FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
STEPHEN R. BUSCHMANN THEODORE F. SMITH, JR.
Buschmann Carr & Shanks Smith & Todd
Indianapolis, Indiana Anderson, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TIPTON COUNTY, INDIANA, acting by )
and through its several officers and bodies, )
to-wit, the Tipton County Council, collectively )
and by its individual elected members; the )
Board of Commissioners, collectively and by )
its individual elected members of the Tipton )
County Auditor, as that office has been and )
currently and hereafter will be filled by an )
elected officer, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A02-9912-CV-810
)
STATE OF INDIANA ON THE )
RELATION OF DANE P. NASH, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Carl VanDorn, Senior Judge
Cause No. 48C01-9809-CP-534
June 21, 2000
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
SHARPNACK, Chief Judge
Tipton County appeals the trial courts grant of partial summary judgment in favor
of Judge Dane P. Nash, who is acting as a relator on behalf
of the State. The county raises one issue, which we restate as
whether the trial court erred when it determined that Tipton County violated the
Indiana Constitution by ending its voluntary supplemental wage payments to Judge Nash.
Judge Nash raises one issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as whether the
trial court erred when it determined that Judge Nash is not entitled to
liquidated damages and attorney fees. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
The relevant facts follow. On January 1, 1991, Judge Nash began serving
a six-year term of office as a circuit court judge in Tipton County.
As a circuit court judge, Judge Nashs salary was paid in part
by the State and in part by Tipton County from 1991 until July
1995. Furthermore, from 1991 until July 1995, the county voluntarily paid Judge
Nash a supplemental wage in addition to its state-mandated salary obligations. On
May 5, 1995, the General Assembly enacted, and the Governor signed into law,
an act that amended the judicial pay statute. Broadly speaking, the amendments
provided, inter alia, that counties were no longer required to pay a salary
to their trial judges because the State was assuming sole responsibility for their
salaries. However, if counties chose to continue providing voluntary supplemental wages to
their trial judges, the counties could not pay them more than $5,000 per
year. The amendments took effect on July 1, 1995.
In September 1994, Tipton County budgeted $4,400 for voluntary supplemental wages to be
paid to Judge Nash in 1995. At the time that the amendments
to the judicial pay statute took effect on July 1, 1995, the county
had already paid him $2,219.89 in supplemental wages for the year. After
the amendments took effect, Tipton County stopped paying voluntary supplemental wages to Judge
Nash. He did not receive any supplemental payments from July 1, 1995,
through all of 1996.
On September 25, 1998, Judge Nash filed a petition for writ of mandamus
and damages against Tipton County in which he sought to compel Tipton County
to pay him the unpaid supplemental wages. He also sought liquidated damages
and attorneys fees. Thereafter, the county filed a motion for summary judgment,
and Judge Nash filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the question
of the payment of wages. The trial court granted Judge Nashs motion
and ordered the county to pay him $6,600 for the supplemental wages.
In addition, the trial court granted Tipton Countys motion in part and denied
Judge Nashs claims for liquidated damages and attorneys fees.
I.
The issue raised by Tipton County is whether the trial court erred when
it determined that Tipton County violated the Indiana Constitution by ending its voluntary
supplemental payments to Judge Nash. The county claims that if Judge Nashs
state wages and county supplemental wages are considered together, then his overall pay
has actually increased rather than decreased, even though the county has stopped paying
voluntary supplemental wages to Judge Nash, and therefore no constitutional violation has occurred.
Judge Nash replies that the state wages and county supplemental payments must
be considered separate sources of income. Consequently, he concludes that the countys
failure to pay him any supplemental wages from July 1, 1995, to December
31, 1996, violates the Indiana Constitution because the county decreased his salary while
he was in office.
Initially, we note our standard of review. When we review a trial
courts ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we are bound by the
same standard as the trial court. See Ayres v. Indian Heights Volunteer
Fire Dep't, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (Ind. 1986); see Ind. Trial Rule
56. The appellant bears the burden of proving that the trial court
erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. 1993).
Any doubt as to the existence of an issue of material fact, or
an inference to be drawn from the facts, must be resolved in favor
of the nonmovant. Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 633
(Ind. 1991). A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning
an issue, which would dispose of the litigation, are in dispute or where
the undisputed facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue.
