FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
STEPHEN P. ROTHBERG STANLEY A. LEVINE
Fort Wayne, Indiana Rothberg & Logan
Fort Wayne, Indiana
DANIEL H. SORDELET, )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A03-9708-CV-299
)
DONNA K. (SORDELET ) GOLSTEYN, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
FRIEDLANDER, Judge
We reverse and remand for rehearing.
The facts are that Rachel was born to Donna and Daniel on May 26, 1984 and was the
only child of the marriage. On July 28, 1986, the marriage was dissolved by a decree of
dissolution entered in the Allen Circuit Court, which granted physical custody of Rachel to
Donna and gave liberal visitation rights to Daniel. On December 6, 1996, Donna filed a
Notice of Intent to Change Residence with the Allen Circuit Court, stating her intention to
move to Nashville, Tennessee for career-related reasons and also notifying the court that she
intended to move Rachel to Nashville as well. Shortly thereafter, Daniel filed an Objection
to Removal and Petition to Modify, requesting that the court change physical custody of
Rachel from Donna to Daniel. The matter was set for hearing.
Evidence was presented at the hearing, after which the court issued the following
findings of fact:
28. That Rachel is a good student and has been involved in athletics
since the fifth grade, namely basketball, volleyball, and now soccer.
29. That Rachel played on a "club volleyball" team for two (2) years and which team did not have any students from either St. Charles School, which school she is currently attending or St. Vincent School where she had
gone to school, and Rachel adjusted well and made friends with members of
the "club volleyball" team which traveled in organized volleyball competition.
30. That Rachel has made two (2) trips to Nashville, Tennessee and
has exhibited an ability to relate to a child close to her age who she met while
there on those visits.
31. That Rachel changed schools in the fourth and fifth grades from
St. Vincent to St. Charles School and made that adjustment well.
32. That Therese Mihlbauer described Rachel as being in early
adolescence.
33. That the report of Dr. Newbauer's psychological testing of
Rachel Sordelet was admitted in to [sic] evidence.
34. That Dr. Newbauer's report reveals that "Rachel seems to have
adequate skills in adapting to life and that she has a positive relationship with
her parents. She has an adequate sense of self-esteem, and seems to have a
positive attitude toward school and her teachers.
35. That whereas the focus of Dr. Newbauer's report and
psychological testing and interviews were "What will the impact be on Rachel
from a move to Nashville, Tennessee and how will this affect her relationship
with her father," Dr. Newbauer acknowledged that his report did not focus on
what the impact would be on Rachel if her mother moved to Tennessee
without her and Rachel was deprived of the stability of her relationship with
her mother and with the post-dissolution family unit created by her mother.
36. That Dr. Newbauer acknowledged that part of his inquiry was
to determine if there would be any harm to the child in the move or if the child
was coping with the move that it would be important for Rachel to be with the
parent that she feels most comfortable with.
37. That his report and testimony acknowledged that her peer
relationships are "getting more and more complicated with the advent of boy-
girl relationships in particular" and "that certainly raises her anxiety level and
is probably is [sic] related also to some of her anxiety about the move at this
time in her life when she has recently developed a set of peers that she has
become friends with and seems to have developed a good sense of trust with."
38. That Dr. Newbauer testified that Rachel is now being challenged
and persons can meet challenges if they have a supporting living [sic] family
unit.
39. That Dr. Newbauer's testimony was that if Rachel moved she
would adjust, and that he did not think that the move would present a
challenge that she couldn't cope with.
40. That Dr. Newbauer also testified that Rachel would have anxiety
whether she moved with her mother or if she stayed in Fort Wayne by reason
of the altered time with either parent.
41. That Dr. Newbauer testified that the move would cause "no
harm" to Rachel.
42. That Dr. Newbauer further testified that Rachel's anxiety was
situational, i.e. arising out of the move, and that said anxiety was not
debilitating, and did not require any kind of psychological treatment or
counseling.
43. That Dr. Newbauer testified that Rachel was very self-centered
because of her age.
44. That Dr. Newbauer testified that he saw her involved in a
network of friends and he saw that as the biggest cost of her move.
45. That Dr. Newbauer testified that he did not see any significant
signs of undue parental influence on Rachel.
46. That Dr. Newbauer acknowledged in his testimony that [Donna]
has been the primary caregiver of Rachel for the last ten (10) years of her life
and that [Donna] further has provided a female role model for Rachel with
regard to her education and professional career.
47. That Dr. Newbauer acknowledged that Rachel's family unit with
her mother and step-father created after the dissolution was a stable one and
had a positive influence on Rachel.
48. That Dr. Newbauer further acknowledged the child's relationship with her primary caregiver as the single most important factor affecting its welfare when the child's parents do not live together.
