Supreme Court Docket
Select Cases Pending Review by the U.S. Supreme
Court
Last updated
11/24/2008
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07-1114 CONE V. BELL
DECISION BELOW: 492 F3d 743
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 99-5279
HOLDING BELOW:
On state post-conviction review, the Tennessee courts refused to
consider petitioner’s claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), on the ground that the claim had already been “previously
determined” in the state system. On federal habeas, a divided
panel of the Sixth Circuit held that the state courts’ ruling
precluded consideration of the Brady claim. The court of appeals
reasoned (in conflict with decisions of five other circuits) that
the claim had been “procedurally defaulted.” The court
of appeals further reasoned (widening an existing four-to-two circuit
split) that the state courts’ ruling was unreviewable. Seven
judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The question presented is whether petitioner is entitled to federal
habeas review of his claim that the State suppressed material evidence
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which encompasses two sub-questions:
1. Is a federal habeas claim “procedurally defaulted”
because it has been presented twice to the state courts?
2. Is a federal habeas court powerless to recognize that a state
court erred in holding that state law precludes reviewing a claim?
Cert. Granted 6/23/2008
07-1122 ARIZONA V. JOHNSON
DECISION BELOW: 170 P3d 667
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2 CA-CR 2006-0079
HOLDING BELOW:
Arizona Court of Appeals held that:
1. defendant, as a passenger, was seized when police officers stopped
the car for an investigatory stop, but
2. pat-down search was not authorized because seizure had evolved
into a consensual encounter at time police officer conducted search.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
In the context of a vehicular stop for a minor traffic infraction,
may an officer conduct a pat-down search of a passenger when the
officer has an articulable basis to believe the passenger might
be armed and presently dangerous, but has no reasonable grounds
to believe that the passenger is committing, or has committed, a
criminal offense?
Cert. Granted 6/23/2008
07-1315 KNOWLES V. MIRZAYANCE
DECISION BELOW: Petition Appendix B
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-57102
HOLDING BELOW:
Concluding that defense counsel was ineffective in advising petitioner
to withdraw his not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals granted habeas relief to petitioner without
analyzing the state-court adjudication deferentially under “clearly
established” law as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and
by supplanting the district court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations with its own, opposite factual findings. This Court
vacated the Ninth Circuit decision and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006).
On remand, the Ninth Circuit conceded that “no Supreme Court
case has specifically addressed a counsel’s failure to advance
the defendant’s only affirmative defense” but nonetheless
concluded that its original decision was “unaffected”
by Musladin and subsequent § 2254(d) decisions of this Court.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
1. Did the Ninth Circuit again exceed its authority under §
2254(d) by granting habeas relief without considering whether the
state-court adjudication of the claim was “unreasonable”
under “clearly established Federal law” based on its
previous conclusion that trial counsel was required to proceed with
an affirmative insanity defense because it was the only defense
available and despite the absence of a Supreme Court decision addressing
the point?
2. May a federal appellate court substitute its own factual findings
and credibility determinations for those of a district court without
determining whether the district court’s findings were “clearly
erroneous?”
Cert. Granted 6/27/2008
07-8521 HARBISON V. BELL
DECISION BELOW: 503 F3d 566
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-5059
HOLDING BELOW:
As framed in petitioner’s questions presented:
Every jurisdiction that authorizes the death penalty provides for
clemency, which is of vital importance in assuring that the death
penalty is carried out justly. But, in this case the District Court
held Mr. Harbison’s federally-funded lawyers could not present,
on his behalf, a clemency request to Tennessee’s governor.
The denial of clemency counsel contravenes basic principles of justice.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Herrera v. Collins.
Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law,
and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice
where judicial process has been exhausted.
Indeed, the clemency power exists because “the administration
of justice by the
courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of
circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt.” Thus, executive
clemency is the “fail safe’ in our criminal justice
system.” A system which includes capital punishment but does
not provide a meaningful opportunity for executive clemency is “totally
alien to our notions of criminal justice.”
Yet, the lower courts arbitrarily denied Mr. Harbison’s federally-funded
habeas counsel permission to represent him in state clemency proceedings
after the State had denied him counsel for that purpose. The District
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit not only defied
Congress’ explicit directions to provide clemency counsel
for the condemned, but denied Mr. Harbison a meaningful opportunity
to present compelling facts mitigating his guilt and the punishment
of death to the only person presently able to consider them, the
Governor of the State of Tennessee. Equally troubling, the Sixth
Circuit barred Harbison from appealing the denial of clemency counsel
by refusing to grant a certificate of appealability on the issue.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
In order to harmonize the law of the circuits and to decide an
important issue regarding the appeals court’s jurisdiction,
this Court should resolve the following questions:
1. Does 18 U.S.C. §3599(a)(2) and (e) (recodifying verbatim
former 21 U.S.C. §848(q) (4)(B)and (q) (8)), permit federally-funded
habeas counsel to represent a condemned inmate in state clemency
proceedings when the state has denied state-funded counsel for that
purpose?