Scott v. Bodor, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 313, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
We will affirm the grant of summary judgment if it is sustainable
on any theory or basis found in the record. Pyle v. National
Wine & Spirits Corp., 637 N.E.2d 1298, 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
The governing state constitutional provision in dispute is article VII, § 19, which
provides: The Justices of Supreme Court and Judges of the Court of Appeals
and of the Circuit Courts shall at stated times receive a compensation which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Ind. Const. art.
VII, § 19. Judges are officers of the state, and the General
Assembly establishes the salaries and benefits of judges. See Board of Trustees
of Pub. Employees Retirement Fund v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. 1985),
rehg denied. The legislature may delegate its authority to establish judicial salaries
to county governments, but without such a delegation of its authority, only the
legislature may raise or lower judicial salaries. See Mance v. Board of
Dir. of Pub. Employees Retirement Fund, 652 N.E.2d 532, 537 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995), rehg denied, trans. denied.
In order to determine whether Tipton County violated art. VII, § 19, we
must decide whether the state wages and county supplemental wages should be considered
one source of income or two separate salaries. Therefore, we must refer
to the statutes that govern judicial salaries. Before we do so, a
review of our relevant rules of statutory construction is necessary. We independently
determine as a matter of law a statute's meaning and apply it to
the facts of the case at bar. Skrzypczak v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 668 N.E.2d 291, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Our
foremost objective in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to
the intent of the legislature. Walling v. Appel Serv. Co., 641 N.E.2d
647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). It is presumed that our legislature
intended its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the
statute's underlying policy and goals. Id. We may not interpret a
statute that is facially clear and unambiguous. See Skrzypczak, 668 N.E.2d at
295. Rather, we give the statute its plain and clear meaning.
Id.
The current version of the leading statute provides, in relevant part, The total
annual salary of each full-time judge of a circuit, superior, municipal, county or
probate court is ninety thousand dollars ($90,000) and any additional salary provided under
IC 36-2-5-14 or IC 36-3-6-3(c). Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(a) (emphasis added).
Thus, the plain and clear language of the statute provides that state wages
and county supplemental wages are linked aspects of a single salary, not two
separate incomes. Id.
The legislative history of the judicial pay statutes supports this plain reading.
Prior to the 1995 statutory amendments, counties were required to contribute to their
trial judges salaries. Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7 (repealed by Act of May
5, 1995, P.L. 280-1995, § 25, 1995 Ind. Acts 4082, 4101). In
addition, the other judicial pay statutes provided that counties were permitted to pay
unlimited amounts of supplemental wages to their judges. Ind. Code §§ 36-2-5-14
(1980) (amended 1995); 36-3-6-3(c) (1980) (amended 1986, 1995). This system created problems.
As the Indiana Commission on Courts noted in 1994, the alternative compensation
structure for Indiana judges has created significant disparities in the compensation of trial
court judges throughout Indiana. Record, p. 134. The disparity in judicial
pay caused by the county supplemental wages violated the legislatures intent because, as
our supreme court has noted, [t]here has been a legislative intent manifest throughout
legislation providing for pay and benefits for judges, to treat working judges in
a uniform manner. Hill, 472 N.E.2d at 207. Consequently, the 1995
amendments to the judicial pay statutes eliminated the requirement that counties contribute to
judicial salaries, but it also provided that counties could pay their judges no
more than $5,000 per year in supplemental wages. See Act of May
5, 1995, P.L. 280-1995, §§ 6, 23-24, 1995 Ind. Acts 4084-485, 4100-4101.
Therefore, the legislative history of the judicial pay statutes reflects a legislative intent
to closely regulate county payments to trial judges and regulate such payments as
part of the trial judges salaries, not as an entirely separate source of
income.
Although it does not directly address art. VII, § 19, the Olszewski case
is instructive on this issue. Olszewski v. Stodola, 226 Ind. 639, 82
N.E.2d 256 (Ind. 1948). In Olszewski, Lake County had been paying its
trial judges $5,800 in county supplemental pay when the legislature enacted a new
statute that raised the States share of the trial judges salary from $4,200
to $4,800 and limited the trial judges maximum salary to $10,000. Id.
at 642, 82 N.E.2d at 257. Because Lake Countys supplemental payments in
combination with the state pay would have raised the Lake County judges salaries
above the $10,000 limit, Lake County filed suit to determine whether it was
still required to pay the excess supplemental salary. Id. at 641, 82
N.E.2d at 256-257. Our supreme court determined that the legislature had clearly
expressed its wishes when it placed the $10,000 total pay limit upon both
state pay and county supplemental pay together, and as a result Lake County
was barred from paying the full supplemental amount that it had previously provided
to its trial judges. See id. at 644-645, 82 N.E.2d at 258.
