ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER:    ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
STEPHEN E. DEVOE    STEVE CARTER    
B. KEITH SHAKE    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
HENDERSON DAILY WITHROW    Indianapolis, IN
& DEVOE     
Indianapolis, IN     TED J. HOLADAY
    DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
    Indianapolis, IN
    

_____________________________________________________________________

    IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT _____________________________________________________________________

INDIANAPOLIS RACQUET CLUB, INC.,                                          )
                                                                               )
    Petitioner,                                                                )
                                                                               )
    v.                                                                         )   Cause No. 49T10-0206-TA-60
                                                                               )
WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP                                                            )              
(MARION COUNTY                                                                 ) ASSESSOR,         )
                                                                               )
    Respondent.                                                                )    
 _____________________________________________________________________
     
                                                 

II.     Whether the Indiana Board erred in its failure to adjust the grade factor assigned to IRC’s improvement; and

III.    Whether the Indiana Board erred in its failure to adjust the physical depreciation factor assigned to IRC’s improvement.
    

Id. at 939. The Court subsequently remanded the matter for the State Board to “apply the model that most closely resembles the physical structure of the tennis facility . . . and [to] recalculate the facility’s reproduction costs based upon that model.” Id. at 941. In so doing, however, the Court stated:
[IRC] is reminded that, on remand, it bears the burden of going forward with probative evidence . . . concerning the appropriate model to use in calculating the base rate for the . . . indoor tennis facility at issue, including but not limited to evidence regarding the proper grade to be assigned [to] the subject improvement.

Id. (internal citation and footnote omitted).
    On August 16, 2001, the State Board conducted a remand hearing. On April 17, 2002, the Indiana Board See footnote issued a final determination in which it applied the GCI light warehouse model base rate to IRC’s building.
IRC filed another appeal with this Court on June 3, 2002, claiming that when the Indiana Board applied the GCI light warehouse model base rate to its building, it was required to make several adjustments to the base rate to account for the fact that the building lacked certain features presumed in that model. The Court heard the parties’ oral arguments on October 27, 2003. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(3)    in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations;

(4)    without observance of procedure required by law; or
(5)    unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence.
Ind. Code § 33-3-5-14.8(e)(1)-(5) (West Supp. 2003). The party seeking to overturn the Indiana Board’s final determination bears the burden of proving its invalidity. Osolo Township Assessor v. Elkhart Maple Lane Assocs., L.P., 789 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).

MODEL: GCI—LIGHT WAREHOUSE—First [Floor]

Foundation:    12” reinforced concrete perimeter grade walls to 2’6” high on 12” x 18” strip footings including trench excavation and back-fill
Walls:
    Type 1:    Reinforced concrete block with two coats masonry paint for a wall height of 18’
    Type 2:    Common brick on concrete block backup for a wall height of 18’
Openings    1% 1 ¾” hollow metal service doors
        4% overhead doors
Mechanical and Interior Components
    Type:    Unfinished, 18’ floor height
Interior Finish
    Partitions    8” hollow concrete block painted one side with a density of 100 S.F. floor/L.F. partition to a floor height of 18’
    Lighting    200 Ampere service with panel board and feeders. Fixtures are fluorescent and include switches and receptacles.
    HTG Only    Gas fired, hot water boiler with unit heaters
        AC Add    Single zone electric cooling
50 IAC 2.1-4-7.
The assessment regulations also provide that when an improvement varies from the model, adjustments must be made to the base price to account for its variations. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.1-4-3(c) (1992). These adjustments can generally be accomplished via an application of the assessment regulations’ unit-in-place cost tables. See Ind. Admin. Code, tit. 50, r. 2.1-4-10 (1992).
    As the party challenging the propriety of the Indiana Board’s final determination, IRC bears the burden of proving its invalidity. Elkhart Maple Lane Assocs., 789 N.E.2d at 111. Thus, to be entitled to a base rate adjustment, IRC must first submit probative evidence that its building does not contain construction elements listed in the GCI light warehouse model or that its building contains construction elements that are not listed in the models. See Barth, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 756 N.E.2d 1124, 1129 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001). IRC then has the burden to ascertain the cost of each component based on the assessment regulations. See id.

