose of the testimony was
to explain subsequent conduct of the detective, the court considered the relevance of
the detectives course of police work and whether the danger of prejudice in
admitting this evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.
The court concluded the probative value was low because the defendants out-of-state apprehension
was not a contested issue. On the other hand, the testimony was
relevant as circumstantial evidence of the defendants guilt. The court noted that
when course of police work testimony consists entirely of inadmissible evidence, the danger
of unfair prejudice might well outweigh the probative value.
Id. at 162.
However, the court finally determined any error in the admission of the
out-of-court statements was harmless because the statements were cumulative of other direct, non-hearsay
testimony to Defendants flight. Id.
Similarly, in
Hernandez, 785 N.E.2d at 300, we determined the relevance of evidence
of course of police work testimony was slight when the genesis of the
investigation was not relevant to any contested issue in the case. We
held, however, that the prejudicial impact was great where the defendant was charged
with promoting prostitution and the challenged testimony indicated the police began their investigation
because they had received complaints about prostitution connected with the business.
In the case before us, whether a robbery had occurred is not a
contested issue. However, the prejudicial impact of the statement suggesting the police
pursued Vertner and his companions because of a report they had committed a
crime is great. The testimony did not provide evidence Vertner was guilty
of any of the charges against him, and the reason the police pursued
Vertner was not a contested issue at trial. The testimony therefore had,
at most, little probative value. The prejudicial effect was great, as it
suggested Vertner had been a participant in an uncharged crime. The motion
in limine therefore should have been granted.
Although admission of the officers statement was error, it was harmless error.
The testimony was presented only once, it was immediately objected to, and the
judge admonished the jury that the statement was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. Further, ample evidence supported Vertners conviction of
resisting law enforcement by fleeing. The error was therefore harmless.
2. Prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments
In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine first whether the prosecutor committed
misconduct and second, whether the alleged misconduct put the defendant in a position
of grave peril. Robinson v. State, 693 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ind. 1998).
In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated, What it comes down to is
. . . the credibility of the witnesses. Its great defense strategy,
well admit one, so that means were telling the truth about everything else.
But, ladies and gentlemen, thats not the truth. (Tr. at 129.)
Vertner objected to the statement and both parties went off the record
for a bench conference. The record does not reflect whether the trial
court ruled on the objection, and the prosecutor resumed her closing argument.
Vertner asserts the trial court failed to either sustain his objection or to
admonish the jury regarding the prosecutors statement, and argues the lack of a
proper curing admonition to the jury amounts to reversible error.
See footnote
He further
argues a mistrial must be granted if an admonition is not given or
is not sufficient to cure the error.
See footnote
Vertner argues the prosecutors statements amounted to improper personal opinion because they were
conclusory and not based on analysis of the evidence admitted at trial.
He suggests the prosecutor could have avoided improper personal opinions by prefacing her
statements with the words the evidence shows as indicated by our supreme court
in Swope v. State, 263 Ind. 148, 155, 325 N.E.2d 193, 196 (1975),
cert. denied sub nom. Swope v. Indiana, 423 U.S. 870 (1975). The
State argues the prosecutor was merely commenting about the credibility of the witnesses.
A prosecuting attorney may comment upon witness credibility during closing argument as long
as the assertion is based upon reasons that arise from the evidence.
Quarles v. State, 493 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Ind. 1986). By contrast, it
is improper for the prosecutor to state during trial a personal opinion as
to the credibility of a witness. Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853,
859 (Ind. 1998), rehg denied. The State notes the prosecutor characterized
witness credibility by contrasting the testimony of Vertner and the police officers, but
that she never expressed her opinion that Vertner was lying.
The prosecutors statement Its great defense strategy, well admit one, so that means
were telling the truth about everything else. But, ladies and gentlemen, thats
not the truth might well have been objectionable in isolation. However, the
prosecutor explicitly preceded that statement with What it comes down to is .
. . the credibility of the witnesses. The jury therefore could not
have taken the statement as anything other than a characterization of witness credibility
and not as a personal opinion. We cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion when it declined to declare a mistrial.
3. Reckless possession of paraphernalia
Vertner was charged with reckless possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.
Reckless possession of paraphernalia is defined in Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(c):
A person who recklessly possesses a raw material, an instrument, a device, or
other object that is to be used primarily for: (1) introducing into the
persons body a controlled substance; (2) testing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of
a controlled substance; or (3) enhancing the effects of a controlled substance; commits
reckless possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.
Vertner tendered a final instruction on possession of paraphernalia, a Class A infraction,
which the trial court declined to give. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(a) provides:
A person who possesses a raw material, an instrument, a device, or other
object that the person intends to use for: (1) introducing into the persons
body a controlled substance; (2) testing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of a
controlled substance; or (3) enhancing the effects of a controlled substance; in violation
of this chapter commits a Class A infraction for possessing paraphernalia.
