FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

ALAN K. WILSON     JOHN H. BROOKE
Muncie, Indiana     CASEY D. CLOYD
    Brooke & Cloyd
JOSEPH P. HUNTER    Muncie, Indiana
Quirk & Rivers
Muncie, Indiana

CITY OF MUNCIE,                        )
                                            )
    Appellant-Defendant,                    )
                                            )
        vs.                                 )    No.  18A02-9710-CV-719
                                            )
JAMES W.  LOWE, D.  BRUCE RING, JOHN J.     )
LETTER, STEPHEN F.  MURRAY, MICHAEL         )
M.  LOFFER, et al, and CHARLES FRITZ,       )
DEBORAH COLLINS, SUZANNE EMERSON,           )
WALTER BAKER, et al,                        )
                                            )
    Appellees-Plaintiffs.                   )

the appellate court should be confident that its affirmance is consistent with all of the trial court's findings of fact and the inferences reasonably drawn from the findings. Id. at 924. In reviewing the judgment, we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment. Ahuja v. Lynco Ltd. Medical Research, 675 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. The judgment will be reversed only when clearly erroneous. DeHaan v. DeHaan, 572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. Id. To determine whether the findings or judgment are clearly erroneous, we consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, and we will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Id.

that the annexation ordinances assign annexed territory to a councilmanic district. The trial court correctly found that the City did not make these assignments in its annexation ordinances. Based upon this finding, the trial court granted the remonstrance petitions and denied the annexations, concluding that the City's failure to assign the territory to councilmanic districts in the annexation ordinances required, as a matter of law, that the annexations be denied.
    The City argues that its failure to comply with IC 36-4-3-4(f) is not fatal to the annexations. First, the City contends that a statute addressing municipal legislative body districting relieves the City of its obligation to make the district assignment in the annexation ordinance. Our purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute. In so doing, the objects and purposes of the statute in question must be considered as well as the effect and consequences of such interpretation. State v. Windy City Fireworks, Inc., 600 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), adopted on transfer, 608 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 1993). When interpreting the words of a single section of a statute, this court must construe them with due regard for all other sections of the act and with regard for the legislative intent to carry out the spirit and purpose of the act. Detterline v. Bonaventura, 465 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied. We presume that the legislature intended its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Id. We presume words appearing in the statute were intended to have meaning, and we endeavor to give those words their plain and

ordinary meaning absent a clearly manifested purpose to do otherwise. Indiana Dept. of Human Services v. Firth, 590 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied.
    Ind. Code § 36-4-6-3 requires second class cities, of which the City is one, to adopt an ordinance to divide the city into six councilmanic districts. The statute mandates how and when a city must perform this districting. Furthermore, the statute makes provision for instances where a city has failed to include a portion of the municipality in a district. Subsection (j) of IC 36-4-6-3 provides: “If any territory in the city is not included in one (1) of the districts established under this section, the territory is included in the district that: (1) is contiguous to that territory; and (2) contains the least population of all districts contiguous to that territory.”
    Because subsection (j) will place unassigned, annexed territory in a councilmanic district, the City argues that subsection (j) abrogates the requirement that the City make a district assignment in the annexation ordinance. We disagree. Initially, we observe that if the General Assembly had wished to eliminate this requirement, it could have repealed IC 36-4-3-4(f). It has not done so. Notwithstanding this fact, we do not believe the legislature intended to affect this statute when it enacted subsection (j) of IC 36-4-6-3.
    Subsection (j) was enacted in 1993 along with other amendments to IC 36-4-6-3. See P.L. 3-1993, § 265, 1993 Ind. Acts 1264-66. In addition to subsection (j), the General Assembly created subsection (k), which provides:
    (k) If any territory in the city is included in more than one (1) of the districts established under this section, the territory is included in the district that:
        (1) is one (1) of the districts in which the territory is described in the                          ordinance adopted under this section;

the statutory scheme leads to an absurd result is unfounded. The trial court did not err by granting the Remonstrators' petitions and denying the annexations.

statute in order to sustain its burden, the issue may not be raised in a petition for remonstrance. We disagree.
    Remonstrance is the exclusive manner for landowners to obtain relief from annexation proceedings. Deaton, 582 N.E.2d at 885. Accordingly, if we were to accept the City's argument, the Remonstrators would have no means of challenging the City's failure to assign the annexed territory to a councilmanic district in the ordinances. Furthermore, the City's taxpayers would also lack standing to bring a declaratory judgment suit, since the taxpayers are not individuals being deprived of representation or information regarding that representation. See Deaton, 582 N.E.2d at 886. Therefore, under the City's argument, a municipality could not be forced to comply with the mandate of IC 36-4-3-4(f).
    IC 36-4-3-11 provides that a remonstrance petition “must state the reason why the annexation should not take place.” The statute does not specify or limit the reasons that may be given. Here, the City's ordinance did not comply with IC 36-4-3-4(f). The Remonstrators are not prohibited from raising this issue in their remonstrance petition.
    Affirmed.
SHARPNACK, C.J., and GARRARD, J., concur.

attempted to utilize IC 36-4-3-4.

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