49. That Dr. Newbauer further acknowledged that the stability
within a household may be more important than geographical stability.
50. That Dr. Newbauer further acknowledged that there was no
evidence that Rachel wasn't content in her home with her mother and there is
evidenceSee footnote
1
that she was anything but developmentally on course and that further
her relationship with her mother as primary caregiver was a stable one.
51. That Dr. Newbauer, notwithstanding his concern with the
anxiety created in Rachel by potential separation from her peer group and her
relationships with them and [sic] acknowledged that Rachel could cope with
the challenge of the move and that said move would not be harmful to her.
52. That the court conducted an interview with Rachel.
53. That it was obvious from the interview that prior to the filing of
Petitioner[']s NOTICE OF INTENT TO CHANGE RESIDENCE, Rachel had
observed minimal, if any, conflict between the parties.
54. That since the filing of Petitioner[']s NOTICE OF INTENT TO
CHANGE RESIDENCE, Rachel has experienced considerable anxiety due to
the conflict between the parties.
55. That Rachel experiences a warm and loving relationship with
both of her step-parents.
56. That as the primary caregiver, [Donna] provided a detailed
description of Rachel and her interests and concerns.
57. That [Donna] testified that her relationship with Rachel was a
close one and that Rachel often confided in her and that as an early adolescent
she was concerned with Rachel's needs as she entered puberty and she
acknowledged coping skills and ability to make friends were good, particularly
since she is an athlete.
58. That there was unrebutted testimony that visitation could be exercised by [Daniel] and [Donna] driving to Scottsburg, Indiana, which is
approximately three and one-quarter hours from Nashville, Tennessee and Fort
Wayne, Indiana.
59. That [Donna] has carefully explored educational potential and
schools in Nashville for Rachel and alternative child care arrangements in
Nashville.
Record at 90-92. The court "approved"See footnote
2
Rachel's change of residence from Fort Wayne to
Nashville and ordered that Donna retain primary physical custody of Rachel.
Prior to the hearing, Daniel requested that the trial court enter findings of fact pursuant
to Trial Rule 52 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. He contends that the findings of
fact entered pursuant to that request were unsupported by the evidence and thus clearly
erroneous.
When a party requests specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment
will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. Such a judgment is clearly erroneous only
if it is unsupported by findings of fact and the conclusions entered thereon. Breeden v.
Breeden, 678 N.E.2d 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. To determine
whether the findings of judgment are clearly erroneous, we consider only the
evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing
therefrom, and we will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility.
Shafer v. Lambie, 667 N.E.2d 226, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
The evidence in question is comprised of the report and testimony of Dr. John
Newbauer. The court cited liberally from those sources in its findings of fact. Dr. Newbauer
was appointed by the court to evaluate the impact upon Rachel of a move to Nashville. Dr.
Newbauer conducted three personal interviews with Rachel, one each with Daniel and
Donna, and administered several diagnostic tests and indices to both the parents and Rachel.
After completing his evaluation, Dr. Newbauer issued a detailed written report, which was
entered into evidence. Dr. Newbauer testified only briefly at the hearing. Most of his
testimony centered upon his written report.
Dr. Mihlbauer, the only other expert to testify, was retained by Donna to counsel
Rachel. Dr. Mihlbauer did not conduct any tests and saw Rachel for only two sessions.
During the first session, Donna was present the entire time. At the second session, Dr.
Mihlbauer met with Rachel alone for the initial part of the session, and with Donna and
Rachel together at the end of the session. Dr. Mihlbauer spoke with Daniel only one time,
by telephone, for three or four minutes. At the hearing, Dr. Mihlbauer's testimony was
confined to commenting on what she perceived to be alternative interpretations for Rachel's
anxiety. She opined that, in addition to anxiety about leaving Fort Wayne, Rachel may be
anxious about other unspecified matters that were unrelated to the pending move to
Nashville. When specifically questioned about the matter, Dr. Mihlbauer stated that she
neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations made in Dr. Newbauer's report and
had no opinion as to whether Rachel should move to Nashville with her mother or remain in
Fort Wayne with her father.See footnote
3
The extent to which the court relied upon Dr. Newbauer's report is made manifest in
the court's findings of fact. The findings of fact consisted of sixty numbered paragraphs.
Findings 1 through 31 set forth biographical data concerning the parties, the marriage, and
the procedural history of the custody proceeding. Finding 32 stated that Dr. Mihlbauer
"described Rachel as being in early adolescence." Record at 90. Findings 33 through 51
addressed the psychological evaluation of Rachel and of the effect upon Rachel of a move
to Nashville. The court attributed the findings contained in those paragraphs to Dr.