Olszewski provides guidance in the instant case because in Olszewski, the General
Assembly demonstrated an intent to treat state pay and county supplemental pay as
a single salary. See id. at 644-645, 82 N.E.2d at 258.
Furthermore, the judicial pay statutes in both cases also demonstrate that the legislature
intends to regulate state and county pay as a cohesive whole. See
I.C. §§ 36-2-5-14, 36-3-6-3(c); Olszewski, 226 Ind. at 644-645, 82 N.E.2d at 258.
Judge Nash asserts that the other subsections of Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1 provide
evidence of a legislative intent to treat state pay and county supplemental wages
as separate salaries. He concludes that the only way to harmoniously interpret
Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(a) with the rest of the statute is to address
the state pay and county supplemental pay as separate salaries in all circumstances.
We must give effect and meaning to every word of a statute, if
possible, and no part should be held meaningless if it can be reconciled
with the rest of the statute. Olejniczak v. Town of Kouts, 651
N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Furthermore, we agree
with Judge Nash that statutes relating to the same general subject matter are
in pari materia and should be construed together. Irving Materials, Inc. v.
Board of Commrs, 683 N.E.2d 260, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied,
698 N.E.2d 1183. However, a review of the other subsections of Ind.
Code § 33-13-12-7.1 does not contradict the legislatures plain statement in Ind. Code
§ 33-13-12-7.1(a) that salary consists of state wages and county supplemental wages.
Turning to Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(c), that subsection provides that the counties that
choose to pay supplemental wages to their trial judges must also pay their
share of Social Security and Medicare taxes. I.C. § 33-13-12-7.1(c). This
subsection is a bookkeeping provision that ensures that the federal government receives the
proper amount of Social Security and Medicare taxes for each trial judge, regardless
of the source of income. Id. Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(c) also
ensures that counties do not impinge upon State fiscal sovereignty, as discussed in
Mance. Mance, 652 N.E.2d at 537. In that case, we determined
that the state was not required to consider county supplemental pay when it
calculated trial judges retirement benefits. Id. at 537. If the state
were required to do so, then counties could gain a measure of influence
over state fiscal expenditures by raising their supplemental payments. Id. In
the context of Social Security and Medicare taxes, Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(c) avoids
fiscal sovereignty issues by requiring counties to pay their own way for Social
Security and Medicare taxes.
In the instant case we are confronted with the mere payment of wages,
which in no way impinges upon the states fiscal prerogatives. Regardless of
how much counties choose to pay to their trial judges, the states payment
of wages to trial judges is unaffected. Therefore, the concerns addressed in
Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(c) and Mance are not raised here and do not
compel a conclusion that State pay and county supplemental pay should be considered
separate in all circumstances.
See footnote
Turning to Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(d), a plain reading of that provision does
not conflict with Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(a). Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(d) provides,
in relevant part: For purposes of determining the amount of life insurance premiums
to be paid by a judge . . . the judges salary does
not include any amounts paid to the state by a county under subsection
(a). It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that, where a
restriction is not general but is provided in a specific instance, application of
the specific instance will not be carried into other statements that do not
provide such limitations.
Indiana Family & Soc. Serv. Admin. v. Methodist Hosp.
of Indiana, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 186, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Therefore,
the county payment exclusion contained in subsection (d) should not be read into
subsection (a), because subsection (d) applies only when the state calculates the judges
life insurance premiums. See id.
Judge Nash also notes that when the General Assembly amended the judicial pay
statute in 1995, it placed a $5,000 cap upon the amount of supplemental
pay that counties may give to their trial judges. See Ind. Code
§§ 36-2-5-14, 36-3-6-3. He contends that the fact that the legislature put
the cap in separate statutes instead of including it in Ind. Code §
33-13-12-7.1(a) is evidence of a legislative intent to separate state pay from county
voluntary supplemental pay. We disagree.
Ind. Code § 36-2-5-14 provides:
(a) This chapter does not affect the salaries of judges, officers of courts,
prosecuting attorneys, and deputy prosecuting attorneys whose minimum salaries are fixed by statute,
but the county fiscal body may make appropriations to pay them more than
the minimums fixed by statute subject to subsection (b).
(b) Beginning July 1, 1995, an appropriation made under this section may not
exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each judge or full-time prosecuting attorney in
any calendar year.