(Cert. Admin. R. at 198.)
When a taxpayer challenges its assessment, it is required to make a detailed factual presentation, supported by probative evidence, relating to the alleged assessment error. Hoogenboom-Nofziger v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 715 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1999). IRC made no such presentation in this case. First, it made no reference to the unit-in-place tables See footnote to determine the cost to be deducted for the lack of a concrete floor slab. See 50 IAC 2.1-4-10 (stating that the use of the unit-in-place tables is the appropriate method to make an adjustment for the lack of a concrete floor slab). See also Barth, 756 N.E.2d at 1129 (stating that taxpayers like IRC bear the burden of ascertaining the cost of adjustment pursuant to the unit-in-place tables).
Furthermore, IRC provided no explanation as to why the $0.90 per square foot figure was the appropriate figure to use to calculate the amount of the adjustment. More specifically, the Court notes that the assessment regulations provide that 2” of asphalt paving on a 5” base is valued between $0.90 and $1.10 per square foot (depending on the total amount (i.e., square footage) of paving). See Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.1-4-5 (Schedule G) (1992). Consequently, IRC was required to do more than say “use the $0.90 figure.” Rather, it was required to present evidence indicating that its asphalt tennis courts were indeed 2” on a 5” base, as well as the total amount of paving (square footage) it had. It did neither. This Court will not now make IRC’s case for it. See Davidson Indus. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 744 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001). Because IRC made no case, it receives no relief.
Nevertheless, IRC argues that this result should be different. First, it states that because the Indiana Board has been “designated by the legislature as a repository of the administrative expertise on [assessment] issue[s,]” it must be required to know, and apply, the assessment regulations as written. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 42; Pet’r Br. at 9.) As a result, IRC contends it is absurd to require it to submit evidence as to the proper amount of the adjustment when the Indiana Board, the State’s “property tax expert,” should have known what the proper adjustment was (i.e., “it’s their manual”) (See Oral Argument Tr. at 36.) Second, IRC argues that when this case was remanded, the Indiana Board was required to calculate a completely new assessment. Because IRC had no idea what that new assessment would be, it could not anticipate whether or not the Indiana Board would make an adjustment for the lack of a floor slab. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 39.) IRC asserts that because it could not have anticipated the error, it could not have borne the burden of proof in arguing against the error. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 42.)
While IRC considers it absurd that it must “instruct” the Indiana Board, Indiana’s “property tax expert,” as to the content of the assessment regulations, case law is explicit: a taxpayer, when challenging an assessment, must provide the Indiana Board with an argument and probative evidence to support its challenge. See North Park Cinemas, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 689 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1997) (stating that a party adversely affected by an assessment “has an obvious responsibility to . . . present evidence and argument in support of its position"). The reason for this standard is simple: it eliminates the possibility that the Indiana Board expends valuable time and resources building a taxpayer’s case for it. Indeed, “[i]f a taxpayer cares so little about its case that it does not make a strong factual case at the administrative level, why should the [Indiana] Board care any more than the taxpayer?” See Hoogenboom-Nofziger, 715 N.E.2d at 1023.
IRC was required to make a detailed factual presentation, supported by probative evidence, relating to the alleged assessment error to the Indiana Board. See id. Because IRC declined to do that, its claim for relief must be denied. See id. at 1024-25 (stating that to allow a taxpayer to prevail even though it did not meet its burden of proof is, among other things, “patently unfair to other taxpayers who do make detailed presentations”).
    In addition, IRC’s claim that it could not have possibly borne the burden of proof on remand is misguided. In its remand order, this Court explicitly stated that IRC bore the burden of proof. Indianapolis Racquet Club, 722 N.E.2d at 941 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this order, it was up to IRC, at the remand hearing, to present any issue, calculation, argument, or theory relevant to a proper calculation of its base rate. The Court cannot now allow IRC a second bite at the apple.

For our indoor courts, there are 26 low cost fluorescent fixtures per court, each with 6 eight foot fluorescent tubes (we only use 4 at a time in order to be able to maintain constant lighting levels as tubes age). The 1979 Manual figures for tennis court lighting are based on pole lighting which is lower intensity than what we have and accordingly I believe these cost figures are much too low for our system. On the other hand I also believe the 1995 Manual figures are about 25% too high based on 1989 replacement costs so the cost recommended . . . for these lights is $3,825 for the first court and $3,600 for the other 15 courts, for a total of $57,825 (this is 75% of the 1995 Manual figures). [IRC] believes this cost should be included in the cost computation for the [facility].

On the other hand, these tennis court lights are the only lights in the area of the building occupied by the 16 indoor tennis courts, so [IRC] has argued that the normal lighting cost included in the standard per square foot base cost for these improvements should be deducted. I do not believe a cost for this adjustment is set forth in the 1979 Manual. [IRC] believes that a reasonable approach for determining the amount of this deduction would be to determine it by reference to the tennis court lighting costs noted above. For instance, the light levels on a good indoor tennis court are about twice the levels in good industrial work areas. Further, the type of fixtures and tubes are the same so [IRC] believes a consistent and fair deduction would be 50% of the court lighting cost used. If this approach is used, the net adjustment to the standard cost of the building for the lack of lighting in the tennis court area would be a decrease of $28,913 (50% of the $57,825 cost for the special tennis court lighting as noted above) or $[0].30 per square foot. See footnote

(Cert. Admin. R. at 196-97 (footnote added).)
    This written statement is confusing. Furthermore, DeVoe uses numbers from both the 1979 and 1995 assessment manuals to calculate a number applicable to the 1989 assessment. All this mathematical effort is irrelevant: the Indiana assessment regulations in effect for 1989 clearly state the range for such an adjustment is between $0.05 and $0.15 per square foot. See 50 IAC 2.1-4-5 (Schedule C). See footnote Thus, IRC is asking for a 30% increase in lighting assessment when the assessment regulations only allow for, at the most, 15%. The Court, finding that the administrative record does not support a $0.30 increase per square foot to account for IRC’s more abundant lighting, therefore AFFIRMS the Indiana Board’s final determination on this issue.

More abundant illumination    ADD upper range limit
AND Higher quality fixtures

Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.1-4-3(c)(6) (1992).