ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

HILARY BOWE RICKS                STEVE CARTER
Indianapolis, Indiana                Attorney General of Indiana

                             ELLEN H. MEILAENDER
                            Deputy Attorney General
                            Indianapolis, Indiana

MARCEILUS ABEL,                    )
                                        )
    Appellant-Defendant,                )
                                        )    Supreme Court Cause Number
        v.                              )    49S00-0011-CR-709
                                        )
STATE OF INDIANA,                       )
                                        )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                 )

Id. at 27. In determining whether the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances, due weight must be given not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Id.
    The record shows that Officers Patton and Stevenson believed they were on the lookout for a fleeing suspect who had just been involved in a robbery. Although there is no evidence in this record that a robbery had in fact occurred, Officer Lewis had broadcast that he thought a robbery had occurred or was about to occur. It was this information to which Officers Patton and Stevenson were reacting. Whether Officer Lewis was reasonably justified in his belief concerning a possible robbery suspect has no bearing on whether his fellow officers were entitled to rely upon his representation. See Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 1983) (holding that where police officers act in good faith reliance on a radio dispatch that a crime has been committed, there is no need to show that the source of the dispatcher’s information is reliable); see also Russell v. State, 519 N.E.2d 549, 551-52 (Ind. 1988) (finding investigatory stop warranted where the officer heard a radio dispatch that a possible robbery had been committed and the defendant matched the description relayed in the dispatch).
    It is true that not every robbery is committed while armed with a deadly weapon. However, an “officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. In this case, considering the early morning high-speed chase by car and then the chase on foot, a reasonably prudent officer would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Id. Accordingly, Officers Patton and Stevenson did not violate Abel’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by conducting a pat-down search for weapons and seizing Abel’s handgun. In turn, the trial court properly admitted the handgun into evidence.

R. at 977-78. As for the hardship that will result to his child from incarceration, Abel does not explain how his incarceration for the maximum sentence will result in more hardship to his daughter than his incarceration for the presumptive or minimum sentence. Indeed, the difference here between the presumptive or minimum sentence and the enhanced sentence “hardly can be argued to impose much, if any, additional hardship on the child.” Battles v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind. 1997). The trial court correctly declined to give this factor any mitigating weight. In sum, the trial court did not err in imposing sentence.