I.C. § 36-2-5-14. Ind. Code § 36-3-6-3, provides, in relevant part:
(a) A legislative body shall, by ordinance or resolution, fix the annual compensation
of all appointed officers, deputies, and employees under its jurisdiction.
* * * * *
(c) This chapter does not affect the salaries of judges, officers of courts,
prosecuting attorneys, and deputy prosecuting attorneys whose minimum salaries are fixed by statute,
but the city-county legislative body may make appropriations to pay them more than
the minimums fixed by statute. Beginning July 1, 1995, an appropriation made
under this subsection may not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) for each judge
or full-time prosecuting attorney in any calendar year.
I.C. § 36-3-6-3.
Neither Ind. Code § 36-2-5-14 nor Ind. Code § 36-3-6-3 contradict the plain
language of Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1, because both statutes state that they do
not affect the salaries of judges . . . whose minimum salaries are
fixed by statute. I.C. §§ 36-2-5-14, 36-3-6-3. Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1
establishes that trial judges salaries consist of state wages and county supplemental wages,
and Ind. Code §§ 36-2-5-4 and 36-3-6-3 merely establish the upper limits of
the supplemental wages. Indeed, when the three statutes are read together, it
is evident that the legislature has created a regulatory framework in which state
pay and county supplemental pay are not treated separately but are regulated as
one unified salary. This interpretation is consistent with the legislatures intent that
trial judges salaries should be treated in a uniform manner. See Hill,
472 N.E.2d at 207. Consequently, the plain language of Ind. Code §
33-13-12-7.19(a) is uncontradicted, and we hold that state pay and county supplemental pay
should be considered one salary for the purposes of Article 7, § 19
of the Indiana Constitution.
In this case, when Judge Nashs state wages and county supplemental wages are
considered together, it is indisputable that his salary increased, not decreased:
Year
|
Statutory Salary
|
Voluntary County Supplemental Wages
|
Total Annual Compensation
|
|
1991
|
$61,740.00
|
$3,824.00
|
$65,564.00
|
|
1992
|
$61,740.00
|
$4,034.00
|
$65,774.00
|
|
1993
|
$61,740.00
|
$4,214.00
|
$65,954.00
|
|
1994
|
$61,740.00
|
$4,214.00
|
$65,954.00
|
|
1995
|
$73,465.59
See footnote
|
$2,219.89
|
$75,685.48
|
|
1996
|
$85,000.00
|
- 0 -
|
$85,000.00
|
Record, pp. 26, 40. Consequently, Tipton County did not violate art. VII,
§ 19, of the state constitution when it stopped paying supplemental wages to
Judge Nash. See I.C. § 33-13-12-7.1(a). As a result, Judge Nash
was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and we
must reverse the judgment of the trial court on this issue.
II.
The issue raised by Judge Nash on cross-appeal is whether the trial court
erred when it granted partial summary judgment in favor of Tipton County on
Judge Nashs claims for liquidated damages and attorney fees. The trial court
granted Tipton Countys motion on grounds that Judge Nashs claims for liquidated damages
and attorneys fees were barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Nash
asserts that the trial court applied the incorrect statute of limitations and that
his claims are not time-barred. We need not address this issue on
the merits, however, because we have held that Tipton County did not unconstitutionally
reduce Judge Nashs pay during his term in office.
See supra Part
I. If Judge Nashs underlying claim is without merit, then his claims
for liquidated damages and attorneys fees must also fail. Consequently, we affirm
the trial courts entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Tipton County.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial courts grant of partial summary
judgment in favor of Judge Nash and affirm the trial courts grant of
partial summary judgment in favor of Tipton County. We remand with instructions
to the trial court to enter summary judgment for Tipton County.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Kirsch, J. concurs.
Riley, J. dissents in part and concurs in part with separate opinion.
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TIPTON COUNTY, INDIANA, acting by )
and through its several officers and bodies, )
to-wit, the Tipton County Council, )
collectively and by its individual elected )
members; the Board of Commissioners, )
collectively and by its individual elected )
members of the Tipton County Auditor, as )
that office has been and currently and )
hereafter will be filled by an elected officer, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A02-9912-CV-810
)
STATE OF INDIANA ON THE RELATION )
OF DANE P. NASH, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
)
RILEY, Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I respectfully dissent as to Issue I and concur in result on Issue
II.
Issue I
In January 1991, Judge Nash began serving his second six year term as
Circuit Court Judge of Tipton County, Indiana. During this term, Judge Nash
received compensation from both Tipton County and the State. When Judge Nash
began his term, his compensation was governed by Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7(a).
