FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
WILLIAM E. DAILY              KAREN M. FREEMAN-WILSON
Danville, Indiana                    Attorney General of Indiana    
                
                             EILEEN EUZEN
                            Deputy Attorney General
                     Indianapolis, Indiana

KEVIN NASSER,                      )
                                        )
    Appellant-Defendant,                )
                                        )
        vs.                             )    No. 84A04-9910-CR-473
                                        )
STATE OF INDIANA,                       )
                                        )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                 )

                                    

                                    

                     May 11, 2000

(1) a person knowingly or intentionally violates this subsection; and
(2) less than ten (10) years have elapsed between the date a judgment was entered against the person for a prior unrelated violation of this subsection or IC 9-1-4-52 (repealed July 1, 1991) and the date the violation described in subdivision (1) was committed; the person commits a Class A misdemeanor.

    In support of his position that the trial court is required to conduct bifurcated proceedings under this statute, Nasser directs us to IND. C ODE . § 35-34-1-2.5 and IND. C ODE § 35-38-1-2(c). The first statute reads as follows:
If the penalty for an offense is, by the terms of the statute, increased because the person was previously convicted of the offense, the state may seek to have the person sentenced to receive the increased penalty by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, that the person was previously convicted of the offense.

The second statute that Nasser points to provides that:

If:

(1) the state in the manner prescribed by IC 35-34-1-2.5 sought an increased penalty by alleging that the person was previously convicted of the offense; and

(2) the person was convicted of the subsequent offense in a jury trial;

the jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing. The person shall be sentenced to receive the increased penalty if the jury . . . finds that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person had a previous conviction for the offense.

I.C. § 35-38-1-2(c). In construing these statutes, Nasser urges that the State was required to hold a new proceeding on the Class A misdemeanor enhancement provision of the driving while suspended statute. Error occurred here, Nasser contends, because his prior violation for driving while suspended was presented to the jury before there was any determination as to the original charge as a Class A infraction.
We initially observe that Nasser has waived the issue because he failed to object to the manner of the proceedings at trial. See James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. 1993) (a party may not fail to object to a court’s action and then raise the issue on appeal for the first time). Waiver notwithstanding, we note that our supreme court in Landis v. State, 704 N.E.2d 113 (Ind. 1998), determined that a defendant is entitled to a bifurcated proceeding where evidence of a prior conviction will be presented to a jury to enhance the instant offense. Id.
In Landis, the defendant was charged with stalking as a Class B felony, based upon his prior conviction for that offense as a Class B misdemeanor. Landis v. State, 693 N.E.2d 570, 571-73 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Landis requested bifurcated proceedings of his guilt and penalty phases which the trial court denied. In agreeing with Landis that the trial court’s denial of his request was error, we noted that where the State is required to prove Landis’ prior stalking conviction to elevate the instant stalking offense, evidence of the prior conviction would only serve to mislead the jury and it was, therefore, necessary that a bifurcated proceeding be conducted. Id. at 572. Specifically, we observed that:
[W]e find here that where the State is required to prove a prior conviction in order to elevate the current offense, a bifurcated trial must be held wherein evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction, and the acts which culminated in the prior conviction, shall not be introduced until the jury has first decided upon the defendant’s guilt for the charge at hand.

Id.
Our supreme court granted transfer in Landis and affirmed the portion of this court’s determination that Landis was entitled to a bifurcated trial where the State sought an enhanced penalty based upon the prior stalking conviction. Landis, 704 N.E.2d at 113.
Unlike the circumstances presented in Landis, we note that Nasser made no request for a bifurcated proceeding. Moreover, the violation for which Nasser was charged was not a criminal offense. Specifically, I ND. C ODE § 35-41-1-19 defines an “offense” as “a crime” and “does not include an infraction.” (Emphasis supplied); see also State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Ind. 1997) (traffic violations are considered civil proceedings).
As set forth above, Nasser’s case involves the enhancement of an infraction to a misdemeanor which was based upon the trial court’s adjudication of a prior infraction. Inasmuch as the evidence at trial was offered to enhance the infraction to a Class A misdemeanor, and Nasser did not object to the nature of the proceedings, there is no merit to Nasser’s contention under these circumstances that he was entitled to a bifurcated proceeding. Thus, Nasser may not succeed on his claim that his due process rights were violated. See footnote

R. at 165-66 (emphasis supplied). Because Nasser has failed to provide the pertinent portions of the record for review of this issue, he has waived the claim on appeal. See id.
Waiver notwithstanding, we note that the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate sentence, and it may be reversed only if the defendant shows a manifest abuse of discretion. Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ind. 1998). Additionally, it is within the trial court’s discretion to impose enhanced and maximum sentences. Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1073 (Ind. 1996). An enhanced sentence may be supported by only one aggravating factor. Adkins v. State, 703 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). A defendant’s criminal history, by itself, is sufficient to support an enhanced sentence. Battles v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1230, 1235 (Ind. 1997).
As Nasser correctly observes, the trial court did not specifically state any aggravating factors when imposing the maximum sentence. However, the trial court pointed to the content of Nasser’s presentence report and criminal history at the sentencing hearing. R. at 163-67. Specifically, the trial court noted that it had a copy of the report and had “acquainted [itself] with [Nasser’s] prior criminal record.” R. at 163. The State pointed out that Nasser had a long history of both felony and misdemeanor convictions, previous suspensions and disciplinary proceedings before the BMV. R. at 163-64. The trial court was familiar with Nasser’s prior convictions before its own court, as well as the recent conviction in the Vigo Superior Court. R. at 163-64, 166-67. The court also heard the prosecutor point out that Nasser continues “to drive without insurance, and continues to drive while intoxicated.” R. at 165. Contrary to Nasser’s claim, the circumstances set forth above were certainly aggravating factors that the trial court could, and did consider, in enhancing the sentence. Moreover, Nasser has not suggested that the trial court overlooked any mitigating circumstances that the trial court should have considered. As a result, there was no error in sentencing Nasser.