ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
RUTH JOHNSON STEVE CARTER
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
GARY DAMON SECREST
Deputy Attorney General
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
J. D., )
vs. ) No. 49A04-0410-JV-528
STATE OF INDIANA, )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
The Honorable James Payne, Judge
Cause No. 49D09-0406-JD-3077
April 28, 2005
OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
J.D. admitted to committing acts that would constitute Class B felony burglary if
committed by an adult and was sentenced to a one-year determinate sentence in
Marion Superior Court. J.D. appeals, raising the following restated issue for review:
Whether J.D. is entitled to time-served credit for his pre-sentence confinement. Concluding
J.D. is not entitled to time-served credit for his pre-sentence confinement, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 28, 2004, J.D. was arrested and alleged to be a delinquent
child for committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute Class
B felony burglary, Class D felony theft, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement. On August 3, 2004, J.D. admitted to committing burglary. Pursuant
to J.D.s plea, the State dismissed the remainder of J.D.s allegations and recommended
that J.D. serve a one-year determinate sentence.
The trial court concluded J.D. was eligible for determinate sentencing under Indiana Code
and ordered J.D. to serve a one-year determinate sentence. J.D.
then requested time-served credit for the thirty-five days he was detained prior to
sentencing. The trial court denied J.D.s request, and J.D. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
J.D. asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to award
him pre-sentence confinement time-served credit. An abuse of discretion occurs if the
trial courts decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.
State v. Willits, 773 N.E.2d 808, 811 (Ind. 2002).
J.D. claims the trial court abused its discretion because Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1
indicates that, the procedures governing criminal trials apply in all matters not covered
by the juvenile law and the criminal code provides for time-served credit.
Br. of Appellant at 6.
However, the assertion of a right to time-served credit is an assertion of
a substantive rather than a procedural right. Substantive rules fix duties, establish
rights and responsibilities among and for persons; procedural rules merely prescribe the manner
in which [substantive] rights and responsibilities may be exercised and enforced in a
State v. Blood, 239 Ind. 394, 400, 157 N.E.2d 475, 478
Accordingly, Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1s incorporation of criminal procedures into the juvenile code
does not, in and of itself, vest a juvenile with substantive rights given
to criminal defendants. Rather, Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1 merely uses the criminal
code as a template for prescribing the manner in which existing substantive rights
may be exercised and enforced in a court. See
In re K.G.,
808 N.E.2d 631, 637 (Ind. 2004) (using Indiana Code section 31-32-1-1 to demarcate
the procedures to apply to an existing substantive right); see also Yarbrough v.
State, 463 N.E.2d 1098, 1099 (Ind. 1984); In re D.D., 668 N.E.2d 1250,
1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); C.D.T. v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995).
J.D. also asserts
C.T.S. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1193, 1204 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004), trans. denied, entitles him to time-served credit. Br. of Appellant at
5. In C.T.S., this court remanded C.T.S.s indeterminate sentence to the trial
court and ordered the trial court to give C.T.S. time-served credit. 781
N.E.2d at 1204. However, C.T.S. involved an extraordinary period of months awaiting
disposition, more akin to the constitutional right of speedy trial. Accordingly, J.D.
may not rely upon C.T.S.s unusual remand order.
Because the trial court had no statutory authority to award J.D. time-served credit,
it did not abuse its discretion when it denied J.D.s request for time-served
The trial court was within its discretion when it denied J.D. time-served credit.
BAILEY, J., and BAKER, J., concur.
We held oral argument in this matter at Hanover College. We
thank Hanover College and its staff for their professionalism and hospitality in hosting
oral argument and commend both advocates for their able presentations.
See Ind. Code § 31-37-19-10 (1998).
Ind. Code § 31-32-1-1 (1998).