FOR PUBLICATION


ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

LYNNE D. LIDKE    DARLENE R. SEYMOUR
MICHAEL B. LANGFORD    Kiefer & McGoff
Scopelitis, Garvin, Light & Hanson    Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
     KIMBERLY E. WILLIAMS
    Whiteman Burdette, PLLC
    Charleston, WV

     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

KLLM, INC. and KEITH JAMES PIERCE,          )

                                                 )
Appellants-Plaintiffs,                           )
                                                 )
vs.                                              )    No. 32A01-0409-CV-392
LaCRECIA E. LEGG, as Personal Representative     )
of the Estate of Mark S. Hanna, and              )
LAURA BRWER,                                     )
                                                 )
Appellees-Defendants.                            )

    APPEAL FROM THE HENDRICKS SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Robert W. Freese, Judge
    Cause No. 32D01-0308-PL-64

    April 27, 2005

    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Judge

In Davidson, we recognized that the purposes of Indiana’s Guest Statute are threefold: first, it reduces the threat of “collusive” lawsuits, whose likelihood would be greater between family members than mere acquaintances; second, it reduces the threat of “Robin Hood” proclivities of juries where juries would be more eager to take from the “rich” liability insurance companies and give to the “poor” victims, especially where the victims were members of the same family; and three, it fosters family harmony by not allowing family members to sue and recover for injuries caused by another family member’s negligence. Davidson, 558 N.E.2d at 851. With respect to hitchhikers, we recognized a fourth purpose for Indiana’s Guest Statute: it deters the illegal act of hitchhiking by not allowing hitchhikers to recover for their injuries caused by a driver’s negligence. Id.
Thus, under the Guest Statute, KLLM would not be liable for any loss or damage arising from the death of Hanna if Hanna was a hitchhiker who was being transported without payment in or upon the motor vehicle at the time of his death. See footnote

Id. at 315.
    Hanna’s status when he first entered Pierce’s tractor-trailer was that of a hitchhiker. Legg’s contention that Hanna’s status changed in Louisville when Hanna was unable to contact his girlfriend is unpersuasive; Hanna agreed to continue on with Pierce on his journey. Because there was no interruption in their journey, Hanna’s status as a hitchhiker remained unchanged, and he was a hitchhiker, for purposes of Indiana’s Guest Statute, at the time of his death.

Id. at 209.
    The panel in Republic Services did not explicitly define the phrase “in or upon.” However, in Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Combs, 446 N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), we held that the term “upon” was ambiguous, and we interpreted its meaning in the context of an insurance policy. In Michigan Mutual, a driver’s vehicle became disabled while stopped in a lane of traffic, so the driver walked to his brother’s place of employment to obtain his brother’s assistance in fixing the vehicle. The driver and his brother subsequently returned to the vehicle to fix it. While the driver’s brother was working on the engine at the rear of the vehicle, he was struck by another vehicle and injured. Id. at 1002.
    The driver of the other vehicle was uninsured, so the driver’s brother attempted to file a claim under the uninsured motorist clause of the driver’s insurance policy. The clause protected the “insured” against damages caused by an uninsured motorist. An “insured” was defined by the policy as any person while “occupying” an insured automobile. The policy defined “occupying” as “in or upon or entering into or alighting from.” Id. (emphasis added).
    The insurance company filed an action for declaratory judgment to determine if the driver’s brother was covered by the uninsured motorist clause. The trial court found that the driver’s brother was occupying the vehicle according to the policy and, thus, was covered by the clause. We agreed. We held that the term “upon” was ambiguous in its meaning. Id. at 1007. We stated that it was a claimant’s relationship with the vehicle that determined whether he was “occupying” it, and because the driver’s brother was working on the vehicle’s engine when he was injured, a sufficient relationship existed between the driver’s brother and the vehicle so as to establish that the driver’s brother was “upon” the vehicle. Id. at 1006-07. See also United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 152 Ind. App. 387, 283 N.E.2d 788, 790-91 (1972) (holding that where a vehicle was stuck in the snow and the owner alighted from the vehicle to push it out and was thereafter injured, vehicle owner was “in or upon” the vehicle for insurance policy purposes because evidence of physical contact with the vehicle prior to the injury was sufficient to establish that the owner was “upon” the vehicle).
    Legg contends that Michigan Mutual is inapposite because, in that case, we were interpreting the language within an insurance policy and not the language within a statute, as we are required to do here. Instead, Legg contends that because Hanna was not inside or physically on the vehicle at the time of his death, Indiana’s Guest Statute was inapplicable. We disagree.
    The phrase “in or upon” contained in the Guest Statute is written in the disjunctive; therefore, the General Assembly intended that the term “in” and the term “upon” be given different meanings. Under Michigan Mutual, the driver’s brother was “upon” the motor vehicle, even though he was not inside or physically on the vehicle, because a sufficient relationship existed between him and the vehicle. 446 N.E.2d at 1006-07. We agree with Michigan Mutual’s interpretation of the term “upon.” Under the Guest Statute, then, in order for a person to be “upon” a motor vehicle, the person is not required to be physically inside the vehicle at the time; instead, a person may be “upon” a motor vehicle if a sufficient relationship exists between that person and the vehicle.
    Here, Hanna had only temporarily left the vehicle in order to assist Pierce in backing up the tractor-trailer. The undisputed evidence shows that Hanna had intended to re-enter the vehicle and continue his journey with Pierce after he finished assisting Pierce in backing up the tractor-trailer. Hanna’s actions in temporarily exiting the vehicle and assisting Pierce were in direct furtherance of their journey back to Louisville; thus, a sufficient relationship existed between Hanna and the tractor-trailer to establish that Hanna was “upon” the tractor-trailer at the time of his death.
Moreover, we agree with KLLM that Republic Services is distinguishable. In Republic Services, when the child exited the garbage truck to urinate, his actions were not in direct furtherance of his and his stepfather’s journey. Therefore, a sufficient relationship failed to exist between the child and the garbage truck so as to establish that the child was “upon” the garbage truck at the time of his injuries. For these reasons, we hold that Hanna was “in or upon” the motor vehicle at the time of his death for purposes of Indiana’s Guest Statute.

Nonetheless, “[t]he court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where the judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Ind. Code § 34-14-1-6. “The purpose of [a declaratory judgment action] is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered.” Ind. Code § 34-14-1-12.
    The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act was not intended to eliminate well-known causes of action or to substitute an appellate court for a court of original jurisdiction, particularly where the issues are ripe for litigation through the normal processes. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 390 N.E.2d at 1085. Instead, the Act was intended to furnish a “full and adequate remedy where none existed before,” and a declaratory judgment action should not be resorted to where such a judgment is unnecessary. Id. Such a judgment is unnecessary where a full and adequate remedy is already provided by another cause of action. Id. However, “[t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.” Ind. Trial Rule 57. “The test to determine the propriety of declaratory relief is whether the issuance of a declaratory judgment will effectively solve the problem involved, whether it will serve a useful purpose, and whether or not another remedy is more effective or efficient.” Boone County Area Plan Comm’n v. Kennedy, 560 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied.