Attorneys for Appellee
Attorney General of Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Appellant (Defendant below),
STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee (Plaintiff below ).
) Supreme Court No.
) Court of Appeals No.
June 28, 2002
The police returned later that day with a warrant and searched the house
where the crack was purchased. The police found Defendant in an upstairs
bedroom with a certain amount of money on his person and a bag
of crack located nearby. Money seized matched the money given by the
police to the confidential informant, and used to buy the cocaine ea
Defendant was arrested, and charged with two counts. Count I was possession
of an amount of cocaine weighing more than (3) grams with the intent
to deliver this cocaine to another person, a class A felony. Count
II was knowingly deliver cocaine to another pe
rson, a class B felony.
Rather than face trial, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State
in which he pled guilty to both counts in return for Count I
being reduced from a Class A felony to a Class B felony.
He was sentenced to twenty years for Count I and fifteen years for
Count II, with the sentences to run concurrently, for a total of twenty
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished memorandum decision, vacated Mapps guilty plea
as to Count II.
Mapp v. State, No. 48A02-0006-CR-368 (Ind. Ct. App.
Feb. 15, 2001). The court reasoned that because it was clear from
the face of the charging instrument that the two counts violated double jeopardy
principles, the plea agreement was invalid. Id., slip op. at 6.
We granted transfer. Mapp v. State, 761 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. 2001) (table).
Assuming for the moment that Defendants legal claim is correct, there is still
icate factual dispute to be resolved. Defendant contends that he was
charged twice for essentially the same criminal conduct the sale and possession
of the same quantity of cocaine. In rebuttal, the State contends that
there is evidence to show two separate charges were sustainable. This is
the kind of factual dispute that a post-conviction trial court is suited to
resolving and that an appellate court is not.
However, because the State did not argue either to the Court of Appeals
or to us that we should dismiss this appeal as improper, we elect
to address the claim on the merits.
We find that Mapp waived his right to challenge his convictions on double
jeopardy grounds when he entered his plea agreement. This principle was most
recently affirmed in
Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ind. 2001).
We further hold that there is no exception to this rule for facially
Plea bargaining is a tool used by both prosecutors and defendants to expedite the trial process. See footnote Defendants waive a whole panoply of rights by voluntarily pleading guilty. These include the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right of appeal, and the right to attack collaterally ones plea based on double jeopardy. See Ind. Code §35-35-1-2(a)(2) (1998); Games, 743 N.E.2d at 1135. We see no basis for a different rule for facially duplicative charges. To hold otherwise would deprive both prosecutors and defendants of the ability to make precisely the kind of bargain that was made here. That would not be in the interest of either the State or of defendants.
Here, Mapp had a choice. He could either plead guilty to the
two crimes with which he was charged possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute and dealing cocaine or go to trial. In return
for his guilty plea, the prosecution agreed to reduce Count I, possession with
intent to deliver, from a Class A felony to a Class B felony.
This reduction in crime class exposed Mapp to a lesser sentence.
Mapp received the benefit of having his maximum possible sentence on any one
count reduced from 50 years in prison down to 20 years. In
fact, after Mapp pled guilty, the trial court sentenced him to 20 years
for Count I, and 15 years for Count II, with the sentences to
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, J.J., concur.