Supreme Court Docket
Select Cases Pending Review by the U.S. Supreme Court
Last updated 08/20/2010
For a complete list of criminal cases on the Supreme Court docket go to the U.S. supreme court monitor at law.com
Bibliography:
<http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/>
Walker v. Martin, 09-996, cert. granted 6/21/2010
Questions presented: Under California state law, a prisoner who has “substantially delayed: filing his habeas petition may be barred from collaterally attacking his or her conviction. In federal habeas corpus proceedings, is such a state law “inadequate” to support a procedural bar because “1) the federal court believes that the rule is vague and (2) the state failed to prove that its courts “consistently” exercised their discretion when applying the rule in other cases?
Case below: 357 Fed. Appx. 793
Cullen v. Pinholster, 09-1088, cert. granted 6/14/2010
Questions presented: (1) Whether a federal court, on habeas review, may conclude that a state court’s adjudication of petitioner’s claim was unreasonable in light of facts that were available but not presented to the state court; and (2) whether Rompilla v. Beard,
545 U.S. 374, 380-81 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); and Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000) have modified the standard of review of claims of capital penalty phase IAC.
Skinner v. Switzer, 09-9000, cert. granted 5/24/2010
Question presented: May a convicted prisoner seeking access to biological evidence for DNA testing assert that claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, or is such a claim cognizable only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus?
Case below: 2010 WL 3380818 (5th Cir.)
Wall v. Kholi, 09-868, cert. granted 5/17/2010
Question presented: Whether a state court sentence-reduction motion consisting of a plea for leniency constitutes an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review,” 28 U.s.c. 2244(d)(2), thus tolling the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year limitations period for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition.
Decision below: 582 F.3d 147 (1st Cir. 2009)
Belleque v. Moore, 09-658, cert. granted 3/22/2010
Questions presented:
1. This Court established in Hill v. Lockhart the standard for assessing, in a collateral challenge, IAC based on guilty or no contest plea. In Arizona v. Fulminante, a direct appeal case, this Court reviewed all of the evidence presented at trial and held that the erroneous admission of a coerced confession at trial was not harmless.
A. If a collateral challenge is based on defense counsel’s decision not to move to suppress a confession prior to a guilty or no contest plea, does the Fulminante standard apply, even though no trial record is available for review?
B. Even if the Fulminante standard applies, is it “clearly established Federal law” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)?
2. In Moore’s underlying criminal case, he confessed to police that he personally shot the victim. He also confessed to two other people, and he ultimately pleaded no contest to murder. In his collateral challenge to his conviction, he alleged that his attorney should have moved to suppress the confession to police, but he offered no evidence that he would have insisted on going to trial had counsel done so. Did the Ninth Circuit err by granting federal habeas relief on Moore’s IAC claim?
Decision below: 574 F.3d 1092
Connick v. Thompson, 09-571, cert. granted 3/22/2010
Question presented:
Prosecutors in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office hid exculpatory evidence, violating John Thompson’s Brady rights. Despite no history of similar violations, the office was found liable under §1983 for failing to train deputy prosecutors. Inadequate training may give rise to municipal liability if it shows “deliberate indifference” and actually causes a violation. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 658, 689-911 (1978); Bd. Of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-07 (1997). A pattern of violations is usually necessary to show culpability and causation, but in rare cases, one violation may suffice. Bryan County, 520 U.S., at 409. The Court has hypothesized only one example justifying single-incident liability: a failure to train police officers on using deadly force. See Canton, 489 U.S., at 390, n.10. Does imposing failure-to-train liability on a district attorney’s office for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous culpability and causation standards of Canton and Bryan County?
Decision below: 578 F.3d 293
Harrington v. Richter, 09-587, cert. granted 2/22/2010
Questions presented: (1) In granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, did the 9th Cir. fail to give the state court judgment due deference and impermissibly enlarge the 6th Am. Right to effective assistance of counsel to require presentation of expert opinion testimony in virtually all cases? (2) Does AEDPA deference apply to a state court’s summary disposition of a claim, including a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)?
Decision below: 578 F.3d 944
Michigan v. Bryant, 09-150, cert. granted 3/1/2010
Question presented: Whether preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the perpetrator and circumstances of the shooting are nontestimonial because they were “made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” including not only aid to a wounded victim, but also the prompt identification and apprehension of an apparently violent and dangerous individual?
Decision below: 768 N.W.2d 65
08-1301 Carr v. United States
DECISION BELOW: 551 F.3D 578 (7th Cir. 2008)
HOLDING BELOW: Provisions of federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act that makes it a crime for sex offender registrants to travel to other states without registering at their destinations, 18 U.S.C. § 2250, may be applied to registrants whose travel was completed before law went into effect in 2006; statute does not require that defendant’s travel postdate act, any more than it requires that conviction of sex offense that triggers registration requirement postdate it.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
(1) May person be criminally prosecuted under Section 2250(a) for
failure to register when defendant’s underlying offense and
travel in interstate commerce both predated SORNA’s enactment?
(2) Does Ex Post Facto Clause preclude prosecution under Section
2250(a) of person whose underlying offense and travel in interstate
commerce both predated SORNA’s enactment?