See footnote
This statute provided that full-time circuit court judges be paid an annual salary
of $61,740 during the calendar year 1991 and thereafter. The source of
payment for this salary was $56,780 from the State general fund and $4,960
from Tipton County. Also, under Ind. Code § 36-2-5-14, counties were allowed
to make appropriations for the payment of judges in addition to the total
set by State statute. Accordingly, during Judge Nashs second term, Tipton County
made certain appropriations to add to his annual salary set by Ind. Code
§ 33-13-12-7(a). For each year of Judge Nashs term, except for 1996,
this additional appropriation or voluntary county supplement was increased.
Effective July 1, 1995, Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7(a) and Ind. Code § 36-2-5-14
were amended. The 1995 amendment to Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7(a) provided for
a total annual salary for fulltime circuit court judges of $85,000 to be
paid by the State, plus any additional salary provided under Ind. Code §
36-2-5-14 and Ind. Code § 36-3-6-3(c). The amendment to Ind. Code §
36-2-5-14 provided that although counties were allowed to make additional appropriations for the
payment of judges in excess of the minimum set by state statute, this
additional voluntary appropriation was not to exceed $5,000 for each judge. In
response to the changes in these statutes, Tipton County decided not to pay
Judge Nash the remaining amount appropriated for the second half of 1995, approximately
$2,200, and further, decided not to appropriate any additional sum for 1996.
Thus, even though Judge Nash received compensation from the State pursuant to Ind.
Code § 33-13-12-7 and received compensation from the county pursuant to Ind. Code
§ 36-2-5-14, the majority concludes that the compensation from these two sources constitute
only one income. In deciding whether these statutes should be interpreted to
constitute one income or two separate incomes, the trial court found:
A plain reading of the 1995 judges pay raise statute [Ind. Code §
33-13-12-7(a)], along with the amended county supplement statute [Ind. Code § 36-2-5-14], indicates
that the legislature intended to keep separate the concept of State pay from
County supplemental pay. This is evidenced by the continued existence of two
difference (sic) statutes, the detailing by the Indiana legislature of not combining the
applicable social security taxes and medicare taxes between State and County and, finally,
by not allowing the County supplement to affect the State life insurance premiums
of judges with regard to its calculation. Replete throughout the 1995 judges
pay raise statute are references to the existence of the voluntary county supplement.
(R. 223).
I agree with the trial court. Additionally, case law has recognized that
the voluntary supplement paid by the county is additional compensation separate from what
is paid by the State. See Loos, 416 N.E.2d at 875 and
Mance, 652 N.E.2d at 537. Also, there are other indicators that Judge
Nash received separate compensation from the State and county. First, as discussed,
there are two separate statutes, one setting the State salary minimum for circuit
court judges, and one allowing the county to pay an additional supplement in
addition to the amount already received from the State. Further, the county
supplement is not considered part of the Judges salary in determining retirement benefits
and for calculating State life insurance premiums. See Mance, 652 N.E.2d at
537; and Ind. Code § 33-13-121-7(d). Additionally, counties are required to pay
their share of Social Security and Medicare taxes when they pay supplemental wages
to the trial judges. Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(c). All of these
factors lead to the conclusion that Judge Nash received separate compensation from the
State and county.
The majority relies in part on this courts decision in
Olszewski, 226 Ind.
639, 82 N.E.2d 256. However, Olszewski does not concern whether a reduction
in county supplemental pay to trial judges during their term in office is
constitutional under Art. VII, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution. In Olszewski,
the issue was whether Lake County would be required to pay a county
supplement that would result in Lake County judges receiving total pay from the
State and county in excess of the total salary limit set by State
statute. Id. at 641-642, 82 N.E.2d at 257. Here, even if
Tipton County continued to pay Judge Nash the voluntary county supplement it had
previously paid, there was no concern that Judge Nash would receive income in
excess of $90,000, which at that time was the total maximum amount a
trial judge was allowed to receive annually under State statute.
See footnote
The majority concludes that the legislative history of the 1995 amendments to the
judicial pay statutes demonstrate an intent to create one unified salary for trial
judges. However, as the majority notes, the 1995 amendment to the judicial
pay statutes were intended to end large disparities in judicial pay between counties
by limiting the amount paid by the counties to $5,000. However, that
does not mean that the legislature intended to create one salary. Instead,
it is clear that these statutes allow judges to receive separate compensation from
two sources, the State and the county, and provide for maximum amounts to
be received from each.