Newbauer and they are presented such that the findings appear to support the court's
judgment. In fact, if one were to read the court's findings in isolation from Dr. Newbauer's
report and testimony, one would conclude that the court's judgment reflected Dr. Newbauer's
recommendation. Such, however, was not the case.
As stated previously, Findings 33 through 52, which were critical to the court's
judgment, were explicitly based upon Dr. Newbauer's report and testimony. However, the
doctor's report and testimony, read in context, do not support the court's conclusion. For
example, the court noted in Findings 39 and 41 that it was Dr. Newbauer's opinion that, if
forced to move to Nashville, Rachel would adjust and the move would cause her "no harm".
Record at 91. The court failed to note, however, that Dr. Newbauer also concluded that the
move would not be "a positive step." Record at 265, Respondent's Exhibit A at page 6.
Thus, there is validity to Daniel's claim upon appeal that the statements and opinions
attributed to Dr. Newbauer in the court's findings of fact were lifted out of context. In fact,
this occurred to such an extent that the findings might be said to mischaracterize the tenor
of Dr. Newbauer's report. We therefore conclude that the evidence upon which the court
based the critical findings in question does not support the findings.
In support of our conclusion that the evidence does not support the findings, we need
only consider the views attributed to Dr. Newbauer in the court's findings of fact in
juxtaposition to the summary section of Dr. Newbauer's written report, which we reproduce
below. When such is done, it is obvious that the doctor's conclusions and recommendations
are inconsistent with the statements that the court culled from his testimony and written
report. The Summary and Recommendation section of the report states:
This move presents a challenge to Rachel. She has a perception of herself as
having a number of friends in her present school and in her present
neighborhood. She has two parents who love her and is faced with being
separated from one of them, no matter what the outcome happens to be. She
is a person who seems to take things rather seriously and although she remains
rather calm on the surface, she seems to have a good deal of anxiety about the
outcome of events under her facade of calmness and everything's okay. It is
this examiner's opinion, after talking with Rachel for approximately three
hours and reviewing the tests that were administered during part of that time,
that this move is not a positive step for her. It is my recommendation that she
not move if this [is] at all possible. She is showing signs of a great deal of
anxiety. I believe with the move this will increase considerably and as a result
she is likely to have a great deal of difficulty in making a positive adjustment.
Rachel has made one move in the past, from one school to another, and it was
for her apparently a big challenge and an anxiety-producing situation. While
there is a tendency to think that if you face one challenge and then face another
challenge you can eventually learn to face all of life's challenge's a little more
bravely, there is also the issue, which is very important in her development, the
issue of peer socialization and friendship development. She sees herself as
rooted firmly in her present school and community and to dislodge her in a
sense from [the Fort Wayne] community of cousins, aunts and uncles, friends
and teachers who have taken on a supportive role would, I think, have negative
consequences for her in the long run.
Record at 26, Report of Psychologist Testing at page 6 (emphasis supplied). We conclude
that the findings are not supported by the evidence and therefore reverse and instruct the trial
court to vacate its order and conduct a new hearing on Daniel's modification petition.
We wish to make it clear that our decision should not be interpreted as expressing an
opinion concerning the difficult question of which parent should receive primary physical
custody of the child. We merely hold that the trial court's findings were not supported by the
evidence upon which they were ostensibly based, i.e., the report and testimony of Dr.
Newbauer. Mindful of the rapidly approaching date of the start of the 1998-99 school year,
we further direct the trial court to expedite the hearing in this matter so that a decision may
be rendered within forty-five days of the receipt of this opinion.
Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
KIRSCH, J., concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs with separate opinion.
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DANIEL H. SORDELET, )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A03-9708-CV-299
)
DONNA K. (SORDELET) GOLSTEYN, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
SULLIVAN, Judge, concurring
The majority construes the trial court's "Findings" to imply that an independent
determination of facts was made based upon the testimony of Dr. Newbauer. I do not dispute
that such implication may be drawn. However, in actuality, the trial court's enumerated
"Findings" are not the court's findings of fact. They merely state what the "testimony" of Dr.
Newbauer was. The court did not adopt Dr. Newbauer's testimony or "acknowledgments"
as fact; nor did the court make an independent determination of fact in reliance upon the
testimony.
In my view, the "Findings" are inadequate without regard to what the evidence may
have disclosed in terms of expert opinions. A summary of testimony or a "finding" that a
particular witness testified to thus and so is not a finding that the content of the testimony is
a fact. Perez v. United States Steel Corp. (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 29; Hehr v. Review Board
(1989) Ind.App., 534 N.E.2d 1122. This deficiency, in itself, would support a remand for
findings of fact.
In all other respects, I fully concur.
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