ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT :            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SUSAN K. CARPENTER                STEVE CARTER
Public Defender of Indiana                Attorney General of Indiana

AMY E. KAROZOS                JOSEPH A. SAMRETA
Deputy Public Defender                Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana                Indianapolis, Indiana

JOHN WESLEY, JR.,                )
                                  )    Supreme Court Cause Number
    Appellant (Petitioner         ),            )    27S04-0201-PC-10
                                  )    
        v.                        )
                                  )
STATE OF INDIANA,                 )    Court of Appeals Cause Number
                                  )    27A04-0012-PC-531
    Appellee (Respondent          ).            )

P-C R. at 144.
Among other things, Wesley testified at trial that Isom approached him with a knife or other object and later brandished a shotgun. R. at 366, 371. Wesley admitted holding the shotgun during part of the encounter, although he claims that occurred when he was attempting to take it away from Isom. Id. at 371-74. Wesley also admitted that the two struggled and did not dispute that Isom was injured during the course of the struggle. Indeed, Wesley testified that he did not “purposely batter” Isom. Id. at 374.
Based on Wesley’s testimony alone, the jury could conclude that Wesley touched Isom in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (West Supp. 1990). The jury could also conclude the touching occurred by means of a deadly weapon. Id. In like fashion, the jury could conclude, based on Wesley’s own testimony, that he substantially interfered with Isom’s liberty without her consent while armed with a deadly weapon. See I.C. § 35-42-3-3 (West Supp. 1990). The question is whether Wesley engaged in the foregoing conduct “knowingly and intentionally.”
To establish a post-conviction claim alleging a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish before the post-conviction court the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). First, a defendant must show that defense counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This requires showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687-88. The objective standard of reasonableness is based on “prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. Second, a defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would be different. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
At the time of Wesley’s trial, evidence was considered relevant if it tended to prove or disprove a material fact or shed any light on the guilt or innocence of the accused. Davidson v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1077, 1088 (Ind. 1990). Wesley did not explain to the post-conviction court, nor does he now explain how the use of Isom’s psychiatric records to impeach Isom on “her ability to realistically recall the facts she was testifying to” would tend to prove or disprove his state of mind. Nor has Wesley ever explained how such impeachment would shed any light on his guilt or innocence. At best, Isom’s psychiatric records were only marginally relevant. Counsel’s representation cannot be deemed to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to obtain and use marginally relevant evidence.