Because I would conclude that the pay received by Judge Nash from the
county is separate compensation than the pay he receives from the State, I
would further conclude that Tipton Countys reduction of Judge Nashs compensation during his
term violated Article 7, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution. As set
forth in the majoritys opinion, this provision prohibits a reduction in a circuit
court judges compensation while in office.
The purpose of this provision is
to preserve the independence of the working judiciary in such a clear and
unmistakeable manner as to entirely rule out conflict and argument on the point.
Board of Trustees of the Public Employees Retirement Fund v. Hill, 472
N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. 1985). By reducing the compensation paid to Judge
Nash during his term of office in violation of Article 7, § 19
of the Indiana Constitution, Tipton County was allowed to interfere with the independence
of the working judiciary. Thus, as to this Issue I, I would
affirm the trial courts grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Judge
Nash.
Issue II
I concur in result with regard to Issue II; however, since the majority
did not reach the merits of this issue, it is necessary to explain
the basis for my concurrence.
Issue II concerns Judge Nashs assertion on cross-appeal that the trial court improperly
granted Tipton Countys Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to his claim for
damages and attorney fees under Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2. The trial court
concluded that even though Judge Nashs claim for unpaid compensation was brought under
Ind. Code § 34-1-2-1(2),
See footnote
which has a five (5) year statute of limitations,
his claim for liquidated damages and attorney fees was brought under Ind. Code
§ 22-2-5-2, which is governed by a two (2) year statute of limitations.
Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2 provides for the award of liquidated damages up
to double the amount of wages owed plus attorney fees when an employer
has failed to pay wages. Although Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2 does
not have a self-contained statute of limitations, the trial court reasoned that Ind.
Code § 22-2-5-2 is penal in nature because it authorizes damages greater than
those actually incurred, and because of the statutes penal nature, it is governed
by a two (2) year statute of limitation. When a statute requires
an award of damages in an amount greater than those actually incurred, the
statute is penal in nature. Browning v. Walters, 616 N.E.2d 1040, 1045
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993). Consequently, I would agree with the trial court
that Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2 is penal in nature because it requires the
payment of liquidated damages and attorney fees.
Further, actions claiming a forfeiture of a penalty provided by statute are governed
by Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 provides that:
An action for: (1) injury to person or character, (2) injury to personal
property; or (3) a forfeiture of penalty given by statute; must be commenced
within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues. Since a
claim based on Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2 is an action claiming a forfeiture
of a penalty provided by statute, claims brought under Ind. Code § 22-2-5-2
must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues,
pursuant to Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
Judge Nash filed his Petition for Writ of Mandamus on September 25, 1998.
On August 15, 1995, the Tipton County Council voted not to pay
Judge Nash the last half of the 1995 county supplement previously appropriated for
him and on September 6, 1995, the Council voted not to pay him
the voluntary county supplement for 1996. Thus, his claim for the 1995
supplement accrued on August 15, 1995, and his claim for the 1996 supplement
accrued on September 6, 1995, and consequently, Judge Nash was required to file
his claim for liquidated damages and attorney fees relating to the 1995 county
supplement by August 15, 1997, and his claim for liquidated damages and attorney
fees relating to the 1996 county supplement by September 6, 1997. However,
because Judge Nash did not file this cause of action until September 25,
1998, his claim for liquidated damages and attorney fees under Ind. Code §
22-2-5-2 would be time barred.
Footnote:
Loos, another case cited by Judge Nash, is also distinguishable from
the instant dispute. Loos v. Long, 416 N.E.2d 874 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981). In Loos, we were called upon to interpret the statute that
governs prosecuting attorneys salaries, a statute that is dissimilar to Ind. Code §
33-13-12-7.1(a). See id. at 874-875; Ind. Code § 33-14-7-5 (establishing prosecutors salaries).
Footnote:
Based on a pro rata calculation of a statutory salary of
$61,740 from January 1, 1995, to June 30, 1995, and a statutory salary
of $85,000 from July 1, 1995 to December 31, 1995, pursuant to the
judicial pay raise granted by P.L. 279.
See Act of May 5,
1995, P.L. 279-1995, § 6(a), 1995 Ind. Acts 4062, 4065.
Footnote:
Now Ind. Code § 33-13-12-7.1(a).
Footnote: $85,000 total annual salary from the State per Ind. Code §
33-13-12-7(a) and $5,000 maximum annual voluntary county supplement per Ind. Code § 36-2-5-14.
Footnote: Now Ind. Code § 34-11-2-6.