2. Is a certificate of appealability required to appeal an order
denying a request for federally-funded counsel under 18 U.S.C. §3599(a)(2)
and (e)?
Cert. Granted 6/23/2008
07-1309 BOYLE V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 2007 WL 4102738
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 05-4239
HOLDING BELOW:
Appellant contended that his due process rights were violated because
the government advanced a theory of criminal liability in this case
that was factually inconsistent with one pursued by the government
in a previous action. Although Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted
it had not yet addressed the issue, other circuits have found that
“the use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates
the principles of due process.” Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d
1045, 1052 (8th Cir.2000); accord Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594,
611 (6th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, Bradshaw v. Stumpf,
545 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005). Court held
case did not present the opportunity for it to consider the issue.
Contrary to appellant's assertion, the government's two theories
are not “factually contradictory.” Nothing dictates
that a single crime cannot be committed by two enterprises working
together, each in furtherance of its own interests. Indeed, the
indictment in this action and the indictment in the prior action
both charged that the crime was committed by the defendants “together
with others.” Because a single racketeering act may be in
furtherance of the activities of two different enterprises, the
government has not contradicted itself. Accordingly, Court held
the appellant's conviction does not even implicate concerns of due
process.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Does proof of an association-in-fact enterprise under the RICO statute,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d), require at least some showing
of an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern
of racketeering activity in which it engages - an exceptionally
important question in the administration of federal justice, civil
and criminal, that has spawned a three-way circuit split?
Cert. Granted 10/1/2008
07-1356 KANSAS V. VENTRIS
DECISION BELOW: 176 P3d 920
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 94,002
HOLDING BELOW:
The Kansas Supreme Court held that:
(1) as a matter of first impression, following attachment of Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, defendant's statements made to undercover
informant surreptitiously acting as an agent for the State are not
admissible at trial for any reason, including the impeachment of
defendant's testimony;
(2) admission of defendant's statements in violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights was prejudicial error; and
(3) res gestae was not an independent legal basis for admitting
evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether a criminal defendant’s “voluntary statement
obtained in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
[Sixth Amendment] right to counsel,” Michigan v. Harvey, 494
U.S. 344, 354 (1990), is admissible for impeachment purposes - a
question the Court expressly left open in Harvey and which has resulted
in a deep and enduring split of authority in the Circuits and state
courts of last resort?
Cert. Granted 10/1/2008
07-1529 MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA
DECISION BELOW: 974 So.2d 1238
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2006-KA-1807
HOLDING BELOW:
The Louisiana Supreme Court, Victory, J., held that:
(1) statements defendant made to police officers, after defendant
requested counsel and police terminated his interrogation and placed
him under arrest for murder, and then, a few minutes later, resumed
the interrogation after defendant requested to continue talking
to police, were admissible;
(2) defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent
and voluntary; and
(3) sentence of death for first degree murder was not constitutionally
excessive.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
When an indigent defendant’s right to counsel has attached
and counsel has been appointed, must the defendant take additional
affirmative steps to “accept” the appointment in order
to secure the protections of the Sixth Amendment and preclude police-initiated
interrogation without counsel present?
Cert. Granted 10/1/2008
07-9712 PUCKETT V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 505 F.3d 377
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-10543
HOLDING BELOW:
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
(1) district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
motion to withdraw guilty plea;
(2) plain error review governed defendant's forfeited contention
that government breached plea agreement at sentencing by opposing
any reduction for acceptance of responsibility;
(3) defendant failed to show that plain error was prejudicial;
(4) in calculating offense level for sentencing purposes, district
court did not err when it found defendant had not accepted responsibility
because of his subsequent criminal conduct; and
(5) district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim without a hearing.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
1. Did the Fifth Circuit violate the doctrines set forth in Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) when it applied a “plain
error” standard of review to Defendant’s appeal based
on the government’s admitted breach of the plea agreement
and Defendant did not object to said breach at the time of sentencing?
2. Even if “plain error” is the correct standard of
review when a defendant does not object at sentencing to the Government’s
breach of a plea agreement, did the Fifth Circuit err when it failed
to find “plain error” was established when the breach
of the plea agreement was admitted and the plea was obtained in
exchange for clear promises that the Government failed to keep?
Cert. Granted 10/1/2008
07-10441 CORLEY V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 500 F.3d 210
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 04-4716
HOLDING BELOW:
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
(1) defendant's confessions made outside six-hour statutory period
were voluntary;
(2) district court resolved disputed sentencing guidelines adjustment;
and
(3) district court unlawfully delegated its statutory obligation
to set schedule of restitution payments.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 — read together with Fed. R.
Crim. P. Rule 5(a), McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943),
and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) — requires
that a confession taken more than six hours after arrest and before
presentment be suppressed if there was unreasonable or unnecessary
delay in bringing the defendant before the magistrate judge.
Several United States Courts of Appeals have addressed this issue
and have issued conflicting decisions, and the panel in this case
was split two to one on the issue.
This Court granted certiorari to consider the issue in United States
v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994), but then resolved the case
on a separate “threshold” ground and expressly left
open “the subtle questions of statutory construction concerning
the safe harbor set out in § 3501(c).” Id. at 356.
Cert. Granted 10/1/2008
08-88 VERMONT V. BRILLON
DECISION BELOW: 2008 WL 681425
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2005-167
HOLDING BELOW:
The Vermont Supreme Court held that:
(1) delay of almost three years in bringing defendant to trial violated
his constitutional right to a speedy trial;
(2) when reviewing a trial court's decision on whether a defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Supreme
Court applies a clearly erroneous standard to the underlying facts
found by the trial court and reviews de novo the ultimate legal
question of whether the findings and underlying facts demonstrate
a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial, overruling State v. Beer, 177 Vt. 245, 864 A.2d 643, and
State v. Keith, 160 Vt. 257, 628 A.2d 1247; and
(3) demonstrating actual prejudice at trial is not a prerequisite
in all cases to finding a speedy-trial violation under the federal
constitution, overruling State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387, 750 A.2d
1002, and State v. Turgeon, 165 Vt. 28, 676 A.2d 339.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
1. Whether continuances and delays caused solely by an indigent
defendant’s public defender can arise to a speedy trial right
violation, and be charged against the State pursuant to the test
in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), on the theory that public
defenders are paid by the state (with a small “s”).
2. Whether the right to counsel, as established in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), should result in broader speedy trial rights
to indigent defendants than defendants who are able to retain private
counsel, such that only delays by private counsel get charged against
the defendant under the Barker v. Wingo test.
Cert. Granted 10/1/2008
07-9995 RIVERA V. ILLINOIS
DECISION BELOW: 879 N.E.2d 876
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 98609
HOLDING BELOW:
The Illinois Supreme Court held that:
(1) trial court failed to establish a prima facie case of either
gender or racial discrimination;
(2) trial court's error in denying defendant's peremptory challenge
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(3) trial court's Apprendi violation was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether the erroneous denial of a criminal defendant’s peremptory
challenge that
resulted in the challenged juror being seated requires automatic
reversal of a
conviction because it undermines the trial structure for preserving
the constitutional
right to due process and an impartial jury.
Cert. Granted 10/1/2008
08-108 FLORES-FIGUEROA V. UNITED STATES
DECISION BELOW: 274 Fed.Appx. 501
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-2871
HOLDING BELOW:
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that to convict defendant of
aggravated identity theft, the government was not required to prove
that defendant knew that the means of identification belonged to
another person.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether, to prove aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. §
1028A(a)(1), the
Government must show that the defendant knew that the means of identification
he
used belonged to another person.
Cert. Granted 10/20/2008
08-6 DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE V. OSBORNE
DECISION BELOW: 521 F3d 1118
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-35875
HOLDING BELOW:
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
(1) prisoner had due process right to post-conviction access to
biological evidence used to convict him for purpose of conducting
DNA testing;
(2) standard of materiality applicable to prisoner's § 1983
claim was no higher than a reasonable probability that, if exculpatory
DNA evidence were disclosed, prisoner could prevail in an action
for post-conviction relief;
(3) determination by state court in state post-conviction proceeding
that additional DNA testing would not conclusively establish prisoner's
innocence did not have preclusive effect;
(4) further DNA testing would be material;
(5) confessions during parole proceedings did not foreclose claim;
and
(6) further DNA testing could easily be performed without cost or
prejudice to the state.
QUESTION PRESENTED:
William Osborne was charged with kidnapping, sexual assault, and
physical assault. He had the assistance of a competent lawyer who
made a reasonable strategic decision to forgo independent DNA testing
of the state's biological evidence. He was convicted after an error-free
trial. Now, years later, Osborne has filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, seeking access to the biological evidence for purposes
of new DNA testing. The questions presented are:
1. May Osborne use § 1983 as a discovery device for obtaining
post-conviction access to the state's biological evidence when he
has no pending substantive claim for which that evidence would be
material?
2. Does Osborne have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause to obtain post-conviction access to the state's biological
evidence when the claim he intends to assert - a freestanding claim
of innocence - is not legally cognizable?
Cert. Granted 11/3/2008
Last updated
11/24/08 11:28 AM
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