Attorneys for Appellee
Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana
J. T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Appellant (Defendant below),
STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee (Plaintiff below ).
) Supreme Court No.
June 29, 2001
Defendant, Dennis, and Lopez arrived at Sloans residence and were allowed inside.
Dennis then drew his gun and aimed it at Sloan. Defendant tied
Sloan up in the back bedroom and tied Newsom up in the living
room. Defendant then stabbed Sloan multiple times with the pocketknife, killing him.
Defendant and Dennis returned to the living room at which point Dennis
shot Newsom, killing her.
Shortly thereafter, Defendant, Dennis, and Lopez drove to Hamilton, Ohio. When Defendant
and Lopez returned to Indiana, they learned that the police were looking for
them. Lopez went to the police on January 23 and gave them
a statement, downplaying the role that she and Defendant played in the murder.
The next day, Lopez returned to the police and gave another statement.
In her second statement, Lopez implicated herself in the robbery and Defendant
in the robbery and murder.
Defendant was charged with eight counts: Counts I and II, Murder
See footnote of
Newsom and Sloan; Counts III and IV, Felony MurderSee footnote of Newsom and Sloan;
Counts V and VI, Robbery of Sloan and Newsom, Class A felonies;See footnote Count
VII and VIII, Confinement of Sloan and Newsom, Class A Felonies.See footnote A
jury found Defendant guilty of all eight counts.
During the penalty phase, the jury found that the State proved two statutory aggrava ting circumstances beyond a reasonable doubtmurder during the commission of a robbery, See footnote and the commission of multiple murders. See footnote However, the jury re commended against a sentence of life in prison without parole.
The trial court merged count III with count I and count IV with
count II. For counts I and II, the trial court imposed two
sentences of life in prison without parole to be served consecutively. The
court imposed four 20-year sentences for counts V, VI, VII, and VIII, all
to run consecutively. Id.
During defense counsels closing argument, he referred to a knife that was found
in the bedroom where Sloans body was located. According to State witness
Detective Pollard, the knife did not appear to have blood on it, but
was not scientifically tested for blood. During closing argument, defense counsel suggested
that the knife could have been the murder weapon:
They [the State] werent going to tell you about that knife. Why? Because it messes it up. If that knifes still back in the room, that pocket knife story goes out the window. ... Why wasnt any testing done on that knife? Why wasnt this serologist allowed to at least wash it off, take a washing, make a test on it to see if it had blood on it? Wouldnt you want to know that? Its smudgy because they fingerprinted it. Whose fingerprints are on it? Nobody told you they didnt find prints. ... [W]hose prints are on that knife? Are they [Defendants]? No. We dont know. Somebodys prints are on there. You werent told that. Why? Because that might make that knife the murder weapon and it doesnt have [Defendants] fingerprints on it. And, again, the pocket knife story on the highway goes out the window. Is there a doubt here? You bet. Thats reasonable doubt.
(R. at 666.)
The State responded during its closing statement and the following exchange occurred:
[Prosecutor]: Ive got to address something
boy, it sure sounded like
to me that he told you folks that I withheld evidence.
[Defense Counsel]: Ill tell the jury right now that I did not
say that. And I dont mean to imply--
[Prosecutor]: Well, you said, if we found prints we didnt tell you.
The law requires that I provide anything that even resembles exculpatory evidence
or anything that might show that the defendants innocent. I have to
give that to them. I give them truckloads of information and get
nothing in return. But, part of that information, not only witness statements,
but all the scientific--
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, Im going to object to this. This
is not commentary on the evidence, Your Honor. Im going to object
to this testimony.
[Trial Court]: Well, its an abided response to your argument. Your
objection is overruled. Keep it within the proper boundaries though, please.
[Prosecutor]: If theres even a little bit of evidence in there at
all, a fingerprint that might have been found on that knife, [Defense Counsel]
has just as much right to present that evidence as I do.
