



Michaelangelo Wells appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to two counts of class A felony child molesting. We affirm.

The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court erred in sentencing Wells.

In March 2007, the State charged Wells with six counts of class A felony child molesting and two counts of class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor. In September 2008, Wells pleaded guilty to two counts of class A felony child molesting. Each count represented a separate victim. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the following four mitigating factors: 1) Wells accepted responsibility for his actions; 2) the hardship to Wells' dependents; 3) Wells' remorse; and 4) Wells' lack of criminal history. The court also found the following two aggravating factors: 1) Wells molested two victims; and 2) Wells failed to appear during the proceedings. After considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court imposed the minimum sentence of twenty years for each conviction, but ordered the sentences to run consecutively for a total sentence of forty years. Wells appeals his sentence.

Wells' sole contention is that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in imposing the minimum sentences for class A felonies and then ordering those sentences to run consecutively. Wells appears to believe that the circumstances in this case justified enhanced concurrent sentences.

Because the offenses in this case were committed after the April 25, 2005, revisions to the sentencing statutes, we review Wells' sentence under the advisory sentencing scheme. *Anglemyer v. State*, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007). When evaluating sentencing challenges under the advisory sentencing scheme, we first confirm

that the trial court issued the required sentencing statement, which includes a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial court's reasons for imposing a particular sentence. *Id.* at 490. If the recitation includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating. *Id.*

So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for abuse of discretion. *Id.* An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. *Id.* One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing to enter a sentencing statement at all. *Id.* Another example includes entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence, including aggravating and mitigating factors, which are not supported by the record. *Id.* at 490-91.

Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh such factors. *Id.* at 491. This is so because once the trial court has entered a sentencing statement, which may or may not include the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, it may then impose any sentence that is authorized by statute and permitted under the Indiana Constitution. *Id.*

In order to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must find at least one aggravating circumstance. *Marcum v. State*, 725 N.E.2d 852, 864 (Ind. 2000). Further,

the court may consider aggravators and mitigators in determining the sentence for each underlying offense and then independently consider aggravators and mitigators in determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. *Frentz v. State*, 875 N.E.2d 453, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), *trans. denied*. Both this court and the Indiana Supreme Court have frequently noted that the multiple victims aggravator is sufficient to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. *See McCann v. State*, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001); *Page v. State*, 878 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), *trans. denied*.

Here, the trial court first considered the aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the sentence for each underlying offense. The court then considered those same aggravators, including the fact there were two victims, in making its determination to impose consecutive sentences. This court has previously explained that in cases involving multiple victims, consecutive sentences vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one person. *Perry v. State*, 845 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), *trans. denied*. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences in this case. We find no error.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and BARNES, J., concur.