ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER:    ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
ROBERT M. FRYE    STEVE CARTER    
FOLEY & POOL, LLP    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
Indianapolis, IN     Indianapolis, IN
    
     TED J. HOLADAY
    DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Indianapolis, IN

_____________________________________________________________________

     IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT _____________________________________________________________________

SHELBY STREET REALTY CORP.,                                               )
n/k/a MERCHANDISE WAREHOUSE, INC.,                                             )
                                                                               )
    Petitioner,                                                                )
                                                                               )
    v.                                                                         )       Cause No. 49T10-0205-TA-46
                                                                               )
PERRY TOWNSHIP ASSESSOR,                                                       )
                                                                               )
    Respondent.                                                                )    

(2)    contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(3)    in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations;

(4)    without observance of procedure required by law; or
(5)    unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence.
Ind. Code Ann. § 33-3-5-14.8(e)(1)-(5) (West Supp. 2003). The party seeking to overturn the Indiana Board’s final determination bears the burden of proving its invalidity. See Osolo Township Assessor v. Elkhart Maple Lane Assocs., L.P., 789 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).

(Pet’r Br. In Supp. of Its Verified Pet. for Judicial Review at 11-12 (citation omitted).) After performing this calculation for all four alleged comparables, the Appraisal concluded that “[t]he market extraction method result indicated a depreciation range [in the comparables] of 59% to 81% concerning functional and economic obsolescence.” (Cert. Admin. R. at 159.) Thus, MWI argues, its request for obsolescence adjustments of only 50% “is supportable.” (Pet’r Br. In Supp. of Its Verified Pet. for Judicial Review at 25.) In other words, MWI contends that the Indiana Board’s final determination affirming the Assessor’s application of obsolescence adjustments is erroneous. The Court, however, disagrees for two reasons.
     First, with respect to the three warehouses that received no obsolescence, all MWI has done is provide the Indiana Board with a laundry list of factors that it alleges are causing obsolescence to its improvements and then say because other properties are suffering from between 59% and 81% obsolescence, “we’re entitled to a 50% obsolescence adjustment.” However, MWI needed to link one with the other by showing an actual loss of value. See Miller Structures, Inc., 748 N.E.2d 954. Instead, the administrative record is completely devoid of any evidence indicating and explaining MWI’s actual loss of value. For instance, MWI needed to provide evidence showing how the fact that its improvements had inefficient floor plans caused it (MWI) to lose money. Similarly, MWI needed to provide evidence showing how its improvements’ ceiling heights ranging from 13 to 80 feet caused it to lose money. MWI’s failure to provide this evidence is fatal to its claim with respect to the three warehouses that received no obsolescence in the first instance. See footnote
    With respect to the five warehouses that received 10% obsolescence adjustments, MWI’s claim that they should have received 50% fails for a different reason.See footnote Specifically, MWI failed to present evidence that the four alleged comparables suffered from comparable causes of obsolescence. See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 391 (12th ed. 2001) (stating that, under the market extraction method, “comparable properties should have similar physical, functional, and external characteristics as the subject, and they should have incurred similar amounts and types of depreciation”). See footnote Instead, MWI’s appraisal merely stated:
[Comparable Property #1:] This parcel was reportedly in average condition as of the sale date. This sale is located in a comparable area to the subject property. This improvement is built of brick, block and metal panel walls, steel frame, with 16’-24’ ceiling heights. This property was reported improved with an obsolete coal fired boiler at the time of sale. This improvement was improved as an automobile manufacturing plant in 1951.

(Cert. Admin. R. at 148, 151, 154, 157.) Without any explanation whatsoever as to what types of obsolescence these four properties suffered from, the Indiana Board was simply unable to make any correlation between the obsolescence present in the comparable properties and MWI’s property. See Blackbird Farms Apartments, LP v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 765 N.E.2d 711, 715 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2002) (stating that without any comparison of lot sizes, shapes, topography, geographical features, lot accessibility, and uses, taxpayer’s assertion that certain parcels of land are “comparable" did not constitute probative evidence).
    A taxpayer cannot quantify its obsolescence depreciation without relating the causes of obsolescence, and the actual loss in value to the improvement incurred as a result of those causes, to the amount of obsolescence it seeks. See Clark, 694 N.E.2d at 1238; see also Miller Structures, Inc., 748 N.E.2d at 954. MWI was required to “carefully, methodically, and in detail brief this Court as to what the amount of obsolescence should be and why.” See Clark v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin., 779 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 n.4 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2002) (emphasis added). While MWI presented an Appraisal stating that it was entitled to additional obsolescence depreciation, the Appraisal bore no relationship to causes of obsolescence depreciation it alleged to exist. Additionally, the Appraisal bore no relationship between the causes of obsolescence present in MWI’s property and that present in the four allegedly comparable properties. Thus, MWI simply did not establish its prima facie case that it was entitled to any additional obsolescence depreciation with respect to the five warehouses that initially received 10% obsolescence adjustments. See Whitley Prods., Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 704 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998), review denied. The Indiana Board’s final determination must stand. See footnote