I didnt withhold from you.
(R. at 675-76.)
Defendant argued that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding discovery in Indiana because the prosecutor implied that the State gives truckloads of information to the defense and [gets] nothing in return. In fact, as Defendant points out, the Marion County courts have promulgated automatic discovery rules requiring that defendants also disclose certain information to the State. See Rule 7(3), Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division.
Defendant also maintains that the result of the prosecutors argument was to make
defense counsel appear to be deceptive while the prosecution hid nothing. Defendant
states, [t]his good guy/bad guy characterization of the prosecution and the defense functions
has been condemned. Appellants Br. at 22 (citing Bardonner v. State, 587
N.E.2d 1353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), transfer denied). Defendant believes that he
was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not
have been subjected and was denied a fair trial.... Appellants Br. at
Defendant failed to request an admonishment or a mistrial and therefore did not
properly preserve this issue for appeal. As to the merits, the basic
thrust of the prosecutors statement was that the State is required to give
the Defendant any exculpatory evidence that the State has in its possession.
This was a correct account of the law and was offered in response
to defense counsels implication that the State was withholding information. The prosecution
did misstate the law by telling the jury that a defendant is not
required to give the State any information. But in light of overwhelming
evidence of Defendants guilt, allowing this statement over objection would have constituted harmless
Lopez testified that she gave a statement to the police on the night
that Defendant and she returned to Jasonville, Indiana. She testified that she
lied in this first statement to minimize Defendants and her role in the
killing. The next day, Lopez made another statement to the police that
implicated both Defendant and herself in the robbery and implicated Defendant in the
homicide of Sloan. She testified at trial that she felt bad about
lying during the first statement and that her second statement was the truth.
On the states direct examination, Lopez implicated Defendant with statements that he had
made to her. Lopez testified that she and Defendant bought gloves
on the way to Sloans house to avoid leaving fingerprints. She also
testified that Defendant admitted to her that he killed Sloan and threw the
knife out the window.
During Lopezs cross-examination, Defendant attempted to impeach Lopezs testimony by implying that she
was lying. Defendant referred to Lopezs plea agreement, suggesting that Lopez was
lying to get favorable treatment by the prosecutor. Defendant also referred to
the two different statements that Lopez gave to the police, emphasizing that they
were not consistent:
[Defense Counsel]: After all this time, you havent been sentenced?
[Defense Counsel]: Because if you dont follow the terms of the plea
ement then it will be withdrawn
[Defense Counsel]: Who determines, Ms. Lopezanybody in this roomwho determines whether or
not youre telling the truth today to qualify and sa
tisfy the requirement of
this plea agreement.
(R. at 494-97.)
On redirect examination, to repair her credibility, the State asked Lopez to read portions of the second statement that she had given to the police. This statement regarding the gloves, the knife, and Defendants confession were all consistent with her trial court testimony. Defendant objected that her out-of-court statement to police was hearsay and therefore inadmissible.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. See Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible.
See Ind. Evidence Rule 802. Under Indiana Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a statement
is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (a) consistent
with the declarants testimony, (b) offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, and (c)
made before the motive to fabricate arose.
Here, Lopezs trial testimony was consistent with her second statement to the police.
It was also offered to rebut an implied charge of fabrication; Defendants
cross-examination implied that Lopez lied during her testimony. Therefore, the statement was
properly admissible if it was made before a motive to fabricate arose.
Whether a motive to fabricate has arisen is a fact sensitive issue.
See Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 475 (Ind. 2001); Sturgeon v. State,
719 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (Ind. 1999). We do not automatically find that
a participant in a crime has a motive to fabricate, even where the
police are inquiring into the declarants involvement in the crime. See Stephenson,
742 N.E.2d at 475; Sturgeon, 719 N.E.2d at 1180 (finding no motive to
fabricate where there [was] no evidence tending to implicate [the declarant] in [the]
murder and therefore no evidence he had a motive to lie about [the
While Lopez might have had a motive to lie in her statement of
January 24th, she did not have a motive to implicate Defendant in the
murder. There was no evidence suggestingand Defendant does not contendthat Lopez herself
killed the victims. The statement she read at trial contradicted her statement
from the day before, shifting blame from Dennis to Defendant. To the
extent she was guilty of robbery and felony murder, her culpability would have
been the same whether either Defendant or Dennis had killed Sloan. We
find no motive on Lopezs part to fabricate Defendants role in Sloans murder.
There is no contention that she tried to minimize her own; indeed,
she implicated herself in the robbery and, as a consequence, felony murder.
Moreover, in regards to the crime in which she did have a
motive to fabr
icatethe robberyshe implicated herself.
The State charged two aggravating circumstances, intentional murder during the commission of a
robbery and the commission of multiple murders. See Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G)
and 35-50-2-9(b)(8). Defendant introduced evidence to demonstrate the following mitigating circumstances:
Youthful age; domination by another; troubled childhood; lack of a criminal history; intoxication;
surrender to and cooperation with the authorities; and remorse.
The jury found that the State had proven the two aggravating circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubt,
See footnote but recommended against a sentence of life impriso
nment without parole.
Contrary to the jurys recommendation, the trial court imposed a sentence of
life in prison without parole.
In the sentencing order, the trial court found, in accordance with the jury
findings, that the State proved the existence of the two aggravating circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubt. The trial court listed other aggravating factors before concluding
that life in prison was appropriate:
The [c]ourt finds that the factual circumstances of the murders are particularly heinous and aggravating. A great deal of discussion and planning took place.... The vicious nature of the killings was particularly disgusting and aggravating. [Defendant] stabbed and slashed Chad Sloan with a knife twenty-nine times. ... [Defendant] was a major participant in the murder of Shirley Newsom. ... [Defendant] had tied her up knowing that [Dennis] was going to kill her. ... Then [Defendant] hid his involvement in the murders by discarding the clothes he was wearing and the murder weapon he used. ... [Defendants] action reveal such abhorrent behavior that life imprisonment without parole is the only appropriate sentence.
(R. at 229-30.)
The trial court was not as thorough in its treatment of the mitigating
circumstances. It only briefly stated the mitigating factors it considered:
The [trial court] considers all the evidence presented to the jury at the trial and sentencing proceeding, and any mitigating circumstance inherent in those proceedings. The [trial court] also considers the defendants statement expressing his condolences to the victims family members and the arguments of his attorney that the defendant was an accessory, that his role was minor compared to that of his accomplice, Frank Dennis, and that he was acting under substantial domination of Frank Dennis.
(R. at 230.)
Defendant challenges the judges findings in two respects. He argues that the
sentencing order violates Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994), cert denied,
516 U.S. 1077 (1996), because it relies on non-statutory aggravating circumstances. And
he also contends that the order violates Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243
(Ind. 1995), in its failure to give specific consideration to mitigating circumstances.
The trial courts analysis of the aggravating factors of Defendants crime was not
limited to statutory factors. The trial court listed non-statutory factors that it
found particularly heinous and aggravating including the planning of the crime by Defendant,
that Defendant hid his involvement, the number of times Defendant stabbed the victim,
and that Defendant was a major participant. The trial court concluded the
list of non-statutory aggravators by stating that Defendants actions were so abhorrent that
life imprisonment without parole is the only appropriate sentence. While we may
agree with the trial court that Defendants behavior was abhorrent, a trial court
may not consider non-statutory aggravating circumstances when imposing life in prison without parole.
644 N.E.2d at 1262 (citations omitted). See also Ajabu, 693 N.E.2d at
During the sentencing phase, the trial court only touched on some of the
many mitigating circumstances Defendant introduced. In this respect, the trial court failed
to fulfill the requirements of Harrisons first and second steps; the sentencing order
does not explicitly indicate which mitigating circumstances the trial court found, nor does
it explain the specific facts and reasons that led the court to find
the existence of whatever mitigating circumstances it did find. This is a violation
of the specificity requirement of Harrison.