Vertner argues a separate instruction should have been given because the crime of
possession of paraphernalia can be charged under two separate culpability levels and because
subsection (a) is a lesser included offense of subsection (c). However, we
need not address whether failure to so instruct the jury was error because
we find, sua sponte, that the State failed to prove Vertners possession was
reckless.
In Avant v. State, 779 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), we noted
that subsections (a) and (c) differ with respect to the character of the
possession. The character of the possession proscribed in section (a) is straightforward:
possession with intent to use. The character of the possession proscribed in
subsection (c) depends on the meaning of recklessly. Id. at 542.
A persons conduct is reckless if it is done in plain, conscious, and
unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial
deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(c).
See footnote
In
Avant, we held that to obtain a conviction under subsection (c) requires more
than a mere showing of possession such as would be sufficient to obtain
a conviction under subsection (a). Avant, 779 N.E.2d at 543.
We recently discussed the meaning of recklessly as used in Ind. Code §
35-48-4-8.3(c) in
Bocko v. State, 769 N.E.2d 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), rehg
denied, trans. denied 783 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. 2002). In Bocko, a straw
and a plastic bag, both covered with a white powder, were found in
one of the defendants pockets. Like Vertner, Bocko was charged with reckless
possession of paraphernalia under Ind. Code. § 35-48-4-8.3(c). We found the evidence
demonstrated Bocko merely possessed a straw, not that he recklessly possessed it, as
there was (1) no evidence the paraphernalia was ever out of Bockos pocket
until the police removed it; (2) no evidence of the harm that might
result from his possession of the straw in his pocket, and, (3) no
evidence that his possession of the straw showed his disregard of the harm
that might result from his conduct or that it involved a substantial deviation
from acceptable standards of conduct. Id. at 664.
In the case before us, Vertners admission would have provided ample evidence to
support a charge of the Class A infraction of possession of paraphernalia.
However, the State directs us to no evidence that the character of Vertners
possession was reckless. The record does not reflect the pipe was out
of Vertners pocket until police removed it during the search incident to Vertners
arrest. Nor does the record include any evidence of the harm that
might result from his possession of a pipe in his pocket, that his
possession of the pipe showed his disregard of the harm that might result
from having the pipe in his pocket, or that having a pipe in
his pocket involved a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. We
accordingly vacate Vertners conviction of reckless possession of paraphernalia.
CONCLUSION
The trial courts admission of hearsay course of police work testimony was harmless
error, and the prosecutors comment on witness credibility was not misconduct. However,
the State did not offer sufficient evidence to support Vertners conviction of reckless
possession of paraphernalia. We affirm Vertners convictions of resisting law enforcement but
reverse his conviction of reckless possession of paraphernalia.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
BARNES, J., concurs.
BROOK, C.J., concurring with separate opinion.
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TED VERTNER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-0203-CR-215
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
BROOK, Chief Judge, concurring as to Issue III
I agree with the majoritys conclusion that the State presented no evidence
that Vertner possessed the crack pipe recklessly, as that word is defined in
Indiana Code Section 35-41-2-2(c). I write separately to urge the General Assembly
to revisit and perhaps revise Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-8.3(c), as it is difficult
to imagine a set of facts that would satisfy the elements of reckless
possession of paraphernalia.
Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-8.3 reads as follows:
(a) A person who possesses a raw material, an instrument, a device, or
other object that the person intends to use for:
(1) introducing into the persons body a controlled substance;
(2) testing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance; or
(3) enhancing the effect of a controlled substance;
in violation of this chapter commits a Class A infraction for possessing paraphernalia.
(b) A person who:
(1) knowingly or intentionally violates subsection (a); and
(2) has a previous judgment or conviction under this section;
commits possession of paraphernalia, a Class D felony.
(c) A person who recklessly possesses a raw material, an instrument, a device,
or other object that is to be used primarily for:
(1) introducing into the persons body a controlled substance;
(2) testing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance; or
(3) enhancing the effect of a controlled substance;
in violation of this chapter commits reckless possession of paraphernalia, a Class A
misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Class D felony if the person
has a previous judgment or conviction under this section.
In
Avant, we noted that subsections (a) and (c) differ with respect to
the nature of the object possessed. Avant, 779 N.E.2d at 541.
Subsection (a) provides that it is a criminal offense to possess an object
that the person intends to use for taking drugs. Subsection (c), on
the other hand, criminalizes possession of an object that is to be used
primarily for taking drugs. Thus, a person would violate subsection (a) by
possessing an object that he intended to use in taking drugs, regardless of
whether the object would be innocuous in a different context. The persons
intentnot the intrinsic nature of the objectis the critical element. On the
other hand, possession of, for example, a crack pipe would constitute a violation
of subsection (c), regardless of whether a person then harbored an intent to
use it to take drugs.
Id.
It would seem that in subsections (a) and (b) of the statute,
See footnote
the
legislatures primary intent was to criminalize the possession of otherwise innocent items, such
as an alligator clip used to smoke a marijuana cigarette or an eyedropper
used to test the purity of cocaine, where the possessor intended to use
the item for one of the activities enumerated in subsection (a). In
subsection (c) of the statute, it would appear that the legislatures primary intent
was to criminalize the possession of not-so-innocent items such as crack pipes and
marijuana bongs, regardless of whether the possessor intended to use the item for
one of the activities enumerated in that subsection. See id. (Thus, the
difference between subsections (a) and (c) in this respect is that (a) focuses
on the possessors intent to use, whereas (c) focuses on the nature of
the object itself.).
See footnote
As worthy and sensible as this objective might be,
it is difficult to imagine that the mere possession of any such item
(with the possible exception of certain sharp objects or volatile raw materials) might
result in harm as contemplated by the culpability statute. See Ind. Code
§ 35-41-2-2(c) (A person engages in conduct recklessly if he engages in the
conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and
the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.).
Although the
use of a crack pipe might well result in harm, the
mere possession of a crack pipe will rarely, if ever, do so, whether
to the possessor or to others. If the legislatures intent is indeed
to criminalize the possession of items to be used primarily for ingesting, testing,
or enhancing the effect of controlled substances, regardless of whether the possessor intends
to use them for these purposes, then perhaps it should consider making their
possession a strict liability offense or, at the very least, criminalizing the knowing
possession of these items instead.
Footnote:
Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3.
Footnote:
Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3.
Footnote:
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3.
Footnote:
We heard oral argument on April 2, 2003 at John Adams High
School in South Bend, Indiana. We thank the school for its hospitality
and commend counsel for the quality of their appellate advocacy.
Footnote:
The record is also silent regarding whether the trial court admonished the
jury. The State argues there is no evidence the court failed to
rule on Vertners objection or that Vertner requested an admonition or a mistrial.
Therefore, it argues, because no admonition was given it is reasonable to
infer none was requested. Accordingly, the State urges us to find Vertner
waived the issue. We decline the invitation by the parties to find
either waiver or reversible error in a silent record.
Footnote:
The record does not indicate whether Vertner requested a mistrial during the
off-the-record bench conference.
Footnote:
We noted in Bocko v. State, 769 N.E.2d 658, 669 n.2 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002), rehg denied, trans. denied 783 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. 2002), that
the prohibition against reckless possession of drug paraphernalia appears to be unique to
Indiana. We further note that reckless acts are generally understood to be
[c]haracterized by the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to
others[.] Blacks Law Dictionary 1276 (Seventh ed. 1999) (emphasis supplied). We
express no opinion regarding whether the legislature could have intended to criminalize behavior
that was done in disregard of harm that might result to the individual
in possession of the paraphernalia and not to anyone else.
Footnote:
I respectfully disagree with the
Avant courts conclusions that under both
subsection (a) and (c), the defendant must knowingly possess an object and that
recklessly as used in subsection (c) describes the manner of possession[.] Avant,
779 N.E.2d at 542. Given subsection (b)s specific mention of a knowing
or intentional violation of subsection (a), I cannot conclude that the legislature also
intended to apply the mens rea of knowingly to subsections (a) and (c).
See N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002) ([W]e will
not read into the statute that which is not the expressed intent of
the legislature. As such, it is just as important to recognize what
the statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does
say.) (citation omitted); see also Tipton County ex rel. Tipton County Council v.
State ex rel. Nash, 731 N.E.2d 12, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (It
is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that, where a restriction is not
general but is provided in a specific instance, application of the specific instance
will not be carried into other statements that do not provide such limitations.),
trans. denied. In my view, possession of paraphernalia under Indiana Code Section
35-48-4-8.3(a) is a strict liability offense, but the State must prove that the
defendant intended to use the object for one of the activities enumerated in
that subsection. This evidentiary burden would preclude the conviction of a person
who mistakenly donned anothers jacket containing a cocaine-encrusted straw and did not intend
to use the straw to ingest a controlled substance.
I must also respectfully disagree with the Avant courts holding that subsection (a)
is a lesser-included offense of subsection (c). Avant, 779 N.E.2d at 543.
In my estimation, these subsections define two separate crimes.
Footnote:
See Blacks Law Dictionary 322 (6th ed. 1990) (Contraband per se
is property the mere possession of which is unlawful, while derivative contraband is
property innocent by itself but used in perpetration of [an] unlawful act.) (citation
omitted).