The sentencing order in Harrison was also found inadequate because it was not
specific enough. The trial court in Harrison identified what the court found
to be mitigating circumstances, but [did] not set forth specific facts and reasons
which lead the court to find the existence of each aggravating and mitigating
circumstance. 644 N.E.2d at 1263.
In some respects, the sentencing order taken as a whole was more specific
than the one in Harrison,
See footnote but it is much less specific about the
ting circumstances. Indeed, it is impossible to tell whether the trial court
found any mitigating circumstances to exist or, if so, the extent to which
it assigned any weight to them. We require such specificity in a
to insure the trial court considered only proper matters when
imposing sentence, thus safeguarding against the imposition of sentences [that] are arbitrary or
capricious, and to enable the appellate court to determine the reasonableness of the
sentence imposed. Id. at 1262 (citing Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487,
491 (1990)). Furthermore, failure to find mitigating circumstances where supported by the
record may reasonably give rise to a belief they were overlooked and not
properly considered. See Scheckel v. State, 620 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind. 1993);
Jones v. State, 467 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. 1984).
We assign little if any weight to the proffered mitigators of intoxication, coo
with authorities, and remorse. The record demonstrates that Defendant engaged in behavior
exhibiting a significant degree of physical and intellectual skill, e. g., he purchased
gloves on the way to Indianapolis. His surrender and cooperation came only
after he learned that the police were looking for him. See Games
v. State, 535 N.E.2d 530, 545 (Ind.) (giving little weight to the
fact that defendant surrendered where defendants apprehension was nearly inevitable), cert denied, 493
U.S. 874 (1989). And there is nothing of record to suggest that
his remorse was out of the ordinary. See Evans v. State, 727
N.E.2d 1072, 1083 (Ind. 2000) (assigning little weight to the defendants remorse in
light of the brutal nature of the victims death).
We assign weight in the low range to the proffered mitigators of troubled
childhood and crime commi
tted under the domination of another. As to Defendants
childhood, there was evidence that his mother had been charged with neglect and
abandoned the family when he was two years old; that his father was
suspected of neglect by child welfare authorities; and that some of his behavioral
problems in school were traced to his being undernourished. See Timberlake v.
State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 264 (Ind. 1997) (acknowledging that being brought up in
a dysfunctional family may be weighed as a mitigating factor) cert denied, 525
U.S. 1073 (1999). We do not accept Defendants claim that he committed
the crimes in this case while under the domination of Dennis; our review
of the record demonstrates that he was a willing participant in the crimes.
At the same time, we accept Defendants argument that Dennis was the
instigator and leader of this criminal episode.
We assign weight in the medium-range to the proffered mitigators of defe
and his lack of criminal history. Defendant was 19 at the time
of these crimes. Brown v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (Ind. 1999)
(defendants youth, although not identified as a statutory mitigating circumstance, is a significant
mitigating circumstance in some circumstances.) (quoting Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 842
(Ind. 1999)). The pre-sentence investigation in this case indicated that defendant had
no adult or juvenile criminal history. (R. at 207.) See Widener
v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ind. 1995) (finding 17-year-old defendants lack of
criminal history to be a mitigating factory); see also Baird v. State, 604
N.E.2d 1170, 1182 (Ind. 1992) (weighing lack of criminal history as a mitigating
circumstance in the medium range), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893 (1993).
In weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances here, we find the a
to outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
Next, the statute requires that the jurys recommendation be consi
dered. Ind. Code
§ 35-50-2-9(e)(2). Here, as noted, the jury unanimously recommended against a sentence
of life without parole. This is particularly significant because this is the
same jury that unanimously found Defendant guilty of murder, robbery, and confinement and
was prepared to accept its role as the conscience of the community in
rejecting the States request for life without parole. See Saylor v. State,
686 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528,
543 (Ind. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1078 (1998)), cert denied, 525 U.S.
831 (1998). Unlike the Saylor and Peterson cases where we affirmed death
sentences notwithstanding jury recommendations against death, here (i) the trial court improperly relied
upon non-statutory aggravating circumstances, (ii) there was no identification or analysis by the
trial court of any mitigating circumstances, and (iii) our independent weighing has identified
two mitigating circumstances, each of medium weight, as well as several additional mitigating
circumstances of lesser weight. When these three considerations are juxtaposed with the
unanimous rejection by the jury of the States life without parole request, with
all that such rejection imports, we conclude that life without parole is not
an appropriate sentence here.
We proceed to determine the defendants sentence for the two murders under the
neral sentencing statutes. At the time these crimes were committed, the standard
or presumptive sentence for murder established by the Legislature was 55 years to
which the court has the authority to add not more than 10 years
for aggravating circumstances and from which the court has the authority to subtract
not more than 10 years for mitigating circumstances. Unlike sentencing under the
death penalty and that life without parole statute, the trial court is not
limited to considering aggravating circumstances specified in the statute. As such, we
here consider the additional aggravating circumstances identified by the trial court and described
above as well as the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances discussed during
our analysis of the propriety of the life without parole sentence. We
find the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances by a sufficient magnitude that
the maximum sentence of 65 years for murder should be imposed on each
count. We order the sentences on these two counts to be served
Defendant also challenges the propriety of the four consecutive 20-year se
ntences for the
two counts of robbery and two counts of confinement. The trial court
entered judgment on these counts as Class B felonies. The presumptive sentence
for a Class B felony is ten years. See Ind. Code §
35-50-2-5 (1993). A sentencing court may add up to ten years for
aggravating circumstances or subtract up to four years for mitigating circumstances. Id.
We agree with the trial court, for the reasons stated above, that
the weight of the aggravating and mitigating factors justifies the maximum sentence of
20 years for each count of robbery and confinement. We order the
sentences on these four counts to be served concurrently.
Finally, we find that the aggr
avating circumstances discussed above warranting fully enhanced sentences
on the murder, robbery, and confinement counts outweigh the mitigating circumstances discussed above
by a sufficient magnitude that the concurrent sentences for the robbery and confinement
counts should be served consecutive to the concurrent sentences for the murder counts.
SHEPARD, C.J., and RUCKER, J., concur.
BOEHM, J., concurs in parts I and III and concurs in result in
part II with separate opinion.
DICKSON, J., concurs in part I, concurs in result in part II, and
dissents in part from part III with separate opinion.
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Cale Bradford, Judge
Cause No. 49G03-9701-CF-012975
June 29, 2001
I concur in Part I, concur in result with Part II, and dissent
from Part III of the m
As to Part I, I write separately to emphasize that a defendant's failure to r equest an admonishment, standing alone, does not necessarily result in waiver. Although Dresser v. State, 454 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. 1983) advises that admonishment is the "correct procedure to employ against an improper argument," id. at 407, it continues with the following important qualification: "Where it is obvious, from the nature and degree of misconduct, that no admonishment could suffice, the motion for one may be dispensed with." Id. at 408; see also Leach v. State, 699 N.E.2d 641, 644 n.4 (Ind. 1998)("We disagree with the State and agree with the defendant that, in cases such as this, an instruction will not cure the error.") Dresser recognizes that merely objecting to improper argument is not enough and advises in general that the correct procedure is to request admonishment followed by a motion for mistrial, but it expressly acknowledges that a request for an admonishment is not necessary in some circumstances. Neither Robinson v. State, 693 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 1998), nor Brown v. State, 572 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 1991), hold to the contrary. Although the language in both is "the failure to request an admonishment or move for a mistrial results in waiver of the issue, Robinson, 693 N.E.2d at 552; Brown, 572 N.E.2d at 498, in both cases, the defendants not only failed to seek an admonishment but also failed to move for mistrial. When an admonishment would be futile, the failure to request one does not preclude appellate review of a denial of an otherwise timely motion for mistrial.
With respect to Part II, I agree with the concurring in result opinion of Ju stice Boehm that the admission of Lopez's prior consistent statement was harmless error.
As to Part III of the majority opinion, I agree that the trial court's sentence of life imprisonment without parole was improperly based on non-statutory aggr avating circumstances, and that it must be vacated. I am unable, however, to join the majority's evaluation of the trial court's consideration of the evidence related to mitigating circumstances, and I disagree with the sentence imposed.
Contrary to the majority's conclusion in Part IIIB, I believe that the trial court's e xplanation was adequate as to mitigating circumstances. The sentencing statement advises that the trial court gave consideration to the defendant's expressions of condolences, his claim that his role as an accessory was relatively minor, and his contention that he was acting under substantial domination of another. A sentencing judge is not obligated to make an affirmative finding expressly negating each potentially mitigating circumstance. Crawley v. State, 677 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind. 1997). The determination that a circumstance is mitigating is within the trial court's discretion, and the court is not obligated to explain why it finds a circumstance not to be mitigating. Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (Ind. 1997). The trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating circumstances as the defendant does. Thacker v. State, 709 N.E.2d 3, 10 (Ind. 1999). I cannot fault the trial court's consideration of mitigating circumstances. Its sentencing statement here is easily equivalent to or much more detailed than many other sentencing statements that we have affirmed.
Having determined that the sentence imposed by the trial court was erron eous, the majority elects to engage in appellate reweighing to determine the sentences to be imposed and expresses its evaluation by assigning various general weights to each aggravating and mitigating circumstance found. While some members of this Court have often chosen to employ this method of analysis, this should not be understood as the exclusive or prescribed methodology for trial or appellate sentencing evaluations.
Matters that may be appropriate for consideration are extraordina rily diverse and often defy quantification or precise analogous comparison to opposing considerations. Determining the appropriate criminal sentence is an act of subjective judgment, the quintessence of a judge's function. The analysis cannot be circumscribed to any single mathematical formula or methodology. The requirement of general sentencing statements to explain the sentencing decision assures fairness and propriety, and permits judicial review. But reasonable latitude is permitted in the way trial and appellate judges undertake to evaluate and determine the sentences to be imposed.
With respect to the majority's reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and consi deration of the jury's recommendation, I agree with the conclusions that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances but that life without parole is not an appropriate sentence. I disagree, however, with the decision to order that the sentences for murder be served concurrently. Notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances found by the majority, the fact that the defendant was convicted of killing two people weighs heavily in my judgment. For the two murder counts, merely imposing the equivalent of a single fully enhanced sentence is insufficient. I would require that sentences on the murder counts be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the concurrent twenty-year sentences for the other counts.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Teresa D. Harper Jeffrey A. Modisett
Bloomington, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Footnote: Id. § 35-42-5-1.
Footnote: Id. § 35-42-3-3.
Footnote: Id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G)
Footnote: Id. § 35-50-2-9(b)(8)
Footnote: A statement is not hearsay if:
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination co ncerning the statement, and the statement is consistent with the declarants testimony, offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, and made before the motive to fabricate arose. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
Footnote: Felony murder occurs when a person kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) (1993). The State need not prove intent to kill in a felony murder charge, only the intent to commit the underlying felony. See Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. 1999).
Footnote: The fact that the jury made affirmative findings that the charged aggravating circumstances had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt distinguishes this case from Farber v. State, 729 N.E.2d 139 (Ind. 2000).
Footnote: The trial courts sentencing order stated that it considered the jurys recommendation; established that the trial court found that the State proved the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and contained the personal conclusion of the trial court that life imprisonment without parole is the appropriate sentence.